Com. v. Stanley, H. ( 2021 )

J-S06030-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HAKEEM STANLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 1308 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 17, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013370-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 26, 2021
Appellant Hakeem Stanley appeals from the order denying his timely
first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act 1 (PCRA). Appellant
argues that the PCRA court erred when it concluded that trial counsel was not
ineffective. Following our review of the record, we affirm on the basis of the
PCRA court’s opinion.
We adopt the PCRA court’s summary of the facts underlying this matter.
See PCRA Ct. Op., 6/17/20, at 1 (unpaginated). Briefly, on October 28, 2013,
a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm without
a license, carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S06030-21
Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime.2 The trial court
subsequently found Appellant guilty of persons not to possess firearms.3 That
same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of life imprisonment
without parole on the murder conviction and a consecutive term of five to ten
years of incarceration on the persons not to possess firearms conviction.
Sentencing Order, 10/28/13. The trial court imposed no further penalty on
the remaining charges. Id.
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, and on November 11,
2013, Appellant filed a timely direct appeal. On March 13, 2015, this Court
affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Stanley,
3535 EDA 2013, 2015 WL 7458667 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 13, 2015)
(unpublished mem.). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal that
was denied by our Supreme Court on October 26, 2015.
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on August 5, 2016. The
PCRA court subsequently appointed counsel, and counsel filed an amended
PCRA petition on November 25, 2017. In the amended PCRA petition,
Appellant asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for advising Appellant not
to testify at trial, failing to call alibi witnesses, and failing to subpoena
telephone records. Am. PCRA Petition, 11/25/17, at 4-26. The PCRA court
held a hearing on August 14, 2019. On June 17, 2020, the PCRA court filed
____________________________________________
2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 6106, 6108, and 907(a), respectively.
3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.
-2-
J-S06030-21
an order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and an opinion in support of the
order. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 2, 2020. The PCRA
court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. Did the PCRA court err, denying Appellant his rights under the
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, sec. 9
of the Pennsylvania Constitution when it found that trial
counsel did not ineffectively advise Appellant not to testify on
his own behalf?
2. Did the PCRA court err, denying Appellant his rights under the
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, sec. 9
of the Pennsylvania Constitution when it found that trial
counsel not ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for trial
resulting in alibi and telephone evidence not being presented?
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered).
Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the well-
reasoned conclusions of the PCRA court, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA
court’s opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 6/17/20, 1-24 (unpaginated). We agree
with the PCRA court that Appellant has not established his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See id. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
-3-
J-S06030-21
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/26/2021
-4-
Circulated 06/29/2021 09:25 AM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY FILEC
TRIAL DIVISION —CRIMINAL SECTION
JUN 17 2020
PCRA Unit
CP Criminal Listings
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51 -CR-001 3370-2011
V.
HAKEEM STANLEY
ORDER
AND NOW, THIS 17TH DAY OF JUNE, 2020, PURSUANT TO THE POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF ACT, 42 PA.C.S.A. §9541, ET. SEQ., IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED AND DECREED THAT FOLLOWING A REVIEW OF THE PETITION AND
THE RECORD, THE PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS
DISMISSED,
PETITIONER HAS THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM TODAY'S DATE IN WHICH TO
FILE AN APPEAL FROM THIS DISMISSAL TO THE SUPERIOR COURV
Any notice of appeal should be sent to 1301 Filbert Street, Criminal Justice Center, Suite 206,
Philadelphia, PA 19107.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
TRIAL DIVISION —CRIMINAL SECTION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-C R-00'13370-2011
V.
HAKEEM STANLEY
OPINION
This Opinion is written in support of this Court's June 17, 2020 dismissal of
Hakeem Stanley's PCRA petition.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 22, 2013, Hakeem Stanley ("Stanley") elected to exercise his right to
ajury trial and pled not guilty to Murder of the First Degree (H1), Carrying Firearms
Without aLicense ("VUFA §6106") (173), Carrying Firearms on Public Property in
Philadelphia ("VUFA §6108") (M1), and Possession of Instrument of Crime ("PIC")
(M1). On October 28, 2013, the jury found Stanley guilty of these charges. Following
the jury verdict, the Commonwealth and Stanley stipulated to the fact that Stanley had
the requisite predicate offense for aconviction under VUFA §6105 and this Court
entered afinding of guilt on that charge. At the conclusion of the trial, this Court
sentenced Stanley to Life imprisonment without parole on the homicide charge and 5-
10 years of imprisonment on the VUFA §6105 charge, to run consecutively. He
received no further penalty on the remaining charges.
On November 11, 2013, Stanley filed aNotice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania and, on March 13, 2015, the Court affirmed his convictions and judgment
of sentence. Stanley filed aPetition for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which was denied on October 26, 2015.
On August 5, 2016, Stanley filed the instant, timely PCRA petition. The matter
was listed before this Court on March 10, 2017 and May 5, 2017 for status of counsel.
On May 5, 2017 and August 4, 2017, PCRA counsel sought extensions to file an
Amended Petition, which this Court granted. On November 25, 2017, counsel filed an
Amended Petition raising several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On
December 1, 2017, this Court continued the matter to March 16, 2018 for the
Commonwealth's response. On March 16, 2018 and June 29, 2018, the
Commonwealth sought extensions to file its response, which this Court granted. On
October 9, 2018, the Commonwealth filed its Answer, in which the Commonwealth was
unopposed to an evidentiary hearing on Stanley's claims of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel and was unopposed to Stanley subpoenaing certain phone records related to
the ineffectiveness claims. On October 19, 2018, this Court granted Stanley's request
to subpoena the T-Mobile cell provider records from September 11, 2011 for Stanley's
cell phone and Shaunta Byard's cell phone. On December 14, 2018 and February 8,
2019, this Court continued the matter for status of the outstanding T-Mobile cell phone
records. On February 15, 2019, Stanley confirmed that T-Mobile did not have any
records to produce in response to the subpoena. On April 5, 2019, counsel discussed
availability for ahearing date and, on April 23, 2019, an evidentiary hearing was
scheduled for August 14, 2019.
On August 14, 2019, this Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and continued
the matter to October 11, 2019 for the parties to submit written post-hearing argument.
On October 11, 2019, the Commonwealth submitted its post hearing brief and, on
October 14, 2019, Stanley submitted his post-hearing brief. The matter was first listed
before this Court for decision on November 22, 2019. On November 22, 2019, this
Court continued the matter to January 24, 2020 for review of the record. On January
24, 2020, Court continued the matter to March 20, 2020 for further review of the record.
On March 16, 2020, this Court sent Stanley a907 Notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
907(1). This Court did not receive any response to the 907 Notice. On June 17, 2020,
this Court dismissed the PCRA petition.
DISCUSSION
The standard applied when reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition is
whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the record evidence and is
free of legal error.' The PCRA court's factual determinations are entitled to deference,
but its legal determinations are subject to plenary review.Z The PCRA court's findings will
not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 3
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b), aPCRA petition, including second and
subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes
final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that his claim(s) fall under any
of the three enumerated exceptions to the one year requirement. These exceptions are
'Com. v. Had, 911 A2 939, 941 (Pa. Super, 2006).
2Com. v. Hawkins, 894 A,2d 716, 722 (Pa, 2006).
aCom. v. Had, 911 A.2d 939, 941 (Pa. Super. 2006).
interference by government officials', facts unknown and not discoverable by due
diligence 5.and newly recognized constitutional rights that apply retroactivelys.A
petition claiming one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty (60) days of the time
the claim could have been presented.r Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set
forth in Commonwealth v. Fahy8 that "a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does
not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits. "9
In the instant matter, Stanley's PCRA Petition was timely filed and asserted
various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review of the record, the
petition, and the submissions of counsel, this Court has determined that Stanley's
claims are without merit.
Under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are evaluated pursuant to the three-prong test set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Pierce'°, using the same standard as when such claims are
raised on direct appeal." Pierce established that ineffectiveness claims are measured
by both counsel's performance and the prejudice suffered by the petitioner.' 2 The law
presumes counsel to have been effective; thus, the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing the following three prongs: first, that the ineffectiveness claim has arguable
merit; second, that counsel's act or omission did not have areasonable basis; and third,
4 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(i).
542 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(ii).
G 42 Pa.C.S, 9545(b)(1)(iii).
T 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(2).
s737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999).
9 Id, at 223.
'0 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
'1 Cam. v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1999).
12 Com. v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987).
that the petitioner suffered prejudice on account of counsel's act or omission, 13 If it is
apparent that the prejudice prong has not been met, the first two prongs of the test need
not be determined. 14
In assessing the Pierce prongs related to counsel's performance, counsel's error
or omission "must have so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 1-
5 Counsel inherently has
broad discretion to determine the strategy employed, thus areview of counsel's act or
omission must determine whether counsel's decisions were reasonably designed to
benefit the client.l 5 A finding that achosen strategy lacked areasonable basis is not
warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered apotential
for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.l 7
In assessing the prejudice prong of Pierce, the petitioner must prove that he
suffered prejudice on account of counsel's decisions. "Prejudice" can be described as
whether, but for the arguably ineffective act or omission, there is areasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different. 18 In other words, the petitioner
must establish that counsel's actions prejudiced him to such an extent that areliable
determination of guilt was not made at trial. 19
13 ld.; see also Com. v. Breakiron, 729 A.2d 1088, 1101 (Pa. 1999).
14 Com, v. Jones, 683 A.2d 1181, 1188 (Pa, 1996).
' Com. v. Hawkins, 894 A.2d 716,722 (Pa. 2006) (citing Com. v. Allen, 732 A.2d 582,587 n.15 (Pa.
5
1999).
'6 Com. v. Fowler, 670 A.2d 153, 156 (Pa. Super 1996); Com. v. Polston, 616 A.2d 669, 677 (Pa. Super
1992).
"Corn. v. Howard, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 1998).
1e Com. v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. 1999),
'" Corn. v. Lassen, 659 A.2d 999, 1011 (Pa. Super 1995).
Claim 1— Trial counsel ineffectively advised Petitioner not to testifv on his own
behalf
Stanley avers that counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify on his
own behalf at trial. This Court disagrees. Our courts have long recognized that the
decision whether or not to testify rests solely with the defendant. 20 Such decision,
however, is to be made after full consultation with counsel. 2' In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the petitioner "must demonstrate either
that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that counsel gave specific advice so
unreasonable as to vitiate aknowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own
behalf. "22 As such, where counsel's advice to adefendant to not testify is reasonable,
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. 23
In the instant matter, trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing as to his
strategy in making representations regarding defense testimony and his assessment of
how the evidence had been presented to the jury at trial. Specifically, the transcript
reflects the following:
Q. Now, Mr. Stanley did not testify on his own behalf, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Did you and he discuss whether or not he should testify?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Do you have aspecific recollection as you sit here today of having that
discussion with him?
A. I'm sure Idid. I'm not specifically saying if we had the conversation. It's
apparent from the transcript that there was aconversation between him
and me before the court colloquized him,
Q. But sitting here today you can't tell us what the substance of that
conversation was?
20 Com. v. Wallace, 500 A.2d 816, 819 (Pa, Super. 1985) (citing Coin. v. Rawles, 462 A.2d 619, 624 n.3
(Pa. 1983)).
zi Coin, v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2040).
zz Corn. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa, 2000).
23 Com. v. Breisch, 719 A.2d 352, 355 (Pa.Super.1998).
A. Ican tell you from my training and experience the question was, you
have heard the testimony. You saw the direct examination. You saw the
cross-examination. He was extremely pleased with that. We discussed
whether or not he should take the stand and the determination was made
that he should not take the stand.
Q. Do you recall telling him that the cross-examination had gone in so well
you didn't think it was necessary for him to testify?
A. Idon't know whether or not Itold him the cross-examination went so
well. Isaid that the manner in which the case had gone in, meaning how it
was developed, there was agood opportunity that the jury would believe
that there was sufficient reasonable doubts. That's what Ispoke to him
about, yes.
Q. What testimony specifically had gone in so well that you felt confident
enough that he didn't need to testify?
A. Well, in reviewing the transcript Ithink Ilaid out 31 reasonable doubts
and that the jury had difficulty coming to adecision as you're well aware.
Q. And did you ever advise Mr. Stanley that his prior convictions could be
used against him if he took the stand?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Do you have aspecific recollection as you sit here today of going
through his criminal conviction record with him prior to making that
decision?
A. Irepresented him prior to this case.
I
... I
Q. Were any of Mr. Stanley's prior convictions crimen falsi?
A. Other than reviewing what Ihave reviewed and knowing what the
transcripts and the prior documents revealed, Ibelieve there is just one
unauthorized use of an automobile, but that's only as aresult of reviewing
the transcript and the dockets prior to coming in here today.
C. .l
Q. Prior to the trial beginning you had already made the determination that
Mr. Stanley should not testify; is that correct?
A. That's absolutely incorrect.
Q. Well, did you tell the court prior to the trial that you didn't believe that
Mr. Stanley would be testifying?
A. That was abelief.
Q. And what was that belief based on?
A. That probably astrategy in terms of Ididn't want the prosecution to
know whether he was or was not.
Q. So even if he was going to testify, you would always tell the court in
advance he's not going to testify?
A. Possibility because the court also knows that at any time the individual
can testify.xd
21 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 28-32.
This Court found trial counsel to be credible in his testimony and such testimony
supports afinding that trial counsel's advice to Mr. Stanley was reasonable.
Further, this Court conducted an extensive colloquy of Stanley regarding his
decision not to testify. For ease on review, this Court has included the relevant portion
of the trial transcript as follows:
THE COURT:] And so it becomes that point of the trial, Mr. Tinari, and Ido
know that before we had begun trial that you did let me know that you
didn't anticipate that your client would exercise his right to testify, but this
is the time where we now make that determination and Ido ask those
questions of Mr. Stanley.
MR. TINARI: Thank you, Your Honor. The defendant and Ihave
discussed this matter and he's prepared to be colloquized regarding his
desires, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stanley, you are sworn in. You were sworn in
when we first arraigned you. So when Iask you these questions, you're
under oath. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor,
THE COURT: All right. Now, Ibelieve that Mr. Tinari has told me that it will
be your decision that you do not wish to testify. Is that accurate?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it's accurate. Iwish to use that right.
THE COURT: To remain silent?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Now, will there be arequest for that jury
instruction, Mr. Tinari, that we generally give when adefendant exercises
his right to remain silent? The jury instruction, Igenerally give it. Let me
read it. It's right here. The jury instruction that we give, Mr. Stanley, if it's
requested is the defendant's decision to remain silent. It is entirely up to a
defendant in every criminal trial whether or not to testify. Defendant has an
absolute right founded on the constitution to remain silent. You must not
draw any inferences of guilt or any other inferences adverse to a
defendant from the fact that he did not testify. Mr. Tinari, will there be a
request to have that charge read?
MR. TINARI: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And so, Mr. Stanley, do you understand that when
you do exercise this right not to testify that there is that jury instruction
that's given?
THE DEFENDANT; Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, Ido have some questions for you to make sure
that this is your decision and that you're doing it voluntarily and that
nobody is forcing you into it. All right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: How old are you as you sit here today?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm twenty-nine.
THE COURT: And are you under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, any
medications at all?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And in the last week or so have you taken any medications?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And have you ever been treated for any kind of mental
health problems, anything that would affect your ability to understand
anything that's going on here?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, do you understand that you do have an
absolute right to get on the stand and give testimony on your own behalf?
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ido, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you, conversely, have an absolute right to remain silent
and that Iwill read that instruction that I've told you. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT; Yes, Your Honor,
THE COURT: Now, have you had achance to speak to Mr. Tinari about
what your rights are, what the implications are of all of it, and kind of get
his advice as an attorney based on all of these things?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. He's kept me well informed.
THE COURT: All right. But do you understand that in the end, this
decision whether to get on the stand and testify or the decision to remain
silent, that is adecision that is yours and yours alone? Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now, has anyone forced or threaten you in any
way to get you to make this decision to remain silent?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now, what will happen is my understanding is, Mr.
Tinari, when the jury comes back tomorrow morning that the
Commonwealth has already rested. I'll look to you and my understanding
is is that you're going to rest.
MR. TINARI: That's correct.
THE COURT: And that there will not be any additional. Ithink you referred
to exhibits, but Idon't know if there were any exhibits that were actually
admitted. Ithink Iheard everything went through the Commonwealth's
exhibits; is that right?
MR. TINARI: That is accurate. We had discussions about the preliminary
hearing notes, but they were not identified nor moved into admission.
THE COURT: All right. And so there will be no witnesses, from what I
understand, that will be presented on Mr. Stanley's behalf; is that right?
MR. TINARI: That is accurate, Your Honor. At the moment that we rest
tomorrow, we'll be prepared to go forward with the Court's instructions
concerning closings.
THE COURT: All right. And so, Mr. Stanley, do you understand that what
Mr. Tinari is going to do, that he'll stand up, he'll rest, that the lawyers will
move right into their closing arguments which will be your lawyer, Mr.
Tinari, going first followed by the District Attorney? Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ido, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, were there any witnesses or any information that you
had wanted Mr. Tinari to present on your behalf that it's your
understanding that he will not present?
THE DEFENDANT: Oh, no. There's no witnesses, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, is there any further colloquy or questions from
either counsel with regards to Mr. Stanley's rights to remain silent?
MR. MACARTHUR: No, Your Honor.
MR, TINARI: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Iam satisfied that Mr. Stanley is exercising his right. He's
doing it voluntarily and having an opportunity to discuss it with his lawyer,
and that he has made this decision to remain silent. Now, Mr. Stanley, you
have up until the time that Mr. Tinari starts with his, you know, says Irest
to change your mind. I'm not suggesting that you should. I'm just letting
you know that. But if you do change your mind, you need to tell Mr. Tinari
before he says the words Irest. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Because if you don't and he says Irest and we move on to
do the arguments, that your right to get on the stand and testify has been
waived. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 25
in assessing the exchange between this Court and Stanley, this Court has relied upon
the Superior Court holding in Commonwealth v. Wallace. 26 In Wallace, the defendant
was given amuch more abbreviated colloquy regarding the defendant's decision not to
testify than that in the instant matter; however, the Court nonetheless determined that
the defendant had "knowingly and voluntarily decided not to testify at trial. "2' Moreover,
the Wallace Court noted that while "trial counsel urged his considered professional
26 N.T.10/23/2013 at 177-183.
26 Com. V. Wallace, 500 A.2d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. 1985).
27 COm. V. Wallace, 500 A.2d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. 1985).
opinion on his client, [the defendant] was apparently satisfied with this advice until the
jury rendered an adverse verdict" and that "given the appellee's extensive juvenile
record, it can hardly be said that he was naive or unfamiliar with the criminal justice
system. "28 Akin to Wallace, Stanley had also had contact with the criminal justice
system in which he was previously represented by Mr. Tinad and Stanley indicated
during this Court's colloquy that Mr. Tinari had kept him "well informed" and that he did
not wish to testify on his own behalf. Accordingly, upon review of the record and the
relevant caselaw, this Court has determined that Stanley's decision not to testify on his
own behalf was knowingly and voluntarily made and the instant claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel lacks merit.
Claim 2— Trial counsel failed to adequateiv prepare for trial
Stanley asserts that his counsel was ineffective for his failure to adequately
prepare for trial. He has identified four areas of alleged unpreparedness, discussed
below, which constitute his claims of ineffectiveness. This Court has found that all of
Stanley's claims lack merit.
A. Time spent with Stanley before trial
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly opined that "by itself, the amount of
time an attorney spends consulting with his client before trial is not alegitimate basis for
inferring the total extent of counsel's pre-trial preparation, much less the adequacy of
21 Com. v. Wallace, 500 A2d 816, 619-20 (Pa. Super. 1985).
counsel's preparation, 9 The shortness of time which counsel spends consulting with
his client does not alone establish ineffective assistance and petitioner bears the burden
of proving his counsel's ineffectiveness, for counsel's stewardship is presumed to be
effective. 30 Stanley claims that trial counsel only met with him one time prior to trial and
that counsel was never available to accept his phone calls; however, the testimony from
trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing refutes this assertion. Counsel knew Stanley
and his family after having represented Stanley in other matters and described the
relationship positively, further noting communication by telephone and letter.
Specifically, trial counsel's testimony provided:
There were many phone calls that Mr. Stanley made to the office that we
had conversations. We had agood relationship, had agood relationship
with the family. Asking me specifically what particular day and what
month, Ican't.
I...1
BY MS. HIMEBAUGH:
Q. Do you have aspecific recollection of having been on the phone with
Mr, Stanley?
A. Absolutely.
Q. How many times prior to the trial?
A. Many times.
Q. Would you have any notes reflecting anything about those
discussions?
A. Idon't have my file. If Ihad my file they may have some reflection of
telephone conversations, but Inormally don't do that. Idon't write down
every telephone call because Idon't charge by the hour.
Q. But would you write down the substance of the telephone calls?
A. Sometimes Ido and sometimes Idon't.
Q. Do you have any recollection of having written down anything
substantive from any of the phone calls from Mr. Stanley?
A. The answer is no. Ido not have aspecific recollection as to date or
time and the length of time or conversations.
Q. Now, were there occasions when Mr. Stanley called your office but he
was unable to reach you and had to leave messages with your secretary?
A. Probably that occurred, sure.
29 Com. v. Mason, 741, A,2d 708, 715 (Pa. 1999) (citing Coin, v. Bundy, 421 A.2d 1050, 1051 (Pa.
1980)),
30 Com. v. Thomas, 539 A. 2d 829, 837 (Pa. Super 1988).
Q. And would you get those messages?
A. I'm certain Iwould at the end of the day.
Q. And do you have arecollection of having received any letters from Mr.
Stanley?
A. I'm sure he sent me letters.
Q. Do you have arecollection of having received any?
A. Idon't have my file. If Ihad my file, Icould certainly tell you if he sent
the letters and my responses to his letters. 31
Moreover, the record reflects that beyond the cross-examination of Commonwealth
witnesses, trial counsel presented adefense witness, and litigated motion submissions
by the Commonwealth. Trial counsel testified that approximately 90% of his practice is
in homicide defense and counsel was very much aware of the applicable rules and
procedures about which he was questioned in the course of his testimony. Having
presided over both the trial and the instant PCRA proceeding, this Court determined
that trial counsel was sufficiently prepared for trial and thus, Stanley's instant claim of
ineffectiveness based on time spent before trial lacks merit.
B. Trial counsel failed to timely give notice of an alibi defense and to
interview/call Kareem Webb and Lauren Crawford as alibi witnesses
In order to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call awitness,
the petitioner must demonstrate that (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was
available; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of the existence of the witness; (4)
the witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony
was so prejudicial to petitioner to have denied him or her afair trial. 32 With regard to an
alibi witness, our courts have held that trial counsel's failure to call such witness is not
31 N.
T.811412019 at 21-23.
32 COM. v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 302 (
Pa. 2011).
per se ineffective assistance of counsel. 33 Rather, the petitioner "must establish that
defense counsel knew of the existence of the alibi witness and that the alibi testimony
would have been beneficial to his or her case. "34 Ineffectiveness will not be found
where there is areasonable basis for counsel's decision based on amatter of trial
strategy, 36 The courts of this Commonwealth have long held that weaknesses in an
alibi, as presented by an alibi witness, would sustain areasonable belief by counsel that
its presentation would not have aided the defense at trial. 36
The record from the evidentiary hearing supports afinding that trial counsel was
never given the names of Kareem Webb or Lauren Crawford as persons who could
present alibi testimony. Trial counsel testified that he was not given the names and that
he knew the procedure for noticing alibi testimony as well as the potential for requesting
that such evidence be permitted by the Court permit, even if untimely. Specifically, the
direct examination of trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing provided as follows:
[BY MS. HIMEBAUGH]
Q. Would you consider an alibi an important defense to present if you
have evidence of it?
A. If it's credible. 37
Q. If you intend to assert an alibi defense, when must the alibi notice be
filed in order for it to be timely?
A. Sure. If you're aware of aviable, truthful alibi witness, you must file it
within the time period. Ithink at that time it was ten days. And if you don't
have that information at that time, it becomes discoverable later on even
prior to trial and ask leave of the court to permit to present an alibi in the
interest of justice. 38
[. .]
33 Com. V, MUMS, 418 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1980) (citing Com. v. Owens, 312 A.2d 378, 381-382
(Pa. 1973) and Com. v. 0livencia, 402 A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. Super, 1979)).
34 Com. V. Williams, 418 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1980).
35 Cam. v. Olivencia, 402 A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. Super. 1979),
36 Com. U. Owens, 312 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. 1973); Com. v. Oiivencia, 402 A.2d 519, 523-24 (Pa. Super.
1979),
37 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 13:7-9.
36 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 14;14-23.
Q. Do you ever affirmatively ask the client when you first meet them, do
you have any alibi witnesses?
A. Sure. We go through that entire list. Is there anybody there that can put
you someplace else other than at the scene of the crime, yes or no? If
yes, who is it? Where is it ?39
Q. Have you ever failed to file atimely alibi notice?
A. Timely?
Q. Yes,
A. Imay have.
Q. Do you have aspecific recollection as you sit here today of having
done so?
A. If aclient who had requested and told me about an alibi witness that
was credible and Ifailed, 1would bring it to the court's attention at some
point in time and then ask the court to permit me to call that witness, but I
don't have any recollection of any alibi witness if Iever used one other
than the couple times that Ispoke to you about that acourt denied me. I
would have known that, denied the testimony. 40
1. .]
Q. Okay. Do you recall Mr. Stanley ever telling you that he wasn't even at
the scene of the crime?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall Mr. Stanley telling you that he had an alibi that he was
with Kareem Webb and Mr, Webb's fiancee Lauren Crawford?
A. Never gave me those names.
Q. Never gave you those names or you don't recollect he gave you those
names?
A. Never gave me those names for any alibi.
Q. So you're absolutely positive you have the one recollection of this case
and that was that he never gave you those names?
A. We're talking about an alibi and that's what you're asking me to refresh
my recollection. He never gave me names of those two people as to being
witnesses."
[... ]
Q. If you had been told say that Friday before the Monday about Kareem
Webb and Lauren Crawford being alibi witnesses, could you have still
gone to the judge and asked to allow them to be witnesses?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Would alibi evidence have possibly helped you establish that the
Commonwealth had not proven Mr. Stanley's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt?
A. if credible and truthful. 42
39 N.T. 8114/2019 at 15:19-24.
40 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 16:10-24.
41 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 24:8-23.
42 N,T. 8/
14/2019 at 27:8-16.
Trial counsel was clear in his understanding of the relevant procedure, he
acknowledged the potential benefit of an alibi defense "if credible and truthful", and he
credibly asserted that he was never provided the names of the two alibi witnesses that
Stanley references in the instant petition.
While Stanley further presented his own testimony and the testimony of Kareem
Webb and Lauren Crawford at the evidentiary hearing to support his ineffectiveness
claim, this Court found such testimony to be wholly incredible. Mr. Webb and Ms.
Crawford averred that they were available and willing to testify at the trial and, if called,
would have testified that, on the day that Alonzo Dennis was shot and killed, Stanley
had come to their house at 52nd Street and Harlan Street in the late afternoon. They
further provided that between 6:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. the three of them walked to and
from asoul food restaurant at 52nd Street and Girard Avenue to order and pick up their
dinner. This testimony, even if believed, does not remove Stanley from the scene of the
shooting, as Alonzo Dennis was shot outside of adeli at 52nd Street and Master Street
shortly after 7:00 p.m. that evening.
Moreover, despite being close friends of Stanley and despite knowing that
Stanley had been arrested for the murder of Alonzo Dennis even though he was
purportedly with them at the time of the shooting, neither Mr. Webb nor Ms. Crawford
made any attempt to give their version of events to the police or to trial counsel. Mr.
Webb testified at the evidentiary hearing that he attended every day of the trial, except
for the last day, and that he was present for this Court's ongoing discussions with
Stanley and with trial counsel and heard them both indicate that no further witnesses
would be called. Mr. Webb further testified that he was the person who brought an
issue of witness sequestration to trial counsel's attention in the middle of trial.
Specifically, the record from the evidentiary hearing provides:
THE COURT: And Iasked him questions about, in fact on the transcript
there is four pages of it, and he stood up and told me there was no
witnesses, that he didn't want to call anybody. And you didn't have a
conversation with Mr. Tinari, who would be sitting right there where Ms.
Himebaugh is, of why isn't somebody going to be calling him? You didn't
have that conversation with Mr. Tinari right there?
THE WITNESS: Ma'am, Idon't know what conversations he had with --
THE COURT: You're saying you didn't say anything to Mr. Tinari right then
when you're sitting in the courtroom with your good friend and hear --
THE WITNESS: I'm the one that pointed out to Mr. Tinari that the witness
was sitting in the room, so if he called, if Iwas asked --
THE COURT: Yeah, but you pointed out that that was the witness in the
room, but you never pointed out to Mr. Tinari that you could put Mr.
Stanley not at the scene of the crime.
THE WITNESS: Iwould assume whatever conversations that he had with
his lawyer would have been brought back to me. I've spoke to Hakeem to
let Hakeem know. Ididn't know Iwould have to speak to his lawyer about
that. Iwould assume that that would be something that would be brought
to my attention.
THE COURT: But you would point out that there was awitness in the
room that shouldn't be for sequestration? You point that out to Mr. Tinari,
but not point out that you could put Mr. Stanley in aspot where he wasn't
at the shooting?
THE WITNESS: Iassume he told his lawyer that 1was awitness, ma'am.
So if his lawyer did not contact me to bring me in for questioning the same
way that way that this young lady's lawyer did, this young lady did, how
would Iknow? I'm not alawyer. Idon't know what these proceedings and
stuff is. A3
THE COURT: So the conversation comes back to if you went through all
of that why I'm sitting here, why wouldn't you tell Mr. Tinari that you have
information? You had now sat through the witness who is saying he shot
him at this time. Why wouldn't you tell Mr. Tinari at that time, hey, it
couldn't have been him because he was with me? Idon't understand why
you wouldn't say that. If you would say that there was somebody in the
courtroom that shouldn't be in the courtroom, why wouldn't you say, that
couldn't be Mr. Stanley because he was with me? Idon't understand why
you wouldn't.
THE WITNESS: Well, because if you blurt it out in the courtroom from my
understanding --
43 N.T. 8/
14/2019 at 58-59.
THE COURT: Well, you blurted it out that there was somebody in the --
THE WITNESS: Ididn't blurt it out.
THE COURT: Then why couldn't you have the same kind of conversation
with Mr. Tinari about you being the person that could give him an alibi in
the same manner that you said there was somebody in the courtroom that
shouldn't be in the courtroom? Idon't understand.
THE WITNESS: When Ihad the conversation and Isaid something to his
mother and when we went outside and they had the break and we went
outside, from my understanding Mr. Tinari knew he had some kind of
witness. From whatever Mr. Tinari and his client, Hakeem Stanley,
discussed or whatever their game plan was or whatever they were trying
to do in that trial, Idid not have no control over that. So as far as my
understanding, he knew. 44
Mr. Webb's explanation as to why he would alert trial counsel to the presence of a
witness in violation of sequestration, but not alert trial counsel to having an alibi for
Stanley was not credible to this Court. The trial record supports the fact that Mr. Webb
was clearly able to convey important communications to trial counsel, as evidenced by
trial counsel requesting asidebar to address the sequestration issue and the
subsequent Rule 104 hearing conducted by this Court. Accordingly, this Court has
found his testimony regarding his inability to communicate with trial counsel unavailing.
Upon further questioning by this Court, Mr. Webb's testimony took adrastic shift
seemingly because he realized that he was supposed to say that he had told trial
counsel that he could provide alibi testimony for Stanley. Specifically, the record from
the evidentiary hearing provides:
THE COURT: Iunderstand. I'm just asking you, you never said anything to
anyone except for when Ms. Himebaugh's investigator came to talk to
you?
THE WITNESS: No, his lawyer -- from my understanding, his lawyer knew
he had awitness beforehand.
THE COURT: No. I'm asking when you told anyone at any time, the only
time you told anyone.
THE WITNESS: When we were all in the hallway, Itold him that the
witness was sitting inside of the room.
41 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 84-88.
THE COURT: No. That you never told anyone that you could be an alibi
for Mr. Stanley, the only time you told anyone was to Ms. Himebaugh's
investigator?
THE WITNESS: No, that's not the only time. Ijust said when we were in
the hallway.
THE COURT: When are the other times? What hallway?
THE WITNESS: After, before the recess, before you came -- before we
came back in from break.
THE COURT: You told Mr. Tinari then that you were an alibi?
THE WITNESS: Yes, so you know we alibis, this and the third. Whatever
he decided to do is whatever he decided to do.
THE COURT: So now that's different than what we heard before. So he's
now saying not only did he talk about --
THE WITNESS: We never even got into aconversation about the hallway.
THE COURT: He's not -- okay. There is aconversation in the hallway that
we haven't heard about, because the conversation about the
sequestration of the witness happened in the courtroom. So you need to
ask about when this conversation happened with Mr. Tinari.
MS. OSBORNE: Yes, Your Honor.
BY MS. OSBORNE:
Q. Mr. Webb, are you now saying that you did tell Mr. Tinari that you were
an alibi witness?
A. We were in the hallway. After Ipointed out the witnesses in the
courtroom and his mother or whoever at the time, because Idon't recall
because it was like Isaid, you in the courtroom and you blurt up you can
get locked up. So after she called break and the recess and we went out
there and once again Isaid, hey, the guy Terrell, this that and the third,
that's the guy that's one of the witnesses. Well, no, I'll make sure that Igo
back in there. Well, you know if you need me or Lauren, we're here.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. Well, Igot this and Ineed this and it's too much reasonable doubt and
this that and the third, and like Isaid, whatever he, now knowing this
conversation once it goes back, he steps off to the side and he's talking to
them, probably talking to Hakeem's mom about the witness and whatever
he can do from there. That's the conversation that he had with his mom.
Q. Sir, don't say this that and the third. Specifically when you said, Me and
Lauren are here if you need us, did you say because Hakeem was with
me during the shooting?
A. Yes, If you need me, if you need us, we were here. He was with us. If
you need us, we're here. So if you need us to go on the stand, we're here
because he was with us.
Q. And is that the first time you said that to Mr. Tinari?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did he say to you?
A. Igot this in the bag. He's too much -- something about too much
reasonable doubt and this that and third. Sorry, Ididn't mean to say this,
that and the third. He said it's too much reasonable doubt within this case,
that Ihave this.
Q, And why didn't you tell that to Her Honor on direct examination or in
your affidavit?
A. What do you mean direct examination?
Q. This is the first time we're hearing about this conversation, so I'm
confused why you didn't tell Teri that on direct, why you didn't tell the
judge that in your affidavit. This is the first time we're hearing about this
conversation.
A. Because in the affidavit they were asked to explain my night, what me
and him were doing that day, Iwasn't asked any questions that what I'm
being asked right now.
Q. But it's fair to say you did bring up the sequestration in your affidavit?
A. What is asequestration? Can you explain that to me? Idon't know what
Q. The part where you said that there was awitness in the courtroom.
A. Yes.
MS. OSBORNE: Okay. No further questions. 45
Mr. Webb's testimony rapidly transpired from him believing that trial counsel knew about
his alibi testimony and not being able to alert counsel of his availability and willingness
to testify to asserting that he directly told trial counsel about his alibi for Stanley out in
the hallway during trial. Having heard this progression of testimony and assessing the
candor of the witness, this Court found Mr. Webb's account of events to be wholly
incredible.
Finally, Stanley testified about being with Mr, Webb and Ms. Crawford on the
night that Alonzo Dennis was fatally shot outside of the dell at 52nd Street and Master
Street. Akin to the testimony of Mr. Webb and Ms. Crawford, Stanley's own testimony
did not remove him from the area of 52nd Street and Master at the time of the shooting,
as his account also placed him in the vicinity of the deli while walking to and from a
restaurant to order and pick up dinner. Stanley indicated that he had told trial counsel
about Mr. Webb, but not Ms. Crawford; however, such claim is unsupported by the
45 N.T. 8/14/2019 at 82-83.
record. The colloquy from the trial indicates that Stanley knowingly made his decision
to not call any further witnesses for the defense and Stanley's own pro se PCRA petition
initiating the instant proceeding made no mention of Mr. Webb and/or Ms. Crawford. In
consideration of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and the full record in
this matter, this Court has determined that Stanley has failed to establish the
performance related prongs of Pierce and, as such, this Court need not address any
alleged prejudice. Accordingly, Stanley's claim of ineffectiveness related to trial
counsel's failure to call Mr. Webb and Ms. Crawford as witnesses does not warrant
relief and must be dismissed.
C. Trial counsel failed to subpoena the cell phone records of Petitioner and
Shaunta Byard
Stanley avers that trial counsel's failure to subpoena his cell phone records and
those of Shaunta Byard was ineffective assistance because the Commonwealth's case
against him "hinged on establishing his alleged motive" for shooting Alonzo Dennis and,
therefore, presenting the jury with the absence of cell phone communication between
Stanley and Byard would have weakened the Commonwealth's case and the jury
verdict would have been different. Given the body of evidence presented at trial, this
Court finds Stanley's averments unpersuasive in its assessment of the purported
prejudice suffered on account of trial counsel's performance and/or decision, as
required by Pierce.
Our Supreme Court has long held that the determination of "prejudice" is
whether, but for the arguably ineffective act or omission, there is areasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different. 46 In other words, the petitioner
must establish that counsel's actions prejudiced him to such an extent that areliable
determination of guilt was not made at trial. 47 Here, the Commonwealth established the
familial relationship between Stanley and Byard and the events leading to the
altercation between Byard and Dominick Simpson on September 11, 2011. As stated
by this Court in its 1925(a) Opinion:
The testimony of Tyrell Herbin and Dominic Simpson established
that Simpson had been arguing with Herbin's neighbor, Shaunta Byard.
Initially, Byard yelled at Herbin's son, Quamir, to stop fighting with her son
because if he didn't, she would call her son's older cousins to come and
rough him up. Simpson responded to Byard's comment by stating that
Quamir had cousins too. The argument continued with Byard stating that
she would "get somebody to fuck him up" and Simpson responding that he
would "get his girl to fuck her up."48 Shortly thereafter, Herbin, his son
Quamir, Simpson and [Alonzo] Dennis walked up Harlan Street to the deli
at 52nd and Master Street and saw Stanley —Byard's cousin —walking
toward Byard's house on the other side of the street. The men went into
deli, purchased beer, exited, and as they were leaving Herbin peripherally
saw an arm raise up to the back of Dennis' head and heard the shot.
Dennis immediately dropped to the ground and Herbin and Simpson saw
Stanley run up Master Street toward 53 111 Street. Both Herbin and
Simpson gave statements to police and identified Stanley as the shooter. 4g
The Commonwealth further presented the jury with aYouTube video establishing
evidence of motive. The video portrayed Stanley rapping and, most poignantly, talking
about his rap career and the change it had made in his life. The relevant portion of the
video that was played for the jury was read into the record by the prosecutor, as follows:
ft's, quote: If you wanna rap, go ahead and rap and do everything you're
supposed to do. But if you wanna be out here on the streets, Idon't want
to do this shit. Do you feel what I'm saying? Running up and down these
streets doing all this shit. If you still want to be out here, you might as well
delete your Twitter and just go run around shooting niggas, beating niggas
48 COM. v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. 1999).
41 COm. v. Lassen, 659 A.2d 999, 1011 (Pa. Super 1995),
48 N.T. 10122/2013 at 200:16-18.
49 April 1, 2014 1925(a) ©pinion at 11.
up, taking shit from niggas. You know what I'm saying? The shit touched
me so Ifelt like this is the change. Do you feel what I'm saying? For Kill
Keem.
And then his friend says: But don't get it fucked up.
And the defendant says, quote: Don't get it fucked up. Don't get it fucked
up. Because if you try to harm me or anyone in my family or stop me from
getting my money, like, feel me, I'm still him but I'm smart now. 5Q
Stanley's own words illustrated that he was moving on from the street life in pursuit of
his rap career; however, he made it explicitly clear that if someone were to harm him or
his family or prevent him from getting him from getting his money, he was still that
person involved in the street life. These words were extremely probative in the instant
case, as the shooting at issue stemmed from an earlier series of threats exchanged
between Simpson and Byard —Stanley's cousin —and an earlier scuffle between
Byard's son and Quamir. Moreover, the Commonwealth established that the video was
uploaded to YouTube on September 17, 2011, which was six days after the murder of
Alonzo Dennis.
While Stanley avers that the potential for trial counsel to have been able to show
an absence of communication between Stanley and Byard during the relevant time
period would have changed the outcome, this Court cannot agree. The Commonwealth
presented multiple eyewitness accounts of the initial altercation between Simpson and
Byard, established the familial connection between Stanley and Byard, presented video
footage of Stanley himself saying that he was moving on from the street life, but that "if
you try to harm me or anyone in my family or stop me from getting my money, like, feel
me, I'm still him but I'm smart now" which was put on the internet only days after the
10 N.T. 10/21/2013 at 216-217,
shooting, and presented two eyewitness identifications of Stanley as the shooter.
Despite trial counsel's tremendous effort to outline points of reasonable doubt for the
jury, the overwhelming body of evidence demonstrated Stanley's guilt. Moreover, the
fact that Stanley coincidentally did not preserve any of his own cell phones showing this
proffered absence of communication diminishes the authenticity of his argument. As
such, this Court has determined that Stanley failed to show that trial counsel's failure to
subpoena phone records prejudiced him to such an extent that areliable determination
of guilt was not made at trial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon this Court's independent review of the record, r: -tition, and the",;
I
submissions of counsel, this Court concludes that Stanley's cl im
M not , arrant relief).
Carpen i- r,
First Judicial District of Pennsylvania
Honorable Linda A. Carpenter
294 City Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Commonwealth v. Hakeem Stanley
CP-51-C R-0013370-2p 11
Date: June 17, 2020
PROOF OF SERVICE
Ihereby certify that Iam this day serving the foregoing upon the person(s), and in the manner
indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 114:
Defense Counsel/Party: Hakeem Stanley/ MU-4853
SCI-Coal Township
1Kelley Drive
Coal Township, PA 17866
Teri B. Himebaugh, Esq.
1400 Spring Garden Street, #911
Philadelphia, PA 19130
Type of Service: ()Personal (X )First Class Mail ()Other, please specify:
District Attorney: PCRA Unit
District Attorney's Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Type of Service: ()Personal (X )First Class Mail ()Other, please specify:
net Brinkman