-
J-S14041-21 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: M.A.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: A.D., FATHER : : : : : : No. 41 MDA 2021 Appeal from the Decree Entered November 24, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2020-00149 BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2021 A.D. (“Father”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“Agency”) to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his dependent child, M.A.M. (“Child”) (a female born in June 2018), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).1 We affirm. In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the procedural background from the juvenile court proceedings, which we adopt as if set forth fully herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 1-3. Briefly, Child was born in June 2018, and the Agency filed a Petition for temporary custody on July 2, 2018. Father’s ____________________________________________ 1 In a separate Decree, entered on the same day, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, Y.-W.A.M., (“Mother”) to the Child. Mother has not filed a brief in Father’s appeal, nor has she filed an appeal from the Decree terminating her parental rights. J-S14041-21 status as Child’s biological father was unknown at the time. Mother did not contest the factual basis for Child’s dependency. Child was ultimately declared dependent in August 2018, and a permanency plan was put in place. Father was identified as Child’s Father in September 2018. In December 2018, the court approved a revised child permanency plan, which included objectives for Father. At the time, Father resided in Georgia. In May 2019, a Recommendation – Permanency Review Order noted minimal compliance by Father with Child’s permanency plan and stated that Father had made no progress towards eliminating the circumstances that necessitated Child’s placement. A subsequent Recommendation – Permanency Review Order found moderate compliance with the permanency plan and moderate progress in alleviating the circumstances that led to Child’s Placement on Father’s part. Father was still living in Georgia at the time. An Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children2 (“ICPC”) request was in progress at the time for the ____________________________________________ 2 An ICPC has been described as follows: As drafted, the [ICPC] provides for notification of appropriate state or local authorities in the receiving state before placement by out- of-state persons and agencies. The authorities in the receiving state are given the opportunity to investigate, and if satisfied, must notify the sending state that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the child’s interest. After a placement has been made, the sending state continues to have financial responsibility for support and retains jurisdiction over the child. McComb v. Wambaugh,
934 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 62 P.S. § 761;
55 Pa. Code § 3130.41. -2- J-S14041-21 child welfare agency in Georgia to assess Father’s home.3 Father moved back to Pennsylvania in January 2020. A third Recommendation – Permanency Review Order was issued in June 2020, which found minimal compliance by Father and minimal progress in alleviating the circumstances that led to Child’s placement. On January 22, 2020, the Agency filed a Petition to terminate Father’s parental rights based on 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). On February 10, 2020, Agency caseworker Ludie Louis Juste (“Ms. Juste”) served Father with the Petition. On August 20, 2020, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the termination Petition. The Agency’s counsel, Tamara Hogan, Esq., was present, as were Father and his counsel, Catherine Roland, Esq. (“Attorney Roland”), and Gina Carnes, Esq., who served as both guardian ad litem and legal interest counsel (“GAL/legal interest counsel”) for Child. Allison Wright, Esq. (“Attorney Wright”), represented Mother, who was not present. Attorney Wright requested to withdraw as Mother’s counsel, which the trial court granted. N.T., 8/20/20, at 4. The Agency first presented the testimony of Bobbi Leiphart (“Officer Leiphart”), an adult probation officer for York County who supervised Father between March 10, 2020, when Father was charged with a second driving under the influence (“DUI”) offense, until August 20, 2020, when Father was sentenced for the DUI offense. Id. at 5-6. Officer Leiphart testified that ____________________________________________ 3 A total of three ICPC approval requests were submitted in this matter. -3- J-S14041-21 Father was sentenced to five years’ probation, followed by 135 days on house arrest, and a $1,500 fine. Id. at 6. She further testified that Father had been wearing a SCRAM continuous alcohol monitoring bracelet, which is a device worn on an individual’s wrist that senses the person’s alcohol intake through means of a thermal detection in the skin, since he was released on bail in March 2020. Id. Next, the Agency presented the testimony of Ms. Juste, who was assigned to Child’s case. Id. at 9. Father then testified on his own behalf. Id. at 47. The trial court continued the hearing to September 17, 2020. At the hearing on September 17, 2020, Mother was not present. Attorney Roland continued her direct examination of Father. N.T., 9/17/20, at 4. Subsequently, counsel for the Agency conducted cross-examination of Father, as did the GAL/legal interest counsel. Id. at 9, 27. Attorney Rolland then questioned Father on re-direct examination. Id. at 31. The trial court ably set forth the factual history and made findings of fact based upon the testimonial and documentary evidence at the dependency/permanency review hearings and the termination hearings, which it found credible. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 5-12. We adopt those findings as though they were fully set forth herein. See id. We provide the following summary of the trial court’s findings of fact. Father was identified as the Child’s biological father in September 2018 and was living in Georgia at that time. The first ICPC was denied because Mother was living with Father and one of Father’s sons; the second ICPC was rejected because Father had moved after the ICPC was requested; and the -4- J-S14041-21 third ICPC was denied due to the high level of alcohol in Father’s system. Father completed a drug and alcohol evaluation in Georgia in September 2019, and it was recommended that Father attend outpatient substance abuse treatment. Father informed the Agency that he was told he did not need services. When the Agency received a copy of the evaluation, the recommendation for treatment had been erased by the provider. Father was charged with DUI in 2010. Father was charged with a second DUI on February 2, 2020. Father remains in denial about his issues with alcohol. Father underwent a second drug and alcohol evaluation in May 2020, and the report recommended outpatient drug and alcohol treatment and recommendations for group and individual therapy. Father failed to provide requested drug screens on three occasions and tested positive for marijuana on four occasions. Father had three visits with Child in 2019. Father had four visits with Child in 2020, before the COVID-19 pandemic forced in-person visits to cease. Father did not have any virtual visits with Child during the COVID-19 shutdown, which extended through June 2020. In-person visits resumed on June 30, 2020. Father has a total of seven children. He has had varying levels of involvement in their respective lives, ranging from living with Father on and off throughout the child’s life to having little contact with Father, depending on the status of Father’s relationship with each child’s mother. -5- J-S14041-21 Finally, Child has resided in the same home since birth, and the home is a potentially permanent home for Child. There are two other children in the home, which Child interacts with as siblings. Child looks to the resource parents for comfort, nurturing, and parenting and refers to them as “mommy and daddy.” Following the August 2020 hearing, the trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Father timely filed a Notice of Appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In his brief on appeal, Father raises four issues, as follows: I. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in finding that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence under 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511(a)(1) that Father evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to [Child] or refused or failed to perform his parental duties for a period of six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of the Petition[,] where Father at all times desired to exercise his parental claim to [Child] and was not provided the opportunity to perform his parental duties? II. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in finding that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence under 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511(a)(2) that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity caused the Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for the Child’s physical and mental wellbeing[,] when Father was never provided the opportunity to show the Agency that he did not have an incapacity and that he could provide essential parental care, control and subsistence necessary for the [Child’s] physical and mental well- being? III. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in finding that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence under 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511(b) that it is in the Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights? -6- J-S14041-21 IV. Was Father denied his Fourteenth Amendment Rights to not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor to be denied the equal protections of law? Father’s Brief at 3-4.4 In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard: [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., []
9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S.,
36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) [(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., …
34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely,
838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court ____________________________________________ 4 In the Statement of Questions Involved, Father included a fifth issue challenging whether he was denied his right to competent representation by legal counsel, but Father withdrew that issue. See Father’s Brief at 4. -7- J-S14041-21 and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio,
650 A.2d 1064, 1066 ([Pa.] 1994). In re Adoption of S.P.,
47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J.,
985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). Moreover, as we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’”
Id.(quoting In re J.L.C.,
837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will address subsections 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b), which provide as follows: § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of -8- J-S14041-21 relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. *** (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (b). With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as follows: Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M.,
708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988). Further, this Court has stated that the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and -9- J-S14041-21 consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination. In re B.,N.M.,
856 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). In Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court reiterated the standard with which a parent must comply in order to avoid a finding that he abandoned his child. A parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect and support his child and to make an effort to maintain communication and association with that child.” Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (quotation omitted). “Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.” Id. In his first claim, regarding 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), Father argues that the trial court erred in failing to examine the totality of the circumstances of the case and to consider his explanations regarding his efforts to parent Child. Father’s Brief at 11. Father argues that there were significant delays in this case, such that the court’s focus should not have been on the six-month period prior to the filing of the termination Petition on January 22, 2020, i.e., July 22, 2019. Id. at 12. Father states that he took immediate steps to parent Child after learning that he was Child’s father, but his efforts had already been significantly delayed by the Agency’s slowness to identify him and the significant delays in the ICPC process. Id. He claims that the record indicates that the Agency did little, or nothing, to move the process along. Id. at 13. - 10 - J-S14041-21 Specifically, Father asserts that during the six-month period, he was working on the child permanency plan and waiting for the ICPC investigations to be completed. Id. at 12. Father asserts that his second ICPC investigation request was rejected on August 30, 2018 because he had moved after the request was made. Id. Father complains that he had made the Agency caseworker aware of his change in address, and the caseworker failed to notify the Georgia agency. Id. Father contends that it was the Agency’s duty to report his address change to the Georgia agency, but the Agency failed to do so. Id. Father posits that his request might have been granted but for the Agency's failure to inform the Georgia agency that he had moved. Id. Father argues that this delay and subsequent denial of his ICPC request should not be held against him, as the Agency is statutorily required to assist parents in gaining the return of their children. Id. Additionally, Father contends that, because he was committed to obtaining custody of Child, he requested a third ICPC investigation. Id. Father complains that his third request was denied because he tested positive for alcohol on the day when the Georgia caseworker came to assess his home in August 2020. Id. Father also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that he evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights despite his sincere efforts to parent Child. Id. at 13. Father asserts that the evidence that he did not have a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights to Child include that he moved to York, Pennsylvania, to be near Child; he - 11 - J-S14041-21 immediately secured employment and housing; and he visited with Child and maintained regular contact with the resource parents through Zoom and e- mail. Id. Father states that, in addition to Child, he has six other children, and he has taken responsibility for all of them. Id. Father states that most of his other six children have lived with him for periods of time, and that two are in college, for whom he continues to take responsibility. Id. Moreover, Father avers that his rights to his other children have not been terminated. Id. The trial court addressed Father’s issue regarding section 2511(a)(1) as follows: There are two pathways to the establishment of the Agency’s case under this subsection of the statute. The statute requires the Agency to prove that during a period of more than six months prior to the filing of the Agency’s termination of parental rights petition Father demonstrated EITHER a settled purpose or intent to relinquish a parental claim OR a failure to perform parental duties. In the instant case, the record supports this court’s finding of facts sufficient to determine that Father, by his inaction, followed the second of these pathways to the inescapable conclusion that Father’s parental rights should be terminated. Father learned that he was a parent to [Child] in the summer of 2018. (Finding of Fact 10.) That condition was conclusively proven through paternity testing, the results, of which were known on September 12, 2018. (Finding of Fact 11.) Measured from the date that Father knew unquestionably that he was a parent to [Child,] to the date that the Agency’s [P]etition was filed (January 22, 2020), a period of more than fifteen months elapsed during which Father did not perform any parental duties toward [Child]. - 12 - J-S14041-21 Father was granted [the] Child’s [p]ermanency [p]lan at the permanency review hearing held before a master on December 19, 2018. Measured from that date, more than a year elapsed during which Father did very little to address the objectives of his plan. As th[is] Court has explained: “There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of a child. Thus, [the Superior Court] has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty, which requires affirmative performance. … Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d [at 855][.] For a period of six months preceding the filing of the Agency’s [P]etition to terminate parental rights, Father took no affirmative steps to perform parental duties. He made no effort to maintain the parent-child relationship. “Although the six- month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition is most critical to the analysis, the court must consider the whole history of the case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.” In re K.Z.S.,
942 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008)[.] Father took no steps to be a parent from the summer of 2018 and those efforts were spotty at best. Grounds for the termination of Father’s parental rights under [section] 2511(a)(1) have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 15-17 (emphasis in original). The trial court’s determination that Petitioners satisfied the requirements of section 2511(a)(1) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826- 27; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We adopt the discussion set forth in the trial court Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 15-17. - 13 - J-S14041-21 In his second claim, regarding section 2511(a)(2), Father argues that Child was placed in the Agency’s custody because Mother could not care for her. Father’s Brief at 14-15. Father asserts that the record indicates that he had housing and income throughout the case; he has six other children and has had a parental role in their lives; he co-parented with the mothers of his other children; and, upon learning about Child's existence, he took immediate steps to unify and be a parent to her. Id. at 15. Father states that these facts contradict the Agency’s argument that Father is incapable of parenting Child. Id. Father contends that there were delays in his being able to parent Child, attributing some of the delays to the Agency’s failure to move the case along, some to the COVID-19 pandemic, and some to his own conduct. Id. Father claims, however, that the record does not show he has a lack of parental capacity, or that he cannot or will not meet Child’s needs. Id. To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well- being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P.,
825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are - 14 - J-S14041-21 not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D.
797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). The trial court addressed Father’s second issue, regarding 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), as follows: The Agency has the burden to prove three elements under this subsection of the statute: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental well-being; and (3) the cause of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P.,
825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Under [section] 2511(a)(2)[,] the focus is on the child’s present and future need for essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental well-being. In re E.A.P.,
944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted and internal quotations omitted). In the present case, Father never has had physical custody of [Child]. He has done little to assert that he was a willing and able parent from the inception of the case. Father has never provided any care for [Child]. He has not demonstrated the parental care necessary for [Child’s] physical and mental wellbeing to flourish. By his own history of his parenting of his other children as he related it, Father is an “on and off” parent. Father’s history gives rise to concerns that he would ever be capable of providing for [Child’s] future needs for essential parental care, control, or subsistence. He only recently began to address the objectives contained in [Child]’s Permanency Plan, despite the fact that the plan was in place since December 19, 2018. Father’s only measurable efforts toward his objectives took place after Father was served with the Agency’s [P]etition to terminate his parental rights to [Child]. Father’s efforts are indubitably too little and too late. Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 17-18. - 15 - J-S14041-21 The trial court’s determination that Petitioners satisfied the requirements of section 2511(a)(2) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826- 27; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We adopt the discussion set forth in the trial court Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 17-18. In his third claim, regarding section 2511(b), Father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agency proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no bond between Child and him. Father’s Brief at 15. Father asserts that a bond exists between Child and him, and that Ms. Juste testified that Child smiles and laughs with Father at visits. Id.at 16. Additionally, Father argues that there were delays that negatively impacted his access to Child, including the delay in formally identifying him as Child’s father, the lengthy ICPC process, and the distance between his home and Child’s placement until Father relocated to York, Pennsylvania. Id. Father urges that the COVID-19 pandemic also restricted his in-person visits with Child, since virtual visits were necessary for safety of all involved, but they impacted his ability to strengthen his bond with Child. Id. Father also complains that there was no testimony, other than that of Ms. Juste that Child would suffer from being placed in Father’s care. Id. This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G.,
956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. - 16 - J-S14041-21 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows: [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M.,
53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [
620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M.,
53 A.3d at 791. In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P.,
994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted). A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis: concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. … Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood. - 17 - J-S14041-21 In re K.K.R.-S.,
958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-64 (affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M.,
856 A.2d at 856(internal citations omitted). This Court has explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In re Z.P.,
994 A.2d at 1121. It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well- being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G.,
956 A.2d at1007 (citing In re Z.S.W.,
946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)). The trial court addressed Father’s issue regarding 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) as follows: The court must next determine whether terminating Father’s parental rights to [Child] will best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of [Child]. See[] 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re G.M.S.,
884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005)[.] An examination of the parent-child bond is required, where the court must assess the effect upon the child of severing that bond. Expert testimony is not required. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d [at] 533 …. - 18 - J-S14041-21 [Child], who was born [in June 2018], is now more than two[-]and[-a-]half years of age. Father is, for all purposes, a stranger to her. Father’s lack of interest was amply demonstrated by his minimal efforts to maintain contact with [Child] long before the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted in-person visitation. Under these circumstances, it is fully evident that [Child] has no bond with Father at all which would be severed by the termination of Father’s parental rights. [Child] deserves permanency. [Child] deserves a nurturing, loving, and stable home. [Child] presently enjoys a home possessing these characteristics with the resource family, which is a potentially permanent resource for her[,] and which is the only family [Child] has ever known. There is no doubt that [Child]’s removal from this home would be highly traumatic and damaging to her psychological and emotional health. In summary, [Child]'s best interests are served if she remains with her resource family and is freed to be adopted into that family. Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 18-19. The trial court’s determination that Petitioners satisfied the requirements of section 2511(b) is supported by competent evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We adopt the discussion set forth in the trial court Opinion with regard to Father’s third issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/21, at 18-19. In support of his fourth issue, Father argues that the termination of his parental rights under section 2511(a) and (b) was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, such that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional due process right to parent Child, despite his efforts to parent her and the significant delays in the reunification process. Father’s Brief at 10, 16-17. - 19 - J-S14041-21 As we have determined that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b), the trial court did not deny Father’s constitutional right to raise Child. We find that his constitutional argument lacks merit. Accordingly, as we find that the trial court did not commit an error of law or an abuse of discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b), we affirm the trial court Decree. Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 07/27/2021 - 20 - Circulated 07/06/2021 12:14 PM
Document Info
Docket Number: 41 MDA 2021
Judges: Musmanno
Filed Date: 7/27/2021
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2024