Com. v. Wolowski, B. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A11030-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    BRANDON LEE WOLOWSKI                       :
    :
    Appellant               :         No. 940 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 23, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0000151-2013
    BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                     FILED: JULY 27, 2021
    Appellant, Brandon Lee Wolowski, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, following
    his jury trial convictions for one count each of first-degree murder, attempted
    criminal homicide, and aggravated assault, and two counts of robbery.1 We
    affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:
    Factual History
    On January 8, 2013, Michelle Powell went to the grocery
    store with a friend. Subsequently, Ms. Powell returned
    home to 905 Fayette Street in the City of Washington,
    Washington County, where she resided with her boyfriend,
    Matthew Mathias. [Appellant], who lived nearby, came over
    to visit Ms. Powell and Mr. Mathias. The three of them talked
    ____________________________________________
    1  18 Pa.C.S.A.       §§   2502(a),     901(a),    2702(a)(1),   and   3701(a)(1)(i),
    respectively.
    J-A11030-21
    for a little while before [Appellant] offered to get Ms. Powell
    and Mr. Mathias some crack cocaine to smoke. [Appellant]
    left for approximately twenty minutes before returning with
    the drugs. [Appellant] gave Ms. Powell and Mr. Mathias the
    crack which they smoked in the kitchen. While they were
    smoking, [Appellant] drew a handgun and pointed it at Ms.
    Powell’s face. [Appellant] indicated that he wanted Mr.
    Mathias’s guns. At first, Ms. Powell and Mr. Mathias believed
    it to be a joke, but [Appellant] stated, “This is not a fucking
    joke, I want the guns.”
    [Appellant] told them to get him the guns and told Ms.
    Powell to flip the lights on and off. [Appellant] then pointed
    the gun back at Ms. Powell’s face and told Mr. Mathias to get
    the guns. Mr. Mathias then ran out of the kitchen and down
    the hallway at which point he entered the computer room.
    [Appellant] ran after Mr. Mathias and Mr. Mathias left the
    computer room and ran out the front door. Ms. Powell
    observed [Appellant] shooting at Mr. Mathias as he was
    running down the hallway and out the front door. Ms. Powell
    ran to the front door in an attempt to lock it shut, but the
    dead bolt was open. As Ms. Powell attempted to lock the
    front door, [Appellant] pushed his way back inside the
    home. While Ms. Powell was hiding behind the front door,
    [Appellant] was shooting at her. Ms. Powell attempted to
    use the front door to shield herself, but [Appellant] pulled
    the door back and shot her in the face. As Ms. Powell
    begged him to stop, [Appellant] told her that he was going
    to kill her.
    [Appellant] then fled from the scene and Ms. Powell ran out
    the front door and across the street seeking help. She was
    bleeding profusely from her face due to the gunshot wound.
    Across the street, Ms. Powell encountered the neighbor[,
    John Lytle,] and asked him to call 911. [Mr. Lytle] then took
    Ms. Powell into his home, located at 916 Fayette Street,
    Washington. Sergeant Carl Martin of the City of Washington
    Police Department received a report of shots fired and a
    person injured in the West End of the city. At 916 Fayette
    Street, Sergeant Martin found Ms. Powell who was suffering
    from an apparent gunshot wound to the side of her face as
    well as her wrist/hand area. Ms. Powell gave Sergeant
    Martin a general description of the shooter and indicated
    that his name was Brandon. Ms. Powell indicated that she
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    could not remember his last name, but it was a funny last
    name or a street last name. Ms. Powell described the
    shooter as a white male with dark hair.
    After spending approximately three to five minutes with Ms.
    Powell, Sergeant Martin proceeded to Addison Street after
    having been informed that [Appellant] had gone into the
    rear apartment at 808 Addison Street. Sergeant Martin and
    his fellow officers approached the door to the apartment,
    knocked on the door and asked for Brandon to open the
    door. When the door was finally opened, police found
    [Appellant] and two other individuals in the apartment.
    [Appellant] was kept at the apartment for approximately 45
    minutes prior to being transported to the police station
    where he was interviewed by detectives. During this time,
    [Appellant] was asking questions about the investigation
    and was “Mirandized”[2] at which time he acknowledged that
    he understood his rights.
    Sergeant Chris Luppino of the City of Washington Police
    received a call at 7:30 P.M. that there was a deceased
    victim, Mr. Mathias, on scene and that Ms. Powell was being
    taken by ambulance to Washington Hospital. Sergeant
    Luppino left his residence and went directly to the
    emergency room at Washington Hospital. Upon arriving at
    the hospital, Sergeant Luppino observed gunshot wounds to
    Ms. Powell’s face, chest, and arm. Ms. Powell told Sergeant
    Luppino that she was shot by an individual named Brandon,
    who she described as having dark hair, skinny, and
    approximately 19-years-old. Ms. Powell informed Sergeant
    Luppino that [Appellant] had come to Mr. Mathias’s home to
    rob him of his guns. She further related that [Appellant]’s
    mother’s name was Bee McMasters and his girlfriend,
    Candy, just had a baby.
    Lieutenant Daniel Stanek of the City of Washington Police,
    the lead investigator, was called to duty around 7:30 P.M.
    on January 8, 2013. Lieutenant Stanek first went to the
    police station before proceeding to the scene of the crime,
    905 Fayette Street. After being briefed at 905 Fayette
    Street, and at 808 Addison Street, where [Appellant] was
    ____________________________________________
    2 Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L.Ed.2d 694
     (1966).
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    arrested, Lieutenant Stanek proceeded to the city police
    station where [Appellant] had been detained. Prior to
    interviewing    [Appellant],   [Appellant]   was      again
    “Mirandized,” acknowledged his understanding of his rights
    and agreed to give a recorded statement. [Appellant] then
    confessed that he had been at 905 Fayette Street that night
    and that he had shot both Mr. Mathias and Ms. Powell.
    [Appellant] confessed that he had went to the residence to
    rob Mr. Mathias of his firearms which he planned to sell to
    obtain money. [Appellant] went on to confess that he had
    been planning to commit the robbery for several days and
    that he believed he might have to shoot both victims.
    Procedural History
    On February 11, 2013, the Washington County District
    Attorney’s Office filed a criminal information charging
    [Appellant with criminal homicide, attempt to commit
    criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and 2 counts of
    robbery].
    On February 13, 2013, Glenn Alterio, Esquire of the
    Washington County Public Defender’s Officer entered his
    appearance on behalf of [Appellant]. On February 19, 2013,
    the District Attorney’s Office filed notice of aggravating
    circumstances, notifying [Appellant] of the Commonwealth’s
    intention to seek the death penalty. …
    On August 2, 2013, [Appellant] filed a handwritten petition
    asking for Attorney Alterio and the Public Defender’s Officer
    to withdraw and for the trial court to appoint new counsel.
    On September 4, 2013, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition
    for habeas corpus. On September 26, 2013, [Appellant]
    again acting pro se, filed an amended petition to have the
    Public Defender withdraw and to have the trial court appoint
    counsel. On October 8, 2013, [Appellant] filed an amended
    petition for habeas corpus as well as a motion to suppress
    evidence.
    On October 15, 2013, Attorney Alterio presented a petition
    to withdraw his appearance and that of the Public Defender’s
    Office and the trial court scheduled a hearing for October
    31, 2013 on the matter. During that hearing, the trial court
    indicated it would take [Appellant]’s petition under
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    advisement as the court had to consider the limited number
    of death penalty qualified attorneys available. Attorney
    Alterio continued his representation and, on February 20,
    2014, presented a petition to retain an expert witness.
    Additionally, Attorney Alterio presented a petition seeking
    release of [Appellant]’s records from the Juvenile Probation
    Department of Washington County and the Child & Youth
    Social Service Agency of Washington County.
    The court authorized the payment and retention of a
    psychiatrist or psychologist for the defense and ordered
    Washington County Juvenile Probation to release records of
    any mental health treatment, or any other treatment,
    pertaining to [Appellant] while under their supervision. The
    trial court further ordered that it would conduct an in camera
    review of [Appellant]’s Child and Youth Service files to
    determine whether the files contained any relevant
    mitigation information. On April 29, 2014, the trial court
    additionally granted [Appellant]’s request for new counsel
    and permitted the Public Defender’s Officer to withdraw so
    that Noah Geary, Esquire, who was death penalty qualified
    at the time, could enter his appearance.
    During a status conference held September 5, 2014, the
    trial court granted defense counsel’s request for a
    continuance to secure the services of a psychiatrist or
    psychologist as well as to review the pro se petition for
    habeas corpus and motion for suppression filed by
    [Appellant]. On April 15, 2015, the trial court, at the
    request of the defense, ordered [Appellant] be transported
    to Torrance State Hospital for up to ninety (90) days to have
    his mental health evaluated.
    Following the suppression hearing conducted on November
    8, 2016, per agreement of the Commonwealth and the
    defense, the trial court agreed to conduct an in camera
    review of [Appellant]’s recorded confession and the
    preliminary hearing transcript. On February 17, 2017, the
    trial court entered an order denying [Appellant]’s petition
    for habeas corpus as well as the motion to suppress. On
    April 18, 2017, the trial court entered a case management
    order setting jury selection to begin August 7, 2017, and the
    jury trial to begin August 21, 2017.
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    At the status conference conducted August 1, 2017,
    Attorney Geary, for the first time, requested that co-counsel
    be appointed in accordance with the American Bar
    Association Guidelines. At that time, and leading up to that
    point, defense counsel had represented that [Appellant]
    would most likely accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer to
    avoid the death penalty and a mandatory life sentence
    without parole.    Defense counsel represented that co-
    counsel was necessary as a precaution to counsel
    [Appellant] regarding the plea offer. The defense then
    asked the trial court to re-schedule jury selection and trial.
    …[T]he court, on August 22, 2017, entered an order
    appointing Jeremy Davis, Esquire as co-counsel, who was
    death qualified. Although Attorney Geary claimed he could
    work with Attorney Davis, he ultimately refused to do so due
    to Davis’ distant familial relation with a retired Fayette
    County judge, against whom Attorney Geary had filed a
    lawsuit. In this regard, on September 12, 2017, Attorney
    Geary presented a motion for re-consideration of
    appointment of co-counsel. On September 18, 2017, per
    Attorney Geary’s request, the trial court vacated Attorney
    Davis’s appointment and appointed Thomas Farrell, Esquire
    as co-counsel. On October 16, 2017, the trial court entered
    a case management order setting jury selection to begin
    April 23, 2018 and the trial to begin May 21, 2018. On
    December 4, 2017, Attorney Geary filed a petition for
    recusal, which the trial court denied. On December 19,
    2017, the trial court denied [Appellant]’s request to amend
    the order denying recusal so that he could seek an
    interlocutory appeal.
    On March 8, 2018, upon consideration of [Appellant]’s
    application for a stay of the proceedings, the trial court
    ordered that jury selection and trial be continued. On April
    10, 2018, the trial court issued a new case management
    order for jury selection to begin September 24, 2018 and
    trial to begin October 29, 2018.         On June 4, 2019,
    [Appellant] filed an omnibus pre-trial motion challenging his
    arrest as well as a Rule 600 motion. On July 26, 2018, the
    trial court denied [Appellant]’s Rule 600 motion and
    scheduled a hearing on his omnibus pre-trial motion. On
    August 2, 2018, despite having been appointed on
    September 18, 2017, Attorney Farrell first entered his
    appearance. The court conducted a hearing on [Appellant]’s
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    omnibus pretrial motion on August 2, 2018, which continued
    over into August 6, 2018. On September 7, 2018, a revised
    omnibus pre-trial motion and brief in support of that motion
    was filed by the defense.       After consideration of the
    testimony and the briefs of the defense and the
    Commonwealth, on September 14, 2018, the trial court
    issued its opinion and order denying said motion.
    On September 24, 2018, jury selection commenced. Jury
    selection was scheduled to take place through the end of
    September leading up to the trial date at the end of October.
    Although selection of the jury panel had nearly been
    completed and the trial date was nearing, due to the
    pendency of [Appellant]’s petition for review to the Supreme
    Court regarding recusal, [Appellant] and the Commonwealth
    jointly requested the court postpone the trial, which the
    court granted.
    Thereafter, on October 25, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a
    motion in limine to preclude expert testimony from Dr.
    Michael Crabtree for the defense. … On October 30, 2018,
    the defense filed a brief in opposition to the
    Commonwealth’s motion in limine to preclude testimony
    from Dr. Crabtree. On October 30, 2018, following a
    hearing on the record, the trial court granted the
    Commonwealth’s motion to preclude Dr. Crabtree’s
    testimony regarding the voluntariness of [Appellant]’s
    confession. …
    On February 19, 2019, jury selection began again with
    selection scheduled to take place through February and trial
    scheduled to begin on March 11, 2019. On March 8, 2019,
    the Commonwealth presented a motion in limine to preclude
    the testimony of an expert witness for the defense, Dr.
    [Robert] Levine. On March 11, 2019, the trial court issued
    its opinion and order addressing the expert testimony of Dr.
    Levine as well as re-visiting Dr. Crabtree’s testimony. The
    trial court again ruled that Dr. Crabtree could not testify as
    to the voluntariness of [Appellant]’s confession during the
    guilt phase. The court further precluded the testimony of
    Dr. Levine, finding that his report was not admissible under
    Rule 702.
    On March 11, 2019, [Appellant]’s multi-day trial began. At
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    the conclusion of the testimony, after deliberating on the
    guilt phase, on March 14, 2019, the jury found [Appellant]
    guilty of 1st Degree Murder, Attempted Homicide,
    Aggravated Assault, and two counts of Robbery. The jury
    then reconvened for the penalty phase. The Commonwealth
    presented the victim impact evidence. The Commonwealth
    offered the trial evidence in support of the aggravating
    factors, homicide committed in the course of a felony—
    Robbery, and placing another person in jeopardy—Michelle
    Powell. The Defense presented evidence of mitigating
    factors including Dr. Crabtree who offered expert testimony
    of [Appellant]’s mental health history, and his fetal alcohol
    syndrome. Dr. Crabtree opined that [Appellant] had an IQ
    of 93 indicating that [Appellant] was of average intelligence.
    [Appellant] also presented the testimony of his sister, who
    related    [Appellant]’s   family   history,   his   multiple
    placement[s] during his involvement with CYS and his
    involvement in the juvenile justice system.              After
    deliberation on the penalty phase, the jury found the
    existence of both aggravating factors, but found that the
    mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating factors.
    Accordingly, the jury returned a unanimous decision for a
    life sentence.
    On May 23, 2019, the trial court [sentenced Appellant to an
    aggregate term of life imprisonment, plus an additional
    twenty-two to forty-four years’ imprisonment.]
    … On June 21, 2019, [Appellant timely] filed his notice of
    appeal to the Superior Court from the judgment of sentence
    entered May 23, 2019. On July 3, 2019, the trial court
    ordered [Appellant] to file his concise statement of matters
    complained of on appeal. On July 24, 2019, the trial court
    granted Attorney Geary’s request for an extension to file the
    concise statement…. [Appellant filed his concise statement
    on August 9, 2019.]
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed June 12, 2020, at 1-13) (internal footnotes omitted).
    Appellant raises ten issues on appeal:
    1. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in denying the
    admission of a Present Sense Impression and Excited
    Utterance which proved that Appellant did not shoot
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    victim Powell?
    2. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in refusing to
    permit Appellant to impeach victim Powell during cross-
    examination with a prior inconsistent statement proving
    that her boyfriend, and not Appellant, shot her?
    3. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in refusing to
    permit Appellant to impeach the Lead Investigator’s
    testimony that Appellant was the sole suspect in the
    shooting with the 911 recording which proved that victim
    Powell’s boyfriend shot her, not Appellant?
    4. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in denying the
    admission of the observations by a witness of suspicious
    conduct of victim Powell’s son immediately after the
    murder?
    5. Did the [trial] [c]ourt commit reversible error by failing to
    permit Appellant to challenge the voluntariness of his
    confession to offer evidence of Appellant’s fetal alcohol
    syndrome, and intellectual disabilities at trial?
    6. Did Appellant produce evidence of the substantial
    appearance of personal animus of the trial judge against
    defense counsel to justify of his Recusal Petition?
    7. In conjunction with the above, did the [trial] [c]ourt
    prevent Appellant from producing evidence by refusing
    to permit a record to be made of the presentation of the
    Recusal Petition proceedings?
    8. In conjunction with the above, did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse
    its discretion in denying to recuse itself from this case?
    9. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in ruling that
    Appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause?
    10. Did the cumulative effect of all of the errors on
    evidentiary rulings deprive Appellant of a fair trial?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 7-9).
    As a preliminary matter, issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    -9-
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    statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. Commonwealth v.
    Castillo, 
    585 Pa. 395
    , 
    888 A.2d 775
     (2005). A Rule 1925(b) statement that
    is not specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issues the
    defendant      wishes   to   raise   on    appeal   may   also   result   in   waiver.
    Commonwealth v. Reeves, 
    907 A.2d 1
     (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied,
    
    591 Pa. 712
    , 
    919 A.2d 956
     (2007). Significantly:
    When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is
    appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When
    an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner
    the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is
    impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is
    pertinent to those issues. In other words, a Concise
    Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify
    the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no
    Concise Statement at all.
    Id. at 2.
    Instantly, in his brief on appeal, Appellant phrases his first issue as: “Did
    the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in denying the admission of a Present
    Sense Impression and Excited Utterance which proved that Appellant did not
    shoot victim Powell?” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). Appellant, however, failed to
    include this specific claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Rather, the seventh
    issue in Appellant’s concise statement reads as follows: “The trial [c]ourt erred
    by not admitting into evidence the 911 recording and the corresponding
    notes/transcript of the 911 Operator.” (Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement,
    filed 8/9/19, at 2). While Appellant might have intended for the seventh issue
    in his concise statement to address the first issue presented in his brief, this
    - 10 -
    J-A11030-21
    was not clear to the trial court. Instead, the trial court addressed the seventh
    issue presented in Appellant’s concise statement in terms of Appellant’s failure
    to authenticate the 911 phone call.            The trial court did not discuss any
    exceptions to the rule against hearsay in its analysis. As Appellant’s issue was
    not made clear to the trial court in a manner which allowed for the court to
    properly address it in its opinion, Appellant’s first issue on appeal is waived
    for purposes of our review. See Reeves, 
    supra.
    Similarly, Appellant failed to specify issues nine and ten in his Rule
    1925(b) statement. Thus, Appellant has also waived these issues for appellate
    review.3 See Castillo, 
    supra.
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant did not raise issue ten at all in his concise statement.      Appellant
    did not specify in his concise statement his ninth issue on appeal which states:
    “Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion in ruling that Appellant’s arrest was
    supported by probable cause?” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). Nevertheless, we
    note that the trial court seemingly discussed and disposed of this issue while
    addressing the fifth issue raised in Appellant’s 1925(b) statement, which
    stated more generically that “[t]he trial [c]ourt erred in denying [Appellant]’s
    Second Pre-Trial Motion, in its entirety.” (Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement
    at 1). In its analysis, the trial court explained that Appellant’s second pre-
    trial motion challenged, inter alia, the legality of his arrest, claiming it lacked
    sufficient probable cause. The trial court initially found that the motion was
    filed “five years too late,” per Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). (Trial Court Opinion at
    27). The court, however, looked beyond this procedural deficiency to
    determine that the issue lacked merit where the following evidence from the
    suppression hearings in August 2018 proved there was sufficient probable
    cause to arrest Appellant: (1) Sergeant Martin and Lieutenant Bradley’s
    testimony that Ms. Powell told them that the name of the man who shot her
    was Brandon; (2) Sergeant Martin’s testimony that Ms. Powell described the
    shooter as a white male with dark hair and explained that the shooter lived in
    the 800 block of Addison Street; (3) Sergeant Martin’s testimony that he was
    informed that Appellant was located at 808 Addison Street and, upon arriving
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    Appellant’s second through fifth issues concern the admission of
    evidence. “The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court
    and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting prejudice,
    constitutes reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Ballard, 
    622 Pa. 177
    , 197-
    98, 
    80 A.3d 380
    , 392 (2013), cert. denied, 
    573 U.S. 940
    , 
    134 S.Ct. 2842
    , 
    189 L.Ed.2d 824
     (2014).
    The term discretion imports the exercise of judgment,
    wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion,
    within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
    purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
    must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed
    to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
    actions. Discretion is abused when the course pursued
    represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
    judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
    applied or where the record shows that the action is a result
    of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
    Commonwealth v. Goldman, 
    70 A.3d 874
    , 878-79 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
    denied, 
    624 Pa. 672
    , 
    85 A.3d 482
     (2014). “To constitute reversible error, an
    evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial
    to the complaining party.”          Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
    57 A.3d 74
    , 81
    ____________________________________________
    at that location and being greeted by Appellant at the door, Sergeant Martin
    noticed Appellant matched Ms. Powell’s description; (4) Sergeant Manfredi’s
    testimony that one of his confidential informants (“CI”) told him that Appellant
    was in the apartment next to the CI’s on Addison Street and had admitted to
    shooting and/or killing somebody; and (5) Sergeant Manfredi’s testimony that
    he learned that the shooter’s name was Brandon and he was a white male.
    (Id. at 26-29). While Appellant has waived this issue on appeal for vagueness
    in his Rule 1925(b) statement, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and
    disposal of this issue as meritless.
    - 12 -
    J-A11030-21
    (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 
    619 Pa. 678
    , 
    62 A.3d 379
     (2013).
    In his second and third issues combined, Appellant argues the trial court
    abused its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to utilize the 911 phone
    call from Ms. Powell’s neighbor, Mr. Lytle,4 to impeach Ms. Powell and
    Lieutenant Stanek at trial. Regarding Ms. Powell, Appellant contends that,
    even if the 911 call did not qualify as substantive evidence, the call still should
    have been admitted as a prior inconsistent statement regarding who shot Ms.
    Powell. Appellant asserts the following exchange would prove that “someone
    other than [Appellant]” shot Ms. Powell:
    911 Operator: …[A]ny idea who did this?
    [Mr. Lytle]:     I—her—she said her—her boyfriend.
    911 Operator: What’s his name?
    [Mr. Lytle]:     What’s your boyfriend’s name?     (Inaudible
    response).
    [Mr. Lytle]:     Matthew.
    911 Operator: Where’s he at?
    [Mr. Lytle]:     Matthew Mathias.
    911 Operator: Matthew Mathias?
    [Mr. Lytle]:     Yes.
    (Appellant’s Brief at 21) (citing the Transcription of the 911 Call, dated
    1/8/13).
    ____________________________________________
    4 Mr. Lytle identified himself on the 911 call as his son-in-law, Bo Fleming.
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    Regarding Lieutenant Stanek, Appellant maintains he should have been
    permitted to utilize the 911 call to impeach Lieutenant Stanek where Appellant
    asserts Lieutenant Stanek’s testimony “clearly leads the jury to believe that
    Appellant was the only suspect.”     (Appellant’s Brief at 35).   Specifically,
    Appellant takes issue with the following testimony from Lieutenant Stanek on
    direct examination:
    The common theme throughout this was that the shooter
    had been identified by first name, and that first name was
    Brandon, and that had come from the officers who were
    arriving on scene who had talked with the surviving victim,
    Michelle Powell. They were telling me this—that, you know,
    it was Brandon.
    (Id. at 34) (citing N.T. Trial, 3/13/19, at 438).    Appellant avers that, in
    contrast to Lieutenant Stanek’s testimony, Appellant was not the only possible
    suspect where the 911 call “evidenced that [Mr. Mathias] shot [Ms.] Powell.
    Not…Appellant.”   (Appellant’s Brief at 35).   Appellant concludes this Court
    should overturn his convictions, vacate his judgment of sentence, and remand
    for a new trial. We disagree.
    The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide:
    Rule 613. Witness’s Prior Inconsistent Statement to
    Impeach; Witness’s Prior Consistent Statement to
    Rehabilitate
    (a) Witness’s Prior Inconsistent Statement to
    Impeach. A witness may be examined concerning a prior
    inconsistent statement made by the witness to impeach the
    witness’s credibility. The statement need not be shown or
    its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on
    request the statement or contents must be shown or
    disclosed to an adverse party’s attorney.
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    (b) Extrinsic     Evidence    of   a   Witness’s    Prior
    Inconsistent Statement. Unless the interests of justice
    otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior
    inconsistent statement is admissible only if, during the
    examination of the witness,
    (1) the statement, if written, is shown to, or if not
    written, its contents are disclosed to, the witness;
    (2) the witness is given an opportunity to explain or
    deny the making of the statement; and
    (3) an adverse party is given an opportunity to
    question the witness.
    This paragraph does not apply to an opposing party’s
    statement as defined in Rule 803(25).
    Pa.R.E. 613(a)-(b). “Our courts long have permitted non-party witnesses to
    be cross-examined on prior statements they have made when those
    statements contradict their in-court testimony.”                Commonwealth v.
    Carmody, 
    799 A.2d 143
    , 148 (Pa.Super. 2002).               “Such statements [are]
    known as prior inconsistent statements….” 
    Id.
     “A party may impeach the
    credibility of an adverse witness by introducing evidence that the witness has
    made one or more statements inconsistent with his [or her] trial testimony.”
    Commonwealth          v.   Bailey,   
    469 A.2d 604
    ,   611    (Pa.Super.   1983).
    Nevertheless, “[m]ere dissimilarities or omissions in prior statements…do not
    suffice as impeaching evidence; the dissimilarities or omissions must be
    substantial enough to cast doubt on a witness’ testimony to be admissible as
    prior inconsistent statements.” 
    Id.
     Additionally, “it must be established that
    the   witness,   in   fact,   made    the    allegedly    inconsistent   statement.”
    - 15 -
    J-A11030-21
    Commonwealth v. Woods, 
    710 A.2d 626
    , 630 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal
    denied, 
    556 Pa. 709
    , 
    729 A.2d 1129
     (1998).
    Instantly, regarding Appellant’s claims concerning Ms. Powell, the 911
    recording was comprised of communications between Mr. Lytle and the 911
    operator. Ms. Powell did not participate in the call. The following discussion
    occurred at sidebar concerning this issue:
    [Defense Counsel]: It’s a gentleman named John Lytle. He
    calls 911. This was provided to me by the Government in
    discovery. And he is with the witness and she’s bleeding.
    They are in his home. He is on the 911 call. The 911
    operator says, do we know who shot her. He says, who shot
    you. And you can hear her groaning in the background. And
    John Lytle says, her boyfriend. The 911 operator said, what
    is his name. John Lytle says what is your name. Matthew,
    Matthew. What’s his last name. Mathias.
    The Court:     Can you hear her on the tape?
    [Defense Counsel]: You can hear her groaning.
    [The Commonwealth]:        Moaning.
    [Defense Counsel]: You can hear her moaning.
    [The Commonwealth]:        So the nature of the 911 call,
    Your Honor, is that it’s her groaning in the background.
    There is a man speaking and that man is speaking to the
    caller on the 911 call. Both of those people are available
    and could be called as witnesses to testify.
    [The Commonwealth]:       We are objecting because she is
    not the one that is on the 911 call. He is a third party in
    this.
    [The Commonwealth]:        Relaying it.
    [The Commonwealth]:         Relaying it. So if he wants to
    play that after he calls these people, maybe that’s how you
    - 16 -
    J-A11030-21
    lay the foundation for it. I don’t think you can play the 911
    tape from a third party relaying information from her
    because you can’t determine the accuracy of it.
    The Court:     Can you hear her saying my boyfriend or do
    you just hear her groaning?
    [Defense Counsel]: You just hear groaning.
    [The Commonwealth]:        And so that’s      one   person’s
    interpretation to another person on 911.
    (N.T. Trial, 3/11/19, at 127-28).
    This sidebar discussion makes clear that it was Mr. Lytle’s statement on
    the 911 call concerning who the shooter was, not Ms. Powell’s. As the trial
    court explained: “By defense counsel’s admission, Ms. Powell can only be
    heard groaning on the recording. There is nothing within the 911 recording
    to indicate the victim’s statement of who shot her.     Furthermore, it is not
    appropriate to attempt to impeach Ms. Powell with the caller’s, Mr. Lytle’s,
    interpretation of what she may or may not have said immediately after being
    shot…”   (Trial Court Opinion at 35-36).     We agree with the trial court’s
    explanation.
    Similarly, regarding Lieutenant Stanek, the 911 call does not include
    any statements which could be used as impeachment evidence against him.
    As previously stated, the call occurred between Mr. Lytle and a 911 operator.
    Lieutenant Stanek was not involved. Thus, we conclude the court properly
    precluded the 911 call as impeachment evidence against Ms. Powell and
    Lieutenant Stanek. See Ballard, 
    supra;
     Woods, 
    supra.
    - 17 -
    J-A11030-21
    In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion
    in denying the admission of DeChaunte Adams’ testimony regarding her
    observations of “suspicious conduct” on the part of her paramour Mike Breese,
    Ms. Powell’s son.   Specifically, Appellant contends the trial court erred in
    omitting Ms. Adams’ testimony that, on the night of the shooting, Mr. Breese
    (1) sat in a dark room downstairs; (2) made no effort to go to the hospital to
    check on his mother after learning of the shooting; and (3) ran up to the
    bedroom and “put a gun in a drawer or took a gun from a drawer” and ran out
    of the house. (Appellant’s Brief at 36-37). Appellant alleges this testimony
    would have been relevant to support his theory that Mr. Breese, not Appellant,
    shot and killed Mr. Mathias after growing tired of “the abuse [Mr.] Mathias
    perpetrated against [Ms.] Powell, [Mr.] Breese’s Mother.”          (Id. at 38).
    Appellant concludes this Court should overturn his convictions, vacate his
    judgment of sentence, and remand for a new trial. We disagree.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as follows:
    Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence
    Evidence is relevant if:
    (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
    probable than it would be without the evidence; and
    (b)   the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
    Pa.R.E. 401. “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material
    fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or
    supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.”
    - 18 -
    J-A11030-21
    Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 
    570 Pa. 117
    , 135, 
    808 A.2d 893
    , 904
    (2002), cert. denied, 
    539 U.S. 919
    , 
    123 S.Ct. 2284
    , 
    156 L.Ed.2d 137
     (2003).
    “Once evidence is found to be relevant, it will be inadmissible only if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
    or confusion.” Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 
    740 A.2d 237
    , 244 (Pa.Super.
    1999), appeal denied, 
    568 Pa. 657
    , 
    795 A.2d 972
     (2000).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
    Rule 403.    Excluding   Relevant   Evidence   for
    Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other
    Reasons
    The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
    value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
    following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
    the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
    presenting cumulative evidence.
    Pa.R.E. 403.
    Instantly, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:
    The trial court submits that Ms. Adams’ testimony in this
    regard was entirely irrelevant. Ms. Adams was going to
    testify to her observations of Mr. Breese on the night of the
    murder, even though there was no evidence that Mr. Breese
    was involved in the killing of Mr. Mathias and shooting of
    Ms. Powell. The evidence presented was overwhelming that
    [Appellant] is the one who committed the shooting. The
    testimony offered, that [Ms. Powell]’s son was upset and
    looking for a gun after finding out that his mother had been
    shot, was not probative to the issue. Furthermore, any
    potential probative value of the evidence was outweighed
    by the danger of misleading the jury. Allowing this evidence
    to come in would only serve to confuse and mislead the jury.
    Thus, it was proper to exclude Ms. Adams’ testimony
    regarding her observations of Mr. Breese on the night in
    question.
    - 19 -
    J-A11030-21
    (Trial Court Opinion at 41).   We agree with the trial court’s analysis.    Ms.
    Adams’ testimony concerning her observations of Mr. Breese on the night in
    question was completely irrelevant to establish who killed Mr. Mathias and
    shot Ms. Powell, where there was no evidence that Mr. Breese was involved.
    That Mr. Breese sat in a dark room, did not go to the hospital to see his
    mother, and possibly “put a gun in a drawer or took a gun from a drawer” do
    nothing to prove that he was involved in the shootings or that Appellant was
    not. See Pa.R.E. 401; Drumheller, 
    supra.
     Thus, Appellant is not entitled
    to relief on this claim.
    In his fifth issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting the
    Commonwealth’s motion in limine seeking to prohibit licensed psychologist
    and expert witness, Dr. Michael Crabtree, from testifying as to the
    voluntariness of Appellant’s confession. Appellant avers Dr. Crabtree would
    have testified to Appellant’s brain damage, learning disability, and cognitive
    impairments.     Despite the trial court’s refusal to admit Dr. Crabtree’s
    testimony on these topics, Appellant asserts the court seemingly reversed its
    position on this issue in its September 14, 2018 order and opinion denying
    Appellant’s suppression motion, acknowledging that testimony on such topics
    was admissible, stating:
    This jury instruction merely reiterates the proposition that
    there are a variety of factors that must be considered when
    determining whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his
    Miranda rights before giving a confession. Any cognitive
    disabilities of [Appellant] would be only one of multiple
    - 20 -
    J-A11030-21
    factors to determine the voluntariness of his confession, but
    do not warrant that he should be treated as a juvenile.
    (Appellant’s Brief at 44) (citing Trial Court’s Order and Opinion, filed 9/14/18,
    at 17).     Additionally, Appellant avers the court erred in relying on cases
    involving false confession experts to reject Dr. Crabtree’s testimony where Dr.
    Crabtree (1) was not a false confession expert, and (2) was offered to testify
    to the very factors the jury must consider and weigh during deliberations (e.g.,
    Appellant’s intelligence, education, mental state, etc.). Appellant maintains
    Dr.   Crabtree’s   testimony   concerned      the   voluntariness    of   Appellant’s
    confession, which is “separate and distinct” from false confession testimony.
    (Appellant’s Brief at 47).
    Appellant further attacks the court’s decision to exclude Dr. Crabtree’s
    testimony based upon the court’s observations of Appellant in the courtroom.
    Appellant contends the court cannot make such a decision where the judge
    was not an expert on neurological deficits, and the court’s opinion was “based
    upon limited observations of Appellant 6 years after the night in question.”
    (Id. at 49).    Appellant concludes the omission of Dr. Crabtree’s testimony
    denied him a fair trial and the court’s decision constitutes reversible error. We
    disagree.
    “[A] court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is subject to an
    evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.”         Commonwealth v.
    Reese, 
    31 A.3d 708
    , 715 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc).                 Likewise, “[o]ur
    standard of review in cases involving the admission of expert testimony is
    - 21 -
    J-A11030-21
    broad: Generally speaking, the admission of expert testimony is a matter left
    largely to the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings thereon will not be
    reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 
    945 A.2d 174
    , 176 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks
    omitted). “An expert’s testimony is admissible when it is based on facts of
    record and will not cause confusion or prejudice.” 
    Id.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert
    testimony and provides:
    Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses
    A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
    experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
    an opinion or otherwise if:
    (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average
    layperson;
    (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
    evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
    (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the
    relevant field.
    Pa.R.E. 702. Furthermore, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data
    in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”
    Pa.R.E. 703.
    Additionally,   “[t]here   has   been     a   long-standing   policy   in   this
    Commonwealth of protecting the jury’s prerogative to determine credibility
    from the undue influence that accompanies expert testimony on the subject
    - 22 -
    J-A11030-21
    of credibility of witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Pugh, 
    101 A.3d 820
    , 822
    (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    632 Pa. 670
    , 
    117 A.3d 296
     (2015)
    (en banc). Significantly, our Supreme Court has held that “[e]xpert testimony
    on the phenomenon of false confessions…invade[s] the jury’s exclusive role
    as the sole arbiter of credibility.” 
    Id. at 823
     (relying on Commonwealth v.
    Alicia, 
    625 Pa. 429
    , 
    92 A.3d 753
     (2014)).
    In Alicia, the defendant was charged with murder and related offenses.
    During police questioning, the defendant ultimately confessed to shooting the
    victim. The defendant later filed a motion for use of a false confessions expert,
    claiming that defendant is of low intelligence and had been a SSI disability
    beneficiary for most of his life due to mental health issues, and was susceptible
    to making a false confession. The Commonwealth filed a motion to exclude
    any such defense expert.        The court permitted the expert’s proffered
    testimony, in part, and the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. A
    divided panel of this Court affirmed.
    Nevertheless, our Supreme Court reversed, holding that “expert
    testimony [regarding false confessions] constitutes an impermissible invasion
    of the jury’s role as the exclusive arbiter of credibility.” 
    Id. at 446
    , 
    92 A.3d at 764
    . The Court further stated: “[T]he matter of whether [the defendant’s]
    confession is false is best left to the jury’s common sense and life experience,
    after proper development of relevant issues related to, inter alia, the particular
    circumstances surrounding the elicitation of his confession, using the
    - 23 -
    J-A11030-21
    traditional and time-honored techniques of cross-examination and argument.”
    
    Id. at 447
    , 
    92 A.3d 764
    .
    Instantly, after taking into consideration Dr. Crabtree’s original and
    amended reports, as well as the Commonwealth’s and defense counsel’s
    arguments, the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine and
    excluded Dr. Crabtree’s testimony. The court reasoned:
    Review of the amended expert report of the proposed
    defense expert, Dr. Crabtree, dated March 4, 2019, reveals
    that the amended report is not significantly different from
    his original expert report dated October 16, 2018, which the
    court excluded following argument on the Commonwealth’s
    previous motion in limine, by order dated October 30, 2018.
    Both the original report and amended report of Dr. Crabtree
    opine as to [Appellant]’s ability to understand the waiver of
    his constitutional rights and to understand the questions
    that were asked of him by police. As such, Dr. Crabtree’s
    opinions go directly to the voluntariness of his confession
    and invade the province of the jury, in contravention to the
    case law set forth in [Alicia, supra] and [Pugh, 
    supra].
    Unlike the defendant in Pugh, [Appellant] has never
    recanted his confession or claimed that he did not
    understand the nature of the Miranda warnings given to
    him prior to the confession. Unlike the defendant in Alicia,
    whose “IQ was 64, placing him in the range considered
    mentally retarded,” [Appellant]’s IQ is 84, according to Dr.
    Crabtree’s report, and according to the Torrance [State
    Hospital] report dated September 23, 2015, his IQ is 93,
    within the average range of intellectual ability. While Dr.
    Crabtree’s expert report regarding [Appellant]’s learning
    disabilities and fetal alcohol syndrome would be appropriate
    for the penalty phase of the trial, should that occur, such
    expert report is not admissible for the guilty phase of the
    trial.
    Following the hearings on [Appellant]’s Revised Omnibus
    Pretrial Motion, the trial court entered an order denying the
    motion to suppress the confession, finding that [Appellant]
    knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The
    - 24 -
    J-A11030-21
    court found that [Appellant] did not demonstrate any
    cognitive impairment to police, or lack of understanding of
    the waiver, or of the questions asked, or the charges. The
    trial court further found no evidence that [Appellant] was
    subjected to coercive tactics or unduly harsh conditions
    during his questioning or that he lacked sufficient
    intelligence to understand the waiver of his rights. The court
    further noted that, based on the representations of counsel
    regarding [Appellant]’s enhanced level of participation in his
    defense (which [Appellant] continued to demonstrate during
    jury selection), [Appellant] does not exhibit signs of
    cognitive impairment which would have interfered with his
    knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda
    rights on the night the crimes were committed.
    (Trial Court Opinion and Order, filed March 11, 2019, at 1-2). We agree with
    the trial court’s analysis of this issue. Here, Dr. Crabtree’s expert report and
    proposed testimony concerned Appellant’s inability to voluntarily confess to
    the crimes at issue due to his cognitive impairments.         Although Appellant
    attempts to differentiate this case from that involving a “false confession
    expert,” Dr. Crabtree’s proffered testimony would similarly conflict with the
    jury’s responsibility to assess the credibility of Appellant’s confession. See
    Alicia, 
    supra;
     Pugh, 
    supra.
                Thus, the trial court properly granted the
    Commonwealth’s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Crabtree’s testimony, and
    Appellant’s claim merits no relief. See Reese, 
    supra;
     Watson, 
    supra.
    For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s sixth, seventh, and
    eighth issues.5 In these issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
    ____________________________________________
    5 Appellant failed to present separate argument sections in his brief regarding
    issues seven and eight, which could warrant waiver. See Commonwealth
    - 25 -
    J-A11030-21
    denying his recusal motion where Appellant’s counsel produced sufficient
    evidence of the trial court’s “personal animus” toward counsel.          Appellant
    avers the trial court exhibited personal animus toward counsel after counsel
    requested the trial court remove Attorney Davis as co-counsel due to counsel’s
    pending lawsuit against Attorney Davis’ cousin. Appellant contends counsel
    explained to the court that Attorney Davis’ cousin hated counsel due to the
    lawsuit, to which the trial court replied: “There are a lot of people who hate
    you.” (Appellant’s Brief at 53). Appellant maintains counsel interpreted the
    court’s comment to mean that the trial judge included himself in the group of
    people who hated counsel.           Additionally, Appellant asserts the trial court
    refused to allow counsel to find alternative death penalty-certified co-counsel
    and forced counsel to “draft, file, and present a Motion for Reconsideration”
    before the court replaced Attorney Davis with Attorney Farrell. (Id. at 55).
    Appellant additionally claims the court belittled the existence of the apparent
    conflict with Attorney Davis, and stated the conflict existed only “in the mind”
    of counsel. (Id.) As further evidence of the court’s “personal animus” toward
    ____________________________________________
    v. Buterbaugh, 
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1262 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating: “The
    Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that each question an
    appellant raises be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent
    authority, and failure to do so constitutes waiver of the claim”). See also
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating argument section shall be divided into as many
    sections as there are questions presented, followed by discussion and citations
    to pertinent legal authorities).    Nevertheless, Appellant has apparently
    combined all these arguments together as the sixth issue in his brief. Thus,
    we choose to address them here.
    - 26 -
    J-A11030-21
    counsel, Appellant also alleges the court failed to pay a $5,000.00 bill that
    counsel submitted, but the court managed to pay a $27,000.00 bill for
    Attorney Farrell. Appellant emphasizes that in order to be paid, counsel had
    to sue the trial judge.
    Appellant further asserts that he presented his recusal petition in a
    timely manner and, at the presentation of the recusal motion, the trial judge
    “became so enraged that he prevented a record of the presentation
    proceedings from being made by the Court Stenographer,” and prevented the
    proceedings from being audio recorded as well.       (Id. at 56). Based upon
    these actions by the trial judge, Appellant alleges the court’s statement in its
    opinion that Appellant “has failed to offer any evidence” is disingenuous where
    the trial court prevented any record from being created for this issue. (Id. at
    56) (citing Trial Court Opinion, filed June 12, 2020, at 17-18).       Appellant
    concludes the trial court erred in denying the recusal motion and, if this Court
    should grant a new trial, it should ensure that a different judge preside over
    the proceedings. We disagree.
    “[A] party seeking recusal or disqualification must raise the objection at
    the earliest possible moment or that party will suffer the consequence of being
    time barred.” Commonwealth v. Pappas, 
    845 A.2d 829
    , 846 (Pa.Super.
    2004), appeal denied, 
    580 Pa. 712
    , 
    862 A.2d 1254
     (2004). Furthermore, “[i]t
    is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing
    bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s
    - 27 -
    J-A11030-21
    ability to preside impartially.” Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 
    611 Pa. 203
    ,
    222, 
    24 A.3d 319
    , 330 (2011). “In considering a recusal request, the jurist
    must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess
    the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the
    outcome.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 
    606 Pa. 384
    , 443, 
    998 A.2d 606
    , 641-
    42 (2010), cert. denied, 
    563 U.S. 941
    , 
    131 S.Ct. 2102
    , 
    179 L.Ed.2d 900
    (2011).   “The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued
    involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would
    tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.” Id. at 443, 
    998 A.2d at 642
    .
    Instantly, the court appointed Attorney Davis as co-counsel on August
    22, 2017, and Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the appointment
    on September 12, 2017. The court granted counsel’s request on September
    18, 2017, appointed Attorney Farrell as co-counsel, and rescinded the order
    appointing Attorney Davis.    Appellant, however, waited to file his recusal
    motion until December 4, 2017.        Thus, Appellant’s motion is arguably
    untimely. See Pappas, 
    supra.
     See e.g., Lomas v. Kravitz, 
    642 Pa. 181
    ,
    
    170 A.3d 380
     (2017) (determining recusal issue was waived where appellant
    filed motion more than one month after all facts supporting motion had been
    disclosed).
    Moreover, even if Appellant’s motion was timely filed, it would merit no
    relief. Appellant’s arguments concerning recusal focus on counsel’s and the
    - 28 -
    J-A11030-21
    court’s interactions, and apparent disagreements, over replacing Attorney
    Davis with Attorney Farrell as co-counsel. Appellant contends the court made
    disparaging remarks toward counsel, repeatedly refused counsel’s request to
    appoint Attorney Farrell, and caused counsel to spend time “draft[ing], fil[ing],
    and present[ing] a Motion for Reconsideration.”           Ultimately, however,
    Appellant and counsel got their way, and the court agreed to appoint Attorney
    Farrell as co-counsel and remove Attorney Davis as co-counsel. Furthermore,
    Appellant’s remaining complaints concern issues that occurred after the filing
    of the recusal motion.    Appellant has therefore failed to present sufficient
    evidence of any bias, prejudice, or unfairness, and the trial court properly
    denied Appellant’s recusal motion.      See Birdsong, 
    supra;
     Flor, 
    supra.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/27/2021
    - 29 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 940 WDA 2019

Judges: King

Filed Date: 7/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024