Com. v. Poe, R. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD LEE POE :
:
Appellant : No. 1285 MDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 25, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003989-2018.
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: July 30, 2021
Ronald Lee Poe appeals pro se from the order denying his petition for
relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-46. We dismiss.
The facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows: On
June 24, 2018, Trooper Timothy Richartz of the Pennsylvania State Police
arrived at Poe’s residence to serve an arrest warrant upon Lisa McCall because
she had violated her probation. McCall was arrested, taken to the police
barracks, and interviewed. Based on information she related to them, the
police applied for and executed a search warrant for weapons and drugs at
Poe’s residence that same day. Based on evidence found therein, the
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Commonwealth then charged Poe with a firearm violation and drug-related
offenses.
On April 10, 2019, the case against Poe proceeded to a jury trial on only
the firearm violation, and the jury found him guilty. On June 19, 2010, the
trial court imposed a standard range guideline sentence of five to ten years of
incarceration.
Poe filed a timely appeal to this Court in which he challenged the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained under the
search warrant, as well as the statements he made to the police that same
day. On January 7, 2020, this Court rejected Poe’s claims and affirmed his
judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Poe, 226 A.3d 618 (Pa. Super.
2020) (non-precedential decision). Poe did not seek further review.
On March 16, 2020, Poe filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and the
PCRA court appointed counsel. On May 18, 2020, PCRA counsel filed a motion
to withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,
544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (en banc). Poe filed a pro se response and request for a hearing.
On July 31, 2020, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of its
intent to dismiss Poe’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Poe failed to file a
timely response. By order entered August 24, 2020, the PCRA court denied
Poe’s PCRA petition and granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. This
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timely appeal followed.1 Both Poe and the PCRA court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
We begin our analysis by observing that both Poe’s Rule 1925(b)
statement and his brief are incomprehensible. Additionally, appellate briefs
must materially conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. If the defects in the brief are
“substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.” Id.This Court has stated:
[A]lthough this Court is willing to liberally construe materials
filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no
special benefit upon an appellant. Commonwealth v.
Maris, 427 Pa. Super. 566, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 n.1
(1993). Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the
procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the
Court. Id. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an
appellate fails to conform with the requirements set forth in
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id.,Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
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1 The PCRA court initially found that Poe’s pro se notice of appeal was untimely
because it was due by September 23, 2020 and was not received and recorded
until September 30, 2020. Although the PCRA court’s August 24, 2020 order
in the certified record contains a notation indicating that a copy was sent to
Poe’s prison address, via certified mail, return receipt requested, there is no
docket entry indicating that Poe was served with the order. Rather, the docket
indicates that, on August 25, 2020, the order was electronically served on
counsel for the Commonwealth and PCRA counsel. As there is no evidence of
record that Poe was served with, or otherwise informed of, the court’s
dismissal, we will not quash the appeal as untimely. See generally,
Pa.R.Crim.P. 114; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4).
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Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.2d 768, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citations omitted).
Although Poe’s pro se brief marginally complies with Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 2111(a), we note that it lacks a statement of questions
involved and consists of a lengthy argument—at times incoherent and/or
irrelevant—raising multiple claims, including trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
during Poe’s suppression hearing and at his trial.
Poe’s brief parallels the lengthy Rule 1925(b) statement that Poe filed
below. The PCRA court found this lack of “conciseness” should result in waiver
of all claims. The court explained:
Here, [Poe’s] 12-page statement is not concise. Rather,
it is confusing, redundant, makes vague claims that fail to
provide sufficient detail or identify all pertinent issues,
presents fragmented statements, fails to contain
comprehensible argument or citation to the record, and
includes defamatory rants. Because the court is impeded in
its ability to conduct meaningful analysis, [Poe’s] claims
should be deemed waived.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/16/20, at 5. We agree. See Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 522 (Pa. Super. 2016) (reiterating that, to avoid
waiver, an issue in a Rule 1925(b) “must be identified with sufficient
particularity”).
Our reading of Poe’s pro se brief, as well as his subsequently filed
“summary” and “amendment to summary,” reveals a rambling “incoherent,
confusing, redundant, defamatory rant” alleging a conspiracy between the
police, their alleged agent, the trial judge, the prosecutor, and his trial
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counsel. This type of brief renders it impossible for use to conduct any type
of appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031,
1042 (Pa. Super. 2018) (dismissing appeal when Vurimindi’s defamatory rant
against everything and everyone involved in this case shows complete
defiance toward the purpose of appellate review).
In sum, given the overall tenor of Poe’s Rule 1925(b) statement, we
agree with the PCRA court that he has waived any issue he wished to raise in
this appeal. See id. at 1043. We therefore dismiss Poe’s appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/30/2021
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