In the Int. of: R.L.T., Appeal of: T.A ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.L.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.A., FATHER :
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: No. 2339 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered December 10, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000074-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.L.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.A., FATHER :
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: No. 2340 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001772-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 2, 2021
T.A. (“Father”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by
the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (hereinafter, “DHS” or the
“Agency”) seeking to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his
dependent child, R.L.T. (“Child”) (a female born in May 2017), pursuant to the
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Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Father also
appeals from the Order changing Child’s permanency placement goal to
adoption, pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.2 We affirm.
DHS became involved with the family in September 2017 due to
concerns for the safety and welfare of Child. DHS had received a report that
Mother was unable to care for Child. The report was determined to be valid
and in August 2018, legal custody of Child was transferred to DHS and physical
custody of Child was transferred to a maternal cousin, L.K. L.K. also has
custody of Child’s sibling, E. Father’s location was unknown. In August 2018,
the court ordered a Parent Locator Search for Father and appointed Claire
Leotta, Esquire (“Attorney Leotta”), as Father’s counsel.3 Shelter Care Order
– Amended, 8/1/18, at 2. Numerous meetings and hearings relating to Child
____________________________________________
1 In a separate Decree entered on October 1, 2020, the trial court voluntarily
terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, R.T., (“Mother”), to Child,
confirming her consent to Child’s adoption. Mother has not filed a brief in
Father’s appeal, nor has she filed an appeal from the Decree terminating her
parental rights or the Order changing Child’s permanent placement goal.
2 On January 6, 2020, this Court, sua sponte, consolidated Father’s appeals.
Father properly filed a Notice of Appeal at each docket number.
3 Numerous additional attempts were made to locate Father. At a September
2018 Adjudicatory hearing, The Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) was
ordered to make outreach to Father. Order of Adjudication, 9/26/18, at 2.
Following a permanency review hearing in March 2019, the court ordered DHS
to conduct another Parent Locator Search for Father. Permanency Review
Order, 3/6/19, at 2. In June 2019, the court ordered the Assistant City
Solicitor to conduct an updated Parent Locator Search as to Father.
Permanency Review Order, 6/5/19, at 2.
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were held between 2017 and 2020, including single case plan meetings, status
meetings, an adjudicatory hearing, a shelter care hearing, and multiple
permanency review hearings. Father was not present at any of the meetings
or hearings, and his whereabouts remained unknown until January 2020,
when he attended a permanency review hearing. Permanency Review Order,
5/22/20, at 2. At that hearing, Father requested, and was referred for, a
paternity test. Id. A permanency review hearing was held in May 2020, at
which Mother signed Voluntary Relinquishments to Child, and Father was
determined to be Child’s biological father by paternity test. Id. Father did
not attend the hearing, and CUA again was ordered to make outreach to
Father. Id.
On October 1, 2020, the trial court held a hearing, after which it issued
a Decree of Termination of Parental Rights – Confirm Consent for Mother. Trial
Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 14. The trial court ordered Father to comply with
a home evaluation, provide proof of income, and have supervised visits at the
Agency. Permanency Review Order, 10/1/20, at 2. A termination hearing
was scheduled for Father alone on December 10, 2020.
On December 10, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on DHS’s Petitions
for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights and a goal change.
Kristina Helmers, Esquire (“Attorney Helmers”), represented DHS. Attorney
Leotta represented Father, who participated via teleconference. Craig Lord,
Esquire, represented Child, who was three-and-a-half years old, as guardian
ad litem/legal interest counsel.
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DHS first presented the testimony of Tyesha Grasty (“Grasty”), the CUA
case worker assigned to the case. Father then testified on his own behalf.
The trial court made the following findings of fact based on the testimonial
and documentary evidence.
At the termination hearing on December 10, 2020, this
[c]ourt heard credible, persuasive evidence from [] Grasty, … who
stated she was assigned to the case on March 11, 2020. She
noted [that] Child came into care because of [] Mother’s mental
health issues, and her lack of adequate supervision. She noted
that Father was not involved in [] Child’s care, and at the time
when the first single case plan was created, Father’s whereabouts
were unknown. Father made himself available to DHS on [January
20, 2020], when he appeared at a hearing and requested a
paternity test.
[] Grasty testified she made various attempts to engage
Father a couple of weeks after the case was assigned to her by
sending certified mail to [Father’s] address []. She did not receive
a response from Father after the mailing. She testified [that] the
first time she made contact with Father was at the court hearing
on [October 1, 2020], and [Father] said he knew he was the
biological father as a result of the paternity test. [] Grasty
testified that between the time she was assigned the case in March
2020[,] and the court hearing on [October 1, 2020], Father did
not at any point reach out to her asking to see [C]hild. After she
made contact with Father, single case plan objectives were listed
for him: to have supervised visitation at the Agency; for him to
complete a home investigation; for him to provide proof on [sic]
employment or S[ocial] S[ecurity] I[ncome][(“SSI”)]; and for him
to maintain contact with [Grasty] and DHS.
[] Grasty testified she made a visit to the home … and she
determined the home was appropriate. Father stated this address
was his mother’s home and he had no ownership or lease of the
property. [Grasty] stated she had concerns about whether Father
actually had stable housing and lived at the address. Regarding
his income, she testified [that] Father provided a letter stating
[that] he was in the process of obtaining SSI but was not receiving
assistance at the present time[,] and noted Father was currently
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unemployed. [] Grasty stated she had concerns about Father’s
stability, his housing and how he supports himself, and his ability
to care for [] Child. She noted [that] Father has not at any time
made himself available to attend any of [] Child’s medical
appointments.
Regarding visitation, [] Grasty testified Father was offered
11 supervised visits with [] Child. He missed 2 visits, [and]
attended 9 visits. [Grasty] testified she was able to observe the
visits. She noted [] Child does not know [Father,] as her [f]ather
and has had no contact with her in the two years she has been in
care. [Grasty] believes there is no parent-child relationship
between the two and there is no parental bond. [Child] sees
[Father] only at the supervised visits and does not know him.
[Grasty] noted that Father has other children who are in the care
of their mothers and he is not involved in their care.
[] Grasty testified [that] Child lives with her pre-adoptive
foster parent, [L.K.] She has observed the relationship between
[] Child and [L.K.;] they are bonded and have a parent-child
relationship. [] Child looks to [L.K.] for love, support and
protection. [] Grasty opined that [] Child would not suffer
irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated
because they do not have a parental bond and [] Child does not
know him. Further, she opined it would be in [] Child’s best
interest to be freed for adoption by [L.K.]
On cross-examination by [Attorney] Leotta, … Grasty
testified she was unaware that Father was incarcerated [in 2016].
She noted that after her first contact with Father in October 2020,
and that [sic] he was able to begin and attend parenting class[es].
[] Grasty testified that[,] during her supervision of the case, she
sent Father 3 or 4 certified letters to [Father’s] address and did
not receive a response.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 17-20 (citations omitted).
Next, the trial court set forth its findings of fact from Father’s testimony.
Father was the next witness to testify. He stated he was at
home in August [] 2018 when [] Child came into care and he did
not receive certified letters at his address. He stated he received
a [N]otice to appear at a court hearing when the case first opened
in 2018, but he did request a paternity test in 2019. He testified
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he was incarcerated and released in 2016, and he has not been
incarcerated since that period. He stated he began parenting
classes in October 2020 and believes he has attended 2 sessions.
He attended visits with [] Child and wants to continue the visits.
He further testified he received the results of the paternity tests
in August 2020.
On cross-examination by [Attorney] Helmers, … Father
stated he was aware in August 2020 that he was the [f]ather and
was unaware [that] Child was in care in 2018.
This [c]ourt found that Father’s testimony was not credible.
Father first claimed he did not know [] Child was his until he
received the results of the paternity tests[;] however, he did know
[that Mother] claimed he was the [f]ather in 2018 and received
court [N]otices to appear and appeared at [] certain hearings[,]
but does not recall what the hearings were for. His response to
questioning was being coached by his girlfriend, who was on the
virtual call and admitted she was refreshing his recollection as to
dates and his actions.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 20 (citations omitted).
On December 10, 2020, the trial court entered the Decree involuntarily
terminating Father’s parental rights to Child, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and the Order changing Child’s
permanency placement goal to adoption, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6351.
On December 15, 2020, Father timely filed Notices of Appeal, along with
Concise Statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
In his brief on appeal, Father raises four issues, as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father,] and changing [Child’s]
goal to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1)[,] where
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Father presented evidence that he made significant efforts to
perform his parental duties[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father,] and changing [Child’s]
goal to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2)[,] where
Father presented evidence that he made significant efforts to
remedy any incapacity or neglect[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father,] and changing [Child’s]
goal to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) and
(a)(8)[,] where the evidence clearly showed that [Child] was
removed from Mother’s care at birth and [Father’s] whereabouts
were not known at that time[?]
4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of [Father,] and changing [Child’s]
goal to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b)[,] where
evidence was presented that Father has a positive parental bond
with [Child] that would be detrimental to sever[?]
Father’s Brief at 8.
In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)
(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel
Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [] 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa.
2011); Christianson v. Ely, [], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
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only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066
(Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C.,
837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination
of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along
with consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
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(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will address sections 2511(a)(2) and (b),
which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
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being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272
(Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under
section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are
not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Regarding section 2511(a)(2), Father argues that the testimonial
evidence admitted at the hearing showed that he has remedied the conditions
that caused Child to come into care. Father’s Brief at 21. Father asserts that
he has complied with the goals set for him, and he continued to maintain
contact with Child after his release from prison. Id. at 21.
The trial court addressed Father’s issue regarding 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2) as follows:
This [c]ourt found Father is incapable of providing safety
and permanency for [] Child now and in the future. Father failed
to act on any opportunity to get to know [Child] and failed to take
any meaningful steps to be involved in her life. The conditions
which necessitated their placement exist today. The evidence
leaves no doubt that Father cannot and will not remedy the
conditions which brought [] Child into supervision. Here, the
totality of the evidence supports this [c]ourt's conclusion that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of
this Child.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 17, 20-21.
The trial court found that Grasty credibly testified that she first made
contact with Father at the court hearing on October 1, 2020. Trial Court
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Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 11. Grasty testified that between
the time she was assigned the case in March 2020, and the court hearing on
October 1, 2020, Father did not ask to see Child. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19,
at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 12.
Father had Single Case Plan objectives, including participating in
supervised visitation with Child at the Agency, completing a home
investigation, providing proof of employment or SSI, and maintaining contact
with her and DHS. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 12.
Although Father had appropriate housing, Grasty was concerned that he was
residing in his mother’s home, which he did not own. Trial Court Opinion,
2/15/19, at 18; N.T., 12/10/20, at 13. Grasty was not certain that Father
even lived at the home or could provide Child with stable housing. Trial Court
Opinion, 2/15/19, at 18; N.T., 12/10/20, at 13. Additionally, although Father
provided Grasty with a letter stating that he was in the process of obtaining
SSI, he was not receiving SSI assistance and was unemployed. Trial Court
Opinion, 2/15/19, at 18; N.T., 12/10/20, at 13-14. Thus, Grasty was
concerned about Father’s stability, his housing, his own support, and his ability
to care for Child. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 18; N.T., 12/10/20, at 14.
Moreover, Father had not attended any of Child’s medical appointments.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 18. Grasty testified
that Father was offered eleven supervised visits with Child, of which he
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attended nine and missed two. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T.,
12/10/20, at 14.
The trial court’s determination that DHS satisfied the requirements of
section 2511(a)(2) is supported by competent, clear, and convincing evidence
in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; In re: T.S.M., 71
A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Thus, we cannot grant Father relief on this claim.
Regarding section 2511(b), Father argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it terminated his parental rights. Father’s Brief at 24. Father
asserts that the extent of the bond depends on the circumstances of the case,
and that the party seeking termination must produce evidence concerning the
effect that termination would have on Child. Id. Father argues that a needs
and welfare analysis requires consideration of the developmental and
emotional needs of Child. Id.This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under
section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section
2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under
section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and
welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620
A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination
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of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances … where direct
observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:
concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. … Nor
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
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In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary
termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where
placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his … child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill his … parental duties, to the child’s right
to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
This Court has explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and
affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-
being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G.,
956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a
parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)).
The trial court addressed Father’s issue regarding 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(b) as follows:
After this [c]ourt found the statutory requirements for
involuntary termination of parental rights had been met pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), this [c]ourt then determined pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) whether severing the parent-child
relationship is in [] Child’s best interest, giving primary
consideration to the needs and welfare of [] Child. In making this
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determination, this [c]ourt carefully examined both the tangible
and intangible dimension of the needs and welfare of [] Child. The
tangible dimensions of [] Child’s needs involve providing for the
physical necessities of life including shelter, food, clothing and
medical care. The intangible dimension of the parent-child
relationship involves consideration of the love, closeness, comfort
and security shared, the emotional bond that may or may not exist
between the parent and [] Child and the likely effect termination
of parental rights will have on them.
In this case, this [c]ourt had adequate evidence of the
status of the parent-child bond to examine and determine whether
terminating Father’s parental rights would destroy a necessary
and beneficial relationship.
This [c]ourt heard credible, persuasive testimony from []
Grasty, who testified she had personally observed interactions
between [] Child and Father[,] and there is no parental bond. []
Child has a parental bond with her pre-adoptive foster mother,
L.K., and looks to her for love, support and care. She further
opined [] Child would not suffer any irreparable harm if Father’s
parental rights were terminated[,] and it would be in [] Child’s
best interest to be adopted.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 21-22.
The trial court found that the following testimony of Grasty was credible.
When Grasty observed the visits, she noted that Child does not know Father
as her father, and Child has had no contact with Father in the two years she
has been in care. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 15.
Grasty believes there is no parent-child relationship between Child and Father,
and there is no parental bond. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T.,
12/10/20, at 16. Child sees Father only at the supervised visits and does not
know him. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 16. Grasty
noted that Father has other children who are in the care of their mothers, and
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he is not involved in their care. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T.,
12/10/20, at 15.
Grasty testified Child lives with her pre-adoptive foster parent, L.K. Trial
Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 17-18. She has observed
the relationship between Child and L.K., and testified they are bonded and
have a parent-child relationship. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T.,
12/10/20, at 18. Child looks to L.K. for love, support, and protection. Trial
Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 18. Grasty opined that
Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were
terminated because they do not have a parental bond and Child does not know
him. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 19. Further, she
opined it would be in Child’s best interest to be freed for adoption by L.K. Trial
Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19; N.T., 12/10/20, at 19.
The trial court’s determination that DHS satisfied the requirements of
section 2511(b) is supported by competent evidence in the record. S.P., 47
A.3d at 826-27; T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. There was sufficient evidence in the
record from which the trial court, considering Child’s needs and welfare, could
have properly found that there was no bond between Child and Father, and
that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest.
Next, we address Father’s final claim, in which he asserts that the trial
court erred in concluding that DHS proved, by clear and convincing evidence,
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that Child’s permanency placement goal should be changed to adoption. 4
Father’s Brief at 23-24.
We address this issue mindful of the following:
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190 .
Moreover,
[i]t is this Court’s responsibility to ensure that the record
represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge
has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.
Nevertheless, we accord great weight to the court’s fact-finding
function because the court is in the best position to observe and
rule on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.
In the Interest of D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In
re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 513 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
Further, we have instructed that,
[p]ursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the
juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing
necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent
of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of
progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and
____________________________________________
4 In his Concise Statement and the Statement of Questions Involved portion
of his brief, Father raises the goal change, and Father discusses the goal
change Order in the argument portion of his brief, supporting the discussion
with citation to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. Thus, we find that Father preserved the
challenge to the goal change Order.
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feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a
likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement
for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best
interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must
guide the trial court. As this Court has held, a child’s life simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon
the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.
As this Court has stated,
a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts
to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 910 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re Adoption
of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
In its Opinion, regarding the goal change Order, the trial court stated as
follows:
The concept of a “goal change” is consistent with the statute
which requires the trial court, at the conclusion of a permanency
hearing in a child dependency proceeding, to order the
continuation, modification, or termination of placement or other
disposition which is best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child; an order to
continue, modify, or terminate the current placement, as required
by the statute, is synonymous with a decision to continue or
change the permanency plan goal. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g)[.]
Once reunification is ruled out, the second preferred
permanency option is adoption. Adoption has been clearly
established as the appropriate goal in the best interest of [Child].
This [c]ourt heard credible, persuasive testimony that this 3½
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years[sic][-]old[-][c]hild is bonded to [L.K.] and that it would be
in her best interest to be adopted.
This [c]ourt finds the record sustains the factual findings
and legal conclusions regarding [] Child’s current placement,
Father’s lack of compliance, and lack of willingness to be a
responsible parent for this Child. Most importantly, the record
demonstrates both that reunification is not feasible, and that
sufficient competent evidence exists to change the permanency
goals from reunification to adoption.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/21, at 22-23.
After a careful review, we conclude that the record supports the trial
court’s determination. The record demonstrates that Father was not able to
provide appropriate parental care or control for Child at the time of the goal
change Order, and that it would be in Child’s best interest to be adopted by
L.K. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court in
concluding that Child’s life should not remain on hold indefinitely and that a
goal change to adoption would be in her best interest. In re A.B., 19 A.3d at
1088-89.
Accordingly, as we conclude that the trial court did not commit an error
of law or an abuse of discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights to Child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b), we affirm the termination
Decree, as well as the Order changing Child’s permanent placement goal to
adoption.
Decree and Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/2/2021
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