In the Int. of: J.S., Appeal of: K.T.-B. ( 2021 )

J-S18017-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.T.-B., MOTHER : No. 473 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered January 22, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000377-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M.T.-S., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.T.-B., MOTHER : No. 474 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 22, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000479-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED AUGUST 6, 2021
In these consolidated appeals concerning J.S. (Child), born in February
of 2019, K.T.-B. (Mother) appeals from: (1) the decree entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, terminating her parental rights
to the Child; and (2) the order, entered the same day, changing the Child’s
placement goal to adoption.1 After careful review, we affirm.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s two appeals. We note the trial
court also terminated, on the same day, the parental rights of J.S. (Father),
Child’s father. Father has not filed an appeal.
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I. Facts & Procedural History
The trial court summarized the factual history concerning Mother’s own
dependency, her mental health, and the birth of Child:
[The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS)]
became involved with this family on September 18, 2018, when
Mother was adjudicated dependent and placed in DHS custody.
On October 29, 2018, Mother was placed at Northern Children
Services Generations One maternity group home (“Northern”),
where she gave birth to Child [in February of 2019.2 . . . ].
* * *
Mother has several mental health diagnoses, including
unspecified bipolar disorder, oppositional defiant disorder,
unspecified intellectual disability, and unspecified schizophrenia
spectrum and other psychotic disorder[s], along with a history of
emotional instability and erratic behavior. Mother was found to
be at a 7th grade reading level when testing for Intellectual or
Development[al] Disabilities (“IDD”). . . .
Trial Ct. Op., 3/24/21, at 1-2 (paragraph break added).
The trial court also summarized the general protective services (GPS)
report made within weeks of Child’s birth:
[O]n February 22, 2019, DHS received a [GPS] report
alleging[: (1) Mother would leave Child unattended with a bottle
propped in his mouth and continued this behavior after being
counseled against such[; and (2)] Mother had a history of
becoming verbally aggressive with the staff at Northern and
leaving without disclosing her intended location. . . .
. . . The GPS report indicated concern for Child’s safety and well-
being when in Mother’s care due to a need for constant childcare
counseling, staff monitoring every fifteen minutes, Mother not
____________________________________________
2 Mother was 17 years old when she was declared dependent, and when she
gave birth to Child.
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participating in parenting classes or therapy, Paternal
Grandmother’s home being inappropriate, Child’s Father[ ] being
in delinquent placement . . . and a belief that Mother needed a
higher level of care than Northern could provide. This report was
determined to be valid.
On February 23, 2019, DHS received a supplemental report
alleging: Mother enrolled in learning support classes at
Roxborough High School; Mother may not be able to care for Child
on her own; Mother did not have a good relationship with Maternal
Grandmother; Mother continued problematic or dangerous
behavior with Child despite repeated counseling; and Mother
would appear easily frustrated when Child cried. DHS received
another supplemental report on February 25, 2019, alleging
Mother had been prescribed Haldol and received counseling at
Northern.
Trial Court Op. at 1-2.
The trial court also set forth the factual history precipitating DHS’
dependency petition:
In early February 2019, [the same month in which Child was
born,] Mother attempted to stab another resident [at Northern]
with a steak knife. Police were called . . . .
DHS conducted a visit to Northern on March 1, 2019, and
observed Mother feeding Child with a bottle . . . on his back, a
practice Mother admitted to using regularly. DHS observed
Mother become defensive when counseled about safe and
appropriate care for Child. DHS learned Mother refused
medication, and on or about February 27, 2019, threatened to kill
herself and Northern staff if Child was removed from her care.
Mother was subsequently evaluated at Philadelphia Children’s
Crisis Response Center . . . and was involuntarily committed for
psychiatric treatment.
On March 1, 2019, [when Child was three weeks old,] DHS
obtained an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) and Child was
placed in foster care . . . . At the March 4, 2019, shelter care
hearing, the trial court lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary
DHS commitment stand.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
On March 8, 2019, when Child was approximately one month old, DHS
filed a dependency petition.
Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Tabor Community
Partners held a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) meeting on March 27,
2019. Child’s primary goal was reunification, with adoption as a
concurrent goal. Mother’s objectives were to make herself
available and comply with CUA services, comply with Child
visitation, follow all mental health treatment recommendations,
comply with medication management, participate in parenting
classes, and comply with all court orders.
Around July 5, 2019, DHS learned Mother had attended three
of nine scheduled visits with Child. On July 9, 2019, . . . Child was
adjudicated dependent[ and] was fully committed to DHS custody.
The trial court ordered Mother be referred to the Achieving
Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting services, Mother and
Father be referred for domestic violence counseling and the
Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for forthwith drug and alcohol
screens, dual diagnosis assessment, and three random drug
screens prior to the next court date on September 13, 2019.
Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (footnote omitted.)
Around September 11, 2019, DHS learned Mother had
attended none of the five visits offered with Child. Mother was
engaging in parenting classes. Her current address was unknown
as she no longer resided with Maternal Grandmother. Mother and
Father had been involved in multiple physical altercations since
the July court date and neither had engaged in domestic violence
services. Paternal Grandmother has also been involved in multiple
physical altercations with Mother, harassed and used threatening
language against Mother.
On September 13, 2019, the trial court held a permanency
review hearing for Child. Mother was present for this hearing.
[She was again referred to drug and alcohol screening, ARC, and
parenting classes.] A stay-away order[ ] was issued . . . against
Paternal Grandmother . . . to have no contact with Mother and
have no visits with Child.
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The [plan] was revised on October 1, 2019. Child’s primary
goal remained reunification[ and his] concurrent goal . . .
adoption. [In addition to the above plan goals, Mother was
directed to] provide proof of housing and employment, and allow
CUA to assess her home.
Around December 3, 2019, DHS learned Mother was visiting
Child since October 15, 2019; however, [she] was inconsistent
with her parenting classes and ARC services. Mother had also
enrolled at Roxborough High School and was four credits from
earning her high school diploma.
[Meanwhile,] Mother had tested positive for marijuana on
September 23, 2019, and amphetamines on October 21, 2019.
While Mother was referred for substance abuse treatment through
NorthEast Treatment Centers . . . she did not attend her intake
appointment.
Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.
The trial court described the subsequent proceedings and permanency
review hearings in Child’s dependency case:
On December 5, 2019, the trial court held a permanency
review hearing[.] Mother was found minimally compliant with her
permanency plan, inconsistent in her parenting class attendance,
and had only visited with Child four times since the September
2019 hearing. . . . Mother was ordered to engage in substance
abuse treatment and participate in a dual diagnosis program and
provide her current address to her CUA Case Manager. . . .
As of February 11, 2020, DHS learned Mother remained
consistent in visitation, completed housing services through ARC,
and engaged in parenting services through the Achieving
Independence Center (“AIC”). Mother was also referred for a PCE
(“Parenting Capacity Evaluation”) and Intellectual Disability
Services (“IDS”). On February 13, 2020, the CEU Case Manager
provided DHS with a progress report stating Mother tested
negative for all illicit substances on January 2 [and] 6, 2020, but
failed to schedule and attend a third random assessment.
On February 13, 2020, the trial court held a permanency
review hearing for Child. Mother was present for this hearing.
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. . . Mother was referred to Serenity Safe Haven Outpatient Clinic
(“Serenity”) for monitoring and to CEU for three random drug
tests prior to the next court date[.] Mother was also ordered to
provide proof of employment and housing. The stay-away order
against Paternal Grandmother remained. Mother’s visitation with
Child was set at weekly supervised visits at [DHS] for two hours.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.
The trial court set forth additional factual and procedural background
regarding Child’s dependency case as follows:
On September 8, 2020, DHS learned Mother had attended
five of 16 required parenting classes prior to the COVID-19
pandemic and had not re-engaged in virtual parenting classes.
Mother was inconsistent with her mental health and substance
abuse treatment. The CUA Case Manager would periodically lose
contact with Mother due to Mother’s losing her cell phone and lack
of stable and appropriate housing. Mother had attended 23 of the
50 offered visits since the last court date in February. Mother was
not confirming her visits. Mother lacked the knowledge of how to
appropriately care for Child; therefore, [she] was previously
referred for a PCE. DHS also learned that Father had physically
assaulted Mother on multiple occasions, used threatening
language against her, and had not visited Child in over a year to
establish a bond with Child.
The [plan] was once again revised on October 2, 2020.
Child’s goals remained the same. Mother’s objectives [also
generally remained the same, and she was directed to] file for a
Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) against Father. . . . . DHS learned
on October 5, 2020, that Mother had begun in-person visits with
Child, but did not appear able to care for Child appropriately.
On October 7, 2020, the trial court held a permanency review
hearing. . . . The trial court found Mother minimally compliant
with her permanency plan, with minimal progress made with
respect to alleviating the circumstances requiring Child’s
placement. [A plan meeting] was ordered to assess the
appropriate goal for Child. Father was to have no-contact with
Mother and Mother was ordered to seek a PFA order against
Father. Mother was referred for [drug screenings and] a Healthy
Relationship program. . . . The CUA Case Manager was to refer
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Mother for a Philadelphia Health Management Corporation
(“PHMC”) grant once she obtained appropriate housing. The stay-
away order against Paternal Grandmother stood. Mother would
have weekly supervised visits with Child at [DHS] and needed to
confirm her visits 24 hours in advance and on the day of the visit.
On December 10, 2020, Mother underwent a [parenting
capacity evaluation], conducted by William Russell, PhD. Dr.
Russell reported Mother was unable to provide a safe environment
for Child at that time, did not have appropriate housing or income,
had minimal family/social support, and had extensive mental
health history impacting her ability to parent. Recommendations
were for Mother to complete her [plan] objectives.
Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.
Where Child had been in DHS care since March 1, 2019, when he was
three weeks old, on December 28, 2020, DHS filed petitions to change the
goal to adoption, and to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). The trial court appointed Lisa Visco,
Esquire, as Child’s guardian ad litem and legal counsel (“GAL/Counsel”).3
____________________________________________
3 Child was two years old at the time of the termination hearing. The
GAL/Counsel stated that there is no conflict in representing both the best
interests and being legal counsel. N.T. 1/22/21, at 16. See In re Adoption
of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 174 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a)
mandates appointment of counsel for children involved in contested
involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings). See also In re T.S.,
192 A.3d 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018) (trial court did not err in allowing the
children’s guardian ad litem to act as their sole representative in termination
proceeding because, at two and three years old, they were incapable of
expressing their preferred outcome).
The GAL/Counsel has filed a brief in support of terminating Mother’s
parental rights. See In re: Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 670 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (en banc) (while this Court has authority to raise sua sponte
issue of whether the trial court appointed any counsel for the child, but not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On January 22, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
goal change and termination petitions. We note that at this time, Child was
almost two years old, and had been dependent since he was approximately
one month old. Mother participated via videoconference and was represented
by counsel. Father did not attend but was represented by counsel. The
GAL/Counsel was present on behalf of Child. DHS presented the testimony of
Summer Mills, CUA Case Manager, and Dr. William Russell. Mother testified
on her own behalf. On the same day, the trial court entered an order changing
Child’s permanent placement goal to adoption and a decree involuntarily
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child.
On February 17, 2021, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal
from the termination decree and goal change order, along with Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2) concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. On April 1,
2021, this Court sua sponte consolidated her appeals.
Mother raises the following claims for our review:
1. Did the [trial court] err in finding that [DHS] had met its burden
in proving grounds under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[ ] 2511(a)(2), (5), and
(8)?
2. Did the [trial court] err in finding that DHS had met its burden
to prove that termination would be in the child’s best interests,
under § 2511(b)?
____________________________________________
the authority to sua sponte review “whether a conflict existed between
counsel’s representation and the child’s stated preference in an involuntary
termination of parental rights proceeding”), aff’d 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020).
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3. Did the [trial court] err when it found that DHS by clear and
convincing evidence had met its burden to change child’s goal to
adoption?
4. Did the [trial court] err in failing to make a finding as to
“reasonable efforts”, and specifically as to assistance with
Mother’s [intellectual or developmental disabilities] challenges?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
II. Termination Under Subsection § 2511(a)
First, Mother asserts the trial court erred in finding DHS established by
clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate her parental rights under
Susbsection 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). Specifically, Mother argues she did
initiate efforts to remedy the conditions that led to the termination petition,
and she made progress with her objectives. In support, she maintains she
was consistent in her visitation, completed housing services through ARC,
engaged in parenting services through AIC, tested negative for drug use on
January 2 and 6, 2020, and obtained employment. With respect to
completing her objectives, she reasons that where the termination petition
was filed on December 28, 2020, and the hearing was held on January 22,
2021, she had “at most 25 days to” complete her efforts. Mother’s Brief at
13. Mother also contends DHS failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her
with the challenges presented by her intellectual or developmental disability.
We conclude no relief is due.
We note the relevant standard of review:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope
of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
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presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (citations omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of
parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b)[.]
In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree
with the court as to any one subsection of 2511(a) to affirm. In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the trial
court’s decision to terminate pursuant to Subsection 2511(a)(2), which
provides as follows:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
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necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). This Court has stated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[ ]
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted).
In its opinion, the trial court discussed its decision to terminate Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2):
Child has been involved with DHS since February 2019 and
committed to DHS custody since March 1, 2019, less than one
month after his birth[.] Mother’s [plan] objectives throughout the
life of the case were to: make herself available for and comply
with CUA services; comply with visitation; follow all mental health
treatment recommendations; comply with medication
management; participate in parenting classes; comply with all
court orders; obtain stable and appropriate housing, provide
proof, and allow the CUA Case Manager to assess [her] home;
obtain stable employment and provide proof; engage in dual
diagnosis treatment and follow all recommendations, including
availing for drug screens; comply with a PCE referral; comply with
ARC services to accomplish her objectives; and file a PFA against
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Father. Mother participated in [plan] meetings and was aware of
her objectives.
Trial Ct. Op. at 9 (record citations omitted).
With respect to Mother’s mental health, the trial court found: “Mother’s
mental health crisis was a determinant factor in committing Child to DHS
custody in March 2020 and she has not taken satisfactory action to ensure her
mental health will not cause repeated and continued incapacity, resulting in
Child being without essential care.” Trial Ct. Op. at 10. The court explained
in detail:
Mother has diagnoses of bipolar disorder, oppositional defiant
disorder, schizophrenia, and intellectual developmental
disabilities. Dr. William Russell,[ , who performed Mother’s
4
parenting capacity evaluation, testified that she] has been
prescribed Haldol, Depakote, and Abilify for her mental health
disorders, although her medication management has been
inconsistent with a history of noncompliance. Mother had been
refusing medication while at Northern early in the life of the case,
and explicitly reported noncompliance on December 2020. Mother
has also been involuntarily psychiatrically hospitalized and
ordered to engage in therapeutic treatment services, for which
she also has a history of noncompliance. Records reviewed by Dr.
Russell . . . indicated Mother has had ongoing psychiatric
treatment since 2004, but with a pattern of inconsistency and
noncompliance. After threatening to kill herself and staff at
Northern, Mother was involuntarily hospitalized at Belmont
Hospital and would repeatedly [go] AWOL from the facility.
Mother was also receiving counseling and substance abuse
treatment at Serenity for over a year; however, Mother’s
attendance was inconsistent, and she reportedly came on days no
____________________________________________
4 Here, the trial court noted a typographical error in the January 22, 2021,
notes of testimony. The testimony at pages 16 to 45 is attributed to “Ms.
Mills,” where the witness was in fact Dr. Russell. Trial Ct. Op. at 9 n.4.
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appointment was scheduled and would frequently state she no
longer needed therapy; between October . . . and December 2020,
Mother attended therapy at Serenity only three times. Mother did
not consistently comply with her objective to obtain dual diagnosis
treatment and was consistently found noncompliant throughout
the life of the case. Mother’s explanation for her inconsistency
and noncompliance with mental health treatment is that she
believes there is nothing “wrong with her” and she’s “cool. [She]
don’t [sic] need it.” [N.T. 1/22/21, at 54.] Mother has failed to
appropriately engage in her mental health objective due to
inconsistent attendance at therapy and noncompliance with
medication management. Mother was aware of her mental health
objective. . . .
Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (some record citations omitted and paragraph break
added).
With respect to Mother’s plan objectives concerning housing, parenting
capacity evaluation, parenting classes, and visitation, the trial court found as
follows:
Mother also has unstable housing. [N.T. at 23, 40, 95.]. Prior
to the termination hearing, Mother had been residing . . . in
placement at Northern. At the time of the termination hearing in
January of 2021, Mother resided with Maternal Grandmother, but
Dr. William Russell noted how their history had been volatile with
frequent fights . . . that had previously caused Mother to be placed
outside Maternal Grandmother’s home. [N.T. at 40.] The CUA
Case Manager stated housing with Maternal Grandmother is not
appropriate and that[,] despite multiple conversations with
Mother about her housing objective and options, Mother only
expressed interest in non-viable housing options. [N.T. at 62-65.]
Mother was aware of her housing objective and remained
noncompliant. [N.T. at 64, 95.] Mother was referred to ARC to
attend the housing, employment, and parenting programs.
Trial Ct. Op. at 10.
The trial court found the following with respect to Mother’s parenting
abilities:
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Mother completed her [parenting capacity] evaluation. Dr.
William Russell provided a professional opinion that Mother is
unable to provide safety for Child. Dr. Russell recommended that
Mother must successfully complete a parenting program and
family school, and engage in long-term therapy and medication
management. [N.T. at 30-35.] Parenting classes had remained
an objective for Mother throughout the life of the case, and Mother
was inconsistent in her compliance. [N.T. at 53, 64-65.] Mother
initially attended parenting classes through Tabor, then she was
referred to ARC. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parenting
classes became virtual; however, Mother inconsistently attended
classes. At the time of the termination trial, Mother had not
successfully completed her parenting program objective. [N.T. at
65-66.] Mother does not have adequate understanding of Child’s
developmental needs and could not have unsupervised visits with
Child throughout the case. [N.T. at 67.] Mother was also
minimally compliant with visitation. Mother has been inconsistent
with her visitation with Child throughout the life of the case.
Mother frequently would not attend, come late, or not confirm the
visit. [N.T. at 66.] Mother never graduated beyond supervised
visits at [DHS] with Child. [N.T. at 67.]
Mother’s behavior during visitations remained problematic.
DHS originally became involved in the case in part due to Mother’s
unsafe feeding practices. This behavior continued through
supervised visits, where Mother would attempt to feed Child
cookies despite him not having enough teeth and when instructed
to engage with Child in a safer and more appropriate manner,
Mother laughed. [N.T. at 67.] While Mother shows affection
towards Child, she becomes easily upset and irritated if Child cries
or screams and is unable to calm Child. [N.T. at 66-67.] Mother
and Child needed to be monitored every 15 minutes while at
Northern, and Mother has failed to learn safe parenting practices.
Mother never successfully completed a parenting program and
was inconsistent in attending her supervised visits. Mother is
unable to provide a safe environment for Child and has
refused to remedy the issues causing Child to be without
essential care. [N.T. at 68, 95].
Trial Ct. Op. at 11 (some record citations omitted and emphasis and paragraph
break added).
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The trial court, therefore, found the following with respect to section
2511(a)(2):
Overall and throughout the life of the case, Mother has been
minimally compliant with her [plan] objectives[ and] has failed to
successfully complete most of her critical [plan] objectives, such
as her mental health treatment, obtaining stable and appropriate
housing, participating in a dual diagnosis program, and
successfully completing a parenting program. [N.T. at 22-26, 40-
41, 62-64, 95.] The CUA Case Manager believes Mother does not
have adequate understanding of Child’s developmental needs.
[N.T. at 67.] The conditions and causes of Mother’s
incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by Mother. Child
was adjudicated dependent on March 4, 2019. Child had been in
DHS care for twenty-two months at the time of the termination
trial on January 22, 2021. Mother has attended almost all the
court hearings and is aware of her [plan] objectives. Mother had
ample opportunity to put herself in a position to adequately parent
and care for Child, but her repeated and continued incapacity
has not been mitigated. Mother is unable to meet Child’s basic
needs due to her lack of adequate understanding of parenting and
child developmental needs. [N.T. at 67.] The testimony of Dr.
William Russell and the CUA Case Manager was credible. Mother
has demonstrated an unwillingness to acknowledge or remedy the
causes of her incapacity to parent in order to provide Child with
essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his
physical and mental well-being. Termination under 23 Pa.C.S.[ ]
§ 2511(a)(2) was proper.
Trial Ct. Op. at 8-12 (emphases added).
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusions. The trial
court credited Ms. Mills’ testimony that Mother’s compliance with her plan was
minimal. See N.T. at 68. Dr. Russell opined that Mother did not have the
capacity to provide safety and permanency for Child based on her lengthy
history of mental health issues and her noncompliance and inconsistency with
treatment and medication. Id. at 22-23. Dr. Russell also expressed concern
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for Mother’s lack of income and appropriate housing, as well as minimal
community or family support. Id. Dr. Russell emphasized that “[t]he more
support you have, the better off you’re going to be, especially in this situation,
because we have a very young girl who, because of the toll from this
developmental history, is immature and is having a difficult time navigating
this.” Id. at 36.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that Mother is incapable of
providing Child with proper parental care, and that she cannot or will not
remedy her parental incapacity. Child has been in care since March 4, 2019,
22 months at the time of the termination hearing on January 22, 2021. N.T.
at 9-10. Despite almost two years of opportunities, Mother made only minimal
progress toward compliance with her goals. Child is in need of a permanent
and stable home, and his life cannot remain on hold forever. See In re
Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[A] child’s life
cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.”). Therefore, we discern
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511.
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III. Termination Under Subsection 2511(b)
In her second issue, Mother alleges DHS failed to present sufficient
evidence, pursuant to Subsection 2511(b), that termination would serve
Child’s best interests. Mother maintains there was “no direct evidence” as to
whether there was a bond between her and Child. Mother’s Brief at 19. She
also challenges the trial court’s inference that no bond existed, arguing such
an inference ignores “all the evidence of the interactions and relationships”
between her and Child. Id. Mother also avers “there was scant testimony” —
and not clear and convincing evidence — about the effect termination would
have on Child. Id. We conclude no relief is due.
Subsection 2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving
of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
This Court has stated:
Once the statutory requirement for involuntary termination of
parental rights has been established under subsection (a), the
court must consider whether the child’s needs and welfare will be
met by termination pursuant to subsection (b). In this context,
the court must take into account whether a bond exists between
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child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an
existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required
to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can
offer evaluations as well.
“Above all else…adequate consideration must be given to the
needs and welfare of the child.” A parent’s own feelings of love
and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of
parental rights.
Before granting a petition to terminate parental
rights, it is imperative that a trial court carefully consider
the intangible dimension of the needs and welfare of a
child — the love, comfort, security, and closeness —
entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the
tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also
important to a child, for whom severance of close
parental ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court,
in considering what situation would best serve the
child[ren]’s needs and welfare, must examine the status
of the natural parental bond to consider whether
terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy
something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing
of his…child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his . . . parental
duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment
of his . . . potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. A
parent cannot protect his parental rights by merely stating that he
does not wish to have his rights terminated.
Id. at 1120 (citation omitted). Pertinently,
In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the
parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The
extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008).
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Here, regarding section 2511(b), the trial court reasoned:
Mother has been only minimally compliant with supervised
visitation throughout the life of the case. [N.T. at 66, 74-75, 80,
95.] Mother was minimally compliant until October 2020, since
when [sic] she missed two weekly visits. [N.T. at 66, 74-75.]
Prior to October 2020, Mother was routinely inconsistent and
noncompliant. Mother would miss visits, show up late, and fail to
confirm visits, without any explanation. [N.T. at 66.] For the life
of case, Mother never graduated beyond weekly supervised visits
at [DHS] with Child. [N.T. at 67.] Mother’s behavior during
visitations remained very concerning throughout the case. Unsafe
feeding practices and other behavior continued through
supervised visits. Mother needed a lot of re-direction in order to
keep Child safe. [N.T. at 67.] While Mother shows affection
toward Child, she becomes easily upset and irritated if Child cries
or screams and [she] is unable to calm Child. [N.T. at 66-67.]
Mother and Child needed to be monitored every 15 minutes . . .
at Northern and Mother has failed to learn safe parenting
practices. The CUA Case Manager believed Mother does not have
adequate understanding of Child’s developmental needs and so
could not move toward unsupervised visits. [N.T. at 67.] The
CUA Case Manager noted that Child is “very, very bonded to the
foster parent” and becomes upset with Mother because he is not
with the people he primarily knows, the foster parents. [N.T. at
67.] The CUA Case Manager testified that Child cannot be safely
returned to Mother. [N.T. at 73.] It would be harmful to remove
Child from their [sic] current caregiver and return him to Mother.
[N.T. at 73.]
Child has been in foster care placement since birth and the
trial court found that there is no parental bond between Child and
Mother. [N.T. at 67-68, 96-97.] Because there is no apparent or
beneficial bond to preserve, it is in Child’s best interest to
terminate Mother’s parental rights and so be freed for adoption.
[N.T. at 67-68, 96-97.] Due to Mother’s inconsistent participation
in supervised visits, Mother has not created a parental bond with
Child. The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that termination would not sever an existing and beneficial
relationship with Mother. Mother is unable to provide stability to
Child and does not have a parental bond with Child. Mother is
unable to meet Child’s basic needs or provide safety. [N.T. at 67.]
Trial Ct. Op. at 17-18 (paragraph break added).
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The competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s
determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve Child’s
best interests. The trial court credited Ms. Mills’ testimony that Child is “very,
very bonded to the foster parent,” and Child views her as his parent figure.
See N.T., 1/22/21, at 67, 71. Ms. Mills testified further that Mother does not
have an adequate understanding of Child’s developmental needs. Id. at 67.
Contrary to Mother’s contentions, Dr. Russell and Ms. Mills provided ample
testimony in support of their opinions regarding Child’s relationship with
Mother. This is especially true given Child’s young age and the fact that he
has spent most of his life in foster care. In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d
434, 449 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The court should specifically consider that a child
develops a meaningful bond with a caretaker when the caretaker provides
stability, safety, and security regularly and consistently to the child over an
extended period of time.”).
The trial court appropriately considered Child’s need for safety and
stability and determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights best met
Child’s needs and welfare. After careful review, we find there is competent
evidence of record that supports the trial court’s decision that termination is
appropriate pursuant to section 2511(b). We do not discern an error of law
or abuse of discretion.
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IV. Permanency Goal Change to Adoption
We address Mother’s final two issues together as they are related. She
argues that the trial court erred, with respect to both its goal change and
termination decisions because, Mother contends, DHS failed to assist her or
make “reasonable efforts” with respect to her intellectual and developmental
disabilities. Mother also asserts the trial court “was unsympathetic . . . to
providing [her] with any more ‘ample time and opportunity;’” she reasons that
the “mere passage of time — without reasonable efforts . . . to assist [her] —
cannot suffice.” Mother’s Brief at 25. For example, with respect to her visits
with Child, Mother avers there was “no indication that she was offered any
assistance in keeping organized, keeping a calendar, and managing her
affairs.” Id. at 27. Finally, Mother claims she was denied a full opportunity
at the termination hearing to cross examine Dr. Russell, who had performed
the “Parenting Capacity Evaluation.” Id. at 26. Mother points out Dr. Russell’s
testimony, “I think the biggest issue there is finding [Mother] help.” Id. We
conclude no relief is due.
We address these issues mindful of the following.
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).
Moreover, we have stated:
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It is this Court’s responsibility to ensure that the record represents
a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied
the appropriate legal principles to that record. Nevertheless, we
accord great weight to the court’s fact-finding function because
the court is in the best position to observe and rule on the
credibility of the parties and witnesses.
Interest of D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
Further, we have instructed:
Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the
juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing
necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent
of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of
progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and
feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a
likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement
for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best
interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must
guide the trial court. As this Court has held, “a child’s life simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon
the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
As stated above,
“[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts
to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.”
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.
In its opinion, the trial court found DHS and CUA made reasonable
efforts to reunify Mother and Child and assist Mother with her developmental
and disability needs:
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. . . . DHS and CUA have indeed made reasonable efforts in this
case. The docket reflects that the trial court found reasonable
efforts were made in this case from March 4, 2019, up until the
termination on January 22, 2021. At the termination trial [in]
January 2021, Child had been in placement since birth for twenty-
two months. [N.T. at 96-97.] The docket reflects that Mother had
been ordered and the CUA Case Manager made the necessary
referrals for ARC services, dual diagnosis assessment, supervised
visits, and assisted Mother with mental health.
The CUA Case Manager had been working with Mother and
Child for the life of the case. [N.T. at 46.] Mother had originally
been committed to DHS on her own, as a minor, [in] September
2018, prior to the birth of Child. [N.T. at 48.] The CUA Case
Manager testified that when Mother turned 18, her commitment
was discharged due to Mother often being AWOL from placement
and refusing services. [N.T. at 48-49.] After Mother’s discharge,
she still refused services while in a mother-baby program at
Northern and was “302”[5] due to erratic behavior, which as the
CUA Case Manager testified, was one of the reasons the OPC for
Child was initially obtained. [N.T. at 49.]The CUA Case Manager
testified that Mother AWOL’d from multiple facilities after being
302 [sic]. [N.T. at 52-53.]
Mother was informed that after age 18, she could continue
under DHS care through a board extension but [she] refused as
“there was too many rules and regulations.” [N.T. at 53.] The
CUA Case Manager, despite Mother’s inconsistency, would do
video calls, phone calls, and in-person visits. The CUA Case
Manager would provide resources for Mother, by highlighting
bullet points, and giving verbal explanations of expectations to
her. The CUA Case Manager would check-in with Mother’s
therapist monthly to check on Mother’s attendance. [N.T. at 54.]
Mother would tell the CUA Case Manager she was consistent in
attending her weekly therapy, but the therapist indicated
otherwise. [N.T. at 55-56.] When the CUA Case Manager
discussed improving attendance in therapy and potential barriers
____________________________________________
5 See Mental Health Procedures Act (Act), 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503. See also
50 P.S. § 7302 (regarding involuntary emergency examination and treatment
authorized by a physician.)
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or assistance Mother may need to do so, Mother would argue she
did not need therapy. [N.T. at 55-56.]
Mother was also recommended for targeted case
management, a higher level of case management, which she
began but did not complete due to inconsistency and
noncompliance. [N.T. at 57.] The CUA Case Manager testified
she had worked with the [A]gency’s Community Behavioral Health
representative regarding intellectual disability services Mother
could receive upon turning 18 years old. Mother refused these
services, arguing she “was tired of people putting things in her
head that didn’t belong there” and people were “trying to call her
slow”, which Mother believed was incorrect. [N.T. at 59-60.]
Testimony indicated that in order to receive intellectual
disability services, Mother needed an original birth certificate, so
the CUA Case Manager obtained one for [her. N.T. at 60.] Mother
still needed her Social Security card, and so the CUA Case
Manager connected Mother with the Homeless Advocacy Project
and with the Achieving Independence Center (“AIC”), both of
whom have been attempting to help Mother obtain her Social
Security card for a full year. [N.T. at 60-61.] They also applied
for Social Security disability benefits on behalf of Mother, but the
application was denied based on Mother’s inconsistency in mental
health treatment. An application was resubmitted. [N.T. at 60-
61.]
Along with refusal or inconsistency and noncompliance with
mental health services, Mother also refused housing services. In
the six months preceding the January 2021 termination, Mother
had three different addresses on record. [N.T. at 61.] The CUA
Case Manager and AIC discussed with Mother multiple times the
possibility of DHS reentry through Act 91 and stabilizing her
housing in this manner, but Mother consistently rejects viable
options. [N.T. at 62-63.] The CUA Case Manager also testified
that [DHS] was unable to help Mother submit a PHMC [Public
Health Management Corporation] housing grant application unless
Mother had suitable employment. Mother did not obtain
employment until December 2020. [N.T. at 78-79.] Mother was
also noncompliant with the parenting program. [N.T. at 65.]
Despite ARC services performing extensive outreach to Mother,
she did not complete her parenting program. [N.T. at 65.] Mother
was also noncompliant and inconsistent with visitation services.
The CUA Case Manager testified to popping in on supervised visits
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if Mother showed up; however, Mother was inconsistent and would
“show up late or she wouldn’t confirm at all.” [N.T. at 51, 66.]
Mother was offered services for the life of this case, and prior
to Child’s birth, but refused services or was noncompliant and
inconsistent. Mother’s assertion of lack of reasonable efforts by
DHS and the CUA Case Manager lacks merit both factually and
based on the case law of this Commonwealth.
Trial Ct. Op. at 19-20 (paragraphs breaks added).
The trial court also credited Dr. Russell’s testimony with respect to
providing additional services to Mother:
[She has a] rather immature appreciation for the fact that she has
some problems that need to be addressed.
She tends to minimize and pretend that she has no problems,
and that she really doesn’t have a mood disorder, and that she
can get herself along okay, that she can provide adequate care
and safety for her child.
. . . I think the biggest issue there is finding [Mother] help in
addressing and understanding that she does have problems, and
that they do require ongoing, long-term support in order for her
to develop the ability to provide an environment that would be
safe.
See N.T., 1/22/21, at 24-25.
Ms. Mills recounted an extensive history of Mother’s refusal to
consistently cooperate with services. Ms. Mills indicated that Mother was often
dishonest regarding her compliance with services. N.T., 1/22/21, at 56. Ms.
Mills testified at length to the programs and services that were offered to
Mother, and Mother’s repeated noncompliance. Id. at 51, 62-63, 65-66.
Notably, at the termination hearing, when asked if Mother would like more
intensive therapy services, Mother responded, “[T]o be honest, I really feel
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like I don’t really need it because I don’t have issues like how I had before
[when I was a minor].” Id. at 91.
After a careful review, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s
determinations. The record demonstrates that Mother was not able to provide
appropriate parental care or control for Child at the time of the goal change
order, and that it would be in Child’s best interest to be adopted by his foster
parent. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of
law in concluding that Child’s life should not remain on hold indefinitely and
determining that a goal change to adoption would be in his best interest. See
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513. See also T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,
269 (Pa. 2013) (stressing the need to expedite the placement of dependent
children “in permanent, safe, stable, and loving homes”).
Accordingly, as we find that the trial court did not commit an error of
law or an abuse of discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the termination
decree, as well as the order changing Child’s permanent placement goal to
adoption.
Decree and order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/6/2021
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