In the Int. of: I.B., Appeal of: T.B. ( 2021 )

J-S15002-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 136 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000199-2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: AUGUST 9, 2021
T.B. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s order involuntarily
terminating his parental rights to his minor son, I.B. (Child) (born 10/2017).
After careful review, we affirm.
Child was placed in Father’s care by the Allegheny County Office of
Children, Youth and Families (CYF), after being released from the hospital
following his birth in October of 2017. A.C. (Mother)1 had given birth to Child
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Mother has also filed an appeal from the court’s order terminating her
parental rights to Child. Mother’s appeal is docketed at 183 WDA 2021.
Because the factual circumstances underlying termination were different in
each case, we have not consolidated the appeals.
J-S15002-21
while she was incarcerated2 for theft at Allegheny County Jail. In November
of 2017, CYF received three reports regarding Father; for each incident, CYF
reported to Father’s home and addressed each of the allegations with him.
N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/18/20, at 14. The third report involved a
deceased man being discovered in Father’s home, when neither Father nor
Child were present. Father reported to CYF that the decedent was a friend
who had fatally overdosed on drugs in his home. Id. at 15. As a result of
that incident, CYF implemented crisis in-home services to offset removal of
Child from Father’s care. Id.
On December 15, 2017, Child was removed from Father’s home after
police executed a search warrant at the residence and found people in Father’s
home under the influence of heroin with Child present and recovered several
stamp bags of heroin from the home. Id. at 15-16, 80. Father was arrested
and, after being read his Miranda3 rights, told the police “[he] quit selling two
weeks ago.” Id. at 80-81. In January of 2018, Father was ordered to undergo
a drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with random urine screens. Order,
1/16/18. On March 29, 2018, Father was arrested again after police
discovered heroin and cocaine in a vehicle in which Father was a passenger.
____________________________________________
2 Upon her release from prison, Mother was scheduled to be discharged to a
90-day inpatient drug treatment program where she was not permitted to
have custody of Child. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 10/23/20, at 12.
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-2-
J-S15002-21
N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/18/20, at 80-82.4 An additional eight bundles
of heroin were recovered from a subsequent search of Father’s residence. Id.
at 83-84. On July 10, 2018, Father pled guilty to one count of possession of
a controlled substance,5 resulting from the 2017 raid on his home, and one
count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance,6 as a result
of his 2018 arrest. In August of 2018, the court ordered Father to secure
stable, safe housing and limited his visits with Child to unsupervised,
community visits. Order, 8/9/18.
From the time of Child’s removal, CYF had concerns regarding Father’s
association with drugs and drug users in his home. N.T. Termination Hearing,
12/18/20, at 46. Father was not permitted to have unsupervised visits with
Child in his home due to ongoing concerns that he was allowing people to use
drugs there. Id. at 73. Mother reported to Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., a
psychiatric expert, that she had overdosed in Father’s home in November of
2018. See Report of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., 2/28/19, at 3. The court’s
continued concern about Father’s drug involvement was also based upon the
observations by Father’s CYF visit supervisor, Kristina Scott, and his Project
STAR parenting coach, Coach Kirk Thoma. During one visit, Coach Thoma
observed Father answer his phone and tell the caller, “I’ll get the money to
____________________________________________
4 Ten bundles of heroin were recovered from the driver.
A Ziploc bag of crack
cocaine and $591.00 were found on Father’s person. Id. at 83.
5 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(1).
6 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
-3-
J-S15002-21
you after my visit with my son.” N.T. Termination Hearing, 10/23/20, at 127-
29. During coached parenting sessions, Father would frequently talk to Coach
Thoma about money. One conversation included discussing an Audi that
Father had recently purchased in cash. Id. at 130 (Q: “[I]f we’re
talking about just [F]ather talking about money, [F]ather recently purchased
a ca[;] It’s an Audi and he told me what he had paid for it in cash. Q.
And what did [F]ather admit to you? A: For the car he paid $24,000 in
cash.”). Coach Thoma also testified that Father told him “numerous times”
that he “traded taking drugs and he became addicted more to the money of
selling drugs[.]” Id. at 131. Father also mentioned to Dr. Rosenblum that he
enjoyed the “financial gains” of selling drugs. Id. at 55.
Both Coach Thoma and Ms. Scott were concerned about the frequent
visitors to Father’s home and the numerous phone calls Father would receive
during visits and coaching sessions. Ms. Scott reported that Father received
as many as twenty phone calls during his visits with Child and that between
August of 2018 and April of 2019, there were approximately eighteen incidents
of people knocking on Father’s door during a visit. Id. at 91-92. When Father
did not answer the door, these individuals “would go around the back of the
home and knock on the window.” Id. at 91.
Although the number of visitors to Father’s home decreased after he
moved to a new neighborhood in May of 2019, Father continued to receive
concerning phone calls and visitors during supervised visits with Child and his
parent coaching sessions. N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/18/20, at 92.
-4-
J-S15002-21
Between May of 2019 and October of 2020, approximately one dozen visitors
came to Father’s new residence during parent coaching sessions. Id.,
10/23/20, at 124. According to Coach Thoma, at least two individuals
appeared regularly at Father’s new home: a “younger” man, who began
visiting in early July of 2019, and an “underweight and very pale” woman, who
“didn’t have a very healthy overall look about her.” Id. at 124-27. In one
instance, which Coach Thoma found “kind of weird,” this woman interrupted
a parent coaching session, ostensibly to use Father’s phone. Id. During a
home assessment on August 7, 2019, a CYF caseworker observed a “very
thin” woman sitting on Father’s bed who was “significantly younger than
him[,] which is the dynamic between him and [Child’s] mom.” Id., 12/18/20,
at 70. When the caseworker expressed her concerns to Father, he said the
woman was “just a friend.” Id.
Father also continued to receive an inordinate number of phone calls
during visits after moving to his new residence. Coach Thoma testified that
generally, during sessions with Father:
There were countless, countless phone calls. Father would usually
say they’re robo[t] phone calls, but not always, and there were
times when he did answer and would get mad at the person or
persons because he would explain to them that he was in the
middle of a visit and that he could talk to them afterwards, but
there were many, many phone calls throughout all the visits.
Id. at 127.
On November 9, 2019, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5),
-5-
J-S15002-21
(8), and (b). Termination hearings took place on October 23, 2020, and
December 18, 2020. At the second termination hearing, Father denied selling
drugs or using drug money to purchase the Audi. N.T. Termination Hearing,
12/18/20, at 136-37. When asked how he was able to afford the car, Father
said that “[he] started saving . . . [his] Social Security, [his] unemployment
[compensation], and [his salary from his] job, . . . because [he] didn’t want
to catch the bus anymore.” Id. at 137-38. Father admitted that “[he knew]
the people who sell the drugs . . . [and] used to get drugs and give it to them,”
id. at 136, but that now he sold drugs to his friends because “they were in
sickness. They were so sick. They begged.” Id. at 147. Father acknowledged
having a criminal history of selling drugs, but testified that he stopped because
it was “causing [him] too [many] problems.”7 Id. at 147. When asked about
the frequent visitors to his home, Father testified on cross-examination as
follows:
____________________________________________
7 Father explained:
[W]hen I used to sell drugs in 2005, I went to jail. I used to sell
crack. The police told me, he said, [“]man[”], he said, [“]you are
one of the nicest dope dealers I ever met[,”] but I got out of it . .
. and then all of a sudden this heroin came out[.] . . . I used to
get heroin for people who I knew but I don’t do that no more
because it is causing me too [many] problems. Just like the officer
said that when I got arrested [in March of 2018], [“W]here [did]
this crack came from[?”] I don’t know because I just caught a
ride, you know. In my opinion, I think the cop was lying because
nobody in that apartment had no crack. Nobody smokes crack. I
don’t.
Id. at 147.
-6-
J-S15002-21
Child’s counsel: Just so we’re clear, you’re saying that you were
never selling drugs, you were buying drugs and giving them –
Father: They would give me the money but I know the people
that I was dealing with, okay.
Child’s counsel: So then you had people coming to your home
that were looking for drugs and wanted you to buy them drugs,
right?
Father: Sometimes, yes, ma’am.
Child’s counsel: Okay.
Father: Sometimes they came and asked me but I didn’t do
it.
Child’s counsel: Do you understand why that was a concern for
CYF and a concern for the [c]ourt?
Father: Yes, that’s why I quit all of that, yes.
Id. at 146.
During his psychological evaluations with Dr. Rosenblum, Father
acknowledged that throughout 2018, he would periodically obtain drugs for
friends because he has a hard time saying no to people. N.T. Termination
Hearing, 10/23/20, at 55. Father “fully admitted each and every time” he met
with Dr. Rosenblum that “[Father i]s too nice of a guy, that he has a hard time
turning people down, and of course particularly in regard to . . . [M]other.”
Id. at 56. As recently as September of 2020, Father told Dr. Rosenblum that
he gave Mother money when she asked, although he insisted she was not
using the money for drugs. Report of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., 10/9/20, at 8.
On December 18, 2020, the trial court entered an order terminating
Father’s parental rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of
-7-
J-S15002-21
the Adoption Act.8 Father filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Father presents the following issues for our review:
(1) Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion
in finding [CYF] met [its] burden of proof and proved by clear
and convincing evidence that [Father’s] parental rights should
be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[§] 2511(a)(2),
(a)(5), and (a)(8).
(2) Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion
in finding [CYF] met [its] burden of proof and proved by clear
and convincing evidence that terminating [Father’s] parental
rights best meets [Child’s] needs and welfare pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
Father’s Brief, at 5.
We review the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental
rights for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560,
563 (Pa. Super. 2003). Our standard of review is well-settled:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
____________________________________________
8 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.
-8-
J-S15002-21
Under section 2511 of the Adoption Act,9 termination of parental rights
requires a bifurcated analysis that initially focuses on “the conduct of the
parent and whether the party seeking termination has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination.” In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). The
party seeking termination of parental rights bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that at least one of eight grounds for
termination under section 2511(a) exists, and that termination promotes the
emotional needs and welfare of the child as set forth in section 2511(b). In
re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006). The standard of clear and
convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty,
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re A.L.D.,
797 A.2d 326, 336 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In his first issue on appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that CYF met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that his parental rights should be terminated under sections
2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). Specifically, Father claims that termination is
improper where he has complied with his court-ordered goals to remedy the
conditions that led to Child’s removal, CYF failed to provide necessary services
____________________________________________
9 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
-9-
J-S15002-21
to reunify him with Child, and termination would not best serve Child’s needs
and welfare. Father’s Brief, at 19.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly
found “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing” evidence supporting termination
of Father’s parental rights exist pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).10 See
id.; In re A.L.D., supra.
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8), a petitioner
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
[(1)] The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court[; (2) twelve] months or more have
elapsed from the date of removal[; (3)] the conditions which
led to the removal [] of the child continue to exist[;] and
[(4)] termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). “[T]ermination under subsection (a)(8) ‘does not
require an evaluation of [the parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the
conditions that led to placement of the children.’ Instead, subsection (a)(8)
‘requires only that the conditions continue to exist’ after the twelve[-]month
period has elapsed.” In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679–80 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
____________________________________________
10 While the trial court also found grounds for termination under subsections
2511(a)(2) and (5), we may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any singular subsection of section
2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
- 10 -
J-S15002-21
The first two prongs of section 2511(a)(8) was clearly satisfied here, as
Child had been removed from Father’s care, by the court, for almost three
years at the time of the termination hearings.11 While application of
subsection (a)(8) “may seem harsh” when a parent has demonstrated
progress in remedying the conditions, “the statute implicitly recognizes that a
child’s life cannot be held in abeyance” and the statutory and case law
“contemplates only a short period of time . . . in which to complete the process
of either reunification or adoption.” In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 997 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citation omitted). See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[A]lthough Mother exhibited substantial progress in
meeting the Agency’s objectives, she ultimately was unable to care for [her
child] because, twelve months later, she could not provide the requisite
parenting and adequate housing.”).
____________________________________________
11 Here, Child was removed from Father on December 15, 2017. Father’s
contention that a period of two to two and a half years can be a “reasonable
period of time” to remedy conditions, Father’s Brief, at 16, is only applicable
to section 2511(a)(5), not section 2511(a)(8). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)
(termination of parental rights proper where petitioner proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, that “[t]he child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court . . . for a period of at least six months, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not
likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child”) (emphasis added);
see also In re Adoption of R.K.Y, supra.- 11 -
J-S15002-21
With regard to the third prong of section 2511(a)(8)—the conditions that
led to Child’s initial removal—the record bears out the fact that Father’s
lifestyle and association with drug sales and drug users continue to exist. This
Court has concluded that termination is proper under subsection (a)(8) where
“at the time of the termination hearing, [the parent’s] drug[-]related issues
continued to impact [the child] and [the parent’s] ability to care for [the
child].” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006–07 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).12
Specifically, “[a] child cannot be returned to a home in which drug activity is
occurring,” especially when drug activity is among the conditions that led to
the initial removal, regardless of whether a parent continued to engage in
personal drug use.13 Id.; In re Adoption of M.A.R., 591 A.2d 1133, 1137
(Pa. Super. 1991) (father’s drug convictions and fact that he frequented
mother’s home relevant evidence to assess mother’s home environment for
purposes of termination analysis).
____________________________________________
12 In In re C.L.G., this Court stated:
Regardless of whether [m]other used drugs in the twelve months
prior to the Agency’s termination, the fact remains that, at the
time of the termination hearing, [m]other’s drug[-]related issues
continued to impact [child] and [m]other’s ability to care for
[child]. Thus, it is the underlying drug issues [that] preclude
[m]other from properly caring for [child] and not the
incarceration, which is merely a consequence of [m]other’s
inability to lead a life free from involvement with drugs.
Id. at 1006–07 (emphasis added).
13 There is no evidence of record to suggest that Father has used drugs since
Child’s birth.
- 12 -
J-S15002-21
Instantly, Child was initially removed from Father’s care in December of
2017 after police discovered heroin and active drug use in Father’s home in
the presence of Child. Mother also overdosed in Father’s home eleven months
after Child’s removal. Father has never progressed to unsupervised visitation
with Child in his home due to the number of suspicious visitors and phone calls
Father would receive during supervised visits. These visitors and phone calls
continued after Father moved to a new home in May of 2019. In March of
2018, Father was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to drug-related
charges. Father has been the target of multiple search warrants, before and
after Child’s removal, resulting in heroin being recovered from his residence.
Most significantly, Father has acknowledged he has trouble saying “no” when
people ask him to buy drugs for them or when Mother asks him for money.
Father has also admitted to enjoying the money he made selling drugs.
Although Father may genuinely love his son and has demonstrated
moderate compliance with his court-ordered plan, Father has been unable to
lead a life free from involvement with drugs in the three years since Child was
removed from his care. Thus, a significant safety concern for Child continues
to exist, which satisfies the third prong under section 2511(a)(8). In re
D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197, 205-06 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“[T]his Court has held that,
where a parent has addressed some of the conditions that led to a child’s
removal, but other conditions still exist, [the third prong of section
2511(a)(8)] may be deemed to be satisfied.”). Cf. In re R.A.M.N., 230 A.3d
423, 428-29 (Pa. Super. 2020) (termination petition denied where no factual
- 13 -
J-S15002-21
basis to conclude conditions warranting children’s initial removal continued to
exist; agency failed to present evidence demonstrating parent will fail to
protect children).
With regard to the fourth prong of section 2511(a)(8), that termination
would best serve the child’s needs and welfare, this Court has explained:
[W]hile both [s]ection 2511(a)(8) and [s]ection 2511(b) direct us
to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required
to resolve the analysis relative to [s]ection 2511(a)(8), prior to
addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed
by [s]ection 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must
address [s]ection 2511(a) before reaching [s]ection 2511(b).
In re C.L.G., supra at 1009. “[T]he analysis under [s]ection 2511(a)(8)
accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent.”
Id. at 1008-09.
Instantly, the trial court did not specifically conduct a needs and welfare
analysis under section 2511(a)(8), but, did address Child’s needs and welfare
generally under a best interest analysis. In its best interest analysis, the court
determined that “Father’s lifestyle would undoubtably create an unsafe and
unstable environment for [Child] . . . [and] Father’s poor judgment in general,
as well as with regard to Mother[,] would most certainly subject the child to
danger and disruption.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/21, at 25-26.14 Relying on
____________________________________________
14 “In Dr. Rosenblum’s final evaluation, he concluded that ‘it remains difficult
to view [Father] as capable of providing [Child] with a supportive home
environment or guiding his development in [a] secure direction.’” Id. at 25
(quoting Report of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., 10/9/20, at 11).
- 14 -
J-S15002-21
the expert opinion of Dr. Rosenblum, the court also determined that “removing
[Child] from his current placement could have long[-]lasting harmful effects
on him.”15 Id. at 28. Because the trial court’s best interest analysis
considered Father’s behavior, as well as Child’s need for safety and stability,
we find the trial court did not err in concluding that the needs and welfare of
Child support termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to the third
prong of section 2511(a)(8). See In re C.L.G., supra at 1009 (expert opinion
regarding parent’s inability to meet needs and welfare and harm of removing
child from current placement satisfied fourth prong of section 2511(a)(8)).
Thus, we conclude that CYF met its burden in proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, termination was warranted under section 2511(a)(8). See In re
L.M., supra.Having concluded that termination was proper under subsection (a)(8),
we may now move on to subsection 2511(b) – “other considerations,” – which
includes a needs and welfare analysis. Pursuant to section 2511(b), “[t]he
court[,] in terminating the rights of a parent[,] shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs and
____________________________________________
15 See Report of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., 10/9/20, at 11 (“[Child] remains a
very sensitive and[,] at times[,] emotionally insecure youngster who does not
adjust well to change. As such it would be highly disruptive to [Child’s]
attachment process and emotional[] well[-]being to remove him from [his
current placement.]”).
- 15 -
J-S15002-21
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).16 The section 2511(b) needs
and welfare analysis is determined under the standard of best interests of the
child. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). “One major aspect
of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the
effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.” Id.Father argues that preservation of natural family bonds should be
favored over severing the bond between Father and Child forever. Father’s
Brief, at 22 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982)).
We note that section 2511(b) “does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 11 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal citations omitted). Rather, the bond between a parent and child is
“only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining
what is in the best interests of the child.” Id. In considering a child’s needs
and welfare under section 2511(b), “[t]he court may equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child and may consider intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.”
In re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 984 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
Here, the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Rosenblum to
conclude that severing any existing bond between Father and Child would not
____________________________________________
16 Likewise, “[w]ith respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection[s]
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to
remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent
to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
- 16 -
J-S15002-21
cause Child to suffer any detrimental effects. Doctor Rosenblum opined that
“[although Child] knows his parents[,] he does not have a primary attachment
to either [M]other or [F]ather.” Report of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., 10/9/20, at
11. Moreover, Dr. Rosenblum concluded that Child has developed an
increasingly secure attachment with his foster parents and thrives in their
care. Id. In fact, in Dr. Rosenblum’s opinion, removing Child from his foster
home would put Child at risk of developing a serious attachment disorder. Id.
Accordingly, Dr. Rosenblum concluded that adoption is the only permanency
outcome consistent with Child’s needs and welfare.17 Id. In light of this, we
conclude that the trial court properly determined that termination would serve
Child’s needs and welfare under section 2511(b) where Father is not capable
of providing the safety and security Child needs and where Child’s need for
permanency weighs heavily. In re M.P., supra.Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings are supported in
the record and that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor committed
____________________________________________
17 We note that Foster Mother told Coach Thoma that “if [Child] doesn’t go
with [F]ather, meaning that if [Child] is adopted, . . . [Father] will have so
many visits with [Child] that [Father] will get sick of him.” N.T. Termination
Hearing, 10/23/20, at 133-43. Perhaps the best option for Father at this
juncture is to seek a mutual agreement with foster parents to permit him to
visit with Child if and when he is adopted by foster parents. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2731 (provides option for adoptive parents and birth relatives to enter into
voluntary agreement for ongoing communication or contact that: “(1) is in
the best interest of the child; (2) recognizes the parties’ interests and desires
for ongoing communication or contact; (3) is appropriate given the role of the
parties in the child’s life; and (4) is subject to approval by the courts”).
- 17 -
J-S15002-21
an error of law in terminating Father’s parental rights under sections
2511(a)(8) and (b). In re T.S.M., supra.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/09/2021
- 18 -