Com. v. Mayers, N. ( 2021 )

J-S23008-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NELSON ALEXANDER MAYERS :
:
Appellant : No. 361 EDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 4, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002743-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 9, 2021
Nelson Alexander Mayers appeals from the order, entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Northampton County, denying his petition filed pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After
careful review, we affirm on the basis of the opinion authored by the Honorable
Jennifer R. Sletvold.
On May 16, 2019, Mayers entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count
of driving under the influence—third offense, graded as a misdemeanor of the
first degree. That same day, the court sentenced Mayers to a term of one to
five years’ incarceration. Mayers did not file post-sentence motions or a direct
appeal.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On January 27, 2020, Mayers, acting pro se, filed a timely first PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition, in which
Mayers alleged ineffectiveness of plea counsel. Specifically, Mayers claimed
that his plea was unlawfully induced by counsel, resulting in an unknowing
and involuntary plea. Mayers further alleged that counsel failed to conduct
any investigation, failed to file a requested pre-trial motion to suppress blood
evidence, failed to meet and consult with him, and failed to pursue defenses
requested by Mayers. The court held a hearing on September 24, 2020. On
January 4, 2021, the court denied relief. Mayers filed a timely notice of
appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal.
Mayers raises the following claim for our review: “Whether the PCRA
court erred in denying the requested relief where ineffective assistance of
counsel caused Mayers to enter an involuntary and unknowing plea?” Brief of
Appellant, at 4.
Our well-settled standard of review for an order denying a PCRA petition
is as follows:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This
review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence
of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is
supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
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petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted). The PCRA court’s credibility findings are binding on the appellate
courts where such determinations are supported by the record.
Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 2015).
Our Supreme Court has explained that:
To obtain PCRA relief, appellant must plead and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence [that]: (1) his conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the errors enumerated in
42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2); (2) his claims have not been
previously litigated or waived, id., § 9543(a)(3); and (3) “the
failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial . . . or on direct
appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic[,]
or tactical decision by counsel[,]” id., § 9543(a)(4). An issue is
previously litigated if “the highest appellate court in which
appellant could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on
the merits of the issue.” Id., § 9544(a)(2). “An issue is waived
if appellant could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at
trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”
Id., § 9544(b).
To be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA
petitioner must establish [that]: (1) the underlying claim has
arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s
action or failure to act; and (3) he suffered prejudice as a result
of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a
reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, [] 30 A.3d 1111,
1127 ([Pa.] 2011) ([citing] Commonwealth v. Pierce, [] 527
A.2d 973, 975-76 ([Pa.] 1987)). Counsel is presumed to have
rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Ali, [] 10 A.3d
282, 291 ([Pa.] 2010). Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth
v. Jones, [] 912 A.2d 268, 278 ([Pa.] 2006). Finally, because a
PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to be entitled
to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements of an
ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim fails
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under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on that
basis.
Treiber, 121 A.3d at 444-45 (brackets and footnote omitted).
Additionally, our Supreme Court has reiterated that:
Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused [A]ppellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. In
determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and
intelligently, a reviewing court must review all of the
circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2014) (citations
omitted).
To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super.
2016). “Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea
was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of
proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa.
Super. 2018). Where an appellant affirms on the record at the plea colloquy
hearing that he is satisfied with his attorney’s services in connection with his
plea, the appellant is then precluded from contradicting himself in collateral
proceedings and claiming he was coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. See
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002),
citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Super. 1996);
see also Kpou, 153 A.3d at 1024, citing Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832
A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound
by the statement he makes in open court while under oath and he may not
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later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements
he made at his plea colloquy.”).
During a plea colloquy, a trial court is required to elicit the defendant’s
understanding of six areas to ensure that the defendant comprehends the full
impact and consequences of his plea: (1) the nature of the charges to which
he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) the right to a trial
by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible range of
sentences; and (6) the court’s power to depart from any recommended
sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. See also Kpou, 153 A.3d at
1023. A written colloquy signed by the defendant may supplement an oral
colloquy as long as there is some on-the-record examination of the defendant.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
Here, we have reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the
applicable law, and conclude that the well-written and thorough opinion
authored by Judge Sletvold correctly disposes of Mayers’ claim on appeal.
Specifically, Judge Sletvold notes that she engaged in a lengthy oral colloquy
in which Mayers acknowledged: (1) that he was neither promised anything in
exchange for his plea, nor forced or threatened in order to induce the plea;
(2) that counsel answered all of his questions and he was satisfied with her
representation; (3) the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty,
i.e. DUI—third offense; (4) the factual basis for his plea; (5) the range of
possible sentences; (6) his right to a jury trial; (7) the presumption of
innocence; and (8) that he understood, completed, and initialed the written
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guilty plea colloquy.1 See Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/21, at 4-7, quoting N.T.
Guilty Plea/Sentencing Hearing, 5/16/19, at 1-6.
Additionally, Judge Sletvold credited the testimony of Mayers’ plea
counsel, who testified at the PCRA hearing that: (1) she routinely reviews
with her clients discovery, potential defenses, and plea offers; (2) Mayers
never requested that she file pre-trial motions; (3) she saw nothing in the
record to warrant the filing of pre-trial motions; (4) Mayers’ desire was to
quickly resolve the matter and receive inpatient treatment; (5) Mayers never
indicated that he did not wish to proceed with his plea; (6) Mayers never
sought to withdraw his plea after sentencing; and (7) “based on the discovery,
including video from the DUI center, there is nothing that would have cause[d]
her to change her course of action in this matter.” Id. at 8-9, citing N.T. PCRA
Hearing, 9/24/20, at 28.2
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1 In addition, the written plea colloquy confirmed Mayers’ understanding that
the court would not be bound by the terms of the plea agreement. See Guilty
Plea Statement, 5/16/19, at ¶ 28.
2 Further, in his written plea colloquy, Mayers affirmed that: (1) he was
satisfied with his attorney’s representation, see id. at ¶ 42; (2) he had
sufficient time to consult with his attorney before entering his plea, see id. at
¶ 43; (3) his attorney reviewed with him possible defenses to the charges and
potential witnesses to call, see id. at 44; and (4) he had not asked his
attorney to do anything for him in connection with the charges that the
attorney had not done, see id. at 45.
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In light of the foregoing, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief on the basis
of Judge Sletvold’s opinion and direct the parties to attach a copy of that
opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2021
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Circulated 07/28/2021 09:56 AM