Wakefield, D. v. Zaken, M. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DALE MICHAEL WAKEFIELD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL ZAKEN
Appellee No. 1066 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
Civil Division at No.: 2020-50505
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: AUGUST 10, 2021
Appellant Michael Zaken pro se appeals from the September 23, 2020
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County (“trial
court”), dismissing his third petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying his
third request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are uncontested.1 Since
2014, Appellant has been serving a life sentence at SCI-Somerset imposed
after he pled guilty to murder and aggravated assault. In early 2018, the
Commonwealth charged Appellant with criminal homicide, assault by prisoner,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Unless otherwise specified, these facts come from this Court’s June 3, 2020
Memorandum decision affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s
second petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying his second IFP petition.
Wakefield v. Gilmore, No. 1371 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum, at
1-3 (Pa. Super. filed June 3, 2020).
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and aggravated assault after prison staff discovered Appellant’s cellmate dead
in their shared cell in the restricted housing unit. The Commonwealth filed a
notice of aggravating circumstances and intent to seek the death penalty.
Appellant waived his right to counsel and filed numerous pro se pretrial
motions.
On May 2, 2018, Appellant pro se filed his first request to proceed IFP
and his first petition for writ of habeas corpus (docket number 249 Civil 2018),
claiming that criminal homicide is not a valid charge and that it, therefore,
fails to confer necessary subject matter jurisdiction over his case to the court
of common pleas. The civil division of the Somerset County Court of Common
Pleas transferred the petition to the criminal division for disposition. On
January 25, 2019, following a hearing, the criminal division (trial court) denied
the petition. Appellant did not appeal this ruling.
On August 15, 2019, Appellant again filed in the civil division a pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus—his second—and a request to proceed IFP
(docket number 517 Civil 2019) raising the same issues and presenting the
same arguments as in his May 2, 2018 petition, i.e., that criminal homicide is
a non-existent offense and that the criminal division of the court of common
pleas, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The civil division declined
to transfer the second petition to the criminal division and, instead, dismissed
the petition and denied Appellant’s request to proceed IFP. Appellant pro se
appealed. Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, we affirmed the trial court’s
ruling on June 3, 2020. We reasoned that the claims raised in Appellant’s
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second petition mirrored the claims presented in his first petition, which was
adjudicated by the criminal division of the trial court. Specifically, we
concluded that the factual allegations in the petitions were the same, the acts
giving rise to the relief sought by Appellant were the same, the identity and
capacity of the parties were the same, and the relief sought was the same.
On September 17, 2020, Appellant filed the instant—his third—petition
for writ of habeas corpus and request to proceed IFP in the civil division. In
the petition, Appellant alleged that he “is being illegally, fraudulently, and
unlawfully confined and restrained of his liberty at State Correctional Institute-
Greene . . . by [r]espondent Michael Zaken, as superintendent.” Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 9/17/20, at ¶ 4. In particular, Appellant challenged
the enforceability of Section 2501(a) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2501(a), relating to criminal homicide and alleged that “there is no lawful,
legal process that can be assumed to justify the illegal, false imprisonment,
detention and warehousing of [Appellant].” Id. at ¶ 7. On September 23,
2020, the trial court denied the petition with prejudice, noting that it was
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as applied by this Court in its June 3,
2020 Memorandum decision issued in connection with Appellant’s appeal from
the trial court’s denial of his second habeas corpus petition. Appellant pro se
timely appealed. Both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents two handwritten issues for our review,
which we reproduce verbatim.
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[I.] Whether the lower court judge flagrantly abused his discretion
to deny the writ of habeas corpus and the fraud perpetrated
caused a complete and fundamental miscarriage of justice issued
fatally depriving [Appellant] of his constitutional rights to due
process under the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions
where the courts to include quasi court of original jurisdiction
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute in the instant
related matter[.]
[II.] Whether the lower court judge flagrantly abused his
discretion disregarding Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa.
428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978 Pa. Lexis 831) and Commonwealth v.
Kemmerer, 526 Pa. 160, 584 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1991), both
Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedents that must be applied in
accordance to the constitutional safeguards of substantive due
process, thus invoking the void ab initio doctrine to wit and the
writ of habeas corpus must issue[.]
Appellant’s Brief at iv (sic) (unnecessary capitalizations omitted). In essence,
he opposes the trial court’s dismissal of his third petition for writ of habeas
corpus by which he challenged the enforceability of Section 2501(a), criminal
homicide.2
Upon reviewing the record, as detailed above, we must agree with the
trial court’s conclusion that, consistent with our June 3, 2020 Memorandum
decision, the claims raised in Appellant’s third petition for writ of habeas
corpus are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Indeed, pursuant to the
doctrine of res judicata, once a court of competent jurisdiction considers and
decides an issue, the court’s final judgment constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim. Mariner Chestnut Partners,
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2 We review the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus for an abuse of
discretion. Rivera v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 837 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. Super.
2003).
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L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2016). The application of res
judicata “reflects the refusal of the law to tolerate a multiplicity of litigation.”
Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1316 (Pa.
Super. 1983). The doctrine bars a subsequent action when both lawsuits
contain the following elements in common: “(1) identity of the thing sued
upon; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; (4) identity
of the capacity of the parties.” Robinson Coal Co. v. Goodall, 72 A.3d 685,
689 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Moreover,
[i]n determining whether res judicata should apply, a court may
consider whether the factual allegations of both actions are the
same, whether the same evidence is necessary to prove each
action and whether both actions seek compensation for the same
damages. If the acts or transactions giving rise to causes of action
are identical, there may be sufficient identity between two actions
for the [holding] in the first action to be res judicata in the second.
Dempsey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 653 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en
banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 663
A.2d. 684 (Pa. 1995).
Here, as he did in his first two habeas petitions, Appellant challenges
the enforceability of Section 2501(a) and, relatedly, the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, claiming that “there is no lawful, legal process that can be
assumed to justify [his] illegal, false imprisonment, detention and
warehousing.” The factual allegations across his three habeas petitions are
the same, the acts giving rise to the relief sought by Appellant are the same,
the identity and capacity of the parties are the same, and the relief sought is
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the same. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Appellant’s third habeas petition on the basis of res judicata.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/10/2021
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