In Re: A.L., a Minor ( 2021 )

J-S20032-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: C.L.-D., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 380 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 10, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2020-02336
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: AUGUST 12, 2021
C.L.-D. (“Father”), appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed
by the Lancaster County Children and Youth Service Agency (“CYS”) to
involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to his child, A.L. (“Child”) (a
male born in February 2019), with K.A.B. (“Mother”), pursuant to the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).1 We affirm.
Child was born to Mother and Father in February 2019.2 Relevant to
this appeal, on December 1, 2020, CYS filed a Petition to terminate the
____________________________________________
1 On March 2, 2021, Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to Child.
N.T., 3/2/21, at 4-11. Mother has not filed a brief in Father’s appeal, nor has
she filed an appeal from the termination of her parental rights.
2 We note that, while pregnant with Child, Mother was arrested on multiple
charges related to the physical abuse of another child, for whom Mother was
the caretaker but not the natural mother. N.T., 3/2/21, at 13.
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parental rights of Mother and Father to Child.3 On March 2, 2021, the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing on CYS’s Petition. At the time of the hearing,
Child was two years old and resided with Child’s six-year-old cousin and his
maternal great-aunt, who wished to adopt Child. Present at the hearing were
Tamara E. Hogan, Esquire (“Attorney Hogan”), for CYS, and JoAnne Murphy,
Esquire (“Attorney Murphy”), the guardian ad litem/legal interest counsel
(“GAL”), for Child. Father, who was in prison at the time of the hearing,
participated with his counsel via telephone, and Mother participated via
videoconferencing with her counsel. CYS presented the testimony of
permanency caseworker Sophia Maples (“Maples”), and Father testified on his
own behalf.
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3 On April 21, 2021, CYS filed a Motion requesting that this Court remand this
matter in order for CYS to supplement the record, after CYS inadvertently
failed to offer the juvenile dependency record into evidence as an exhibit at
the evidentiary hearing. This Court denied CYS’s Motion. In its Opinion, the
trial court detailed the history of this appeal regarding the underlying
dependency action, and suggested that this Court, operating under concepts
of judicial economy and judicial notice, accept the trial court’s unchallenged
consideration of the dependency proceedings.
This Court will not take judicial notice “of records in another case, even when
the case arose in the same court and the contents of the records are known
to the court,” nor will we “take judicial notice of evidence of which the trial
court was not requested to take judicial notice.” In re Estate of
Brockerman, 480 A.2d 1199, 1202 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citation omitted).
However, the parties do not dispute that Child was adjudicated dependent on
March 19, 2019, and that a series of permanency review hearings followed
the dependency adjudication prior to CYS’s filing of the Petition seeking to
involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights.
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The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding the
termination Petition from the testimonial and documentary evidence at the
termination hearing that it deemed credible:
Child was placed into the physical custody of [CYS] on February
27, 2019. [] Child was placed as a result of Mother and [Father]
residing together in a home when Mother received the
previously[-]referenced criminal charges of a physically abusive
nature [against a child who was not Child]. [CYS] attempted to
conduct a home study of the family’s residence, but [Father] was
not responsive to [CYS]’s telephone calls or voicemail messages
and was not present for an unannounced home visit. At that time,
[Father] indicated that he was “moving his stuff to his sister’s
house … on South [] Street.” Prior to that relocation, [Father]
admitted to living in a home with Mother ….
[Father] testified that he was unable to receive any of
[CYS]’s telephone calls or voicemail messages because his “phone
contract was in [Mother’s] name” and she was incarcerated.
[Father] indicated that none of the household bills were paid and
his cellular telephone had been disconnected due to Mother’s
incarceration. It is noted that [Father] made no attempt to
reactivate his telephone.
After [] Child had been adjudicated dependent, the court
approved a child permanency plan for [Father] with goals for
reunification. [CYS] was unable to maintain ongoing contact with
[Father], despite his reunification goals. As previously noted,
[Father’s] last successful period of visitation with [] Child occurred
on April 17, 2019. Thereafter, [CYS] did not have contact with
[Father] again until June 25, 2019. During a telephone call with
the caseworker, [Father] indicated that he did not have contact
with [CYS] from April to June[,] because he “[wanted] to lay low
as his parole and probation officer was very strict, and [he was
not] to have contact with the police” []. [Father] further reported
that police officers were “showing up” to his parent/child visits at
[CYS] to ask him questions regarding Mother’s pending criminal
charges. Accordingly, the [trial] court finds that, during this time,
[Father] intentionally failed to maintain contact with, or actively
participate with, [CYS] in an effort to complete the goals of the
court-approved child permanency plan.
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A meeting was scheduled for July 3, 2019[,] for [Father] to
meet with the caseworker [and] address his permanency goals.
[Father] failed to appear for that meeting. The meeting was
subsequently rescheduled for July 9, 2019. [Father] again failed
to appear. [Father] could not provide any explanation for his
absence from both scheduled appointments. It is noted that
[Father] was not incarcerated at the Lancaster County Prison until
the end of August 2019.[4] [Father] made no attempts to contact
[CYS] or [] Child during that time.
[Father] contends that, prior to his incarceration, he was
receiving drug and alcohol counseling at “128 East Orange Street.”
He was unable to articulate the name of the counselor or the
duration of his attendance in any such counseling. [Father] later
clarified that such treatment occurred prior to [] Child’s birth,
although he maintained his attendance until March of 2019. No
evidence was presented to substantiate these claims. [Father]
testified that “his insurance ran out,” as the reason he stopped
attending counseling. When questioned, [Father] evasively
indicated that Mother set up his insurance, he was unsure how to
set up new insurance, and his mother (Paternal Grandmother) was
going to set up his new insurance, but never did.
[CYS] was unable to make contact with [Father] again until
October 1, 2019. At that time, [Father] was incarcerated at the
Lancaster County Prison. Following an in-person meeting at the
prison, [Father] signed all necessary release paperwork so as to
permit the scheduling of a psychological evaluation, which could
be conducted at the prison. Before the evaluation could be
scheduled, [Father] was transferred to a federal detention center.
While at the federal prison, [Father] reported he had the ability to
complete a drug and alcohol program, although he never enrolled
in that program. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, [Father]
had also failed to complete a mental health evaluation or any
related treatment. Moreover, on February 25, 2021, [Father] was
reassigned to a “special housing unit” within the prison due to his
intentional disobeying an officer’s orders. While in the specialized
unit, [Father] was ineligible for treatment programs. [Father]
____________________________________________
4 On November 21, 2019, Father was indicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on criminal charges related to
his alleged participation in an armed robbery of a Lyft driver in Lancaster
County. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 1; N.T., 3/2/21, at 3, 31.
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alleged that he did complete a drug and alcohol program but failed
to provide [CYS] with such documentation. With respect to
[Father’s] crime[-]free goal, [Father] incurred new criminal
charges related to the August 2019 incident. [Father] reported
that, if convicted, he expects to be incarcerated from anywhere
between one-hundred and twenty-one to one-hundred eighty-one
months (approximately ten to fifteen years). The record also
reflects that [Father] has not started working on the following
goals: learning and using good parenting; providing financially for
himself and his Child; obtaining and securing appropriate housing;
or demonstrating an ongoing commitment to [] Child. [Father]
has consistently failed to provide any proof of income or bank
statements for the period of time he was not incarcerated.
Moreover, [Father] has not visited with [] Child since April [] 2019.
It is specifically noted that [Father] was not incarcerated on the
date of [] Child’s initial placement with [CYS].
… [Father] has not provided any gifts, letters, or
communication to his Child. When confronted with such
information, [Father] incredibly testified that “he was not aware
[he] was allowed to have contact with [Child].” [Father] had been
provided with a telephone number to reach [] Child for telephone
visits; however, he has failed to reach out in any manner.
[Father] curiously maintains that he did not visit or contact [Child]
due to “getting harassed by the police.” [sic]; however, he also
testified that the police were present only at his last visit with
[Child] (in April [] 2019). [Father] also stated that [] Child’s
caseworker recommended that he speak to the police. [Father]
made the unilateral decision to stop visiting [] Child thereafter.
To date, [Father] is uncertain as to when he may be released from
federal prison[,] although he estimates it will take at least two
years to go to trial. Upon his release, [Father] indicated that he
would like to work with his friend to open a storefront for a clothing
line. [Father] has no plans as far as housing or other income.[FN]
It is also noted that in his testimony regarding his “future plans,”
[Father] failed to testify regarding his goals relative to [] Child.
___________________________________________________
[FN]It is noted that [Father] has a second child with a different
biological mother. [Father] did not testify to any instances of
communication or maintaining contact with that child.
___________________________________________________
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Trial Court Opinion, 4/23/21, at 11-14 (internal citations omitted, one footnote
added, one footnote in original).
On March 10, 2021, the trial court entered the Decree granting the
Petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights. On March 29,
2021, Father filed a Notice of Appeal, along with a Concise Statement of
matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).5
In his brief on appeal, Father raises the following issue:
Whether the [trial] [c]ourt correctly found that [CYS] had met its
burden of establishing with clear and convincing evidence that
Father, who was incarcerated for a majority of the time period,
failed or refused to perform his parental duties and would not be
in a position to do so in the reasonable future[?]
Father’s Brief at 8.6
In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)
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5 On June 4, 2021, CYS and the GAL filed a joint brief arguing that this Court
should affirm the trial court Order.
6 Although Father does not specifically reference sections 2511(a)(1) or (2) in
his Concise Statement and Statement of Questions Involved portions of his
brief, we find his issue encompasses both of those sections, which he has
discussed in the Argument section of his brief.
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(plurality). As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does
not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached
a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson
v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may
be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066
(Pa. 1994).
In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343-44 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption
of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
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hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C.,
837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
“Satisfaction of the requirements in only one subsection of Section
2511(a), along with consideration of the provisions in Section 2511(b), is
sufficient for termination.” See In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Super.
2008) (brackets and citation omitted). Here, we consider sections 2511(a)(1)
and (b), which provide, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
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In the present case, Father first contends that the trial court erred in
finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(1). Father’s Brief
at 12-17. Father asserts that the trial court overlooked evidence of his
progress on his child permanency plan, and failed to consider the obstacles
Father faced, such as the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on his ability to access
resources in prison to address his permanency plan goals. Id. at 15-17.
With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as
follows:
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court
must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation
for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination
of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
The focus of involuntary termination proceedings is on the conduct of
the parent and whether that conduct justifies a termination of parental rights.
In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001). Although the statute
focuses on an analysis of the six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition, the court must consider the whole history of a given case and
may consider a parent’s inaction before the six-month statutory provision. In
re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). Additionally, “[t]he court
must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all
explanations offered by the parent facing termination of [her] parental rights,
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to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances,
clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” Id. (citations omitted).
With regard to a parent’s incarceration, in In re Adoption of S.P., our
Supreme Court reiterated the standard of analysis pursuant to section
2511(a)(1) for abandonment and added as follows:
[a]pplying [In re: Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (Pa.
1975),] the provision for termination of parental rights based upon
abandonment, now codified as [section] 2511(a)(1), we noted
that a parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect and support
his child and to make an effort to maintain communication and
association with that child.” [Id.] We observed that the father’s
incarceration made his performance of this duty “more difficult.”
Id.***
[A] parent’s absence and/or failure to support due to
incarceration is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment.
Nevertheless, we are not willing to completely toll a parent’s
responsibilities during his or her incarceration. Rather, we must
inquire whether the parent has utilized those resources at his or
her command while in prison in continuing a close relationship
with the child. Where the parent does not exercise reasonable
firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be
forfeited.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. Further, the Supreme Court stated,
“incarceration neither compels nor precludes termination of parental rights.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (quoting In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,
1120 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Finally, this Court has repeatedly defined “parental duties,” in general,
as the affirmative obligation to provide consistently for the physical and
emotional needs of a child:
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There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child
needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held
that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance. This affirmative duty ... requires
continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child. Because a child
needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a
parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
in the child's life.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (citations and internal paragraph breaks
omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court analyzed termination pursuant to section
2511(a)(1) as follows:
In the matter at bar, [Father] contends that many of the resources
offered were unavailable to him due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[The trial] court disagrees. This case was instituted in February[]
2019, prior to [Father’s] current incarceration or the onset of the
ongoing public health situation. The court approved a child
permanency plan for [Father] on March 19, 2019. Since that time,
[Father] has failed to actively engage with [CYS] resources or
follow up with provided referrals. [Father] vaguely discussed a
drug and alcohol program he was involved in prior to his
incarceration, although the court finds such testimony evasive,
lacking specifics, and not of a credible nature. Since his period of
incarceration, [Father] has testified that: 1) programming is not
available; 2) [] programs were available, but not running; and,
[sic] 3) programs were available and he was on the waiting list to
enroll. N.T., 3/2/21[,] at 39-40)[ ](emphasis added). Such
inconsistencies suggest [Father’s] claims lack credibility and
continue to demonstrate that [Father] has failed to actively
address the goals of the child permanency plan.
Father’s permanency plan included a goal of improving his
mental health functioning to the extent that he could care for []
Child. It is noted that Father has candidly admitted his ongoing
struggle with mental health concerns. Initially, Father expressed
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interest in [CYS] assistance; however, he failed to follow up with
any resources prior to his incarceration. While in prison, Father
did complete a program entitled “Enjoying the Second Half of
Life,” although he has not participated in any appropriate mental
health treatment. Father also had a goal to remain free from
drugs and misuse of alcohol. To date, Father has failed to
complete any drug and alcohol treatment subsequent to court
approval of the child permanency plan. Father provided vague
testimony regarding previous involvement with a program, but no
evidence was presented to support Father’s participation. Father
has also not completed his parenting goal. Father has not
participated in any parenting education classes, nor has he
completed the prerequisites to start the program.
Father’s permanency plan also contained a goal of
remaining crime free. Father was federally indicted on four
separate charges on November 22, 2019[,] relative to a criminal
incident that occurred in August [] 2019. It is specifically noted
that this alleged incident occurred during a time when Father
failed to visit [] Child due to his desire to “stay off police radar”
and to comply with his probation. Father is presently awaiting
trial. Even prior to his current period of incarceration, Father has
not maintained an ongoing commitment to [] Child. Father has
only visited [] Child twice. Notably, Father had three scheduled
visits with [] Child. He arrived late for two of those periods of
visitation and failed to show up for the third appointment. Father
has not sent any letters, gifts, drawings, or cards to [] Child. For
the first time during his present period of incarceration, on
September 15, 2020, Father requested one photo of [] Child.
Father has failed to ask for photos prior to this time or request
any updates regarding [] Child.
Father’s plan also incorporated goals to be financially stable
and to obtain a home free and clear of hazards for himself and []
Child. Since August 2019, Father has consistently been
incarcerated at the Lancaster County Prison or a federal detention
center. Prior to that, Father failed to provide any proof of income.
The record does not reflect a time where Father held any type of
gainful employment. During the evidentiary hearing, Father was
unable to provide more than a cursory plan for employment after
his incarceration. Moreover, Father has failed to maintain a stable
residence since his involvement with [CYS]. It is noted that Father
moved at least twice prior to his incarceration, was unable to be
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located by [CYS] for an extended period of time, [sic] and is now
situated in a federal detention center.
… [Father] has not demonstrated any progress towards
improving his ability to parent. Here, [Father] has not
demonstrated any commitment to future success as a parent.
Notably, [] Child has not had meaningful contact with [Father]
since birth. [] Child met with [Father] approximately two times
prior to his first birthday. It is clear that termination of parental
rights would not have a detrimental effect on [] Child, as [] Child
lacks a firm understanding of the identity of his biological parents.
Stated another way, [] Child’s present pre-adoptive placement is
the only “home” [] Child has ever known. Father has failed to
express anything more than “hopes” and “wishes” to provide []
Child with essential parental care. Accordingly, [CYS] satisfied its
burden pursuant to [section] 2511(a)(1).
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/21, at 20-22.
There is competent, clear and convincing evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusion that Father failed to perform his parental duties for a period
of six months prior to CYS’s filing of the termination Petition. The trial court
also properly considered Father’s explanation for his conduct in abandoning
Child; the post-abandonment contact between Father and Child; and the effect
of termination of parental rights on Child pursuant to Section 2511(b), based
on the discussion set forth in the trial court’s Opinion. See id. The trial court’s
determination regarding section 2511(a)(1) is supported by competent, clear
and convincing evidence in the record. Thus, we will not disturb the trial
court’s determination on appeal. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-
27; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Finally, we must determine whether termination was proper under
section 2511(b). Initially, we note that even though Father challenged the
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trial court’s determination under section 2511(b) in his Concise Statement,
Father’s appellate brief contains no argument related to section 2511(b), nor
is it referenced in Father’s Statement of Questions Involved. See Father’s
Brief at 8, 12-18. Accordingly, Father has waived any challenge related to
that section. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(stating that “[b]ecause Mother failed to include a challenge to [s]ection
2511(b) in her statement of questions involved and concise statements that
issue is also waived”) (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, in an abundance of
caution, and mindful of Child’s best interest, we have reviewed the record and
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
termination was appropriate under section 2511(b).
We have explained that the focus in terminating parental rights under
section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section
2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section
2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated the following:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d
781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485
(Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be
paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing
the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
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In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
This Court has explained that a parent's own feelings of love and
affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Further, this Court has stated that “a parent’s
basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 856(internal citations omitted). It is well settled that “we will not toll the well-
being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G.,
956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d at 732 (noting that a child’s
life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)).
In its Opinion, the trial court stated the following:
In this matter, [Father] has caused the Child to be without
essential parental care. Notably, [] Child has had no contact with
his biological [F]ather in over twenty-four months. It is further
noted that [] Child was placed into the physical custody of the
Agency at birth. As such, [] Child has not established any true
bond with [Father]. [Father] has been absent for the entirety
of [] Child’s life. [Father] was not present at [] Child’s birth and
remained largely uninterested in [] Child’s life until his period of
incarceration. The court cannot consider the “hopes” of [Father].
Rather, the court must analyze what is best for [] Child.
***
… While [Father] seemingly has a limited history of drug
abuse, he has demonstrated a continuing pattern of serious
criminal activity, most recently in August [] 2019. In that
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incident, [Father] is alleged to have held a Lyft driver at gunpoint
in an attempt to steal money from the driver. The court is
extremely troubled by [Father’s] recent criminal activity,
especially in light of [Father’s] purported desire to “stay off police
radar.” In his testimony, [Father] justified his missed visitation
with [] Child for that reason. [Father] did not want to “take the
risk” regarding police contact. Despite that desire, [Father]
allegedly engaged in criminal conduct resulting in his pending
federal charges.
This court recognizes that the decision rendered is, no
doubt, difficult for [Father]. That said, the decision was not
rendered in haste, but, rather, is reflective of the totality of the
evidence presented. It must be recognized that [] Child has spent
his entire, albeit short, life with his resource parent and truly has
had no interaction with his biological [F]ather, as a result of the
choices [Father] has made. There can be no doubt that this Child
deserves to remain in a stable family that is ready, willing, and
able to provide him with needed permanency and stability —
things that [Father] simply cannot provide. The court simply
cannot subject [] Child to any extended period of uncertainty in
the hope that Father someday summons the ability to parent.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/21, at 25-26 (internal citations omitted).
After careful review, we would conclude that competent, clear and
convincing evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination
under section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; In
re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Accordingly, we affirm the Decree terminating Father’s parental rights
pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judge King joins the memorandum.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
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J-S20032-21
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/12/2021
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