Com. v. Troyer, L. ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • J-S19024-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    LEVI RUDY TROYER, JR.                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1080 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 11, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division
    at No: CP-10-CR-0000692-2005
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED: August 18, 2021
    Levi Rudy Troyer, Jr. (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his
    petition for expungement of prior criminal charges. We affirm.
    In April 2005, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with theft by
    unlawful taking,1 as well as burglary, criminal conspiracy, and criminal
    mischief.2 The Commonwealth alleged that in December 2004, Appellant and
    a juvenile co-conspirator broke into and stole items from a storage trailer.
    On July 13, 2005, the parties entered into a negotiated plea agreement,
    which is contained in the certified record. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to
    one count of theft in exchange for the Commonwealth dismissing the
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
    2 See id. §§ 3502(a), 903(a), 3304(a)(1).            We reference these charges
    collectively as “the remaining charges.”
    J-S19024-21
    remaining charges and recommending a sentence of 18 months of
    intermediate punishment (IP).      See Plea Agreement, 7/13/05 (stating the
    remaining charges would be “dismissed”).          The plea agreement did not
    address expunction of the remaining charges.
    The trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea to theft, and the
    remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 18
    months of IP and imposed a $300 fine.
    On August 23, 2019, Appellant filed a petition seeking expungement of
    his arrest record for the remaining charges.       The Commonwealth filed an
    objection in opposition on February 27, 2020 and requested a hearing. The
    Commonwealth argued that under this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
    Lutz, 
    788 A.2d 993
     (Pa. Super. 2001), Appellant’s arrest record could not be
    expunged because the Commonwealth dismissed the remaining charges
    pursuant to the plea agreement.       See 
    id. at 1000
     (“[W]here charges are
    dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement, those charges are not eligible
    for expunction, as to destroy them would obscure the true circumstances
    under which [the accused] has been convicted.” (emphasis added)); see also
    
    id. at 999
     (distinguishing dismissal of charges from a nolle prosequi and
    stating: “[i]n the instant case, charges were dismissed, and the understanding
    of all parties was apparently that the charges could never be revived, which
    is quite a different situation than a Nolle Prosequi.”).
    -2-
    J-S19024-21
    On May 29, 2020, the trial court convened a hearing on the
    expungement petition. The parties presented oral argument rather than
    testimony. Appellant’s counsel argued:
    [A]lthough Lutz is valid, the [trial c]ourt in considering whether
    to expunge a dismissed charge[ should conduct an evidentiary
    hearing] or look at the evidence and weigh the factors between
    the benefit to [Appellant] in getting his arrest record expunged
    and the detriment to the Commonwealth.
    N.T., 5/29/20, at 5.
    By order entered September 11, 2020, the trial court denied the
    expungement petition. Appellant timely filed a motion for reconsideration on
    September 20, 2020, asserting the trial court erred in its application of the
    law. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion two days later.
    Appellant timely appealed.    Both Appellant and the trial court have
    complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents three questions for review:
    A. Whether trial court abused its discretion or committed an error
    of law by relying solely on Commonwealth v. Lutz, 
    788 A.2d 993
     (Pa. Super. 2001) in deciding to deny [Appellant’s] Petition
    for Expungement?
    B. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
    error of law by failing to place the burden of proof on the
    Commonwealth to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, why
    [Appellant’s] arrest record should not be expunged[?]
    C. Whether the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of
    affirmatively justifying why the arrest record of [Appellant] should
    not be expunged?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    -3-
    J-S19024-21
    As Appellant’s issues are related, we address them together. It is well-
    settled that we “review the trial court’s denial of a motion for expunction for
    an abuse of its discretion.” In re P.M., 
    230 A.3d 454
    , 456 (Pa. Super. 2020)
    (citation and brackets omitted).
    In Commonwealth v. Wexler, 
    431 A.2d 877
     (Pa. 1981), the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to have his
    arrest record expunged where the charges had been nol prossed. 
    Id.
     at 879-
    81. The Court detailed a non-exhaustive list of factors a trial court should
    consider, stating the court “must balance the individual’s right to be free from
    harm    attendant   to   maintenance    of   the   arrest   record   against   the
    Commonwealth’s interest in preserving such records.” Id. at 879. When the
    Wexler balancing test applies, the Commonwealth is required “to bear the
    burden of affirmatively justifying why the arrest record should not be
    expunged.” Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 
    737 A.2d 1243
    , 1244 (Pa. Super.
    1999) (citing Wexler, 431 A.2d at 880).
    This Court subsequently discussed the interplay of Lutz and Wexler,
    stating:
    When the defendant pleads guilty and the Commonwealth agrees
    to dismiss charges as part of the plea agreement, a defendant is
    normally not entitled to expungement of the dropped charges
    under the Wexler factors. Commonwealth v. Lutz, 
    788 A.2d 993
     (Pa. Super. 2001). In such a scenario, the Commonwealth
    dismisses charges in connection with a plea arrangement and,
    accordingly, there is no implicit or express admission that it lacks
    evidence to convict a defendant of the crimes. The action of
    dropping the charges is viewed as a contractual arrangement
    negotiated as part of the plea bargain. 
    Id. at 1000
    . This
    -4-
    J-S19024-21
    situation is contrasted with that involved in the nol pros
    setting, where the Commonwealth concedes that there is
    insufficient evidence to support the dismissed charges. 
    Id. at 999
    . Thus, if expungement were permitted as to charges
    withdrawn pursuant to a plea bargain rather than due to a
    lack of evidence, there would not be an accurate record of the
    agreement reached by the defendant and the Commonwealth. 
    Id. at 1000-01
    . Furthermore, “In the absence of an agreement as to
    expungement, [a]ppellant stands to receive more than he
    bargained for in the plea agreement if the dismissed charges are
    later expunged.” 
    Id. at 1001
    ; but see Commonwealth v.
    A.M.R., 
    887 A.2d 1266
     (Pa. Super. 2005) (where charges of theft
    and misapplication of entrusted property were dropped after
    defendant agreed to resign from his job, defendant’s arrest record
    was ordered to be expunged); Matter of Pflaum, 
    451 A.2d 1038
    (Pa. Super. 1982) (before the district justice, Commonwealth
    dropped charges of burglary, trespass, and theft and defendant
    pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct; defendant was entitled to
    have record of withdrawn charges expunged). In applying Lutz
    and Wexler in the plea agreement setting, we have had occasion
    to remand to the trial court to make a clear record as to whether
    charges were nol prossed based upon lack of evidentiary support
    or whether the charges were dropped in exchange for the plea.
    See Commonwealth v. Hanna, 
    964 A.2d 923
     (Pa. Super.
    2009)[; see also 
    id. at 929
     (“[T]he Commonwealth bears the
    burden of proving . . . with clear and convincing evidence that
    Lutz applies.” (footnotes omitted)).]
    Commonwealth v. V.G., 
    9 A.3d 222
    , 225-26 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis
    added, citations modified).
    Here, Appellant argues:
    The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden that Lutz
    applies. As such, the trial court was required to hold a Wexler
    hearing and consider the competing interests between the parties
    as to the benefits and detriments of expungement.
    ***
    [Appellant] does not deny that Lutz is good law, but it [is]
    not the only case law applicable to this matter. See Wexler,
    supra; see also Hanna, 
    supra;
     Matter of Pflaum, 
    supra.
     A
    -5-
    J-S19024-21
    proper analysis of these matters requires examination of several
    other cases and, ultimately, an examination of the facts and
    circumstances surrounding the terms of the plea agreement and,
    possibly, the interests of the parties.
    Appellant’s Brief at 10, 11-12 (citations modified); see also id. at 12-15
    (discussing cases). Appellant asserts the Commonwealth had the burden to
    prove that Lutz applies, see Hanna, 
    supra,
     and argues it failed to meet its
    burden. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-21. We disagree.
    The trial court properly found that Lutz applies and is controlling.
    Appellant did not seek expungement of charges that were nol prossed due to
    lack of evidence or for which he was acquitted. Cf. Wexler, supra. Instead,
    the Commonwealth dismissed the remaining charges against Appellant as part
    of the plea bargain, which did not address expungement.           Under these
    circumstances, Appellant is not entitled to expungement. See Lutz, 
    788 A.2d at 999-1000
    . None of the cases Appellant cites to distinguish Lutz are on
    point, and contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Wexler balancing test was
    not implicated, and therefore the Commonwealth had no burden to justify why
    the remaining charges should not be expunged. Cf. Maxwell, 
    supra.
    In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it properly
    applied the law in denying Appellant’s request for expungement.
    Order affirmed.
    Judge Dubow joins the memorandum.
    Judge Pellegrini files a dissenting memorandum.
    -6-
    J-S19024-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/18/2021
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1080 WDA 2020

Judges: Murray

Filed Date: 8/18/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024