Com. v. Francis, L. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LAWRENCE M. FRANCIS :
:
Appellant : No. 705 WDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 14, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Criminal Division at No: CP-07-CR-0000861-2017
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: AUGUST 18, 2021
Lawrence M. Francis (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his first
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
In April 2017, [Appellant] was charged by criminal complaint with
various violations of the controlled substance act. The charges
stemmed from a grand jury presentment that detailed
[Appellant’s] involvement in a drug distribution organization.
[Appellant] was alleged to be one of the leaders of that ring. In
June 2017, the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to
consolidate [Appellant’s] case with that of eight other co-
defendants. A notice of intent to consolidate filed in October 2017
sought to consolidate his case with eleven other defendants.
The prosecution proceeded through the pre-trial phase. This
involved various status conferences with counsel. During the pre-
trial phase, [Appellant’s] counsel, Mark Zearfaus, filed an omnibus
pre-trial motion on February 20, 2018. The pre-trial motion
included an allegation that there was insufficient evidence to
support the charges against [Appellant]. Attorney Zearfaus
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alleged that [Appellant] was being prosecuted based on a theory
of guilt by association. A thirty-one (31) page incident report was
admitted into evidence as part of the parties’ stipulation for
determination of the pre-trial motion. Other documents were also
admitted. [The trial court] entered an Opinion and Order on
October 24, 2018 regarding [Appellant’s] pre-trial motion.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/21/20, at 1-2.
On November 14, 2018, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of
possession with intent to deliver and one count each of dealing in proceeds of
unlawful activity, corrupt organizations, conspiracy to commit corrupt
organizations, and persons not to possess firearms.1 That same day, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to 11 to 22 years of incarceration, with credit for
time served. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
On August 2, 2019, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition, his first. The
PCRA court appointed Paul Puskar, Esquire to represent Appellant. Attorney
Puskar did not file an amended petition. On March 12, 2020, the court held a
hearing on Appellant’s petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
ordered both parties to submit briefs in support of their respective positions.
See N.T., 3/12/20, at 13; see also Order, 3/18/20. The PCRA court opinion
indicates Appellant complied with this directive on April 17, 2020. PCRA Court
Opinion, 8/21/20, at 3. However, there is no brief in the record and no docket
entry indicating the brief was filed. The Commonwealth filed a memorandum
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1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 911(b)(4), 5111(a)(1),
6105(a)(1).
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of law on May 4, 2020. On May 14, 2020, the PCRA court issued an order and
opinion denying Appellant’s petition.
On July 6, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal.2, 3 Based on
Appellant’s pro se filing, the PCRA court scheduled a Grazier4 hearing for July
23, 2020. During the hearing, Appellant expressed his desire to proceed pro
se. In a document filed July 31, 2020, Appellant confirmed in writing that he
wished to proceed pro se. See Pro Se Correspondence, 7/31/20 (“Your honor
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2 It is well-settled that appellate courts generally cannot extend the time for
filing an appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). Accordingly, on October 16, 2020,
this Court issued a rule to show cause why this appeal should not be quashed
as untimely. Appellant did not file a response. However, in Commonwealth
v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133 (Pa. Super. 1995), we addressed an untimely
appeal where it was shown that a breakdown in the trial court caused the
appeal to be untimely. Here, the record reflects the Clerk of Courts served
Attorney Puskar with the order denying PCRA relief on May 15, 2020, but the
PCRA court failed to notify Appellant of his appellate rights. The court’s failure
to advise Appellant of these rights constitutes a breakdown in the process,
such that we overlook the untimely nature of this appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(compiling cases in which the “courts of this Commonwealth have held that a
court breakdown occurred in instances where the trial court . . . either failed
to advise Appellant of his . . . appellate rights or misadvised him”).
3 The filing of pro se pleadings while represented by counsel is considered
“hybrid” representation and is prohibited within the Commonwealth. See
Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 958 (Pa. 2018) (no defendant has
a constitutional right to self-representation together with counseled
representation “either at trial or on appeal”); see also Commonwealth v.
Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 2011) (citing Pennsylvania’s long-standing
policy precluding hybrid representation). We recognize, however, that when
an appellant is represented by counsel at the time he files a pro se notice of
appeal, the appeal has effect and is not a nullity. See Commonwealth v.
Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 1007 (Pa. 2011) (pro se notice of appeal from final
judgment filed by represented appellant is not automatically void).
4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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I am writing you to let you know that I do want to move forward with my
appeal process pro se.”). Appellant filed a pro se court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement on August 14, 2020; the PCRA court filed its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on August 21, 2020.
On September 28, 2020, this Court entered an order directing the PCRA
court to clarify Appellant’s representation status. By order dated October 1,
2020, the PCRA court excused Attorney Puskar from representation and
granted Appellant’s request to proceed pro se.
On November 10, 2020, Appellant filed in this Court an application for
appointment of counsel. As Appellant had also advised the PCRA court of his
request, on November 16, 2020, the PCRA court sent a letter to this Court
referencing its October 1, 2020 order permitting Appellant to proceed pro se,
and indicating it would await direction from this Court on how to proceed. This
Court denied Appellant’s request for counsel the same day. See Order,
11/16/20. Appellant filed an application for reconsideration of our order
denying his request for counsel, which we denied on November 30, 2020.
However, on December 4, 2020, this Court sua sponte entered an order
vacating its November 30, 2020 order denying reconsideration and remanding
the record “for the lower court to determine if the appointment of counsel
would be appropriate for purposes of the instant appeal.” Order, 12/4/20. On
December 24, 2020, following a hearing, the PCRA court appointed Matthew
J. McGregor, Esquire, as counsel for Appellant. Attorney McGregor has filed
an appellate brief on Appellant’s behalf, and raises the following issues:
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1. Whether PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to address and argue that
a. trial counsel’s abandonment of an outstanding motion to
suppress was unreasonably, prejudicial, and amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel such that appellant’s guilty
plea was not knowing and intelligent,
b. trial counsel’s decision to pursue a guilty plea prior to the
disposition of the outstanding motion to suppress so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnumbered).
When reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record
“in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record
supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of
legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super.
2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are
supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support
in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
Pertinently, the Commonwealth correctly recognizes that Appellant’s
issues are an “improper and impermissible [] attempt to raise issues for the
first time on appeal.” Commonwealth Brief at 2. Our Courts have continued
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to hold claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness may not be raised for the first
time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880 n.4 (Pa. 2009).
However, we cannot disregard that a petitioner has a rule-based right
to the assistance of counsel on their first PCRA petition. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C);
see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super.
2009) (en banc) (stating, “a criminal defendant has a right to representation
of counsel for purposes of litigating a first PCRA petition through the entire
appellate process []”). “The indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be
honored regardless of the merits of his underlying claims, even where those
claims were previously addressed on direct appeal, so long as the petition in
question is his first.” Commonwealth v. Powell, 787 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.
Super. 2001) (citation omitted). “Moreover, once counsel is appointed, he [or
she] must take affirmative steps to discharge his [or her] duties.” Id. “When
appointed, counsel’s duty is to either (1) amend the petitioner’s pro se Petition
and present the petitioner’s claims in acceptable legal terms, or (2) certify
that the claims lack merit by complying with the mandates of
Turner/Finley.[5]” Commonwealth v. Cherry, 155 A.3d 1080, 1083 (Pa.
Super. 2017). “If appointed counsel fails to take either of these steps, our
courts have not hesitated to find that the petition was effectively
uncounseled.” Id. (citing Powell, 787 A.2d at 1019).
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5 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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We recently stated:
[W]e would be remiss to disregard Appellant’s right to counsel on
a first PCRA petition, and the legal authority which provides that
appointed counsel “shall be effective throughout the post-
conviction collateral proceedings, including any appeal from
disposition...”). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), (F)(2); see
also Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 29 A.3d 1177 (Pa. Super.
2011); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455 (Pa. Super.
2009) (en banc). Likewise, our Supreme Court has recognized
the right to effective assistance of PCRA
counsel. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 572 Pa. 343, 815 A.2d
598 (2002). “[D]ue process requires that the post
conviction process be fundamentally fair. ... Thus,
petitioners must be given the opportunity for the
presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa.
382, 930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (2007) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court in Bennett stated, “... while the performance of
PCRA counsel is not necessarily scrutinized under the Sixth
Amendment, the performance of counsel must comply with
some minimum norms[.]” Id. at 1273-74.
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 250 A.3d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(emphasis added to final sentence).
Here, our review of the certified record indicates Appellant’s counsel
before the PCRA court, Attorney Puskar, did not file an amended PCRA petition
or certify that Appellant’s claims lack merit and seek to withdraw pursuant to
Turner/Finley. Notably, the PCRA court’s review of Appellant’s claims was
based only on pro se filings. Also, as noted above, Appellant’s counsel on
appeal, Attorney McGregor, has presented issues on appeal that were not
raised with the PCRA court.
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Accordingly, because counsel failed to comply with the “minimum
norms” of representation, we vacate the May 14, 2020 order denying PCRA
relief and remand for the PCRA court to determine and/or appoint counsel to
represent Appellant in further proceedings before the PCRA court.6 Bennett,
930 A.2d at 1273-74. Counsel shall file an amended PCRA petition or certify
that Appellant’s claims lack merit and seek to withdraw consistent with the
dictates of Turner/Finley. See Cherry, supra; Powell, supra. The case
shall proceed in the PCRA court consistent with this memorandum and
applicable legal authority. See, e.g., Pa.R.Crim.P. 902-908.
Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/18/2021
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6 Assuming Appellant still desires representation, the PCRA court shall have
discretion to determine whether Attorney Puskar, Attorney McGregor, or
another attorney shall represent Appellant on remand.
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