Com. v. Reynolds, J. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JALEN DANDRE REYNOLDS :
:
Appellant : No. 1130 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 9, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002655-2017.
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: August 19, 2021
Jalen Dandre Reynolds appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of murder of the second degree, aggravated
assault, recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), conspiracy to
commit robbery, and related firearms offenses.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history
as follows:
On June 29, 2017, [Reynolds], and two co-defendants,
Taisha Santiago and Lashonda Dade, conspired to rob two
individuals, David Tate and Rashaad Jones. During the robbery,
[Reynolds] shot and killed Tate and shot and severely injured
Jones. . . .
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 2702(a)(1), 2705, 903, 2707.1(a),
6106(a)(1), 907(a),
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Santiago set up a meeting with the victims, Tate and
Jones, ostensibly to arrange a sexual encounter between
Santiago, the two victims and a female. Santiago arranged for
Tate and Jones to pick her up at her house with the plan of
taking her and a female back to Jones’ residence . . ..
In the meantime, Dade drove [Reynolds] to Santiago’s
house where [Reynolds] exited the vehicle and had a
conversation with Santiago outside the residence. After
[Reynolds] re-entered the car, Dade drove to Jones’ residence
and parked outside while [Reynolds] waited for Santiago’s
instructions via cell phone. Tate and Jones exited Jones’
residence and drove away to pick up Santiago. After Tate and
Jones left, [Reynolds] received a communication from Santiago,
exited Dade’s parked vehicle and stationed himself outside
Jones’ residence. Dade remained inside the vehicle. Another
assailant, David Dalton, arrived and positioned himself on Jones’
front porch.
Shortly thereafter, Tate and Jones returned to Jones’
residence with Santiago and exited Jones’ vehicle. Jones walked
up to his front porch where he encountered Dalton. A struggle
between Jones and Dalton ensued. [Reynolds] who was waiting
outside the residence, shot and killed Tate on the sidewalk.
Jones was shot multiple times. Though Jones survived, he
underwent multiple surgeries from the incident and remains
symptomatic from his injuries.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/19, at 1-2.
The matter proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which a jury found
Reynolds guilty of one count each of murder of the second degree and
firearms not to be carried without a license, two counts of aggravated
assault, four counts of REAP, and one count each criminal conspiracy
(robbery) possessing instruments of crime, and discharge of a firearm into
an occupied structure. On August 9, 2018, the trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
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followed by seven to fourteen years in prison. Reynolds filed post-sentence
motions which the trial court denied. Reynolds filed a timely notice of
appeal. Both Reynolds and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Reynolds raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion when it denied [Reynolds’] motion to compel
discovery, seeking to require the Commonwealth to disclose
the details of plea offers/negotiations regarding [Dade]?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or [abuse] its
discretion in denying [Reynolds’] motion in limine to exclude
identification, as the identification of [Reynolds] by [Jones]
was so unreliable and tainted that it deprived [Reynolds] of
the right to a fair trial, and his right to due process as
guaranteed by both the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution
of Pennsylvania[?]
Reynold’s Brief at 9 (excess capitalization omitted).
In his first issue, Reynolds challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motion to compel discovery. Our standard of review over evidentiary rulings
requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 938 A.2d 433, 440 (Pa. Super. 2007). An
abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court
might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of
support so as to be clearly erroneous. Id.Reynolds asserts that the trial court’s denial of his discovery motion
constitutes a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which
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requires the prosecution to release to the defense all material evidence
tending to absolve the defendant. The law governing alleged Brady
violations is well-settled:
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court
subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is
applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, and
that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as
directly exculpatory evidence.
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 853-54 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned
up).
Under Brady, any implication, promise or understanding that the
government would extend leniency in exchange for a witness’s testimony is
relevant to the witness’s credibility. See Commonwealth v. Burkhardt,
833 A.2d 233, 241 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citing United States v.
Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)). The understanding between the prosecution
and its testifying witness need not be in the form of a signed contract or a
completed, ironclad agreement in order to qualify as Brady material. See
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1131 (Pa. 2011). Instead,
Brady requires the Commonwealth to disclose not only definitive
agreements, deals struck, and ironclad, signed, sealed contracts, but also
any potential understanding between the prosecution and its witness, and
any implication, promise, or understanding that the government would
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extend leniency in exchange for a witness’ testimony. See Commonwealth
v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 290 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Nevertheless, “to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must
demonstrate that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth,
either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the
defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its omission resulted
in prejudice to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A.3d 538,
547 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). The burden rests with the
defendant to “prove by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld
or suppressed by the prosecution.” Id.Reynolds contends that the trial court should have granted his motion
to compel the Commonwealth to disclose the specific details of its plea
agreement with Dade. According to Reynolds, after he was sentenced, Dade
was sentenced to a single count of conspiracy to commit robbery which was
a lesser charge than second-degree-murder, for which he was convicted.
Reynolds claims that, although Dade eventually admitted that she had lied
to law enforcement, she nevertheless continued to minimize her involvement
in the criminal scheme.
Reynolds claims that the plea bargain that prosecutors made with
Dade was relevant to her credibility, and his counsel was entitled to know
the details of that plea bargain even if it was not finalized. Reynolds
contends that his counsel attempted to impeach Dade’s credibility by making
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the jury aware that she would be receiving significant consideration for her
testimony, but Reynolds was prevented from doing so by the denial of his
motion to compel. Reynolds maintains that, by denying his motion to
compel, the trial court denied him the right to a fair trial, his right to due
process, and his right to confront witnesses.
The trial court addressed Reynolds’ first issue and concluded that it
lacked merit. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
On June 15, 2018, [Reynolds] filed a motion to compel
discovery. In the motion, [Reynolds] claimed Dade’s motion to
continue her trial until after [Reynolds’] trial and Dade’s
testimony on behalf of the Commonwealth at [Reynolds’] trial
was evidence “Dade will be given consideration by the
Commonwealth for her cooperation and testimony, in the form of
a plea and/or sentencing bargain” and “counsel for [Reynolds] is
entitled to know the details of said bargain, even if it is not
finalized.” The court heard oral argument for the motion on June
15, 2018. The Commonwealth informed the court no plea
bargain with Dade existed and it was waiting until after Dade
testified to discuss a plea bargain. After oral argument, the
court denied the motion to compel.
****
[Reynolds] makes the vague and unsubstantiated
assertion there must have been a plea deal because 1) the
Commonwealth’s denial of plea negotiations with Dade occurred
and 2) the Commonwealth’s denial that it knew what
considerations Dade would be given for testifying, “defy reason
and logic.” [Reynolds] cites [Burkhardt] and Commonwealth
v. Johnston[, 644 A.2d 168 (Pa. Super. 1994)] in support of his
position any “implication” or “understanding” of a plea deal with
Dade should have been disclosed prior to [Reynolds’] trial.
[Reynolds’] contentions are doubly flawed. First, the record
supports the conclusion [that] no plea deal with Dade existed
prior to [Reynolds’] trial. Second, in the absence of a plea deal
prior to trial[,] the cited cases do not support the proposition
that [Reynolds] asserts.
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****
Here, like [in] Burkhardt, the Commonwealth did not
make any promises to Dade about a plea deal but Dade was
“hoping” to get a deal after she testified. Dade’s hope for a
future plea deal does not trigger the protections of Brady.
Furthermore, [Reynolds’] suggestion that the Commonwealth
and Dade had an implicit understanding of a plea deal does not
entitle [Reynolds] to relief, as the Burkhardt court stated “we
[do not] accept any suggestion, that the Commonwealth
attorneys regularly engage in attempts to keep promises of
leniency both off the record and implicit, rather than explicit.”
Burkhardt, 833 A.2d at 243. Lastly, by waiting until after Dade
testified to discuss a plea deal, the Commonwealth engaged in “a
sound, professional policy that should not be discouraged.” Id.Additionally, Johnston is distinguishable. In Johnston,
the Commonwealth did not disclose to the defense and jury that
the testimony of a co-defendant at Johnston’s trial was taken
into consideration at the co-defendant’s sentencing hearing
which occurred prior to Johnston’s trial. [ Johnston, 644 A.2d
at 170-72]. Here, no plea negotiations between Dade and the
Commonwealth occurred before Dade testified at [Reynolds’]
trial. [Reynolds’] trial concluded before Dade pled guilty and
was sentenced. This claim wholly lacks merit.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/19, at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization and citations
to the record omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying
Reynolds’ motion to compel. Reynolds failed to prove the first prong of the
above-stated test, as he proffered no evidence whatsoever that the
Commonwealth had, in fact, made promises to, or had any deals with Dade
at the time of Reynolds’ trial. Rather, Reynolds merely surmises as much
based on the fact that Dade received a more lenient sentence to a lesser
charge within a short time after she testified against Reynolds. This alone is
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insufficient to prove a Brady violation. See Commonwealth v. Morales,
701 A.2d 516, 522-523 (Pa. 1997) (declining to find a Brady violation based
on alleged plea deal with witness where appellant offered nothing besides
mere conjecture that such an arrangement existed); see also
Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 88 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding
that appellant’s mere allegation that the district attorney had promised to
assist in efforts to gain a reduction in the witness’ federal sentence is not
sufficient to establish that such an agreement, in fact, existed either before
or at the time of trial); Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 412
(Pa. 2003) (holding that mere assumption that something such as a promise
to assist in reducing a witness’s federal sentence must have been made is
not sufficient to establish that such an agreement in fact existed). In the
instant matter, Reynolds has offered nothing more than mere conjecture
that any implication, promise, or understanding was made to Dade prior to
her testimony at Reynolds’ trial. Accordingly, his first issue merits no relief.
In his second issue, Reynolds challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motion in limine to preclude the identification testimony provided by Jones
because there had been a news release which included a photo of Reynolds.
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion in limine, this Court applies an
abuse of discretion standard of review. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78
A.3d 644, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013). An abuse of discretion will not be found
based on a mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the court has
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reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the
judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will. See Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753, 760
(Pa. 2014).
With regard to identifications resulting from media exposure, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has discussed the matter as follows:
Whether a pretrial identification is to be suppressed as
unreliable and, hence, violative of due process, is determined
from the totality of the circumstances. A pretrial identification
will not be suppressed as violative of due process rights unless
the facts demonstrate that the identification procedure was so
infected by suggestiveness as to give rise to a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Even where a pretrial
identification is tainted by impermissibly suggestive pretrial
procedures, the subsequent in-court identification will be
admissible if there exists an independent basis for the
identification. The factors to consider when determining whether
an independent basis exists for the identification are: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and
(5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 217 (Pa. 2001). An independent
basis is established when “the in-court identification resulted from the
criminal act and not the suggestive [identification procedure].”
Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 394 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Reynolds claims that Jones’ identification testimony was so unreliable
and tainted that it deprived him of his rights to a fair trial and due process.
According to Reynolds, Jones placed two calls to 911 after the incident and,
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when he was asked during the second 911 call if he had any idea who shot
him, he repeatedly answered that he did not. Reynolds maintains that,
shortly after the shooting, Jones was interviewed by the police and could not
identify Reynolds because Jones was so intoxicated that night. Reynolds
further maintains that, when police asked him if he could tell whether the
assailant was black or white, he said no and indicated that it was too dark,
and the porch light was off. Reynolds argues that two weeks after the
shooting, Jones identified Reynolds in a photo line-up “simply because of a
news release and the photo of [Reynolds] there.” Reynolds’ Brief at 16.
Reynolds’ argument is woefully underdeveloped. Nowhere in his brief
does he direct us to the evidence of record on which he relies. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c), (d). For example, Reynolds does not indicate the
place(s) in the record where Jones made calls to 911, where Jones was
interviewed by police, where Jones failed to identify Reynolds, where there
was a news release which included a photo of Reynolds, or where Jones later
identified Reynolds in a line-up. Without any understanding of these critical
facts, we are wholly unable to determine whether the identification
procedure was so infected by suggestiveness that substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification occurred. See Pierce, 786 A.2d at 217.2 It is
____________________________________________
2 If Reynolds had been able to establish that there had, in fact, been an
impermissible suggestive identification, the Commonwealth would then bear
the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Jones’
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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not this Court’s responsibility to sort through the volumes of trial transcripts
to locate this evidence. See Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960,
970 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that arguments which are undeveloped
and lack citation to factual background or the certified record are waived).
Accordingly, we conclude that Reynolds has waived his second issue.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2021
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
identification was not induced by events occurring between the time of the
crime and the in court-identification. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 643
A.2d 61, 71 (Pa. 1994)
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