Com. v. Jackson, J. ( 2021 )

J-A12032-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOVAR JUWAN JACKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 591 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 2, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0001488-2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: AUGUST 19, 2021
Jovar Juwan Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of two counts of robbery, and one count of
criminal conspiracy.1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural
history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/21/20, at 1-7.
Jackson now raises the following issues for our review:
I. Two of the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified that their
discussions with the prosecutor affected their testimony. … During
[] Jackson’s cross-examination of the second witness, the
Commonwealth objected and the trial court limited [defense]
counsel’s questioning. … Did the trial court err when:
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(9), 903.
J-A12032-21
a. The hearsay rules, on which the prosecutor rested her
objection, would have allowed the witness to answer; and
b. It prevented the jury from forming a significantly different
impression of the witness’s credibility and violated the
Confrontation Clause?
Brief for Appellant at 4.
We will address Jackson’s issues together, as they are related. Jackson
asserts that the trial court “improperly cut off [Jackson’s] cross-examination.”
Id. at 16. First, Jackson claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the
Commonwealth’s hearsay objection, and that the restriction of cross-
examination contributed to the verdict. Id. at 16, 19. According to Jackson,
Todd Coyle (“Coyle”) and William Reiss (“Reiss”), who heard the gunshot and
saw people fleeing the scene from across the street, changed their testimony
at trial. Id. at 17. Jackson argues that defense counsel asked Reiss2 whether
his discussions with the prosecutor influenced his trial testimony regarding his
observation of two or three people running from Hilary Gbotoe’s (“Gbotoe”)
apartment, despite previously having told police that he had observed four
men. Id. at 17-18; see also id. (claiming that “[t]he obvious point of the
question was not to prove the number of people that ran from the apartment;
it sought details of the witness’s preparation to determine whether the
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2 In his Argument, Jackson fails to identify the witness to whom the challenged
objection was directed. From our review of Jackson’s Statement of the Case
and the trial transcripts, it appears that this exchange occurred during cross-
examination of Reiss. See N.T., 10/10/19, at 379-87.
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prosecutor corrupted his recollection.”). Jackson contends that this alleged
error contributed to the verdict, as “[t]here is no understating the importance
of the credibility of the ‘two independent witnesses across the street.’” Id. at
19.
Second, Jackson asserts that, by limiting his cross-examination, the trial
court also violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 20.
Jackson claims that he should have been permitted to cross-examine
Commonwealth witnesses on matters affecting credibility. Id. at 21.
Specifically, Jackson argues that
[] Jackson’s questioning—if the trial court had not intervened—
would have left the jury with a significantly different impression of
[] Reiss’s credibility. [] Reiss indicated that his discussions with
the prosecutor changed his recollection. He admitted that he told
the police that he had seen four people flee and another person
stay in the apartment after closing the door. [Reiss] admitted that
his police statement did not include the “minimum number”
verbiage that he used during his direct examination. He further
admitted that he used that verbiage as a result of his
conversations with the prosecutor before trial. Further exploration
into what the prosecutor had told him would have provided the
jury with an explanation of why [] Reiss’[s] recollection had
changed.
Id. at 22-23 (citations to record omitted). Jackson asserts that both Reiss
and Coyle changed their respective accounts after meeting with the
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prosecutor. Id. at 24, 27.3
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth this Court’s standard of review
and the relevant law, addressed Jackson’s claim, and concluded that it lacks
merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 7-12. Specifically, the trial court
stated that “the court’s ruling did not prevent counsel from impeaching Reiss,
and it did not prevent the jury from assessing his credibility based on the
potential discrepancies between his trial testimony and what he initially told
police.” Id. at 10. The trial court also stated that it was clear, even without
the proffered testimony, that the jury would “understand that counsel was
asking whether the prosecutor got the witness to change their statement.”
Id. Additionally, as the trial court pointed out, Coyle testified that during his
later conversation with the prosecutor, he clarified that there were three
people running from the scene, but the fourth man remained inside the house.
Id. at 9 n.7; see also N.T., 10/9/19, at 354-59. According to the trial court,
even if its evidentiary ruling was erroneous, the resulting prejudice was de
minimus. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 10-12. We agree with the trial
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3 Jackson’s Confrontation Clause challenge is waived. As Jackson
acknowledges in his brief, defense counsel did not raise a challenge based on
the Confrontation Clause in arguing against the Commonwealth’s objection.
Brief for Appellant at 20 n. 1; see also Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d
1077, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding the appellant’s Confrontation Clause
challenge to the preclusion of cross-examination waived, because he first
raised it in his concise statement); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues
not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.”).
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court’s reasoning, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis. See id.
at 7-12. Accordingly, we can grant Jackson no relief on his claims.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/19/2021
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Circulated 07/29/2021 10:15 AM