Estate of Charles Crowder, Appeal of: Crowder, C. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ESTATE OF CHARLES CROWDER, III, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AN INCAPACITATED PERSON : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: CHARLES CROWDER III :
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: No. 1877 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered September 4, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 2020-X1906
ESTATE OF CHARLES CROWDER, III, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AN INCAPACITATED PERSON : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: CHARLES CROWDER III :
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: No. 1878 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered September 4, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 2020-X1484
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2021
In these consolidated appeals, Appellant, Charles Crowder, III
(Crowder), challenges orders of the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County (Orphans’ Court) that dismissed his
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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petition to nullify a health care power of attorney as moot. For the reasons
set forth below, we vacate those orders and remand for further proceedings.
On June 22, 2020, 1700 Pine Street Operations, LLC d/b/a Norriton
Square Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, the nursing home where Crowder
was residing (the nursing home), filed a petition for an adjudication that
Crowder was incapacitated and for appointment of guardian of Crowder’s
estate that was docketed at No. 2020-X1484. On July 30, 2020, Crowder and
Sonya M. Pendleton (Pendleton), who held a February 2020 power of attorney
for Crowder, filed a petition, docketed at No. 2020-X1906, seeking to nullify
a 2017 health care power of attorney in which Crowder had appointed his
daughter, Tierra Williams (Williams), as his health care agent (Williams’ health
care POA). In that petition, Crowder and Pendleton alleged, inter alia, that
Williams was refusing to communicate with Crowder and should be removed
as Crowder’s health care power of attorney because she was not acting in his
best interests. Petition to Nullify Health Care POA ¶¶18, 22.
The Orphan’s Court scheduled a hearing on the guardianship petition for
September 4, 2020 and a hearing on the petition to nullify Williams’ health
care POA for September 14, 2020. The Orphan’s Court appointed counsel to
represent Crowder at the guardianship hearing and a guardian ad litem as
“the investigative arm of the [c]ourt,” N.T. at 127, and appointed psychologist
Kenneth R. Carroll, Ph.D., to perform an independent medical examination
and cognitive assessment of Crowder.
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In its guardianship petition and at the September 4, 2020 hearing, the
nursing home sought only appointment of a guardian of Crowder’s estate and
not a guardian of his person. Petition for Adjudication of Incapacity and to
Appoint Guardian at 8; N.T. at 20, 122. At the September 4, 2020
guardianship hearing, eight witnesses testified or gave statements under oath
and subject to cross-examination: Dr. Carroll; Dr. deButts, a physician who
had treated Crowder at the nursing home; Crowder; a representative of the
nursing home; Williams; the guardian that the nursing home proposed, who
is not related to Crowder or his family (the third-party guardian); and
Crowder’s sister and niece. Crowder was represented at the hearing by both
his counsel on the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA and his court-
appointed counsel. N.T. at 4. Although Pendleton was given notice of this
hearing, she did not appear.
Dr. Carroll testified that Crowder has been diagnosed and is under
treatment for schizophrenia and opined based on his examination of Crowder
that Crowder was unable to manage his finances and needed a guardian of his
estate. N.T. at 29-30, 39-41. Dr. Carroll testified that Crowder’s basic
cognitive functions were intact and that he can make some decisions, but that
Crowder was unable to make complicated decisions and unable to understand
his finances and pay his bills on a consistent basis. Id. at 31-32, 39-40, 42-
45. Dr. deButts testified as an expert only in internal medicine and not as an
expert on Crowder’s mental capacity. Id. at 14-16, 19. The representative
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of the nursing home who testified was not familiar with the payment of
Crowder’s bills and did not testify concerning Crowder’s mental condition or
abilities. Id. at 63-67.
Williams testified that she was able to manage Crowder’s finances and
requested that she be appointed as guardian for his estate. N.T. at 71, 73-
74, 77-81. Williams testified that she last spoke to Crowder in early February
2020, approximately seven months before the hearing. Id. at 71. Williams
and Crowder’s sister and niece asserted that Pendleton had taken advantage
of Crowder, taken money from him that he needed for his own care, and was
not paying his bills. Id. at 82-84, 106-09, 112-14. The third-party guardian
testified only to her abilities and willingness to fulfill guardianship duties if
appointed and the fact that she was unrelated to Crowder. Id. at 86-91.
Crowder testified that he did not feel that he needed a guardian and did
not want a guardian appointed. N.T. at 6, 96, 100-01. In addition, Crowder
repeatedly stated that he did not want Williams or the other family members
at the hearing to have a power of attorney for him and testified that he
believed that Williams had had him committed in the past and was keeping
him in the nursing home against his will. Id. at 4-7, 99-100, 103-04.
Following the testimony and statements at the hearing, the Orphan’s
Court found that Crowder was incapacitated, unable to manage his financial
affairs, and in need of a guardian of his estate. N.T. at 122-25; 2020-X1484
Orphan’s Court Order, 9/8/20. The court concluded that an independent
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guardian was the more appropriate guardian, at least initially, because of the
strained relationship between Crowder’s family and Pendleton. N.T. at 123-
25. The Orphan’s Court accordingly issued an order, entered on September
8, 2020, adjudging Crowder to be totally incapacitated and appointing the
third-party guardian as plenary permanent guardian of Crowder’s estate.
2020-X1484 Orphan’s Court Order, 9/8/20. In this guardianship order, the
Orphan’s Court vacated Pendleton’s February 2020 financial power of
attorney, pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 5604(c)(3). 2020-X1484 Orphan’s Court
Order, 9/8/20, at 2.
In addition, the Orphan’s Court ruled that Williams’ health care POA
would remain in effect and that the petition to nullify Williams’ health care
POA was moot because Pendleton no longer had standing to pursue that
petition. N.T. at 122-23, 126. The court therefore entered orders in both the
guardianship case and the health care POA case on September 4, 2020
dismissing the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA as moot and
canceling the September 14, 2020 hearing on that petition. 2020-X1484
Orphan’s Court Order, 9/4/20; 2020-X1906 Orphan’s Court Order, 9/4/20.
On September 16, 2020, the court-appointed counsel who had
represented Crowder at the guardianship hearing petitioned to withdraw. The
Orphan’s Court granted the petition to withdraw and on September 28, 2020,
appointed Crowder’s present counsel to represent him. 2020-X1484 Orphan’s
Court Order, 9/18/20; 2020-X1484 Orphan’s Court Order, 9/28/20. On
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October 2, 2020, Crowder, represented by his court-appointed counsel, filed
timely appeals in both the guardianship case and the health care POA case.
In his notices of appeal, Crowder appealed only the Orphan’s Court’s
September 4, 2020 orders dismissing the petition to nullify the health care
POA and did not appeal the guardianship order. 2020-X1484 Notice of Appeal;
2020-X1906 Notice of Appeal.
In these appeals, which this Court consolidated sua sponte, Crowder
asserts that he has standing to appeal the September 4, 2020 orders and
litigate the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA, that the Orphan’s
Court erred in dismissing the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA as
moot, and that the Orphan’s Court erred in drawing an adverse inference
against Pendleton from her failure to appear at the September 4, 2020
guardianship hearing. The guardian ad litem has filed a brief arguing that the
Orphan’s Court’s September 4, 2020 orders should be affirmed. No brief has
been filed in these appeals by the guardian of Crowder’s estate or by the
respondents against whom the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA
was filed, the nursing home and Williams.
We agree with Crowder that he has standing. The issue of standing is
a question of law over which our review in plenary and de novo. Rellick-
Smith v. Rellick, 147 A.3d 897, 901 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal granted on
other issue, 240 A.3d 104 (Pa. 2020). A “party who is aggrieved by an
appealable order … may appeal therefrom.” Pa.R.A.P. 501. A party is
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aggrieved and has standing if he has a substantial, direct, and immediate
interest in the outcome of the litigation at issue. Rellick-Smith, 147 A.3d at
901; In re Estate of Rosengarten, 871 A.2d 1249, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Crowder, who expressed at the guardianship hearing that he did not want
Williams to make decisions for him, N.T. at 4-7, 103-04, clearly has a
substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of his petition to
nullify Williams’ health care POA, which sought to remove her as his health
care decisionmaker, and a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in these
appeals of the September 4, 2020 orders dismissing that petition.
The Orphan’s Court and the guardian ad litem contend that Pendleton
no longer has standing to pursue the health care POA litigation because her
sole interest in that litigation was based on her February 2020 power of
attorney and the guardianship order vacated that power of attorney. See In
the Matter of Brown, 507 A.2d 418, 419 (Pa. Super. 1986) (holder of prior
written agreement with incapacitated person who was not related to him had
no standing to challenge incompetency adjudication or appointment of
guardian). The critical issue here, however, is whether Crowder has standing,
not whether Pendleton has standing. The petition to nullify Williams’ health
care POA was not filed solely by Pendleton; it was filed by both Crowder and
Pendleton. These appeals were filed by Crowder, not by Pendleton. Indeed,
the counsel that represents Crowder in these appeals is his court-appointed
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counsel, not the attorney who represented him and Pendleton in the Orphan’s
Court.
The guardian ad litem also argues that Crowder lacks standing to
maintain the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA and these appeals
because he has been adjudicated incapacitated and a guardian has been
appointed. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Orphan’s Court
adjudicated Crowder unable to manage his financial affairs, not incompetent
to make all decisions concerning his medical care, and appointed only a
guardian of Crowder’s estate, not a guardian of his person. 2020-X1484
Orphan’s Court Order, 9/8/20, at 1. The issue in the petition to nullify
Williams’ health care POA and these appeals is Crowder’s right to make
medical decisions and determine who can act for him with respect to medical
care, not control over Crowder’s finances.
More fundamentally, an adjudication of incapacitation and appointment
of a guardian does not deprive the incapacitated person of all legal rights to
challenge who may serve as guardian. Rosengarten, 871 A.2d at 1256-57(incapacitated person had standing to participate in proceedings concerning
disposition of her assets represented by counsel of her choice and to challenge
the propriety of disposition of assets and request a different guardian). In
Rosengarten, this Court specifically rejected the argument that an
incapacitated person does not have an interest in litigation over her property
and who should act as her guardian and “should be denied the opportunity to
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express her voice in the courts.” Id. at 1257. This Court concluded such a
denial of standing “disregards the language of the applicable statute that is
designed specifically to ensure that the incapacitated person’s desires are
honored to the fullest extent possible unless those desires will harm her.” Id.The cases cited by the guardian ad litem do not support his claim that
Crowder lacks standing. Only one of the cases that the guardian ad litem cites
on this issue, Berry v. Berry, 197 A.3d 788 (Pa. Super. 2018), involved any
issue of the effect of an individual’s competency on his ability to file or litigate
an action. In Berry, this Court held that an incapacitated person cannot bring
a divorce action without a court determination concerning his mental capacity
and understanding of the nature of the divorce action and that a divorce action
cannot be brought or defended by a power of attorney acting on behalf of an
incapacitated person. Id. at 800. Nothing in Berry suggests that an
adjudication of incapacity deprives the incapacitated person of the right to be
heard on the issue of who is appointed as his guardian or who is permitted by
the guardianship court to make decisions on his behalf.
With respect to the merits issues in these appeals, Crowder argues that
the Orphan’s Court erred in dismissing the petition to nullify Williams’ health
care POA as moot because the guardianship order did not resolve the issue of
who has authority to make medical decisions for Crowder. We agree.
Mootness, like standing, is a question of law subject to this Court’s
plenary, de novo review. Commonwealth v. Mauk, 185 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa.
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Super. 2018). A case may be dismissed as moot where, as a result of events
that occurred after the case was brought, the party who brought the action
no longer has standing, no actual case or controversy exists between the
parties, or the court cannot enter an order that would have any legal force or
effect. M.B.S. v. W.E., 232 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2020); T.A. v. Allen,
868 A.2d 594, 600-01 (Pa. Super. 2005); J.S. v. Whetzel, 860 A.2d 1112,
1118 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The Orphan’s Court held, and the guardian ad litem argues that the
petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA was moot because the
guardianship order voided Pendleton’s power of attorney and divested her of
standing to litigate the validity of Williams’ health care POA. This conclusion,
however, is invalid because Crowder was also a petitioner in the health care
POA action and, for the reasons discussed above, the guardianship order did
deprive Crowder of standing.
The guardian ad litem also argues that the petition to nullify Williams’
health care POA was moot because the guardianship order resolved all of the
claims for relief in that petition. This contention is without merit. As has been
discussed above, the Orphan’s Court in its guardianship order appointed only
a guardian of Crowder’s estate and did not appoint a guardian of his person.
2020-X1484 Orphan’s Court Order, 9/8/20, at 1. While the Orphan’s Court
did provide in that order that Williams’ health care POA remained in effect,
that ruling was a preservation of the status quo and a clarification that the
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appointment of the guardian for Crowder’s estate did not affect the health
care POA issue, not a ruling on the petition to nullify Williams’ health care
POA, which was scheduled for a separate hearing that had not yet been held.
Id. at 3; N.T. at 122-23, 126. The Orphan’s Court specifically stated at the
hearing:
[T]his petition was only filed for a guardian of the estate, which is
[Crowder’s] financial guardian. There is no such petition filed at
this time for a guardian of the person. The power of attorney that
is currently in place for Ms. Williams will stay in full force and effect
until such time there is either a conversion to a guardian [or] a
request to remove Ms. Williams, but there is nothing that will
change that at this time.
N.T. at 122-23. The Orphan’s Court thus did not rule on merits of Crowder’s
petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA or dismiss it because the issues
that it raised had fully been resolved. Rather, the record is clear that the court
dismissed the health care POA action without a hearing based on its erroneous
conclusion that Pendleton’s lack of standing made it moot. Id. at 126;
Orphan’s Court Opinion at 6-7.
In his remaining issue, Crowder argues that the Orphan’s Court erred in
drawing an adverse inference against Pendleton from her failure to appear at
the September 4, 2020 hearing. That issue, however, is not before us in these
appeals. The Orphan’s Court drew this adverse inference in deciding the
guardianship action and appointing the third-party guardian as guardian of
Crowder’s estate, rather than Pendleton or a family member. N.T. at 123-25;
Orphan’s Court Opinion at 6-7. Crowder did not appeal the guardianship
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order; he appealed only the September 4, 2020 orders dismissing the petition
to nullify Williams’ health care POA. 2020-X1484 Notice of Appeal; 2020-
X1906 Notice of Appeal. The dismissal orders were based, as discussed above,
on the Orphan’s Court’s erroneous conclusion that the guardianship order’s
voiding of Pendleton’s POA rendered the petition moot, not on any inferences
concerning any party or witness.
Because the petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA was filed by
Crowder and not solely by Pendleton and the guardianship order did not
deprive Crowder of standing or resolve Crowder’s request to remove Williams
as his health care decisionmaker, the guardianship order did not moot the
petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA. The Orphan’s Court therefore
erred in dismissing that petition. We accordingly vacate the Orphan’s Court’s
September 4, 2020 orders and remand that case for the Orphan’s Court to
hold a hearing on Crowder’s petition to nullify Williams’ health care POA and
adjudicate that petition on the merits.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/20/2021
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