Com. v. Brown, K. ( 2021 )

J-S21008-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KELVIN BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 1697 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0000355-2010
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KELVIN BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 1698 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001513-2010
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KELVIN BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 1699 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001514-2010
J-S21008-21
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2021
Kelvin Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence of nineteen to forty
years of incarceration, followed by ten years of probation, imposed following
his convictions of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), unlawful
contact with a minor, corruption of minors, aggravated indecent assault,
indecent assault, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and endangering the
welfare of children at three separate dockets.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts relevant to our review.
The testimony at Appellant’s trial established that he was
the uncle by marriage to one of the complainants, B.S., who was
eight years old at the time of the incidents. The other two
complainants, B.W. and A.F., were cousins by marriage to
Appellant and were seven years old and five years old respectively
when the incidents with Appellant occurred. A.F., who was the
youngest of the complainants, and B.W. lived with their aunt,
Edna McGee, in Philadelphia in 2008 and 2009. Edna McGee was
the legal guardian for her nieces.
While they lived with their aunt, there were occasions when
they would visit and stay overnight at Appellant’s home. On one
of the visits, Appellant became upset with A.F. and ordered her to
go into his bedroom. Appellant followed her into the room and
closed the door. He ordered A.F. to take off her pants and
underwear. He then told her to get on his bed and bound her
hands and feet with scarves. He took another scarf and covered
her face. Appellant penetrated A.F.’s vagina with his hands and
tongue. A.F. testified that she complied with Appellant’s demands
because he had threatened to beat her.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1Appellant was charged with sexual offenses at four separate dockets, but
was acquitted of all charges at CP-51-CR-0000354-2010.
-2-
J-S21008-21
Appellant repeated the assault on A.F. in his bedroom on
another occasion and a third time in the back room where she
slept when visiting. A.F. did not tell anyone because she was
afraid of Appellant. At some point she told Appellant’s wife,
Tionna Brown, but she did not believe her. She finally told her
Aunt Edna McGee and Appellant was confronted about his actions.
B.W., A.F.’s sister, would accompany her younger sister on
the visits to Appellant’s home. B.W. testified on one visit
Appellant told her to go into his bedroom and get on the bed.
Appellant followed her into the bedroom, closed the door, took her
clothes off and put Vaseline on and in her vagina with his fingers.
He put a bandana on her face and wrists and penetrated her
vagina with his penis. On another occasion, Appellant told her to
go into the basement. Once there he asked her to suck on his
penis, threatening that she would not eat if she refused. B.W.
refused anyway telling Appellant that she did not care if she did
not eat.
B.S. was Appellant’s niece through marriage. Her mother,
Moncheri McGee, was the sister of Appellant’s wife, Tionna Brown.
During the year of 2008, B.S. moved with her mother and other
siblings into Appellant’s home. One day while B.S. was sleeping
in the back bedroom, Appellant came up behind her and put his
penis in her vagina. She testified that she did not report the
assault because she was too afraid.
Eventually, B.S. told her mother about Appellant’s assault.
Moncheri McGee called her mother and told her what B.S. had
reported. It was during this conversation that A.F. and B.W. told
their aunt about Appellant’s assault on them.
The Department of Human Services became involved and in
October of 2009 the victims were interviewed by forensic
interview specialists at the Philadelphia Children Alliance.
Detective Erin Hinnov of the Special Victims Unit was assigned to
the investigation and attended the interviews. Following that
investigation the detective prepared an affidavit of probable
cause, secured an arrest warrant and took Appellant into custody.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/20, at 2-4 (cleaned up).
Appellant was arrested and charged with various sexual crimes at
multiple dockets. A jury trial began on December 13, 2013, but a mistrial was
-3-
J-S21008-21
declared when the jury deadlocked. Retrial commenced on September 15,
2015, and the jury reached a verdict on September 30, 2015. Appellant was
found guilty of all charges at three of the docket numbers and not guilty of
the charges at the fourth docket. On October 4, 2016, Appellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of nineteen to forty years of imprisonment
followed by ten years of probation.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We affirmed the
judgment of sentence of the lower court. See Commonwealth v. Brown,
188 A.3d 566 (Pa.Super. 2018) (judgment order) (finding all issues waived
due to wholly inadequate brief consisting of four and one-half pages of
argument with no citation to authorities, and a certified record that did not
contain trial and sentencing transcripts). Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition
alleging, inter alia, appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in filing a deficient brief
and in failing to order the transcripts. The PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s
post-sentence and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the
evidence and seeking reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court
denied on August 5, 2020. Thereafter, he filed notices of appeal at each
docket number and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court issued
its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and this Court consolidated the three appeals sua
sponte.
Appellant presents four questions for our review:
-4-
J-S21008-21
1. Did the trial court err when it found Appellant guilty of the criminal
offense of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (complainant
(B.S.) less than 16 years of age), as there was insufficient
evidence adduced at trial to prove this criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt?
2. Did the trial court err when it found Appellant guilty of the criminal
offense of criminal solicitation – involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse (complainant (B.W.) less than 13 years of age), as
there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to prove this
criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt?
3. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s post-sentence motion for arrest of judgment and/or a
new trial, as the jury’s verdict in this matter was against the
weight of the evidence (on all three trial court docket numbers)?
4. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence,
as Appellant’s sentence in this matter was manifestly excessive
(on all three trial court docket numbers)?
Appellant’s brief at 5 (cleaned up and issues reordered for ease of disposition).
Appellant’s first and second issues challenge the sufficiency of the
Commonwealth’s evidence to support Appellant’s convictions of IDSI and
criminal solicitation – IDSI. Our standard of review when considering a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is:
whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
-5-
J-S21008-21
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation
omitted).
In his first sufficiency challenge, Appellant argues that there was no
evidence of penetration adduced at trial that would support his IDSI conviction
involving B.S. See Appellant’s brief at 45-48.
A person commits IDSI,
when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a
complainant:
....
(7) who is less than 16 years of age and the person is four
or more years older than the complainant and the
complainant and person are not married to each other.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7). Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as:
[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings
and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. The term also
includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of
another person with a foreign object for any purpose other than
good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.
B.S. offered the following testimony at trial:
[District Attorney]: And what part of his body did he touch -- of
your body did he touch?
[B.S.]: Back.
-6-
J-S21008-21
District Attorney: Back. Do you have any other words that you call
your back that you're talking about?
B.S.: No.
District Attorney: What part of your back? Can you show us? Can
you point to the part of your body that you're
talking about?
B.S.: (Indicating.)
District Attorney: When you say “back,” are you pointing to your
back or are you pointing to your butt? I can’t
see.
B.S.: Butt.
District Attorney: To your butt. What did he touch your butt with?
What part of his body touched your butt?
B.S.: His thing.
District Attorney: You're having a hard time saying these words?
B.S.: Yeah.
District Attorney: Why are you having a hard time saying these
words?
B.S.: Because I really don’t like talking about it.
District Attorney: When you say “his thing,” and I know that it’s
hard for you, do you know any other words for
his thing?
B.S.: No.
District Attorney: Would it help if I stood up and pointed to areas
of my body and you can tell me where it is?
B.S.: Yeah.
District Attorney: Okay. When you say his thing, do you mean this
part up here?
B.S.: No.
-7-
J-S21008-21
District Attorney: Do you mean this part down here?
B.S.: No.
District Attorney: Do you mean in between the legs?
B.S.: Yeah.
District Attorney: Okay. Now, when you were in the back room
and his thing touched your butt, can you tell us
how it touched your butt?
B.S.: What do you mean?
District Attorney: So your butt, the butt that you're talking about,
there are two cheeks?
B.S.: Mm-hmm.
District Attorney: Did his thing go in between those two cheeks?
B.S.: Yeah.
N.T. Trial, 9/17/15, at 135-37.
Such evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish the element of penetration per
anus for purposes of IDSI. Thus, Appellant’s first sufficiency claim fails.
Appellant’s second sufficiency claim fares no better. Appellant avers
that there was no testimony elicited at trial to support the conclusion that he
commanded, encouraged, or requested deviate sexual intercourse from B.W.,
that would meet the proof necessary to sustain the conviction for solicitation
of IDSI. See Appellant’s brief at 49-53.
Section 902(a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines solicitation as
follows:
-8-
J-S21008-21
(a) Definition of solicitation.--A person is guilty of solicitation to
commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating
its commission he commands, encourages or requests
another person to engage in specific conduct which would
constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime
or which would establish his complicity in its commission or
attempted commission.
18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a).
The record provides ample proof that Appellant commanded or
requested B.W. to submit to IDSI, specifically, sexual intercourse per os. B.W.
testified that Appellant told her to go into the basement.
[District Attorney]: Do you know why he asked you to do that?
[B.W.]: No.
District Attorney: Did he tell you why he asked you to go into the
basement?
B.W.: No.
District Attorney: What happened when you got all the way down
to the basement?
B.W.: He told me to suck his penis.
N.T. Trial, 9/17/15, at 98-99. B.W. refused.
We find such evidence sufficient to establish that Appellant commanded
or requested B.W. to engage in sexual intercourse per os, which constitutes
deviate sexual intercourse for purposes of solicitation to commit IDSI.
Accordingly, no relief is due.
In his third issue, Appellant attacks the weight of the evidence
underlying his convictions of all charges. Appellant avers that the
Commonwealth’s evidence was too unreliable and contradictory to sustain the
-9-
J-S21008-21
verdict due to B.W. and A.F.’s failure to report an incident prior to trial. See
Appellant’s brief at 42-44. Further, Appellant argues that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence because the results from the physical examinations
of the four alleged victims conducted by Dr. Maria McColgan at the Child
Protection Clinic were “unremarkable.” Id. at 44-45.
Our standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence
claim is:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not the underlying question of whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
The trial court concluded that, based on the testimony adduced at trial
from the four complaining witnesses, medical personnel, investigators, and
families of the victims, “nothing in the jury’s verdict shocked one’s sense of
justice.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/20, at 5. We find no indication in the
record that the trial court reached “a manifestly unreasonable judgment,”
misapplied the law, or based its decision on “partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will[,]” that would constitute an abuse of discretion. Clay, supra, at 433
(quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000)).
Hence, this claim also lacks merit.
- 10 -
J-S21008-21
In his final claim, Appellant challenges his sentence as excessive. See
Appellant’s brief at 30-42. He alleges that the sentencing court did not take
into consideration the fact that he was a “first offender who had a considerable
amount of family support, at trial and at sentencing.” Id. at 39. Further,
Appellant’s family members testified at his sentencing hearing regarding his
“good character and that he had a reputation for being a peaceful and law-
abiding person.” Id. at 33. Appellant argues that his sentence is
unreasonable even though it falls within the sentencing guidelines because it
is a case that “involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines
would be clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 33.
Pennsylvania law is well-settled that sentencing is within the discretion
of the trial court and should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.Super.
2014). Furthermore, challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence do
not automatically entitle an appellant to appellate review. See
Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Rather, an appellant must meet certain procedural requirements before an
appellate court can entertain such a challenge. Specifically, we engage in a
four-part analysis to determine whether: (1) the appeal is timely; (2) the issue
has been preserved; (3) appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to discretionary
aspects of sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the concise
- 11 -
J-S21008-21
statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate
under the sentencing code. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798,
807-08 (Pa.Super. 2013). If each of these prerequisites is met, we will
proceed to a determination on the merits. Id.Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion and a Rule 1925(b)
concise statement of errors in which he alleged that his sentence was
manifestly excessive. His appellate brief contains a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)
statement which technically complies with the requirements to challenge the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Appellant’s brief at 27. However,
that Rule 2119(f) statement “must raise a substantial question as to whether
the trial judge, in imposing sentence, violated a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code or contravened a ‘fundamental norm’ of the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 142 (Pa.Super.
2011) (finding claim that trial court did not state its reasons for sentence
imposed presented a substantial question). Whether a particular issue poses
a substantial question is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.Appellant contends in his Rule 2119(f) statement that “his sentence is
unreasonable under standards set by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2) as, ‘the
sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case
involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be
clearly unreasonable.’” Id. He maintains that “the sentence in the instant
- 12 -
J-S21008-21
matter is so manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment.”
Id. citing (Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2002)).
A claim that “a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes
too severe a punishment” has been held to raise a substantial question.
Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 995 (Pa,Super. 2016) (citing
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa.Super. 2011)). Hence, we
will review Appellant’s discretionary sentencing claim.
When reviewing a discretionary sentencing claim, we bear the following
in mind.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
....
When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer to
the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics
and potential for rehabilitation.
Antidormi, supra at 760-61 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Appellant was sentenced in the standard range on twelve counts, the
mitigated range on five counts, and the aggravated range on two counts. His
aggregate sentence was nineteen years to forty years of incarceration,
- 13 -
J-S21008-21
followed by ten years of probation, which he claims is “an excessive amount
of prison time for a first offender (i.e., someone with no prior criminal history)
who had a considerable amount of family support, at trial and at sentencing.”
Appellant’s brief at 39. He attributes the excessiveness to the fact that the
trial court ran the terms of incarceration on the IDSI and unlawful contact with
a minor convictions consecutively. He argues that since these incidents were
so inconsistent with his good character and his first offenses, “this sentence
was so ‘manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment.’” Id.
at 40 (quoting Mouzon, supra at 624) (citations omitted).
As even Appellant concedes, the trial court considered his prior record
score of zero and his good reputation in fashioning sentence. Id. The trial
court stated:
And I want to be very clear, the only reason I’m giving you the
sentence that I’m giving you is because I’m taking into account,
along with the presentence report, psychiatric report, the
guidelines, Commonwealth’s argument, your counsel’s argument,
I’ve taken into account what your family had to say and that this
could be an aberration. Something that’s not part of your
character. It’s certainly a very flawed part of your character
because individual, defendants in these matters show two faces.
The monster that they are to young children who are impacted by
the sexual desires of an adult. Yet there is the loving side that
you show to your family, your mother, your wife, your ex-wife,
your children, and again it’s all very sad.
(N.T. Sentencing, 10/4/16, at 45-46).
Appellant contends, however, that, based on the court’s statements that
this “could be an aberration[,]” or “[s]omething that’s not part of your
character[,]” the trial court “should have been compelled to give [him] a
- 14 -
J-S21008-21
shorter sentence.” Appellant’s brief at 41. He complains that instead, the
court took into consideration “the impact on the lives of the victims, consistent
with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (b), nothing regarding the rehabilitative needs of
[Appellant], in terms of how much confinement (incarceration) was actually
necessary. . . . except for the mere mention of the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines, the Presentence Report and the Mental Health Report.” Id.
Moreover, he points out that he will not complete his minimum sentence until
he is eighty years old and his sentence may not be completed during his
natural life span. See id.
The Commonwealth noted at sentencing that Appellant faced a
maximum sentence for all of his convictions of 130 to 160 years of
incarceration, and requested that the court impose a sentence of thirty-five to
seventy years of imprisonment. N.T. Sentencing, 10/4/16, at 19, 42. The
sentence imposed was a fraction of Appellant’s maximum exposure. In light
of the fact that Appellant sexually assaulted three children, the trial court
found “unwarranted and meritless” Appellant’s claim “that his sentence was
manifestly excessive and constitutes too severe a punishment.” Trial Court
Opinion, 12/15/20, at 5.
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The trial
court had a presentence investigation report and considered the proper
sentencing factors, including the fact that Appellant had a prior record score
of zero, his age, the sentencing guidelines, the psychiatric report, Appellant’s
- 15 -
J-S21008-21
allocution in which he proclaimed his innocence and refused to express
remorse for his conduct, and favorable character testimony from friends and
family. The court was certainly not compelled in any way to impose a lighter
sentence, and Appellant offers no authority in support of such a proposition.
Appellant did not demonstrate that his sentence was manifestly excessive or
too severe based on the circumstances. We find no abuse of discretion and
no relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/30/2021
- 16 -