Travis, M. v. Whitfield, C. ( 2021 )

J-A19030-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MICHAEL TRAVIS AND SIRI TRAVIS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CARRIE A. WHITFIELD : No. 2109 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 29, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Civil Division at No. 2019-00171
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 7, 2021
Siri Travis (Siri) and her husband, Michael Travis (collectively
Appellants), appeal from the judgment entered in this real property contract
dispute. After careful consideration, we affirm.
Following a bench trial, the court made the following findings:
[Siri] and [Carrie A. Whitfield (Whitfield)] are sisters. At all
times, [Whitfield] was and is the record owner of a piece of
property (hereinafter “the property”), 771 Palmyra Highway,
White Mills, PA, 18743….
***
On, about, and during the early months of 2006,
[Appellants] owned a home at 660 E. Scott Street, Olyphant, PA,
18447, and maintained residence there. A Settlement Statement
regarding the sale of the Olyphant property was entered into on
July 31, 2006. . . . The total amount of the Settlement Statement
for the Olyphant property is for the amount of $17,057.19. . . .
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On, about, or during the early months of 2006, [Whitfield]
was experiencing financial difficulties and was unable to remain
current on the mortgages, taxes, and other expenses related to
the property — which was a “family home.” [Siri’s] “Aunt” resided
on the property at that time.
[Whitfield] proposed that [Appellants] purchase the
property to “save the home (from foreclosure) and to keep it in
the family.” [Appellants] relied on the content of the conversation
with [Whitfield] and as a result, placed the Olyphant property
up for sale in order to purchase the property. The monies
needed to save the property were to be gathered between [Siri’s]
parents, [Whitfield], and [Whitfield’s] husband. Upon the sale of
the Olyphant property, [Appellants] were to pay back [Whitfield],
[Whitfield’s] husband, and [Siri’s] parents the amount which these
parties had collectively paid for the property.
[Siri] and [Whitfield] discussed that [Whitfield] would
keep her name on the mortgage on the property until said
time [Appellants] could obtain a mortgage on the property.
[Appellants] were to make [Whitfield’s] mortgage and property
tax payments on the property while maintaining the property as
their place of residence.
[Siri] believed the price for the purchase of the property
would be “whatever was left on the mortgage.” The oral
agreement with [Whitfield purportedly] was memorialized in a
“short document” which stated [Appellants] were to purchase the
home “within a reasonable amount of time.” [Siri] believes this
document[, which was never produced,] was signed by
[Appellants] and [Whitfield] and was notarized.
A document dated February 4, 2011, which is notarized and
signed only by [Whitfield] states, “Carrie A. Whitfield has bare
legal title to the property and is holding the title for [Appellants].
Moreover, [Appellants’] sister, Carrie A. Whitfield, will transfer the
property to [Appellants] when their credit score makes it possible
for them to obtain financing.” . . . There was no discussion
between [Appellants] and [Whitfield] regarding the meaning of
the phrase “transferring the property.”
[Appellants] cannot produce a written agreement for
sale regarding the property.
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[Appellants] understood the oral agreement stipulated [that
Appellants] would move onto the property and would pay
[Whitfield’s] mortgage and property tax payments on the
property. [Appellants] knew they were not purchasing the
property the day they moved onto the property.
The proceeds from the sale of the property in Olyphant as
well as “physical labor” by [Michael Travis] at [Whitfield’s new
residence,] . . . were used by [Appellants] to pay back [Whitfield],
[Whitfield’s] husband, and [Siri’s] mother for the price they
collectively paid to “save” the home.
[Appellants] believed the total payoff amount for the
mortgage of the property would be approximately $20,000.
[Appellants] moved into the property in the late summer of 2006.
[Appellants made considerable repairs and
improvements to the property over the years.] . . . Two
rooms of the house were “gutted” and needed extensive repair
and . . . the total cost of the repairs for the two rooms is
$3,713.83. [Appellants] completed the repairs on the property
between 2006 — October 2018 and presented receipts . . . which
lists the [] amount for repairs is $6,704.49. [Appellants spent a
total amount of approximately $10,418 on
repairs/improvements.]
[Appellants] have been responsible for maintaining
mortgage payments on the property since 2006. . . . The total
amount of mortgage payments made by [Appellants] is
$24,494.85. . . .
At 5:40 PM on October 4, 2018, [Siri] text messaged
[Whitfield] and said [Siri] “payed [sic] September and October’s
Mortgage today.” In a text message dated Thursday, October 4,
2018 at 4:33 PM, which came in response to [Siri’s] request for
information from [Whitfield], [Whitfield] stated the “Payoff figure
to October 15th (2018) is $20,295.02.”
[Appellants] paid taxes on the property, including taxes in
arrears, from 2006 until October 2018, when they ceased
making any payments but continued to reside on the
property until present day. The total amount of taxes paid by
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[Appellants] is $8,877.76. . . . [Appellants] were either late or
delinquent on both the mortgage and the property tax payments
at least 20 times.
[A] text message from [Siri] to [Whitfield] on an unknown
date at 8:02 PM [states], “Hey I just wanted to let you know that
I have paid the back taxes. The only one due now is the one due
by next week. Please call me so we can talk about what’s going
on.”
***
On Wednesday, October 10, 2018 at 11:50 AM, [Whitfield]
text messaged [Siri] and stated, “The[y] received your payment.
There is $363.86 worth of late fees due which will have to be paid
at some point. Even when the loan is paid off at that time they
can be paid.” . . .
On September 9, 2018 at 8:36 PM, [Siri] text messaged
[Whitfield] that [Appellants] had been pre-approved for a VA loan
and “want to move forward with it” (purchasing the property).
[Siri] further text messaged [Whitfield] that [Appellants] had
taken over the bills and that the loan and mortgage would be in
both [Appellants’] names.
On September 9, 2018, at 8:55 PM, [Whitfield] responded
[to Siri] and stated that [Appellants] “have had 12 years to get a
mortgage.”
***
[The parties thereafter exchanged numerous text
messages; in sum, Appellants asked Whitfield to sell the property
to Appellants but Whitfield refused.] [Whitfield] has failed to
convey the property to [Appellants]. [Appellants] neither set
up an escrow account nor asked this [c]ourt for injunctive relief
for [Appellants] to stop the mortgage or property tax payments
on the property.
***
[Appellants] do not have the funds available as of the
day of the [July 28, 2020] trial to fulfill the payment
obligation for specific performance.
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Trial Court Opinion and Verdict, 9/30/20, at 2-6, 8-9 (emphasis added;
paragraph numbering and breaks omitted).
In their complaint seeking specific performance of the oral contract for
sale of the property, Appellants pled breach of contract, unjust enrichment
and fraudulent misrepresentation. In the alternative, Appellants requested an
award of monetary damages in excess of $50,000. Finally, Appellants sought
an award of punitive damages for Whitfield’s fraudulent misconduct.
Whitfield countered in her answer and new matter that any purported
oral contract was unenforceable and Appellants were not entitled to any
damages, as all monies they spent on the property constituted rent.
After trial, the court on September 30, 2020 issued an opinion and
verdict finding that the parties entered into an oral contract for the sale of the
property. See id. at 12-14 (concluding Appellants met the required elements
for a valid contract and rejecting Whitfield’s claim that all of Appellants’
payments constituted rent). The court found Whitfield (a) breached the
contract, upon which Appellants justifiably relied to their detriment; (b)
fraudulently misrepresented the agreement; and (c) was unjustly enriched
because Appellants made repairs/improvements to the property. See, e.g.,
id. at 17 (“[Whitfield] unilaterally altered the terms of the contract for the sale
of the property…. [Whitfield] never conveyed title to the property even after
[Appellants] performed their end of the bargain as per documentary
evidence.”); id. at 14-19 (addressing Appellants’ claims for breach of contract,
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unjust enrichment, and fraud). However, the trial court ruled that the Statute
of Frauds1 rendered the oral contract unenforceable, and denied Appellants’
request for specific performance. See id. at 9-11; see also Wilson v.
Parker, 227 A.3d 343, 355 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Parties to a contract that is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds frequently act in reliance on it
before discovering that it is unenforceable. A party may, for example, make
improvements on land that is the subject of the contract.” (citation and
ellipses omitted)).
The trial court concluded that Appellants were entitled to monetary
damages based on Whitfield’s unjust enrichment from the improvements and
repairs Appellants made to the property; the court ordered Whitfield to pay
Appellants $10,418.24. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/20, at 16-17 (finding,
inter alia, that the property “undoubtedly increased in value as a result of
[Appellants] making these repairs with the expectation that the property
would someday be titled under [Appellants’] names.”). The court explained
that the damages constituted “the cost incurred by [Appellants] in making
repairs on the property.” Id. at 20; see also id. at 15 (stating the damages
represented expenses “for which [Appellants] can present verified
____________________________________________
1 The Statute of Frauds provides that agreements for the sale of real estate
are generally enforceable only if they are in writing and signed by the
seller. Hostetter v. Hoover, 547 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. 1988); see
also 33 P.S. § 1. The purpose of the statute is to prevent perjury and
fraudulent claims. Hostetter, 547 A.2d at 1250.
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documentation” (emphasis added)). Finally, the court declined to award
punitive damages.
Appellants timely filed a motion for reconsideration on October 8, 2020,
and Whitfield filed a competing motion for reconsideration the same day. The
trial court denied both motions. Whitfield filed a praecipe for entry of
judgment on October 28, 2020. The prothonotary entered judgment on
December 29, 2020.
Appellant timely appealed.2 Both Appellants and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellants present two issues for our
consideration:
I. Whether The Trial Court Abused its Discretion or Committed
an Error of Law in Failing to Award Specific Performance to the
[Appellants] by Requiring a Specified Closing Date and
“Express Funds” on the Day of Trial Despite the Existence of
Facts justifying Such Relief?
II. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion or Committed an
Error of Law in Failing to Award [Appellants] Compensatory
Monetary Damages for Anything Other Than Materials
Purchased, including the Failure to Consider or Award Punitive
Damages for [] Whitfield’s Fraudulent Conduct?
Appellants’ Brief at 6.
We are mindful of our standard of review:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial
verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are
supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
committed error in any application of the law. The findings of the
trial judge in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and
____________________________________________
2 Whitfield filed a cross-appeal which she has discontinued.
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effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury, and the findings will not
be disturbed on appeal unless predicated upon errors of law or
unsupported by competent evidence in the record. Furthermore,
our standard of review demands that we consider the evidence in
a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Additionally, the trial
court, as factfinder, is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence presented[.] Therefore, assessments of credibility and
conflicts in evidence are for the trial court to resolve; this Court is
not permitted to reexamine the weight and credibility
determinations or substitute our judgment for that of the
factfinder.
Sovereign Bank v. Ganter, 914 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations,
brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[w]hen reviewing equitable
decrees, our scope of review and standard of review are deferential[.]”
Wilson, 227 A.3d at 352 (footnote omitted).
Regarding the Statute of Frauds, we have explained:
As a general rule, the effect of the statute is to render oral
contracts for the sale of real estate unenforceable, although not
invalid. Therefore, they cannot be specifically enforced, even
though they may possibly form the basis for an action to
recover damages.
Hostetter, 547 A.2d at 1250 (emphasis added).
As to specific performance and damages in this context:
Recovery of monetary damages for nonperformance of an [oral]
agreement to create or transfer an interest in land is available,
“the measure of such damages being the money that was paid on
account of the purchase and the expenses incurred on the faith of
the contract.” Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. 1955).
Additionally, even specific performance may be ordered upon the
appropriate showing of part performance of the oral contract.
See Hostetter, supra at 1251 (“[S]pecific performance of an oral
contract for the sale of real estate may be ordered where it
appears that continuous and exclusive possession of the subject
property was taken under the oral contract and improvements
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were made by the buyer which are not readily compensable
in money.” [(emphasis added)]).
Vacula v. Chapman, 230 A.3d 431, 436 (Pa. Super. 2020) (emphasis
added); see also Wilson, 227 A.3d at 354 (“Usually, when a trial court
declines to enforce an oral contract for the sale of land under the statu[t]e of
frauds, the court returns the parties to the position they occupie[d] prior to
the failed transaction. This means it will order the would-be seller to return
to the would-be buyer any funds paid under the nullified contract.”). Where
this “part performance” exception is invoked, the plaintiff must show, inter
alia, “performance or part performance by the vendee which could not be
compensated in damages, [] such as would make rescission inequitable and
unjust.” Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 102, 108 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Kurland v.
Stolker, 533 A.2d 1370, 1373 (Pa. 1987)). Additionally, the terms of the
contract “must be shown by full, complete, and satisfactory proof.” Zuk, 55
A.3d at 108.
The Statute of Frauds has no relevance to a claim of unjust enrichment,
which arises from a quasi-contract. Vacula, 230 A.3d at 437. A “party who
would otherwise have a claim in restitution under a contract is not barred from
restitution for the reason that the contract is unenforceable by him because
of the Statute of Frauds[.]” Wilson, 227 A.3d at 354 (citation omitted)).
Finally, in reviewing the denial of Appellants’ request for punitive
damages,
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[t]he law of this Commonwealth calls for the appellate courts to
determine whether the trial court has committed any abuse of
discretion when reviewing a [] punitive damage verdict, or
whether on complete and exhaustive review of the record it shocks
the court’s sense of justice in a given case.
Empire Trucking Co. v. Reading Anthracite Coal Co., 71 A.3d 923, 938
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and brackets omitted).
Appellants argue the trial court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to
specifically enforce the parties’ oral contract for sale of the property; and (2)
awarding Appellants an inadequate amount of damages given Appellants’
significant expenditures on the property over the years. See Appellants’ Brief
at 14-24. As Appellants’ two issues are related, we address them together.
Appellants contend specific performance was appropriate and equitable,
stating:
The trial court had determined that an agreement existed; that
[Appellants] had spent 14 years complying with the agreement;
that they had sold their prior home to help [Whitfield] and the
family; that they had expended substantial sums and made
substantial improvements to the property which enhanced its
value; that [Appellants] had satisfied all the conditions required
of them; that Whitfield was being unjustly enriched; and, -
ultimately - that Whitfield had defrauded [Appellants] as to her
true intentions. During the entire 14 years[, Appellants]
transformed a rundown property in a comfortable home[.]
Id. at 18.
Appellants also challenge the award of damages:
[I]n calculating the damages in this case the trial court effectively
rewarded Whitfield’s fraudulent conduct by giving her $24,494.85
in [Appellants’] mortgage payments and $8,877.76 in tax
payments at [Appellants’] expense. . . . Additionally, the trial
court gave no consideration to the extensive labor provided by
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[Appellants]. … The trial court found that the work [Appellants]
“undoubtedly increased” the value of the property, but gave no
consideration to compensating [Appellants] for the “undoubted”
increase in value to the property arising from their labor.
Id. at 22 (citation and paragraph break omitted); see also id. at 19 (“Much
of what [Appellants] invested in this property is not readily compensable in
monetary damages.”). Appellants aver:
[T]he proper measure of damages in this case when it came
to the fraud claim included everything that [Appellants]
paid throughout the 14 years. That out-of-pocket total is
$43,790.85. Additionally, consideration should be given to the
fact that [Appellants were] induced to part with a home they
already had to rescue Whitfield from foreclosure and that they
have undoubtedly increased the value of the property.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added; some capitalization omitted). Finally, Appellants
assert the court erred in failing to award punitive damages for Whitfield’s
outrageous and intentional misconduct. Id. at 24-25.
Whitfield, on the other hand, defends the trial court’s ruling and award
of damages, arguing:
Appellants failed to show where [their] alleged performance or
part performance could not be compensated in damages, [] such
as would make recission inequitable and unjust. The Appellants
can be compensated for their performance or part performance …
by the award of a money judgment in their favor for the alleged
breach of the oral agreement by [Whitfield]. . . . The trial court
reviewed the evidence presented by the Appellants and awarded
the Appellants an appropriate amount.
Whitfield’s Brief at 5-6 (unnumbered).
Here, the trial court explained its denial of specific performance as
follows:
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[Appellants] concede there was no contract ever memorialized in
writing for the sale of the property.
***
The burden of proof required to be met in order for this [c]ourt to
grant the requested specific performance in this matter has not
been met by [Appellants]. The terms of the agreement are
vague as to the final date on which [Whitfield] would sell
[Appellants] the property. Furthermore, [Appellants] can
show[] performance or part performance for which they can be
compensated in damages such that the awarding of the
damages is equitable and just.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/20, at 10-11 (emphasis added) (citing Hostetter,
supra (where the part performance exception is met, “equity will enforce the
contract to prevent a greater injustice.”)). In denying specific performance,
the court further observed, “[Appellants] do not possess the express
funds with which they can cover the cost of the mortgage –
$19,057.56[.]” Id. at 15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 9 (factual findings
regarding specific performance).
Upon review of the relevant law and facts of record, we discern no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in denying Appellants’ claim for specific
performance. The Statute of Frauds barred enforcement of the oral contract
and the trial court appropriately found Appellants were entitled to damages.
See, e.g., Redditt v. Horn, 64 A.2d 809, 810 (Pa. 1949) (denying specific
performance of oral contract for the sale of real estate where equities did not
support it, though plaintiff could seek damages for expenditures and value of
services performed); Chesney v. Stephens, 644 A.2d 1240, 1243-44 (Pa.
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Super. 1994) (where long-term resident of real property made improvements
but had no ownership interest, resident was entitled to damages for
improvement expenditures from unjustly enriched property owner); Glasgow
v. G. R. C. Coal Co., 442 A.2d 249, 251 (Pa. Super. 1981) (denying specific
performance of oral land contract barred by Statute of Frauds, but “agree[ing]
with the trial court when it held that any performance or part performance by
the [party claiming an interest in the property] was compensable in
damages.”); Vacula, 230 A.3d at 437 (reversing trial court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s claim for breach of an oral contract and unjust enrichment, where
plaintiff sought only monetary damages, not specific performance, for monies
plaintiff spent toward purchase and improvements of real property owned by
defendant, and Statute of Frauds did not preclude claim for unjust
enrichment); cf. Briggs v. Sackett, 418 A.2d 586, 589 (Pa. Super. 1980)
(trial court did not err in specifically enforcing oral contract for sale of real
property under part performance exception where “during the 14 years in
which the [party claiming an equitable interest in the property] inhabited the
home . . . [the property owner] never visited, sought rent, checked on the
condition of the home, or otherwise asserted any interest in the property.”);
cf. Hostetter, 547 A.2d at 1251 (affirming order of specific performance of
oral contract for sale of real estate in favor of equitable owners, finding that a
refusal to enforce the contract under the circumstances would be inequitable
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and unjust, and “improvements were made by the buyer which are not readily
compensable in money.”).
As stated above, we must defer to the trial court’s assessment of the
evidence. See Sovereign Bank, supra; see also Wilson, 227 A.3d at 352.
Here, the court appropriately considered equitable factors, including that (a)
Whitfield breached the contract; (b) Whitfield fraudulently misrepresented a
material fact of the agreement, upon which Appellants justifiably relied to their
detriment; (c) Appellants lacked the necessary funds to pay off the
mortgage; and (d) an award of compensatory damages for monies
Appellants spent on improving the property was warranted because Whitfield
was unjustly enriched.
We also discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in determining
damages. The court found the only expenditures “for which [Appellants] can
present verified documentation” concerned improvements and repairs
Appellants made to the property. Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/20, at 15
(emphasis added)); see also id. at 17 (“Since title to the property was not
conveyed once [Appellants] met their burden and [Whitfield] maintained title
to the property – . . . any out of pocket costs which are substantiated by
[Appellants] in regard to making repairs on the property” are appropriate.
(emphasis added)). The trial court also noted Appellants “benefitted from
making the payments on the property in order to reside on the
property[; thus, Whitfield] didn’t []wrongfully secure or passive[ly] receive a
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benefit [that] would be unconscionable for her to obtain,” aside from the
“verified” cost of the improvements Appellants made. Id. at 16 (emphasis
added); see also Redditt, supra.
Finally, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion in
concluding no award of punitive damages was appropriate under the
circumstances. See Empire Trucking Co., supra; Weston v.
Northampton Pers. Care, Inc., 62 A.3d 947, 961 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The
determination of whether a person’s actions arise to outrageous conduct lies
within the sound discretion of the fact-finder and will not be disturbed by an
appellate court so long as that discretion has not been abused.”).
For the above reasons, Appellants’ issues do not warrant relief.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/7/2021
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