Com. v. Webster, W. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM E. WEBSTER, III :
:
Appellant : No. 2157 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered October 7, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-39-CR-0002085-2006
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: September 9, 2021
Appellant, William E. Webster, III, appeals pro se from the trial court’s
October 7, 2020 order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which
he challenged the legality of his sex-offender registration requirements under
Subchapter I of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA
II”).1 After careful review, we affirm.
Briefly, on October 31, 2006, Appellant was convicted by a jury of rape,
18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(3), and indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). He
was sentenced on February 20, 2007, to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years’
incarceration. Appellant filed an appeal from his judgment of sentence, but
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42 and 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75,
respectively.
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he later withdrew that appeal. Appellant then filed a petition under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, seeking to preclude
application of the prior version of SORNA (“SORNA I”) on the grounds that it
was invalidated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164
A.3d 1189, 1223 (Pa. 2017) (holding that the registration requirements of
Subchapter H of SORNA I, as applied retroactively, were punitive under the
seven-factor test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and thus, SORNA I was
unconstitutional under the ex post facto clauses of the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions).2 The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition, and
this Court affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 1003 EDA
____________________________________________
2 In response to Muniz and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (holding that the statutory mechanism for designating a
defendant a sexually violent predator under SORNA I violated the United
States Supreme Court’s decisions in Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)), the Pennsylvania General
Assembly amended SORNA I by enacting Act 10 on February 21, 2018, and
Act 29 on June 12, 2018, which are collectively known as SORNA II. See Act
of Feb. 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”); Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140,
No. 29 (“Act 29”). SORNA II now divides sex offenders into two subchapters:
(1) Subchapter H, which applies to an offender who committed a sexually
violent offense on or after December 20, 2012 (the date SORNA I became
effective); and (2) Subchapter I, which applies to an individual who committed
a sexually violent offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20,
2012, whose period of registration has not expired, or whose registration
requirements under a former sexual offender registration law have not
expired. Pursuant to SORNA II, Appellant’s rape and indecent assault
convictions became Subchapter I offenses requiring lifetime registration, and
10-year registration, respectively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55.
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2018, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed April 9, 2019), appeal
denied, 223 A.3d 239 (Pa. 2020).
On August 10, 2020, Appellant filed the pro se petition for writ of habeas
corpus underlying the present appeal. Therein, he again sought to bar his
sex-offender registration requirements, arguing that his registration obligation
under SORNA I expired when the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Muniz on January 22, 2018. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138
S.Ct. 925 (2018). On August 27, 2020, the court issued a notice of its intent
to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907,
which applies to petitions filed under the PCRA. Appellant filed a pro se
response, correctly observing that our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), held that the PCRA is not the exclusive
method for challenging sex-offender registration requirements. See id. at
618. On October 7, 2020, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus on the merits. See Trial Court Order, 10/7/20, at 2
(unnumbered). Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal, and he also
complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its Rule
1925(a) opinion on January 6, 2021.
Herein, Appellant states three issues for our review, which we reproduce
verbatim:
(A)- Whether, the Retroactive Application of (Subchapter I) Act-
10 and Act-29 of 2018, can apply Retroactively to the Appellant,
where on December 20th of 2012, the Version of Megan’s Law that
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required the Appellant to Register as a Sexual Offender expired,
and following the invalidation in Commonwealth vs Muniz; 164
A.3d 1189 PA. 2017, by the Supreme Court of the United States
denial of Certiorari review on January 22nd 2018, there was no
over lapping law that could require the Appellant to be subject to
the Retroactive Application of (Subchapter I)
(B)- Whether the Prior version of Megan’s Law 3, pursuant to Act
152 of 2004, can apply moving forward to invoke Registration
requirements on the Appellant.
(C)- Whether the imposed Registration Requirements pursuant to
Megan’s Law 3, can apply to Appellant.
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnumbered).
Appellant’s issues are related and, thus, we will address them together.
Appellant contends that SORNA II cannot be applied to him, as his registration
requirements expired when the invalidation of SORNA I was finalized by the
United States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Muniz. He also claims
that Megan’s Law, the sex-offender registration requirements in effect prior to
SORNA I, expired with SORNA I’s enactment on December 20, 2012, and,
thus, no registration requirements apply to him.
Appellant’s arguments are meritless. As our Supreme Court recognized
in Lacombe, the sex-offender “registration period does not begin until
registrants are released from prison….” Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 618.
Appellant acknowledged in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that he is still
incarcerated for his present convictions. See Pro Se Petition, 8/10/20, at 1
(unnumbered). Thus, his registration requirements have not expired and,
upon his release, he will be subject to Subchapter I of SORNA II. In Lacombe,
our Supreme Court held that the registration requirements in Subchapter I of
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SORNA II do not constitute criminal punishment. Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626.
Accordingly, the registration requirements set forth in Subchapter I may be
retroactively applied to Appellant.
Order affirmed.
Judge McLaughlin joins this memorandum.
Judge Pellegrini concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/21
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