Com. v. Veguilla, A. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S33015-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ANTHONY GEORGE VEGUILLA                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 3201 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-15-CR-0004259-2009
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2021
    Appellant, Anthony George Veguilla, appeals from the October 10, 2019
    violation of parole and probation (“VOP”) sentence imposed following his
    conviction of Flight to Avoid Apprehension at a separate docket number.
    Appellant challenges the legality and discretionary aspects of his VOP
    sentence. After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s sentence in part, vacate
    in part, and remand with instructions.
    Briefly, on July 2, 2010, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to
    one count each of Corruption of Minors (“COM”), Indecent Assault, and Sexual
    Assault.1 On September 24, 2010, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a
    term of 3½ to 7 years of incarceration for his Sexual Assault conviction,
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S §§ 6301(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), and 3124.1, respectively.
    J-S33015-20
    followed by a consecutive 4-year term of probation for his COM conviction and
    a consecutive 2-year term of probation for his Indecent Assault conviction.2
    Appellant’s sentence of incarceration expired on October 3, 2016, and he
    began serving his probation on his COM conviction.
    Appellant serially violated his probation and parole, resulting in the VOP
    court resentencing Appellant numerous times to sentences of incarceration for
    his COM conviction. Relevantly, on April 7, 2019, while on parole, 3 Appellant
    attempted to flee from police who were responding to a domestic disturbance.
    This resulted in Appellant facing charges of Flight to Avoid Apprehension.
    Appellant’s arrest and subsequent guilty plea to the Flight to Avoid
    Apprehension charge gave rise to the instant VOP proceeding, his fourth.
    On October 10, 2019, the VOP court found Appellant in violation of his
    parole. The court sentenced Appellant to serve the balance of the maximum
    of 10 months and 24 days on the sentence of incarceration imposed on his
    COM conviction. The court also revoked the probation sentence imposed on
    Appellant’s Indecent Assault conviction, which he had not yet begun to serve,
    and imposed a consecutive sentence of 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment. The
    court awarded Appellant 125 days’ credit for time served.
    ____________________________________________
    2The court credited Appellant with time served from October 3, 2009, to
    September 24, 2010.
    3 Appellant was on parole from a sentence of incarceration imposed on May
    18, 2018 following a prior VOP.
    -2-
    J-S33015-20
    On   October    21,   2019,   Appellant   filed   a   timely   Petition   for
    Reconsideration and Reduction of Sentence claiming that the VOP court
    imposed an excessive sentence by failing to consider mitigating factors. On
    October 23, 2019, the VOP court denied Appellant’s Petition.
    This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the VOP court have
    complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, which we have reordered
    for ease of disposition:
    1. Did not the court abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant
    to an excessive and disproportionate sentence in light of the
    criminal conduct in the case?
    2. When the court revoked Appellant’s parole for a violation of his
    parole, did the court not lack authority under Pennsylvania law
    to also anticipatorily revoke Appellant’s consecutive sentence
    of probation that he had not yet begun to serve?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Issue I – Challenge to Discretionary Aspects of Sentence
    In his first issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence. In particular, he asserts that his aggregate sentence of 22 months
    and 24 days to 34 months and 24 days of incarceration is manifestly excessive
    and that the court failed to consider mitigating factors such as Appellant’s
    childhood trauma and rehabilitative needs, his acceptance of responsibility,
    the support system he now has in place to comply with supervision, and that
    his probation and parole violations have been primarily technical in nature.
    Id. at 20-25.
    -3-
    J-S33015-20
    Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence do not entitle an
    appellant to review as of right; rather, a challenge in this regard is properly
    viewed as a petition for allowance of appeal.         42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b);
    Commonwealth       v.   Tuladziecki,   
    522 A.2d 17
    ,   18-19   (Pa.   1987);
    Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
    satisfy a four-part test: (1) whether the appellant filed a timely notice of
    appeal; (2) whether the appellant preserved the issue at sentencing or in a
    motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether the appellant’s brief
    includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal
    as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether the concise statement
    raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 
    64 A.3d 722
    , 725 (Pa.
    Super. 2013).
    If an appellant fails to include a Rule 2119(f) statement and the
    Commonwealth objects, the appellant has waived his discretionary sentencing
    claims.    See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    149 A.3d 349
    , 353 (Pa. Super.
    2016). Rule 2119(f) requires an appellant who challenges the discretionary
    aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter to “set forth in a separate section
    of the brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
    appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(f).    The Rule 2119(f) statement must “immediately precede the
    -4-
    J-S33015-20
    argument on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of the
    sentence.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Herein, Appellant filed a timely appeal and preserved the issue in his
    Post-Sentence Motion. Appellant has, however neglected to include a 2119(f)
    Statement in his Brief and the Commonwealth has objected to the omission.
    See Commonwealth’s Brief at 25.          We, thus, conclude that Appellant has
    waived his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    Issue II – Challenge to Trial Court’s Authority to Anticipatorily
    Revoke Probation
    In his second issue, Appellant challenges the revocation of his 2-year
    sentence of probation on his Indecent Assault conviction. He argues that the
    trial court lacked statutory authority to revoke the sentence because Appellant
    had not yet begun serving it. As this claim implicates the legality of Appellant’s
    sentence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    980 A.2d 667
    , 672 (Pa. Super. 2009). See
    also Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    994 A.2d 1141
    , 1144 (Pa. Super. 2010) (a
    sentence is illegal and subject to mandatory correction where there is no
    statutory support for its imposition).
    This court recently addressed this issue in Commonwealth v.
    Simmons, ___ A.3d ___, 
    2021 WL 3641859
     (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 18, 2021)
    (en banc). In Simmons, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of
    six to 23 months’ incarceration followed by a 3-year term of probation. Id.
    at *1. While Appellant was on parole, he pleaded guilty to new crimes. Id.
    -5-
    J-S33015-20
    As a result of his new convictions, the trial court revoked the defendant’s
    parole, anticipatorily revoked his probation, and resentenced him to a term of
    2½ to 5 years’ imprisonment. Id. The defendant challenged the legality of
    the anticipatory revocation of his probation sentence. Id.
    The Simmons Court held that, where the trial court imposes a sentence
    of probation to be served consecutively to a defendant’s sentence of
    incarceration, the defendant may not prospectively violate the conditions of a
    probationary order by committing a new crime after sentencing, but before
    the commencement of his probationary sentence. Id. at *10, *12. Stated
    another way, the Simmons Court held that no statutory authority exists that
    permits a trial court to anticipatorily revoke an order of probation.                 Id.
    Accordingly, the Simmons Court vacated the defendant’s judgment of
    sentence and remanded with instructions that the trial court reinstate the
    original order of probation.4 Id. at *12-13.
    Instantly,    following    Appellant’s    guilty   plea   to   Flight   to   Avoid
    Apprehension, the VOP court revoked his parole and anticipatorily revoked a
    sentence of probation Appellant had not yet begun to serve.                This Court’s
    holding Simmons—that the trial court lacks the statutory authority to
    anticipatorily revoke a probationary sentence a defendant has not yet begun
    ____________________________________________
    4 The Simmons Court also concluded that the defendant’s sentence of
    incarceration was illegal because the court imposed a new term of
    incarceration rather than ordering him to serve the balance of the valid
    sentence previously imposed.       Accordingly, the Court remanded for
    resentencing on the defendant’s parole violation.
    -6-
    J-S33015-20
    to   serve—is,    thus,    dispositive    of   Appellant’s   illegal   sentence   claim.
    Accordingly, we vacate the Judgment of Sentence of incarceration imposed for
    Appellant’s Indecent Assault conviction, and remand for the court to reinstate
    the original order of probation. We affirm Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence
    of 10 months and 24 days of incarceration, the balance of his sentence for his
    COM conviction following his parole violation.5
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part.                  Case
    remanded with instructions. Application for Discontinuance denied as moot.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/10/2021
    ____________________________________________
    5 On September 1, 2021, Appellant filed an Application for Discontinuance.           In
    light of our disposition, we deny Appellant’s Application as moot.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3201 EDA 2019

Judges: Dubow

Filed Date: 9/10/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024