Com. v. Orris, G. ( 2021 )

J-S24040-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GERALD EDGAR ORRIS, III :
:
Appellant : No. 1162 WDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-11-CR-0002150-2016,
CP-11-CR-0002151-2016
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 16, 2021
Appellant, Gerald Edgar Orris, III, appeals from the order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County dismissing his amended second
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546, following a hearing. Herein, Appellant contends the PCRA
court erroneously dismissed his petition raising the claim that he entered an
unknowing and unintelligent guilty plea due to his mental health issues. After
careful review, we affirm.
President Judge Norman A. Krumenacker, III, who presided over
Appellant’s guilty plea hearing, sentencing hearing, and PCRA hearing, aptly
sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of the present matter, as
follows:
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On May 24, 2018, Orris entered pleas [to one count of] Statutory
Sexual Assault, a felony of the second degree [and to one count
of] Illegal to Taunt Police Animals, a felony of the second degree.
N.T. 5/24/18. There was no agreement as to sentence on either
case and all remaining charges would be nol prossed thirty-one
days after sentencing unless an appeal was filed. See id. and
Plea Agreement. Orris acknowledged that he would need to
comply with a Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”) assessment and be subject to registration
requirements to be determined at sentencing following the
evaluation. Id.
On August 20, 2018, Orris was sentenced [on Count 1 to serve 30
to 120 months’ incarceration, to comply with SORNA registration
requirements, and pay costs of prosecution]. Orris was found not
to be RRRI eligible. Orris’ sentence was in the standard range for
this offense. Orris was given credit for time served. [On Count
2, Orris was ordered to] serve a period of incarceration of 12 to
60 months in a state correctional institute concurrent with . . .
Count 1. Orris was found not to be RRRI eligible. Orris’ sentence
was in the standard range for this offense. N.T. 8/20/18. Orris
did not file a direct appeal of his sentence.
On August 29, 2018, Orris filed a pro se [PCRA petition] and on
September 7, 2018, Timothy Burns [(“Attorney Burns”)]. . . was
appointed as PCRA counsel. Attorney Burns filed an Amended
First Petition on October 8, 2018, asserting a claim that Orris’
guilty pleas were not entered in a knowing and voluntary manner
due to ineffective assistance of counsel and Orris’ mental health
issues preventing him from comprehending what he was doing in
entering the pleas.
A hearing on the Amended First Petition was held on November
21, 2018, at which time plea counsel Aaron Ling [(plea counsel)]
and Orris testified. Orris’ First Amended Petition was dismissed
by Order entered December 19, 2018. Orris filed a timely appeal
from this denial that he discontinued [by praecipe to discontinue
filed on April 1, 2019.]
[On April 29, 2019, Appellant timely filed this, his second PCRA
petition raising the same claim of ineffective assistance of plea
counsel that was raised in his first PCRA petition. Counsel was
appointed and a hearing was held on September 1, 2020, after
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which the PCRA court entered its September 15, 2020 order
denying relief, as referenced, supra. This appeal followed.]
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/17/21, at 2-3.
Appellant raises the following issue for this Court’s consideration:
Whether the lower court erred when denying the PCRA [Petition]
of the Appellant where trial counsel was ineffective in advising the
Appellant regarding sentencing consequences when trial counsel
was aware that Appellant was unable to fully comprehend the
consequences of a guilty plea in regard to sentencing and where
the Appellant suffers from mental health ailments?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
We begin by noting our standard of review:
“Our review of a PCRA court's decision is limited to examining
whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by the
record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa.
2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886
(Pa. 2010)). We view the findings of the PCRA court and the
evidence of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Id. With respect to the PCRA court's decision to deny a request
for an evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing,
such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 485 (Pa. 2014). “The
PCRA court's credibility determinations, when supported by the
record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo
standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions.”
Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013). The
denial of an appellant's request for discovery is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Id.To be entitled to PCRA relief, a petitioner bears the burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the
circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2), which
include a violation of the Pennsylvania or United States
Constitution or ineffectiveness of counsel, any one of which “so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
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adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i) and (ii). Further, the petitioner must show
that the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or
waived pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3); See
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 714 (Pa.
2014).
Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617–18 (Pa. 2015) (citations
reformatted).
Herein, Appellant’s entire argument offered in support of his appeal
consists of the following:
The Appellant suffers from an intellectual disability that makes
comprehending complex matters difficult. The Appellant has
testified that because of this mental health condition, he did not
understand trial counsels [sic] explanations regarding the
consequences of pleading guilty. The Appellant claims he was told
by trial counsel that he would receive the maximum sentence on
each of case [sic] if he was to exercise his right to trial, trial
counsel convinced the Appellant that if he plead [sic] guilty he
would be given a sentence of time served and released. The
Appellant has maintained this position throughout. Trial counsel
downplayed Appellant’s mental health issues and failed to
consider the position of someone with the mental health issues of
the Appellant.
Accordingly, the guilty plea of the Appellant was made
involuntarily because of representations of trial counsel.
Therefore, Appellant should be able to withdraw his plea.
Appellant’s brief at 6-7.
Appellant has failed to develop his claim for our review. Indeed, his
argument is devoid of any citations to the record or legal authority supporting
his position, and his assertions consist of nothing more than self-serving, bare
conclusions that his testimony was truthful and deserving of the relief he
currently seeks. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant's
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argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent.”); Commonwealth v. Paddy, 14 A.3d 431, 443 (Pa.
2011) (providing that “boilerplate allegations and bald assertions ... cannot
satisfy a petitioner's burden to prove that counsel was ineffective.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (stating that
“where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation
to relevant authority[,] or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s
claim is waived.
Even if we were to address Appellant’s claim on its merits, we would find
it unavailing. To this effect, we refer to the President Judge Krumenacker’s
Rule 1925(a) opinion in which he discusses his assessment of statements
offered by both plea counsel at the August 20, 2018 sentencing hearing and
by Appellant at the September 1, 2020 evidentiary hearing and deems reliable
only counsel’s representations that appropriate steps had been taken prior to
the plea hearing to ensure Appellant was declared competent to proceed:
At the 2018 hearing, [plea counsel] testified that: he had initial
concerns regarding Orris’ competency; based on these concerns
Orris was committed to the Torrance State Hospital (Torrance) for
a period of evaluation and treatment; Orris was released from
Torrance after being deemed competent; he spoke with Orris
approximately ten times relative to his option to enter a plea or
go to trial; explained the risk that consecutive sentences could be
imposed if Orris was convicted of multiple felonies2; he explained
the plea agreement in detail to Orris; that Orris understood the
plea agreement; Orris eventually elected to enter a plea; and that
he never promised Orris he would receive a sentence of time
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served. N.T. 11/21/18 pp. 4-15; Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4. [Plea Counsel]
did not testify at the 2020 hearing.3
2 Orris faced eleven counts, ten of which were felonies,
in the [first case] and faced three counts, two of which
were felonies, in the [second case].
3 The transcript of the September 1, 2020, hearing has
not been requested and the [PCRA] court is relying on
its notes from that hearing.
Orris testified at the 2018 sentencing hearing that: [plea counsel]
told him he would receive the maximum sentence on each case if
he went to trial; that he didn’t understand what he was doing
when he entered his plea; [plea counsel] told him if he entered
the plea he would receive a sentence of time served and be
allowed to go home immediately; and that he did not realize he
would receive a sentence of incarceration. Id. at 15-21. At the
2020 hearing[,] Orris testified, consistent with his prior testimony,
that [plea counsel] had promised him if he entered guilty pleas in
these cases he would either be immediately released to his home
or to a group home or have to serve only a couple of months’
incarceration based on his time served.
...
As to his allegation that his mental health issues prevented him
from entering a knowing and voluntary plea, Orris has offered no
evidence in support of this assertion in either the 2018 or 2020
hearings other than his own testimony. [Plea Counsel] testified,
and the record reflects, that he had initial concerns regarding
Orris’ competency resulting in Orris being evaluated and treated
at Torrance for mental health issues. N.T., 11/21/18 pp. 7-8, 10-
11; Ex 1. Orris was released from Torrance after he was deemed
competent to participate in his criminal cases. Id.; Ex. 1 pp. 3-4.
Orris has offered no evidence to suggest that between his release
from Torrance and the entry of his guilty plea that he became
incompetent or that his mental health impacted his ability to enter
a knowing and voluntary plea. Accordingly, there is no merit to
this claim for relief.
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PCRA Court Opinion at 5-7.
After conducting an independent review of both Appellant’s August 20,
2018 sentencing hearing and other relevant portions of the record, we discern
no basis to disturb the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/16/2021
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