Com. v. Confer, M. ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • J-A09015-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    MATTHEW CONFER
    Appellant                 No. 1059 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 10, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-42-CR-0000205-2020
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                       FILED: SEPTEMBER 16, 2021
    Appellant Matthew Confer appeals from the September 10, 2020
    judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean
    County (“trial court”), following his negotiated guilty plea to criminal attempt,
    and criminal mischief.1       His counsel has filed a brief and an application to
    withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1969), and
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we
    affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.
    On May 23, 2020, City of Bradford Police Department charged Appellant
    with, inter alia, the foregoing crimes.        The affidavit of probable cause
    accompanying the complaint alleged:
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3921(a), and 3304(a)(5), respectively.
    J-A09015-21
    A male came into the BPD to report that there was a male in the
    parking lot of Tops Market attempting to break into vehicles and
    he had a knife. [Officer Shelby J. Walters] arrived at Tops and
    located 4 individuals standing in the parking lot. One of the
    individuals stated that his brother had a video of a male
    attempting to break into a vehicle. The male showed [Officer
    Walters] a video of a male on one knee trying to pick the lock of
    a vehicle with a knife. [Officer Walters] identified the male as
    [Appellant]. [Appellant] is familiar to [Officer Walters] from
    previous incidents. [Officer Walters] then saw a red Dodge
    sedan’s rear brake lights light up and the witness stated that the
    male was in the red Dodge sedan. Officer Miller arrived at that
    time and [Officer Walters] approached the vehicle. [Officer
    Walters] saw that [Appellant] was sitting in the driver’s seat of the
    Dodge sedan with the door closed. [Officer Walters] then detained
    [Appellant] in handcuffs and briefly patted [him] down over the
    clothing to make sure he did not have the knife or any other
    weapons on him. [Appellant] told [Officer Walters] multiple times
    that he was the owner of the vehicle and to look at his tag.
    [Officer Walters] did run the registration of the vehicle and the
    vehicle was not registered to [Appellant]. Officers inquired about
    the tag [Appellant] kept referring to and [Appellant] stated that it
    showed who he is. [Appellant] had an ID badge clipped to the
    neck of his shirt. The car was in disarray with multiple papers
    strewn inside of the vehicle. [Officer Walters] was then informed
    by the witnesses that [Appellant] had attempted to gain entry into
    a different vehicle as well. [Officer Walters] saw the cover to the
    driver’s side handle lock had been broken off but the vehicle was
    still locked. [Officer Walters] then went back to the passenger
    side of the Dodge sedan and saw that the center console was open
    and there were broken cigarettes inside of the center console as
    well as on the driver’s seat of the vehicle. [Officer Walters] was
    able to locate the knife. The knife had been inserted into the
    ignition of the Dodge Sedan. [Appellant] was still claiming that
    his name was on the tag. I looked at the tag and saw that the ID
    badge was for a male named Collin Maines. The photo on the ID
    badge was not [Appellant’s].
    Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/23/20 (sic). The charges were held for court.
    On September 2, 2020, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea.
    At the guilty plea hearing, he acknowledged on the record that his negotiated
    -2-
    J-A09015-21
    plea agreement called for 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment in a state facility.
    N.T. Guilty Plea, 9/2/20, at 3. In his written colloquy, he acknowledged that
    his maximum sentence for attempted theft by unlawful taking was a third-
    degree felony that carried a maximum sentence of seven (7) “years and
    $15,000.”   Written Plea Agreement, 9/2/20, at ¶ 40.       The trial court then
    reviewed with Appellant all of the rights he would be relinquishing by pleading
    guilty. Appellant indicated that he understood those rights and was pleading
    guilty because his “fingerprints are all over that knife.”    N.T. Guilty Plea,
    9/2/20, at 5-6. He remarked that “I know I’m guilty I know I did a (inaudible
    – fading out) did a crime so I want to admit – I want to man up and take
    responsibility for my actions.” Id. at 6. Appellant indicated to the trial court
    that he reviewed and signed the written plea agreement.            Id. at 6-7.
    Appellant further agreed on the record that it was Appellant’s decision to plead
    guilty and that “[n]o one is making me do this this is all my – all me, I’m
    making this decision on my own.” Id. at 7. He also stated that he was not
    sick, or under the influence of any medication and was thinking clearly. Id.
    at 7-8. Appellant agreed to the Commonwealth’s facts supporting the listed
    charges. Id. at 8-9. At the end of the hearing, Appellant indicated that he
    wished to expedite sentencing because “I want [(sic)] hurry up and get going
    and do my time.” Id. at 10.
    On September 10, 2020, consistent with the terms of the plea, the trial
    court sentenced Appellant to, inter alia, 12 to 24 months’ incarceration with a
    concurrent term of 24 months’ probation. Appellant received 111 days’ credit
    -3-
    J-A09015-21
    for time served. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. He timely
    appealed.     The trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement of errors complained of on appeal. Instead of the court-ordered
    Rule 1925(b) statement, however, Appellant’s counsel filed a statement of
    intent to file an Anders brief under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).2 In response, the
    trial court issued a brief Rule 1925(a) statement.
    On December 10, 2020, Appellant’s counsel filed in this Court an
    application to withdraw as counsel and filed an Anders brief, wherein counsel
    challenged the legality of the sentence.3 Anders Brief at 4.
    When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
    merits of the underlying issues without first examining counsel’s petition to
    withdraw.     Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    , 290 (Pa. Super.
    2007) (en banc).        It is well-established that, in requesting a withdrawal,
    ____________________________________________
    2 Rule 1925(c)(4) provides:
    In a criminal case, counsel may file of record and serve on the
    judge a statement of intent to file an [Anders] brief in lieu of filing
    a Statement. If, upon review of the [Anders] brief, the appellate
    court believes that there are arguably meritorious issues for
    review, those issues will not be waived; instead, the appellate
    court may remand for the filing of a Statement, a supplemental
    opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a), or both. Upon remand, the trial
    court may, but is not required to, replace appellant’s counsel.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
    3 As the Commonwealth notes, the basis for Appellant’s legality of sentence
    challenge is unclear, because he does not identify any sentencing errors. We,
    however, suspect that Appellant is objecting to the imposition of the 12 to 24
    months’ sentence.
    -4-
    J-A09015-21
    counsel must satisfy the following procedural requirements: 1) petition the
    court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious
    examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be
    frivolous; 2) provide a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the
    defendant that he or she has the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro
    se or raise additional arguments that the defendant considers worthy of the
    court’s addition. Commonwealth v. Lilley, 
    978 A.2d 995
    , 997 (Pa. Super.
    2009).
    Instantly, counsel’s application to withdraw from representation
    provides that counsel reviewed the record and concluded that the appeal is
    frivolous.   Furthermore, counsel notified Appellant that he was seeking
    permission to withdraw and provided Appellant with copies of the petition to
    withdraw and his Anders brief. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to
    retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems
    worthy of this Court’s attention. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel has
    satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders.
    We next must determine whether counsel’s Anders brief complies with
    the substantive requirements of Santiago, wherein our Supreme Court held:
    [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
    petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the
    procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
    to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
    the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
    appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
    led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    -5-
    J-A09015-21
    Santiago, 
    978 A.2d at 361
    . Here, our review of counsel’s brief indicates that
    he has complied with the briefing requirements of Santiago. We, therefore,
    conclude    that    counsel    has    satisfied   the   minimum   requirements   of
    Anders/Santiago.
    Once counsel has met his obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility
    of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make
    an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly
    frivolous.” Santiago, 
    978 A.2d at
    355 n.5. Thus, we now turn to the merits
    of Appellant’s appeal.
    Appellant’s sole issue before us implicates the legality of sentence,4
    which we treat as a question of law. Commonwealth v. Aikens, 
    139 A.3d 244
    , 245 (Pa. Super. 2016), aff’d 
    168 A.3d 137
     (Pa. 2017). Our standard of
    review over such questions is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. 
    Id.
    ____________________________________________
    4 “[W]e note that when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives all
    defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the
    jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed.”
    Commonwealth v. Stradley, 
    50 A.3d 769
    , 771 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
    omitted). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was
    aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.”
    Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 
    24 A.3d 1044
    , 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    (citation omitted). Differently put, a defendant may not challenge the
    discretionary aspects of his or her sentence, where the terms of the sentence
    were made part of the negotiated plea. Commonwealth v. Baney, 
    860 A.2d 127
    , 131 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 
    877 A.2d 459
     (Pa. 2005); see
    Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    117 A.3d 777
    , 784 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that
    a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a negotiated sentence is
    unreviewable).
    -6-
    J-A09015-21
    Here, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s legality of sentence
    challenge is wholly frivolous and devoid of any merit. As stated, he agreed
    to 12-24 months’ incarceration with a concurrent term of 24 months’ probation
    for attempted theft by unlawful taking, a third-degree felony carrying a
    maximum sentence of seven years in prison.              See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§
    106(b)(4); 1101; 1103(3). The agreed-upon sentence of 12 to 24 months in
    prison was legal because it was within the standard range and did not exceed
    the seven-year maximum. Accordingly, Appellant does not obtain relief.
    We have conducted an independent review of the record and have
    addressed Appellant’s argument on appeal. Based on our conclusions above,
    we agree with Appellant’s counsel that the issue Appellant seeks to litigate in
    this appeal is without merit, and our independent review of the record has not
    revealed any other meritorious issues. We affirm the judgment of sentence
    and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/16/2021
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1059 WDA 2020

Judges: Stabile

Filed Date: 9/16/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024