Com. v. Williamson, T. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S26023-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    TERRY ROBERT WILLIAMSON                      :
    :
    Appellant             :    No. 788 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 1, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
    Criminal Division at CP-35-CR-0000781-2012
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2021
    Terry Robert Williamson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed after the trial court revoked his probation.          In addition,
    Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has petitioned to withdraw from representation
    pursuant     to        Anders   v.   California,   
    386 U.S. 738
       (1967),   and
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009).                  Given this
    Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Simmons, --- A.3d ----, 
    2021 WL 3641859
     (Pa. Super. Aug. 18, 2021) (en banc), we vacate Appellant’s
    judgment of sentence, deny Counsel’s petition to withdraw, and remand for
    reinstatement of the prior probation order.1
    ____________________________________________
    1 This Court recently decided a similar appeal, finding Simmons “directly on
    point,” denying counsel’s request to withdraw, and remanding for the
    reinstatement of probation. See Commonwealth v. Herrera, 787 MDA
    2020, 
    2021 WL 4060441
     (Pa. Super. Sept. 7, 2021) (unpublished
    memorandum).
    J-S26023-21
    In 2012, Appellant was charged with attempted theft, criminal mischief,
    drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana.2 Appellant pled guilty and
    was sentenced to Drug Court. However, on November 25, 2014, Appellant
    was terminated from Drug Court and resentenced to 4 years of probation.
    Appellant’s probation was subsequently revoked, and on June 14, 2017, he
    was resentenced to 8 to 24 months of incarceration, followed by 2 years of
    probation. While incarcerated, Appellant was involved in a fight with other
    inmates.     As a result, the trial court preemptively revoked his 2-year
    probationary sentence and imposed a sentence of 1 to 2 years of
    incarceration. Appellant timely appealed.3
    On June 23, 2021, Counsel filed with this Court a petition to withdraw
    from representation in which Counsel avers that Appellant’s appeal is
    frivolous. On August 6, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se response restating the
    issues raised in the Anders brief. Our review reveals Counsel has complied
    with the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. See Petition to
    Withdraw as Counsel, 6/23/21; Anders Brief at 5-19. We thus proceed to
    determine whether Appellant’s claims are frivolous.
    Counsel presents the following issues on Appellant’s behalf:
    A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVOKED
    [APPELLANT’S] SPECIAL PROBATION BEFORE IT HAD
    COMMENCED.
    ____________________________________________
    2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(2), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32),
    and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31).
    3 Both the trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -2-
    J-S26023-21
    B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO STATE ON THE
    RECORD THE REASONS FOR THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON
    [APPELLANT’S] SPECIAL PROBATION VIOLATION AS
    REQUIRED BY 42 PA. C.S. §9721(B).
    C. WHETHER THE SENTENCE ON [APPELLANT’S] VIOLATION IS
    EXCESSIVE, HARSH, ARBITRARY AND CONTRARY TO THE
    FUNDAMENTAL NORMS OF SENTENCING IN THIS
    COMMONWEALTH, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE ALREADY WAS
    DISCIPLINED FOR THE ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR BY THE
    DOC.
    D. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF 12 TO 24 MONTHS
    INCARCERATION FOLLOWING THE REVOCATION OF
    APPELLANT’S SPECIAL PROBATION VIOLATED THE DOUBLE
    JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AS APPLIED
    TO THE STATES THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
    Anders Brief at 4 (reordered for disposition).
    Appellant’s first claim is that his sentence is illegal because the trial court
    improperly “revoked [Appellant’s] special probation before it started.”
    Anders Brief at 7. In particular:
    The Appellant asserts that he never violated the terms of his
    special probation because the violation occurred while he was still
    incarcerated prior to the commencement of his term of probation.
    Counsel for the Appellant understands that based upon
    Commonwealth v. Ware, 
    737 A.2d 251
     (Pa. Super. 1999) and
    its progeny, this appeal is frivolous. As noted by the Ware Court:
    “The fact that appellant had not commenced serving probation
    when the new offense occurred did not prevent the court from
    revoking its prior order placing appellant on probation.” Ware,
    
    737 A.2d at 253
    .
    A similar issue was before this Court in Commonwealth v.
    Wendowski, [] 
    420 A.2d 628
     ([Pa. Super.] 1980). The court in
    Wendowski there held that for revocation purposes the term of
    probation included the time beginning when probation was
    granted. The Court stated:
    -3-
    J-S26023-21
    If, at any time before the defendant has completed
    the maximum period of probation, or before he has
    begun service of his probation, he should commit
    offenses of such nature as to demonstrate to the court
    that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting
    of the same would not be in subservience to the ends
    of justice and the best interests of the public, or the
    defendant, the court could revoke or change the order
    of probation.    A defendant on probation has no
    contract with the court. He is still a person convicted
    of crime, and the expressed intent of the Court to
    have him under probation beginning at a future time
    does not ‘change his position from the possession of
    a privilege to the enjoyment of a right.’ Burns v.
    United States, 
    287 U.S. 216
    , 222 [] (1932).
    [] Wendowski, 
    420 A.2d at 630
     (additional citations omitted).
    Anders Brief at 13-14.
    Counsel “correctly represents that this anticipatory revocation of
    Appellant’s order of probation was permissible at the time the trial court issued
    it revocation order under longstanding precedent established by this Court.”
    See Herrera, supra, at *3. However, during the pendency of this appeal
    and after Counsel filed the Anders brief, this Court decided Simmons. We
    have held that a “party whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to
    the benefit of changes in law which occur before the judgment becomes final.”
    Commonwealth v. Chesney, 
    196 A.3d 253
    , 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations
    omitted). Accordingly, Simmons informs our disposition. We explained:
    Wendowski held that a court may anticipatorily revoke an order
    of probation when the defendant commits a new crime after
    sentencing, but before the period of probation has begun. As
    explained above, this holding finds no support in our statutes and
    is contrary to the plain language of Sections 9721, 9754, and 9771
    of the Sentencing Code. Thus, to paraphrase our Supreme Court
    -4-
    J-S26023-21
    in Dickson: “[t]hat we have declined, until now, to address
    [Wendowski and its progeny] on this issue, while perhaps
    regrettable, cannot be used as a brickbat to prevent us from
    bringing the decisional law of this Commonwealth into line with
    the plain language of” the statutes. Dickson, 918 A.2d at
    108. Here, since Wendowski and its progeny are contrary to the
    plain language of the statutes, we follow Dickson and decline to
    apply the discretionary presumption of legislative acquiescence.
    Moreover, since Wendowski and its progeny are contrary to the
    plain     language     of    the     relevant    statutes,   we
    overrule Wendowski and its progeny.
    Simmons, 
    2021 WL 3641859
     at *10-12; see also Herrera, 
    2021 WL 4060441
     at *4 (“[P]ursuant to Simmons, a trial court lacks statutory
    authority to anticipatorily revoke a defendant’s probation . . . before his or
    her period of probation began.”) (citation omitted).
    Consistent with Simmons, Appellant’s first issue is no longer frivolous
    because the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation before it began, and
    although Counsel complied with the requirements of Anders, we are
    constrained to deny Counsel’s petition to withdraw because Appellant’s appeal
    is not frivolous.    See Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 
    149 A.3d 881
    , 889 (Pa.
    Super. 2016) (denying counsel’s petition to withdraw when review of the
    record reveals non-frivolous issue).
    Further, as Appellant is entitled to relief, we vacate the judgment of
    sentence and remand for reinstatement of the June 14, 2017 order of
    probation.4 See Simmons, 
    2021 WL 3641859
     at *12; Herrera, 
    2021 WL 4060441
     at *4-5.
    ____________________________________________
    4 Given our disposition, we need not examine Appellant’s remaining issues.
    -5-
    J-S26023-21
    Petition to withdraw denied.    Judgment of sentence vacated.   Case
    remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judge Musmanno joins the memorandum.
    Judge Stabile notes dissent.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/17/2021
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 788 MDA 2020

Judges: Murray

Filed Date: 9/17/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024