Com. v. Hayes, G. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GARY HAYES :
:
Appellant : No. 1381 MDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0002720-2010
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2021
Gary Hayes (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as
untimely his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
We previously stated:
On May 9, 2011, Appellant pled guilty to third-degree murder.[1]
Appellant’s plea was pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
under which he received a sentence of 15 to 36 years’
imprisonment. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a
direct appeal.
[1] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
On January 5, 2012, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed,
and an evidentiary hearing was held. On December 18, 2012, the
PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal. The [PCRA] court did not order Appellant
to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925, and none was filed.
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Commonwealth v. Hayes, 2013 WL 11255590, at *1 (Pa. Super. Sep. 27,
2013) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2014).
On September 27, 2013, this Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief,
and on January 15, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s
petition for allowance of appeal. On May 18, 2014, Appellant pro se filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. That petition was denied on March 12, 2015.
Hayes v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 1073315 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 2015).
On November 22, 2019, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition.
Although it was Appellant’s second PCRA petition, the court appointed counsel.
Also, despite being represented, Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA
petition on August 3, 2020. On August 12, 2020, counsel filed a motion to
withdraw and a Turner/Finley no merit letter.1 On August 17, 2020, the
PCRA court permitted counsel to withdraw and provided Rule 907 notice of its
intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On August 31,
2020, Appellant filed a response. On October 8, 2020, the court dismissed
the petition as untimely. Appellant filed this appeal.2
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1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
2 The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See
Order, 10/25/20. However, we are unable to determine if Appellant did so
because the record does not include docket entries or a 1925(b) statement.
The PCRA court does not address this issue in its opinion, in which it relies on
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant states his issues as follows:
A. Whether Post-Conviction Counsel failed to investigate
Appellant’s “after-discovered evidence exception” claim,
thereby having provided ineffective representation that
resulted in abandonment under the “time-bar” provision at
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)?
B. Whether the PCRA Court violated Appellant’s “Due Process”
and “Equal Protection of Laws” protections as afforded by
Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
C. Whether initial Post-Conviction and Trial Counsels
[provided] deficient assistance of representation, by failure
to raise “ineffective assistance of counsel”, failure to present
and accessible mitigation evidence, failure to
investigation(s), present “exculpatory evidence”, conduct
reasonable preparations for “guilty plea” and “sentence” the
criminal proceedings in mitigation at sentencing?
Appellant’s Brief at vi.
It is well-settled that we review the propriety of an order denying PCRA
relief “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.”
Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)).
This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports
the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). We
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its Rule 907 notice finding the petition untimely. See Memorandum of
Opinion, 12/29/20. The Commonwealth is likewise silent on this issue, having
advised this Court by writing on July 26, 2021 that it would not be filing a
brief. Under these circumstances, we decline to find waiver.
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grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings and will not disturb them
unless they have no support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg,
84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Further, Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to
hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d
1076, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837
A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within
one year of the date on which the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became
final, unless one of the three statutory exceptions (government interference,
unknown facts, or a newly recognized constitutional right) applies. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a petition invoking one of these
exceptions “within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petition is untimely and the petitioner has not
pled and proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the trial court has
jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the
legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006)).
“A judgment is deemed final ‘at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.’” Monaco, 996 A.2d at 1079 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)).
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Here, Appellant’s petition is untimely because his judgment of sentence
became final on June 8, 2012, and he filed the underlying petition, his second,
more than seven years later, on November 22, 2019. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
Notice, 8/11/20, at 4.3
Although Appellant asserts his petition falls within the exception for
unknown facts and “after discovered evidence,” the record does not support
this claim. The PCRA court accurately explained:
Petitioner claims that the after-discovered evidence exception is
applicable to his case because mental illness prevented him from
previously understanding the facts upon which his claims are
predicated. In support of his claim, Petitioner relies heavily upon
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287 (Pa. 2004). “[I]t is the
petitioner’s burden to plead and prove that one of the exceptions
applies.” Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868, 871
(Pa. 2000). In Cruz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court fashioned
a new method by which PCRA petitioners could employ the after-
discovered evidence exception to the PCRA’s time bar. This
method involved allowing a petitioner to prove that, due to
previous incompetence, facts in support of their PCRA claims were
undiscoverable until the petitioner became competent. Cruz, 852
A.2d at 297. The “limited holding” in Cruz has been construed
“narrowly.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 217 A.3d 265, 271 (Pa.
Super. 2019). In one interpretation of the holding in Cruz, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered it relevant that the
petitioner was cognizant enough to file his first pro se petition in
a timely manner. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 181 (Pa.
2014). Another ruling saw the Superior Court deny application of
the exception where the petitioner failed to offer evidence
showing: (1) when he transitioned from incompetent to
competent, (2) the point at which he reached incompetence after
being deemed competent prior to his guilty plea, and (3) the
nature of his affliction being one that could result in such an
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3 The pages in the Rule 907 Notice are unnumbered; for reference, we assign
the corresponding number.
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improvement from incompetence to competence.
Commonwealth v. Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 40, 48 (Pa. Super.
2006). Although Petitioner’s incompetence has never been
established in this case, he claims that he was previously
incompetent to the point that certain facts were beyond his
discovery. In addition to this lack of information on his
incompetence, Petitioner similarly fails to indicate both the nature
of his affliction and the time at which the facts underlying his
petition became discoverable because of the restoration of his
competence. Further impacting the Court’s determination in this
situation is the fact that, like Ali, Petitioner filed his first pro se
petition in a timely manner, seemingly indicating his
understanding of the requirement then. Considering all of this,
the Court cannot conclude that the facts underlying Petitioner’s
present petition were indiscoverable to him because of
incompetence.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 8/17/20, at 5-6 (emphasis added).4
Appellant attempts to refute the PCRA court’s finding by arguing that
PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate his claim of
after discovered incompetence. Appellant’s Brief at 1. We disagree.
When a petitioner asserts an ineffectiveness claim, he is entitled to relief
if he pleads and proves counsel’s ineffectiveness by a preponderance of the
evidence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). “To prevail on an
[ineffectiveness] claim, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the underlying legal claim has
arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for acting or failing to
act; and (3) the petitioner suffered resulting prejudice.” Commonwealth v.
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4 As we stated above, Appellant also filed – subsequent to the dismissal of his
first PCRA petition – a timely pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
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Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 780 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citing
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). “A petitioner
must prove all three factors of the ‘Pierce test,’ or the claim fails.” Id. “The
burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with Appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 540 (Pa. 2005).
Where an appellant claims ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel who
has filed a Turner/Finley brief and been granted leave to withdraw from
representation by the PCRA court, we must first determine if we are permitted
to reach the claim before we may address it. Rykard, 55 A.3d at 1186. A
petitioner waives the issue of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness related to
Turner/Finley if he declines to respond to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice
of intent to dismiss. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880
n.4 (Pa. 2009)).
Here, Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice in
which he alleged PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Petitioner’s Response,
8/31/20, at 1-4. We therefore consider Appellant’s claim. However, our
review of the record reveals no error by the PCRA court in dismissing
Appellant’s petition.
Counsel drafted a thorough and well-reasoned letter which complied
with the dictates of Turner/Finley, and clearly and succinctly explained that
Appellant’s petition is untimely and he is not eligible for relief under Cruz.
See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 8/12/20, at 4-5. We have reviewed both
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Appellant’s pro se response to the motion to withdraw and his appellate brief,
neither of which present a meaningful argument to counter the legal
conclusions of counsel and the PCRA court that Appellant’s petition is untimely,
and he has not pled and proven an exception to the time bar, i.e., PCRA
counsel was not ineffective and Appellant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s
alleged failure to investigate his competency. Accordingly, no relief is due.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/17/2021
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