Com. v. Green, H. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HARRY GREEN :
:
Appellant : No. 1265 WDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 29, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
Nos: CP-02-CR-0001065-2011,
CP-02-CR-0013983-2010
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: September 17, 2021
Appellant, Harry Green, pro se, appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, entered October 29, 2020, that dismissed
his second petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) 1 without
a hearing. We affirm.
The facts underlying this appeal, taken from the opinion of this Court
from the direct appeal, are as follows.
On the afternoon of August 9, 2010, [the Victim] was shot by her
boyfriend, [Appellant], in her apartment on Deraud Street in the
Hill District section of Pittsburgh. [The Victim] died of a gunshot
wound to the head, with a single bullet having entered her head
below her right eye. . . . Mr. Terrence Lee, a friend of the [V]ictim
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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and acquaintance of [Appellant], was at the apartment at the time
of the shooting and identified [Appellant] as the shooter.
...
According to the recorded statement that Mr. Lee gave to the
police on the night of the shooting, [Appellant] was at [the
Victim’s] apartment, engaged in an argument with her, upon Mr.
Lee’s arrival at the apartment, which was approximately fifteeen
(15) minutes prior to the shooting. Mr. Lee told the police that,
after some period of argument, [Appellant] got up to leave the
apartment. As he was walking out the door, the [V]ictim said
something to [Appellant], at which point [Appellant] turned
toward her, pulled his gun, and shot her in the face. [The Victim]
immediately fell to the floor. Mr. Lee initially grabbed [the Victim],
then ran outside, looking upstairs of [the Victim’s] apartment, and
yelled to the upstairs neighbor, Floorine Turner, to call an
ambulance.
...
Both Mr. Lee and Ms. Turner positively identified [Appellant] via
photo array when questioned by police. Mr. Lee also relayed what
he had witnessed to the [V]ictim’s mother and described the
events leading up to the shooting to her. Ms. Turner, an unbiased
witness with no real connection to anyone involved in this incident,
was the most credible and convincing witness at trial.
Commonwealth v. Green, 76 A.3d 575, 577 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting the
Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/12, at 2-5). At trial, Terrence Lee recanted his
original statements to police. Mr. Lee testified at trial as follows.
Mr. Lee: Well, I seen - - I just heard a knock on the door, and the
door opened, and I heard a shot. She fell.
...
Mr. Lee: I stood up, I looked out the door. There was nobody
there. I yelled upstairs for somebody to call the ambulance. I
yelled out the door for somebody to call the ambulance.
...
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Q: So when you looked out the door, you’re saying you saw
nobody there?
Mr. Lee: I didn’t see nothing.
N.T. 9/19/11, Trial, at 15-17. The trial court found Mr. Lee’s “earlier
statements to police to be credible and compelling, as well as consistent with
other evidence in the case.” Commonwealth v. Green, 76 A.3d 575 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (quoting the Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/12, at n. 2).
On September 20, 2011, following a consolidated bench trial, Appellant
was convicted of third-degree murder at docket number CP-02-CR-0001065-
2011 (No. 1065-2011) and Violation of the Uniform Firearm Act (VUFA) at
docket number CP-02-CR-0013983-2010 (No. 13983-2010).2 The trial court
sentenced Appellant on December 16, 2011 to an aggregate sentence of 21.5
years’ to 43 years’ incarceration. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence. Commonwealth v. Green, 76 A.3d 575 (Pa. Super. 2013). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal on March 11, 2014. Commonwealth v. Green, 87 A.3d 318 (Pa.
2014) (table). Appellant filed a first, timely petition pursuant to the PCRA on
December 18, 2014. Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a
“no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc). The PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and issued
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2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501(a) and 6106(a)(1), respectively.
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notice of its intent to dismiss all claims without a hearing pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on
June 18, 2015. Order, 6/18/15. Appellant did not file an appeal to this Court.
On June 3, 2019, Appellant filed his second, pro se, PCRA petition,
stating that he is eligible for relief under the PCRA because he has “after
discovered evidence” and his sentence is illegal. Appellant’s PCRA Petition,
6/3/19 at 13-19; See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i), (vi), and (vii). Appellant
invoked the governmental interference and newly discovered fact exceptions
to the PCRA time limit for filing. PCRA Petition, 6/3/19 at 10-13; See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii).
The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant and ordered
PCRA counsel to file an amended petition within 90 days of the date of the
order. Order, 6/7/19. PCRA counsel filed several motions requesting
extensions of time to file an amended PCRA petition, which the PCRA court
granted. On April 28, 2020, PCRA counsel filed a timely petition to withdraw
as counsel and a “no merit” letter pursuant to Turner and Finley, concluding
that Appellant’s claims are time barred. No-merit letter, 4/28/20.
On June 11, 2020, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s application
to withdraw and notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss the petition without
a hearing pursuant to Rule 907. Order, 6/11/20. Appellant filed a response
requesting to amend the PCRA petition. Motion, 6/30/20. The PCRA court
granted Appellant’s motion and ordered the amended petition to be filed by
August 31, 2020. Order, 7/1/20. Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA
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petition on August 31, 2020.3 The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing. Order, 10/29/20. The PCRA court concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s second PCRA petition because the
petition was untimely and failed to satisfy an exception to the PCRA’s time
bar.4 Id. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 13, 2020.5
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we must first
determine if Appellant has complied with Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) which requires the
filing of separate notices of appeal when a single order resolves issues arising
on more than one trial court docket. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185
A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). This Court issued a rule to show cause on December
18, 2020, directing Appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be
quashed in light of Walker because Appellant filed one notice of appeal listing
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3 Appellant’s amended PCRA petition was received and stamped by the
Allegheny County clerk of courts on September 2, 2020, however, it was post-
marked August 31, 2020. See Order, 10/29/20. Pursuant to the Prisoner
Mailbox Rule, we will consider August 31, 2020 to be the date of filing. See
Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266, 268 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted) (Under the ‘Prisoner Mailbox Rule’ a document is deemed
filed when placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing).
4 The PCRA court, the Honorable Beth A. Lazzara, is the same Judge that
heard Appellant’s bench trial and subsequently sentenced Appellant.
5 On December 8, 2020, the PCRA court filed an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). On December 21, 2020, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b)
statement. In lieu of an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a), the PCRA court
filed an order stating that it satisfied the requirements of Rule 1925(a) by way
of its Rule 907 Order dated 6/10/20 and Order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition dated 10/29/20. Order, 1/5/20.
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two docket numbers. Appellant filed a response on December 30, 2020. This
Court discharged the rule to show cause and advised the parties that the issue
may be revisited by this panel. Order, 1/5/21.
Appellant filed one notice of appeal listing two docket numbers. The
PCRA court filed one order listing the two docket numbers which dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition and stated “[t]he Defendant is hereby put on notice
that he has the right to file . . . an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.” Order, 10/29/20
(emphasis added). This direction to file “an appeal” misinformed Appellant
that he need only file one notice of appeal. We find that there was a
breakdown in the court operations regarding Appellant’s appellate rights,
leading to Appellant filing one notice of appeal containing both docket
numbers. Therefore, this appeal will not be quashed. See Commonwealth
v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 160 (Pa. Super. 2019) (where the PCRA court
entered a single order covering two docket numbers and advised appellant
that he could pursue appellate review by filing a single notice of appeal, a
breakdown in court operation occurred and this Court did not quash the
appeal).
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Did the PCRA court err in finding that the affidavit of Terrence Lee
did not constitute after discovered evidence, and is the Appellant
entitled to a remand for an evidentiary hearing based on this
affidavit?
Appellant’s Brief at 1 (suggested answer omitted).
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In reviewing an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, “this Court is
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the determination of
the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.” Commonwealth
v. Andrews, 158 A.3d 1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). The
timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). A petition for relief under
the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one
year of the date the judgment of sentence is final, unless the petition alleges
and the petitioner proves one of the three exceptions to the time limitations
for filing the petition set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
The three exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke these
exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the
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petition for allowance of appeal on March 11, 2014. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3) (for purposes of PCRA review, “a judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.”); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Appellant
had one year thereafter to file a PCRA petition – i.e., until June 11, 2015. See
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant filed the current petition on June 3, 2019,
approximately four years late. Therefore, Appellant’s petition was patently
untimely unless he satisfies an exception to the timeliness requirement. Id.
The only exception Appellant asserts is the newly discovered fact
exception under § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (the facts upon which the claim is predicated
were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence). Amended PCRA Petition at 7 (unpaginated);
Appellant’s Brief at 3. In his PCRA petition, Appellant included an affidavit
from Terrence Lee, the eyewitness to the shooting who previously testified at
the trial. PCRA Petition, 6/3/19, at “exhibit A.” In the affidavit, Mr. Lee states
that he saw Robert Murphy kill the Victim. Id. Appellant stated that he
received the affidavit of Terrence Lee on April 12, 2019. Appellant’s PCRA
Petition, 6/3/19, at 12 “exhibit B.” Appellant argued that, therefore, the
petition was timely filed on June 3, 2019, because it was filed within one year
of the date he received the information. Appellant’s PCRA petition, 6/3/19, at
12; See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
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“The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a
petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his
petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due
diligence.” Commonwealth v. Fennell, 180 A.3d 778, 782 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc) (citation omitted).
[S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must be
alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish that:
1) “the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown”
and 2) “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence.”
Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007)). “[T]he
exception set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits
analysis of the underlying claim.” Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1271; See also
Commonwealth v. Howard, 249 A.3d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2021).
“Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to
protect his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176
(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “A petitioner must explain why he could
not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
This rule is strictly enforced.” Fennell, 180 A.3d at 785 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Brown, 111 A.3d at 176).
We find that Appellant did allege newly discovered facts within the
meaning of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). However, we agree with the PCRA court
that Appellant’s petition is untimely as Appellant cannot demonstrate that he
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could not have ascertained the facts by the exercise of due diligence.
Appellant’s petition alleged that Mr. Lee stated that Mr. Murphy is the person
who shot and killed the Victim. This information differs from Mr. Lee’s trial
testimony, that he did not see the person who shot the Victim. The
information is also different from Mr. Lee’s statement to police, where he
identified Appellant as the person who shot the Victim. Appellant has
established that “the facts upon which the claim is based were unknown to
him,” in that he stated did not receive Mr. Lee’s letter stating that Mr. Murphy
killed the Victim until April 12, 2019. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158
A.3d 618, 628 (Pa. 2017). Appellant filed the instant petition within one year
of the date the information was discovered. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Appellant argues that he could not have discovered this information
earlier because Mr. Lee was fearful for his life and would not have admitted
Mr. Murphy shot the Victim until he decided for himself to come forward with
this information. Appellant’s Brief, at 6. However, this does not explain why
Appellant was unable to discover this information earlier with the exercise of
due diligence. See Brown, 111 A.3d at 178.
Appellant knew at the time of his trial in 2011 that Mr. Lee was present
with the Victim at the time of the shooting, initially identified Appellant as the
shooter, then subsequently changed his statement and testified at Appellant’s
trial that he did not see the person who shot the Victim. On cross-
examination, Appellant’s counsel asked Mr. Lee,
Counsel: Did you do this?
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Mr. Lee: No.
Counsel: Okay. But you didn't see the shooter; is that correct?
Mr. Lee: No.
N.T. 9/19/2011, Trial, at 23-26.
Mr. Lee was available at trial, known to the Appellant, and provided
conflicting testimony regarding the identification of Appellant as the shooter,
yet Appellant did not pursue this information on cross-examination or attempt
to contact Mr. Lee after the trial to interview him. Appellant could have
ascertained the information with due diligence. See Brown 111 A.3d at 178(petitioner failed to prove he acted with due diligence when witness came
forward with additional information about the shooting that would have
supported petitioner’s self-defense argument, where witness testified at trial,
petitioner knew witness was present with the victim at the time of the shooting
and failed to cross-examine him about the additional information or contact
him after the trial to attempt to gain additional information); Cf. Medina, 92
A.3d at 1217-18 (where witnesses unequivocally testified at trial that
appellant was the perpetrator, appellant would have no reason to investigate
witness’ new allegations that they were coerced to identify appellant and
counsel does not have to go on a fishing expedition or assume the witness
is perjuring himself).
We discern no error of law in the PCRA court’s conclusion that
Appellant’s petition is time barred and that it was without jurisdiction to
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address the merit of Appellant’s petition as Appellant could have discovered
the evidence with due diligence.6
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/17/2021
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6 This Court may affirm a PCRA court's order on any legal basis.
Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50, 55 (Pa. Super. 2000). While the
PCRA court based its conclusion on whether Appellant presented new facts as
opposed to due diligence, this Court can affirm on any legal grounds.
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