Com. v. Taylor, D. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DARYL VINCENT TAYLOR :
:
Appellant : No. 1081 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0003572-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
Daryl Vincent Taylor (Taylor) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court)
after his jury conviction for murder of the first degree and possession of an
instrument of crime (PIC).1 He challenges the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence and alleges trial court error for charging the jury on
flight/consciousness of guilt. We affirm.
We take the following factual background and procedural history from
our independent review of the certified record.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) and 907(a), respectively.
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I.
At the November 12, 2019 jury trial, Taylor did not dispute that he
stabbed the victim but argued that he had done so in self-defense. He testified
that at the time of the incident, March 13, 2018, he and the victim, Cora May
(May), had lived together romantically at a Philadelphia apartment for
approximately two years. He stated that while in the bedroom asleep,2 May
was in the kitchen doing drugs,3 came into the bedroom, woke him and angrily
charged him with a knife. Believing May was going to kill or seriously injure
him because she had previously hit him in the face with a pot, he reached for
a knife on a nearby table from the bed, stood up and immediately began
stabbing her. Taylor admitted that he did not try to protect himself or get
away from May and that, even when she was raising her hands to protect
herself, he continued stabbing her.
After May fell to the floor bleeding from the stab wounds, Taylor put on
a hoody, a coat and sneakers, walked out of the apartment with the murder
weapon and left her there. Once outside, Taylor threw the murder weapon on
the roof and calmly called police to advise them that someone had been
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2 Taylor testified that he was weak because he had cancer, congestive heart
failure and breathing problems. (See N.T. Trial, 11/15/21, at 17-19).
3 May’s autopsy results indicated that she had cocaine, opiates,
benzodiazepine and PCP in her system. (See N.T. Trial, 11/13/19, at 98).
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stabbed at 107 North Edgewood. (See N.T. Trial, 11/15/19, at 10-13, 20, 23,
26, 52-57, 63-65, 78-80).
Taylor walked approximately two blocks to the home of his friend,
Gerald Kemp, and remained there for four hours. Shortly after Taylor’s arrival,
Kemp received a phone call from an individual who advised him that May had
been stabbed. When Kemp asked Taylor if he had committed the stabbing,
Taylor replied that he had not. However, he texted a friend, T.R., stating that
he had stabbed her and asking if she had died. (See N.T. Trial, 11/14/19, at
52-55, 117-18, 121; NT. Trial, 11/15/19, at 28-29, 31, 66-68, 73).
Later, the police received a phone call from Taylor’s neighbor reporting
that screams had been heard. Upon arriving at the scene, the police observed
May lying in Taylor’s apartment unresponsive. She had multiple stab wounds
to her face, chest, breast, shoulder, arms and hands. The medical examiner
determined that the chest wound was approximately five inches deep and had
punctured May’s chest cavity. The police apprehended Taylor at Kemp’s house
there later that afternoon. He did not have any injuries. Taylor claimed at
trial that he was about to turn himself into police immediately prior to the
arrest. (See N.T. Trial, 11/13/19, at 56-70, 85-86, 195-99; N.T. Trial,
11/14/19, at 11-20, 33-34, 49).
After the close of evidence, the Commonwealth requested that the trial
court give the flight/consciousness of guilt instruction based on Taylor leaving
the scene and concealing his location after the murder. The trial court
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provided the instruction over defense objection. The jury convicted Taylor of
murder of the first degree and PIC, and the trial court sentenced him to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment. On November 20, 2019, Taylor filed a
post-sentence motion and a motion for reconsideration of sentence in which
he sought a judgment of acquittal on the basis that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the post-sentence motions
on January 3, 2020. Taylor appealed.4
Taylor argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence where he established that he acted in self-defense and that the trial
court erred in charging the jury on flight and consciousness of guilt. 5 (See
Taylor’s Brief, at 6, 11).
II.
A.
Taylor claims that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence6 to prove his guilt of murder of the first degree and PIC beyond a
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4 The trial court did not order Taylor to file a statement of errors or file a Rule
1925(a) opinion as the presiding trial judge is no longer on the bench. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
5 We have reordered Taylor’s issues for ease of disposition.
6 In considering this issue, we observe:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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reasonable doubt. Specifically, he maintains that the Commonwealth failed
to prove he was the aggressor or that his belief that deadly force was
necessary was unreasonable and, therefore, the Commonwealth did not
disprove his claim that he acted in self-defense, thus failing to establish
specific intent.
Pursuant to Section 2502 of the Crimes Code, “A criminal homicide
constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional
killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). “In order to prove first-degree murder, the
Commonwealth must establish that: (1) a human being was killed; (2) the
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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Ingram, 926 A.2d 470, 473-74 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citation omitted).
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accused caused the death; and (3) the accused acted with malice and the
specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 967 (Pa.
2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 860 (2014) (citation omitted). “The jury may
infer the intent to kill based upon the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon on
a vital part of the victim’s body.” Id. (citation omitted).
A defendant properly raises a claim of self-defense where the evidence
supports findings that he (1) “reasonably believed that he was in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use
deadly force against the victim to prevent such harm;” (2) did not provoke
the use of force against himself; and (3) he “did not violate any duty to
retreat.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012)
(citations and brackets omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 505.7 Once the
defendant properly raises the question of self-defense, the Commonwealth
may disprove the claim that the use of force was justified by establishing: “1)
the [defendant] did not reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or
serious bodily injury; 2) the [defendant] provoked or continued the force; or
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7 Section 505(a) of the Crimes Code provides:
(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.─The use
of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such other person on the present occasion.
18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a).
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3) the [defendant] had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with
complete safety.” Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The
Commonwealth need only prove one of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt to sufficiently disprove a claim of self-defense. See Commonwealth
v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2000). It remains the province
of the fact-finder to decide whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable,
whether he was free of provocation and whether he had a duty to retreat.
See Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229 (Pa. Super.
2005).
Taylor testified that he was in bed when May entered the bedroom
threatening him with a knife and that he acted in self-defense when he then
stabbed her repeatedly. The Commonwealth elicited testimony from him
which cast doubt on his version of events; that May woke him by entering his
bedroom yelling at him and wielding a knife and then, despite his allegedly
weakened state due to health issues, he reached across to a table for another
knife, jumped up and was able to stab her seven times without getting
wounded once himself. Although he testified that he was afraid for his life
because May was high on drugs and had hit him with a pot in the past, the
Commonwealth also elicited testimony that he, at no point, tried to disarm his
paramour, but instead immediately started stabbing her multiple times,
including causing a five-inch wound that punctured her chest cavity.
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First, the jury could reasonably infer that Taylor intended to kill May
when he fatally stabbed her in the chest cavity. This alone established that
Taylor did not act in self-defense. See Sanchez, supra at 967;
Commonwealth v. Hinchcliffe, 388 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 989 (1978) (holding where there is evidence from which a
jury can reasonably infer malice, the Commonwealth has met its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense).
Furthermore, May had defensive wounds on her hands, with Taylor
admitting that she tried to cover her face while he was stabbing her, which
suggests that she was trying to protect herself. (See N.T. Trial, 11/15/19, at
55-56). Taylor did not sustain even one wound. (See id. at 59). It was
reasonable for the jury to infer that he did not reasonably believe that he was
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. See Hammond, supra
at 559.
Finally, immediately after stabbing his paramour seven times and
leaving her lying on the floor bleeding, he put on clothes and sneakers, left
the scene and threw the murder weapon on the roof. Although he called police
to report that there had been a stabbing at the address, he did not tell them
May’s identity or that he committed the act, whether in self-defense or
otherwise. Instead, he went to a friend’s house where he expressly denied
stabbing May and stayed for four hours until the police located him there and
arrested him. These are facts establishing Taylor’s consciousness of guilt and
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a conclusion that he was not justified in stabbing May to death. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 792 (Pa. 2004) (conduct of
defendant after crime may be admitted showing guilt); Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 69 A.3d 253, 258-59 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[D]efendant’s attempts to
cover up after a crime can be inferred to demonstrate a consciousness of
guilt.”).
When passing on the credibility of Taylor’s version of events, it was for
the jury, as fact-finder, to believe all, part or none of the evidence, including
his self-serving testimony regarding self-defense, and we will not disturb its
finding. After consideration of the record as a whole and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
conclude that it produced sufficient evidence to establish that Taylor did not
act in self-defense and instead had the specific intent to kill May. See
Ingram, supra at 473-74.
B.
Taylor also argues that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence.8 He again maintains that it was established that he did not start
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8 Our standard of review of this challenge is well-settled:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the confrontation with May, had no motive to kill her, reasonably believed
deadly force was necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily
injury, and had no duty to retreat because he stabbed May at his home.9
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and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the
weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
granting or denying a new trial is the [trial] court’s conviction that
the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and
that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 102 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “Discretion is abused
when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied
or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill will.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000)
(citation omitted).
9 The trial court denied Taylor’s post-trial motion arguing the weight of the
evidence without providing an explanation; nor was there a Rule 1925(a)
opinion, as the trial judge has left the bench. However, after our own
independent review of the record, we discern no manifestly unreasonable
abuse of discretion where there is no evidence in the record that the court’s
decision was the “result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” See Widmer,
supra at 753 (citation omitted).
Taylor also provides no pertinent law or discussion thereof in support of his
weight claim other than boilerplate weight of the evidence law. Instead, he
merely recites certain trial evidence and concludes that it supports his weight
of the evidence arguments. (See Taylor’s Brief, at 12-15). Hence, this issue
is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; 2119(a), (b); Commonwealth v. Russell,
665 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Pa. Super. 1995) (declining to review claim where
appellants stated why evidence was against weight of the evidence,
warranting new trial, but failed to provide citation to relevant authority or
discussion thereof). Moreover, it would not merit relief.
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We are aware that a trial court may find that, “despite the abstract
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates
sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice
may have occurred.” Widmer, supra at 752 n.3 (citation omitted). However,
the only evidence supporting Taylor’s self-defense claim was his own
testimony, and the jury was free to believe all, some or none of it in making
its credibility determination. See Ingram, supra at 474; see also
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (fact-
finder not required to believe defendant who raises claim of self-defense). In
reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to find that the jury’s verdict was “so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez,
36 A.3d 24, 27 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 833 (2012) (citation
omitted); see also Horne, supra at 285. Taylor’s claim fails.
C.
In his third issue, Taylor’s one paragraph argument is that the trial court
erred in giving a flight instruction to the jury because the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence that a jury instruction on flight was
justified.10 He maintains that the charge was inappropriate where he
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10 “In examining jury instructions, our standard of review is to determine
whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of
law controlling the outcome of the case. A charge will be found adequate
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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conceded at trial that he committed the crime, and evidence showed that he
called 911 after the incident and was about to surrender to police when they
arrived at Mr. Kemp’s house to arrest him. (See id. at 18-19).
“When a court instructs the jury, the objective is to explain to the jury
how it should approach its task and the factors it should consider in reaching
its verdict. Instructions on defenses or theories of prosecution are warranted
when there is evidence to support such instructions.” Yachimowski, supra
at 865 (citation omitted). A flight/consciousness of guilt instruction is proper
when the evidence supports a finding that “a person commits a crime, knows
that he is wanted therefor, and flees or conceals himself.” Commonwealth
v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 92 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). “[S]uch conduct is
evidence of consciousness of guilt, and may form the basis of a conviction in
connection with other proof from which guilt may be inferred.” Id. (citation
and brackets omitted); see also Pa. SSJI (Crim) 3.14.
In this case, after fatally stabbing May, Taylor left their apartment,
taking the murder weapon with him and throwing it onto a roof. He then went
to his friend’s home, denied stabbing May and stayed there until apprehended
by police four hours later. This evidence supported the jury instruction. See
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unless the issues are not made clear, the jury was misled by the instructions,
or there was an omission from the charge amounting to a fundamental error.”
Commonwealth v. Yachimowski, 232 A.2d 861, 865 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citation and brackets omitted).
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Yachimowski, supra at 865. Although Taylor claimed that he was about to
surrender to police at the exact moment they arrived to arrest him, this fact
did not go to whether the instruction was proper, but was testimony for the
jury to consider and weigh when making its credibility decision. Further,
although Taylor claims that because he admitted at trial that he stabbed May
and the jury instruction was improperly given, he provides no legal authority
for this argument and we are not aware of any.11
Based on the foregoing, the court did not abuse its discretion or commit
an error of law in charging the jury on flight/consciousness of guilt. See
Yachimowski, supra at 865. This issue does not merit relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2021
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11 Taylor does not argue that he was prejudiced by this jury instruction.Even
assuming arguendo that the court abused its discretion in charging the jury
on flight/consciousness of guilt, there was evidence, beyond Taylor’s flight
from the premises, from which the jury could reasonably infer he intentionally
stabbed May with the specific intent to murder her. Therefore, any claim of
prejudice, even had he made it, would not have merited relief.
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