Com. v. Matthews, K. ( 2021 )

J-S28039-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KONATA MATTHEWS :
:
Appellant : No. 2250 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002463-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KONATA MATTHEWS :
:
Appellant : No. 2251 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0006648-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KONATA MATTHEWS :
:
Appellant : No. 2252 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0006649-2015
J-S28039-21
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
In these consolidated appeals, Konata Matthews (Matthews) appeals
from the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
(PCRA court) dismissing his petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we affirm.
I.
On January 20, 2015, Matthews robbed a Republic Bank in Philadelphia
of $5,250 by handing a teller a note stating that he had a bomb. He did the
same thing two weeks later, this time getting away with $1,600 from a
Susquehanna Bank in Philadelphia. He returned to the same bank about two
weeks later and threatened to shoot the tellers if they did not give him money.
The tellers put $1,300 in a bag but also hid a GPS tracker. Philadelphia Police
arrested Matthews in his car and found the money, the tracker and a toy gun.
He was charged with robbery and related offenses for all three robberies.
After Matthews was held for court, the trial court ordered that he
undergo a mental health evaluation to determine whether he was competent
to stand trial. Matthews, however, refused to cooperate. This began a three-
plus year standstill due to Matthew’s refusal to cooperate with the trial court’s
numerous orders for a mental health evaluation. Throughout this delay,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Matthews filed continuous pro se filings and sought to remove trial counsel.
Finally, on June 22, 2018, after Matthews had been found competent to stand
trial, the trial court held a Grazier hearing.1 At the end of the hearing, the
trial court allowed him to proceed pro se and ordered counsel to remain as
standby counsel for his scheduled October 2018 trial.
As trial approached, the Commonwealth offered Matthews a closed plea
agreement. Under its terms, Matthews would plead guilty in each case to one
count of robbery—threatens immediate serious bodily injury,2 and be
sentenced to three to six years’ imprisonment followed by four years of
probation. Matthews at first rejected the offer but later changed his mind. As
a result, on October 15, 2018, the trial court accepted the plea agreement
after conducting an on-the-record colloquy and imposed the agreed sentence
in each case. Matthews did not seek further review.
On May 9, 2019, Matthews filed a timely first petition for relief under
the PCRA. The PCRA court appointed counsel but allowed him to withdraw for
employment purposes, following which new counsel was appointed. Counsel
filed an amended petition, raising four grounds for relief: (1) constitutional
violations; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) unlawfully induced guilty
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1 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (requiring on-
the-record inquiry determining whether waiver of counsel is knowing,
intelligent and voluntary).
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
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plea; and (4) tribunal without jurisdiction.3 After the Commonwealth
responded by filing a motion to dismiss, the PCRA court gave Matthews notice
of its intent to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Upon receiving no response,
the PCRA court entered a final order dismissing the petition.
After his petition was dismissed, Matthews timely appealed,4 and both
he and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Matthews
raises five issues for review:
1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the legality
and propriety of the bills of information, failing to object the lack
of in personam and subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court,
and failing to protect appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial.
2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
violations of appellant’s constitutional rights under the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was the causal nexus of
appellant’s unlawfully induced guilty pleas.
4. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
that the trial court’s lack of subject matter and in personam
jurisdiction created a tribunal without proper jurisdiction.
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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9543(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii) and (viii), respectively.
4 Matthews filed a separate notice of appeal at each docket number pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). This Court sua
sponte consolidated these cases on May 5, 2021. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
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5. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary
hearing.
Matthews’s Brief at 8.5
II.
A. Jurisdictional Claim
For ease of discussion, we begin with Matthews’s jurisdictional claim.
Under § 9543(a)(2)(viii), the PCRA provides relief from convictions that result
from “[a] proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9543(a)(2)(viii). In his argument, Matthews asserts that the “the trial court
record and plea colloquy was absent of any testimony or evidence establishing
a corpus delecti.” He also asserts that the Commonwealth “never established
the validity of the bills of information,” and that he was entitled to a hearing
to prove that they were “illegal, improper, void and forged.”
Beginning with the bills of information, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 560 sets forth the required contents of an information as follows:
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5 In reviewing a denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is limited to
whether the record supports the PCRA court’s factual determinations and
whether its decision is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Lopez,
249 A.3d 993, 998 (Pa. 2021). “The PCRA court’s findings and the evidence
of record are viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
winner before the PCRA court.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] PCRA court has
discretion to dismiss a PCRA petition without a hearing if the court is satisfied
that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact; that the
defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief; and that no
legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 161 A.3d 960, 964 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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(1) a caption showing that the prosecution is carried on in the
name of and by the authority of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania;
(2) the name of the defendant, or if the defendant is unknown, a
description of the defendant as nearly as may be;
(3) the date when the offense is alleged to have been committed
if the precise date is known, and the day of the week if it is an
essential element of the offense charged, provided that if the
precise date is not known or if the offense is a continuing one, an
allegation that it was committed on or about any date within the
period fixed by the statute of limitations shall be sufficient;
(4) the county where the offense is alleged to have been
committed;
(5) a plain and concise statement of the essential elements of the
offense substantially the same as or cognate to the offense alleged
in the complaint;
(6) a concluding statement that “all of which is against the Act of
Assembly and the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(B)(1)-(6).6
The Commonwealth’s bills of information complied with Rule 560. First,
each information has a caption showing that the prosecution is carried on in
the name of and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Second, each information identifies Matthews as the defendant. Third, each
information states when the offenses were committed. Fourth, each
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6 When the Commonwealth filed the bills of information, Rule 560 did not
include current subdivision (B)(7), which states that the information will
include “a certification that the information complies with the provisions of the
Case Records Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of
Pennsylvania regarding confidential information and documents.”
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information states that the offenses were committed in Philadelphia. Fifth,
each information provides the elements of the offenses. And sixth, each
information states, “all of which is against the Act of Assembly and the peace
and dignity of the Commonwealth.” Matthews fails to explain in what manner
the bills of information were defective, nor did he plead or provide proof to
support his claim that they were “illegal, improper, void and forged.” Thus,
any claim that the bills of information were defective is meritless.
We likewise reject his claim that the Commonwealth did not provide
evidence at the guilty plea establishing corpus delecti. Indeed, the
Commonwealth’s recitation of each offense adhered to the elements of the
offenses and established that Matthews committed them in Philadelphia. See
N.T., 10/15/18, at 14-17. Similar to his claim about the bills of information,
he fails to explain how the trial court lacked jurisdiction or what information
the Commonwealth failed to present during the guilty plea hearing that
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. As a result, the PCRA court properly
found that his jurisdiction claim did not raise a genuine issue of material fact
requiring an evidentiary hearing.
B. Constitutional Speedy Trial Claim
We next consider Matthews’s claim that he was entitled to relief under
§ 9543(a)(2)(i), which provides PCRA relief for convictions resulting from “[a]
violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so
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undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i).
Matthews alleges that his speedy trial rights were violated because it
took over three years from the date of his arrest until he entered his guilty
plea, giving little analysis beyond observing that he did not plead guilty until
after two years had passed after the mechanical run date.
Matthews, however, waived this claim by pleading guilty. Generally, a
guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, other than legality of sentence
and the validity of the plea. Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771
(Pa. Super. 2012) (stating when defendant enters guilty plea, he waives all
defects and defenses except those concerning validity of plea, jurisdiction of
trial court and legality of sentence imposed). See also Commonwealth v.
Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“It is well established
that a plea of nolo contendere is treated as a guilty plea in terms of its effect
upon a given case.”). Where a defendant enters a plea, an alleged violation
of Rule 600 is only reviewable to the extent that the violation affected the
voluntariness of that plea. Commonwealth v. Sisneros, 692 A.2d 1105,
1107 (Pa. Super. 1997).
Matthews entered his guilty plea on October 15, 2018, following which
he did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal. Because he does
not assert that the alleged speedy trial violation impacted the validity of his
plea, he waived his speedy trial challenge under Section 9543(a)(2)(i). See
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised
it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or
in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”). We, thus, agree with the PCRA
court that his constitutional claim did not raise a genuine issue of material fact
requiring an evidentiary hearing.
C. Unlawfully Induced Guilty Plea Claim
Matthews also claims that he was entitled to relief under
§ 9543(a)(2)(iii), which permits PCRA relief for “[a] plea of guilty unlawfully
induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused
the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9543(a)(2)(iii). He asserts that he should have been allowed to prove that
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter the plea.
First, Matthews ignores that he waived his right to representation and
proceeded pro se with his guilty plea. By doing so, he cannot now raise a
claim of ineffective assistance of standby counsel. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 196 A.3d 1021, 1027 (Pa. 2018) (“We will not consider any
ineffectiveness claims that arise from the period of self-representation.”).
When a defendant elects to proceed at trial pro se, the
defendant—and not standby counsel—is in fact counsel of record
and is responsible for trying the case. This understanding of the
limited role of standby counsel is essential to satisfy the United
States Supreme Court’s directive that a defendant’s choice to
proceed pro se must be honored out of that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law even when the
defendant acts to his or her own detriment.
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Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). A defendant who chooses to
represent himself cannot obtain PCRA relief by raising claims of ineffective
assistance of standby counsel by claiming that standby counsel unlawfully
induced his guilty plea.
Second, he waived any challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea
by failing to file any post-sentence motion or direct appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“While
Appellant focuses on the voluntariness of his guilty plea, that issue should
have been raised on direct appeal; it was not. Therefore the issue is waived.”)
(footnote omitted).
Third, even if preserved, the claim lacks merit because Matthews did not
show how his plea was involuntary. “A valid guilty plea must be knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d
1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas
be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on-
the-record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of
his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, the court
must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understands: (1)
the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the
factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the
presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of
sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not bound
by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the
agreement. This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea
colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that
plea.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590.
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As the PCRA court summarized, the totality of the circumstances reflects
that his plea was voluntary.
… On October 15, 2018, [Matthews] signed a written guilty plea
colloquy and engaged in an extensive oral colloquy with this Court.
During the oral colloquy, [Matthews] acknowledged that it was his
decision to plead guilty. N.T. 10/15/18, at 6, 13. He also
acknowledged that he reviewed the four-page written colloquy
with standby counsel and voluntarily signed the agreements. Id.
at 7-8. [Matthews] testified that he understood the elements of
the robbery charges he was facing, as well as the maximum
sentence and fine that could be imposed. Id. at 9. He also
indicated that he understood his right to a jury trial, and that he
is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Id. at 9-10.
[Matthews’s] colloquy belies the claim that his plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 4/27/21, at 7-8.
Moreover, the PCRA court summarized the factual basis for the offenses
that the Commonwealth outlined at the guilty plea hearing.
Here, [Matthews] pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery.
The Crimes Code defines the relevant robbery statute as follows:
“A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a
theft, he: … (ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him
in fear of immediate serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3701(a)(1)(ii). Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.” Commonwealth v.
Kubis, 978 A.2d 391, 398 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
The Commonwealth set forth the factual bases of [Matthews’s]
crimes in detail. See N.T. 10/15/18, at 14-17.
At docket CP-51-CR-0006648-2015, the evidence would
establish that on January 20, 2015, [Matthews] entered the
Republic Bank located at 1601 Walnut Street in Philadelphia,
approached the bank teller, stated he was in possession of a
bomb, and also handed a note to her that said, “Suicide bomber.
Allahu akbar.” Id. at 14. The bank teller responded by handing
over $5,250 to [Matthews]. Id.
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At docket CP-51-CR-0006649-2015, the evidence would
show that on February 3, 2015, [Matthews] entered the
Susquehanna Bank located at 1845 Walnut Street in Philadelphia,
approached the bank teller, and handed her a note that said,
“Suicide bomber. Allahu akbar.” Id. at 15. In response, the bank
teller gave approximately $1,600 to [Matthews]. Id.
At docket CP-51-CR-0002463-2015, the evidence would
establish that [Matthews] entered the same Susquehanna Bank,
approached the same bank teller, and threatened to shoot her if
she did not give [Matthews] money. Id. at 16. The bank teller
and several others placed approximately $1,300 into a bag, along
with a GPS tracker, and called 911. Id.
It is clear that in each case, [Matthews] threatened the bank
tellers with physical harm in order to obtain money. Further, had
[Matthews] carried out these threats, they would have amounted
to serious bodily injury, as both a bomb and a gun would surely
cause “substantial risk of death … serious, permanent
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
[a] bodily member or organ.” Kubis, 978 A.2d at 398.
Accordingly, [Matthews’s] claim that the Commonwealth failed to
establish a factual basis for the robbery charges lacks merit.
PCO at 8-9.
We agree with the PCRA court, as its on-the-record colloquy complied
with the requirements of Rule 590. Thus, the PCRA court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Matthews’s guilty plea claim did not raise a genuine
issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Finally, Matthews contends that he raised a meritorious claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in his amended petition, alleging that trial
counsel was ineffective for (1) not challenging “the legality and propriety of
the bills of information,” (2) not objecting to the lack of in personam and
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subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, and (3) not filing a speedy trial
motion under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
“To prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1) his
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for
his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a
result.” Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 452 (Pa. Super. 2018).
“[F]ailure to prove any of these prongs is sufficient to warrant dismissal of the
claim without discussion of the other two.” Commonwealth v. Robinson,
877 A.2d 433, 439 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). Counsel cannot be
ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. Commonwealth v.
Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Matthews’s ineffectiveness claims rehash other claims that we have
already found lacking arguable merit. First, as discussed, he fails to show how
the bills of information were defective, even though they contained the
required contents for a valid criminal information under Rule 560. See supra
at 6-7. The same is true for his claim that trial counsel should have challenged
the trial court’s jurisdiction, as he fails to explain how the trial court did not
have jurisdiction when he was accused of committing offenses under the
Crimes Code in Philadelphia. See supra at 7.
That leaves his final claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing
a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations. As discussed, Matthews cannot
establish a constitutional violation under § 9543(a)(2)(i) because he decided
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to enter a guilty plea after waiving his right to counsel and then sought no
further review. See supra at 8-9. In this issue, though, he styles his speedy
trial claim as an ineffectiveness claim, as he alleges that trial counsel should
have moved to dismiss under Rule 600 while he was still entered as counsel.
This Court has explained:
Rule 600 provides in pertinent part: “Trial in a court case in which
a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence
within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Rule 600 further states:
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
computation.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
To summarize, the courts of this Commonwealth employ three
steps ... in determining whether Rule 600 requires dismissal of
charges against a defendant. First, Rule 600(A) provides the
mechanical run date. Second, we determine whether any
excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the
amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date to
arrive at an adjusted run date.
Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Ordinarily, when a Rule 600 motion is filed, the Commonwealth has the
burden to establish that it acted with due diligence in bringing a defendant to
trial. Because we are on collateral review, Matthews bears both the burdens
of production and persuasion in demonstrating that he was prejudiced by the
failure of trial counsel to file a Rule 600 motion. See Commonwealth v.
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Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1018 (Pa. 2007) (“The burden of proving ineffectiveness
rests with Appellant.”).
In his amended petition, Matthews provided no substantive argument
for the arguable merits of his Rule 600 claim, failing to give any kind of time
computation for what periods of time were attributable to him, the
Commonwealth, or could be deemed excludable or excusable delay. He does
the same in his brief to this Court, failing to give any substantive argument
for a claim that conforms to the three steps outlined above for determining
Rule 600 issues. Such an analysis is needed in a case like this because the
trial court needed to ensure that Matthews was competent, but that he refused
to cooperate with the court’s numerous orders for mental health examinations.
Instead of developing any substantive argument, Matthews merely
contends that his claim has arguable merit because he did not plead guilty
until after three years after the criminal complaints were filed. A criminal
defendant, however, is not automatically entitled to dismissal under Rule 600
if his or her trial commences after the mechanical run date. Commonwealth
v. Goldman, 70 A.3d 874, 879 (Pa. Super. 2013). Dismissal is appropriate
only if the defendant has not been brought to trial by the expiration of the
adjusted run date. Id.Despite having the burden, Matthews has never attempted to calculate
an adjusted run date in any of his cases. By failing to do so, he has failed to
plead and prove the arguable merit prong of his claim that trial counsel was
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ineffective for not filing a Rule 600 motion. As a result, the PCRA court
properly found that this claim did not raise a genuine issue of material fact
requiring an evidentiary hearing.
For these reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court properly determined
that Matthews was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, as none of the four
grounds for relief in his amended petition raise any genuine issues of material
fact.7
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2021
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7 Having found none of the asserted bases for relief required an evidentiary
hearing, we need not address Matthews’s fifth issue, as he merely asserts that
he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing to develop his claims.
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