Com. v. Clayton, W. ( 2021 )

J-S11007-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON :
:
Appellant : No. 707 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
Criminal Division at No: CP-61-CR-0000640-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON :
:
Appellant : No. 708 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
Criminal Division at No: CP-61-CR-0000640-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON :
:
Appellant : No. 709 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
Criminal Division at No: CP-61-CR-0000640-2019
J-S11007-21
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM CALEB CLAYTON :
:
Appellant : No. 710 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
Criminal Division at No: CP-61-CR-0000640-2019
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
FILED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2021
The Majority holds that William Caleb Clayton’s Rule 2119(f) Statement
does not raise a substantial question, but it would affirm the sentence in any
event. See Majority Memorandum at 4, 7. Although I disagree on the issue
of substantial question, I concur in the decision to affirm his sentence.
In his Rule 2119(f) Statement, Clayton contends that “the sentencing
court did not adequately consider all of the relevant sentencing factors
especially his rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. This Court has
held that an averment that the trial court sentenced based solely on the
seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a
substantial question. Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.
Super. 2009).
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Notably, our determination of what raises “a substantial question in
various cases has been less than a model of clarity and consistency, even in
matters not involving excessive sentence claims.” Commonwealth v.
Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013) (comparing different
results from seemingly similar cases, some finding a substantial question and
some not). Until we can provide more guidance to parties and attorneys on
the requirements of a 2119(f) statement - unless it is obviously deficient - I
would address the appellant’s issue, especially where, as here, the appellant
made a good faith attempt to comply with the rule, and the Commonwealth
has not even filed an appellate brief.1
In reviewing the substance of Clayton’s appeal, based on the arguments
as counsel has formed them, I find myself compelled to affirm. Although
Clayton alleges that the sentence was unreasonable, his attorney fails to argue
why, in these circumstances, the sentence that the trial court imposed was an
abuse of discretion.2 Instead, Clayton merely proposes that an alternate
sentence, in the county jail, would have been feasible, and allowed him to
____________________________________________
1 I note my displeasure with the Commonwealth’s failure to file an appellee
brief, despite requesting and being granted two 60-day extensions to do so.
The Commonwealth requested a sentence of 82 months to 48 years, based on
its perception of the seriousness of the crimes, yet, inexplicably, filed no
appellate brief.
2 An abuse of discretion is “not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the
overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,
as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d
877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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rehabilitate. Appellant’s Brief p. 16. This may be true, but it is hardly relevant
to the appellate issue at hand.
Had Clayton argued that a 30-year maximum sentence for the crimes
involved was manifestly unreasonable, (an 18-year-old, high-school student
who masturbated on social media before a 12-year-old and exchanged nude
photos with four young girls)3, given his physical age, mental age, and lack of
a prior record, he may have convinced me that the maximum sentence
imposed here was too extreme and unduly harsh. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Sarvey, 2020 WL 2764229 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding 17-year sentence
for attempting to pass one and one-half pills was “clearly unreasonable”). But
Clayton does not contend – much less persuade me – that the sentence was
manifestly unreasonable.
I recognize that sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. super. 2007).
However, a trial court’s discretion is not unrestricted. “[T]he deference paid
to the trial court does not necessitate a rubber[-]stamped approval of the
sentences imposed by the sentencing court.” Commonwealth v.
Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
Otherwise, “[a]ppellate review of sentencing matters would become a
____________________________________________
3 The record is sparse in this case, and the sentencing transcript does not
detail many of the events that took place. It appears Clayton did meet with
one of the twelve-year-old victims, kissed her, and the two touched each
other’s genitalia. For these physical actions, Clayton was convicted of
indecent assault, which carried a sentence of three to twelve months, plus or
minus six months.
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mockery and a sham if all sentences were routinely affirmed under the guise
of the discretion of the trial court.” Id.Section 9781(c)(2) of the Sentencing Code provides that on appeal, this
Court “shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court
with instructions if it finds: . . . the sentencing court sentenced within the
sentencing guidelines[,] but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable[.]” 42 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 9781(c)(2). In determining whether a particular sentence is clearly
unreasonable,
the appellate court must consider the defendant’s background and
characteristics as well as the particular circumstances of the
offense involved, the trial court’s opportunity to observe the
defendant, the presentence investigation report, if any, the
Sentencing Guidelines as promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission, and the ‘findings’ upon which the trial court based
its sentence.
Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 147 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
Turning to the circumstances of this case, I note that Clayton did not
rape these young girls. Most of his crimes were committed via social media
on Snapchat. He did not disseminate any of the photographs he obtained. He
was a high school student when the crimes occurred.4 Testimony also
indicated that although he was 18, his mental age was more of a 15 or 16-
____________________________________________
4 The record indicates Clayton obtained his high-school diploma while
incarcerated awaiting disposition of this matter. It is unclear whether he was
attending high school at the time of the events in question.
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year-old. Had he been under 18, instead of 18, his crimes would have been
handled in juvenile court.5 While he is not entitled to a volume discount for
the crimes he committed, the aggregate, maximum sentence for these crimes
under these circumstances causes me to question the appropriate length of
his prison sentence.6
However, we need not determine whether the sentence here was unduly
harsh, as Clayton’s lawyer has not effectively argued this issue on appeal by
not conforming her argument to our deferential standard of review. Thus, I
concur with the majority’s decision to affirm Clayton’s judgment of sentence.
Judge Colins joins this concurring memorandum.
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5Many of Clayton’s crimes would have been handled as summary offenses
under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6321(a).
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