Com. v. Brown, W., Jr. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S17007-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    WALTER BROWN JR.
    Appellant                 No. 29 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 18, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-CR-0002487-2019
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 05, 2021
    Appellant Walter Brown Jr. appeals from the November 18, 2020,
    judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
    (“trial court”), following his jury convictions for burglary, criminal trespass,
    and theft by unlawful taking or disposition.1 Upon review, we affirm.
    The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed.         As
    recounted by the trial court:
    On June 4, 2018, employees of Distribution Services
    Company (“DSC”) discovered that some power tools batteries and
    a charger were missing from a building on the property. Upon this
    discovery, the employees checked recorded video footage from
    security cameras that were installed on the property and found
    that an individual unlawfully entered the building and stole the
    battery packs and charger, as well as a pair of work gloves. The
    employees then contacted a nearby police officer who reviewed
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(4), 3503(a)(1)(ii), and 3921(a), respectively.
    J-S17007-21
    the security footage with the employees. The officer recognized
    the individual on the video recording as Appellant, with whom the
    officer had prior contact. The officer notified the affiant [(another
    officer)] in this matter, who compared screenshots from the
    security footage with Appellant’s driver’s license photograph, and
    determined that Appellant was the perpetrator. Appellant was
    thereafter charged with [the above-mentioned crimes].
    At trial, the Commonwealth first called George Dronick
    (“Dronick”), the owner of DSC, located at 1601 North Sixth Street
    in Reading, Pennsylvania (“the Property”), as a witness. Dronick
    testified that DSC provides distribution of rock salt for American
    Rock Salt Company and described the Property as a large paved
    area of several acres upon which is located a scale house (“the
    Scale House”), a garage, and several other ancillary buildings.
    On June 3, 2018, Dronick indicated that the Scale House
    was locked, and that video surveillance was installed, including
    approximately eight security cameras, two of which were located
    inside the Scale House. Dronick continued that the security
    cameras were all connected to a central recording unit and that,
    on June 3, 2018, the cameras and central unit were in proper
    operating condition and recording.
    The Commonwealth presented portions of the surveillance
    recording from June 3, 2018, during Dronick’s testimony. The
    First clip from the video footage was from just outside the Scale
    House and depicted an individual dressed in a hooded sweatshirt
    and jeans approach the single entrance to the Scale House, which
    was locked.       The next video excerpt was time-stamped
    approximately fifteen minutes later, and the same individual was
    seen leaving the Scale House with a bag containing something.
    Dronick testified that he did not know the individual shown in the
    video, nor did he give the perpetrator permission to enter the
    Scale House or take anything from inside. The Commonwealth
    then presented video surveillance footage from inside the Scale
    House in which the intruder is seen walking through the Scale
    House.
    Dronick was notified by several of his employees that a
    burglary had occurred and that items from inside the Scale House
    were missing. Upon his inspection of the Scale House, Dronick
    noticed evidence that the door to the Scale House had been pried
    open. When he reviewed the surveillance video, Dronick took an
    inventory of items inside the Scale House and found that several
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    J-S17007-21
    cordless power tool batteries and charger, valued in excess of
    $500.00, were missing, as well as some beer from the
    refrigerator.
    On cross-examination, Dronick acknowledged that he did
    not know the individual seen on the surveillance video burglarizing
    the Property. Likewise, Dronick admitted that he did not know
    Appellant.
    Brandon Weaver (“Weaver”), an employee of DSC, testified
    that on June 4, 2018, he arrived at the Property with his brother-
    in-law, Jordan Miranda (“Miranda”), but did not immediately
    notice anything unusual. Weaver stated that he went to look for
    the batteries and found that they were missing. After looking
    around the Scale House, Weaver checked the security cameras
    and discovered that the batteries had been stolen. Weaver did
    not recognize the person seen in the surveillance video
    burglarizing the Scale House. Weaver and Miranda then flagged
    down a Reading Police Officer, who then viewed the security
    camera footage.
    Officer Christian Morar (“Officer Morar”), a police officer with
    the Reading Police Department, testified that on June 4, 2018, he
    was on regular patrol when he was waved down by two employees
    of DSC. Upon arriving at the Property, Officer Morar spoke with
    the employees, and then briefly viewed some of the surveillance
    footage. Officer Morar immediately recognized the individual
    depicted on the surveillance footage as Appellant with whom
    Officer Morar had dealt with approximately two weeks prior to the
    burglary. Officer Morar then contacted Officer Adam Babbitt.
    On cross-examination, when asked whether there were any
    distinguishing features of Appellant’s appearance that he could
    remember, Officer Morar responded that he recognized
    Appellant’s gray beard. Officer Morar then continued that he
    recalled no other distinguishing features of Appellant from his
    previous encounter.
    Officer Adam Babbitt (“Officer Babbitt”). of the Reading
    Police Department, testified that he reviewed the surveillance
    video during his investigation of the case and spoke with Officer
    Morar about his observations. Officer Babbitt then returned to the
    station and pulled Appellant’s driver’s license photograph from the
    N.C.I.C. database and compared it with the video images he
    reviewed from the security cameras.            The Commonwealth
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    J-S17007-21
    introduced Appellant’s PennDOT driver’s license photograph into
    evidence at trial, and it was published to the jury. Officer Babbitt
    observed that the photograph from Appellant’s driver’s license
    was taken more than a year prior to the burglary. However, when
    comparing Appellant’s driver’s license photograph with some
    screenshots from the surveillance video footage, Officer Babbitt
    identified Appellant as the individual in both.
    Officer Babbitt admitted on cross-examination that
    Appellant, in his driver’s license photograph, had a substantially
    shorter beard than the individual represented on the security
    camera footage. Officer Babbitt also acknowledged that he did
    not request that any DNA evidence collected, and no fingerprints
    were taken from the scene. Officer Babbitt explained that the
    perpetrator wore gloves during the burglary, but did acknowledge
    that, based on the video footage, the burglar did not have gloves
    on the entire time.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty
    of all charges. The same day, November 18, 2020, this court
    sentenced Appellant on the burglary conviction to a period of
    incarceration of three to six years in a state correctional facility.
    The remaining charges merged for sentencing purposes.
    On November 25, 2020, Appellant, through trial counsel,
    filed post-sentence motions challenging the weight and sufficiency
    of the evidence as to all charges and modification of sentence.
    Th[e trial] court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions by
    order dated December 1, 2020.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/21, at 1-4 (record citations, footnotes and
    unnecessary capitalizations omitted).      Appellant timely appealed.         Both
    Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review.
    [I.] Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the
    conviction of burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful
    taking as there was insufficient evidence that Appellant was the
    perpetrator?
    [II.] Whether the verdicts of guilt went against the weight of the
    evidence?
    -4-
    J-S17007-21
    Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    At the core, Appellant’s issues are interrelated as they both challenge
    his identification as the perpetrator.2 In this regard, he first contends that the
    officers’ trial testimony was unreliable and incredible, as it revealed only
    “general physical characteristics of a beard” for purposes of identifying
    Appellant. Id. at 12. We treat this contention as challenging the weight and
    credibility determination of the fact-finder.
    As we have explained:
    On this issue, our role is not to consider the underlying question
    of whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
    Rather, we are to decide if the trial court palpably abused its
    discretion when ruling on the weight claim. When doing so, we
    keep in mind that the initial determination regarding the weight
    of the evidence was for the factfinder. The factfinder was free to
    believe all, some or none of the evidence. Additionally, a court
    must not reverse a verdict based on a weight claim unless that
    verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
    justice.
    Commonwealth v. Habay, 
    934 A.2d 732
    , 736-37 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    954 A.2d 575
     (Pa. 2008). “[A]
    trial court’s denial of a post-sentence motion ‘based on a weight of the
    evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.’”    Commonwealth v.
    Sanders, 
    42 A.3d 325
    , 331 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Diggs, 
    949 A.2d 873
    , 880 (Pa. 2008)).
    ____________________________________________
    2 Although he couched his first issue as one implicating the sufficiency of the
    evidence, Appellant does not identify any element of any crime upon which
    the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient.
    -5-
    J-S17007-21
    Instantly, Appellant essentially attacks the jury’s weight and credibility
    determinations, and invites us to accept his version of events. We decline the
    invitation. It is settled that we may not substitute our judgment for that of
    the factfinder—whether a jury or the trial court—because it is the province of
    the factfinder to assess the credibility of the witnesses and evidence. See
    Commonwealth        v.   DeJesus,     
    860 A.2d 102
    ,    107   (Pa.   2004);
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    668 A.2d 97
    , 101 (Pa. 1995) (“an appellate
    court is barred from substituting its judgment for that of the finder of fact.”);
    Commonwealth v. Forbes, 
    867 A.2d 1268
    , 1273 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating
    that “[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,] who
    is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
    credibility of witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for
    that for the finder of fact.”). As the jury was free to believe all, part or none
    of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Appellant’s claim lacks merit.
    Next, Appellant challenges his in-court identification by Officer Morar.
    We, however, decline to address this issue because Appellant failed to
    preserve it for our consideration. As we have often stated, with respect to
    preserving a challenge to the admission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 103 of
    the Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
    (a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a
    ruling to admit or exclude evidence only:
    (1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:
    (A) makes a timely objection, motion to strike, or
    motion in limine; and
    -6-
    J-S17007-21
    (B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent
    from the context[.]
    Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1). In Pennsylvania, it is well-settled that a party must make
    a timely and specific objection at trial in order to preserve an issue for
    appellate review.    See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v.
    Montalvo, 
    641 A.2d 1176
    , 1185 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation omitted) (“In
    order to preserve an issue for review, a party must make a timely and specific
    objection at trial.”). Failure to do so results in waiver of that issue on appeal.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v. Schoff, 
    911 A.2d 147
    ,
    158 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    Instantly, the trial transcript reveals that Appellant’s counsel failed to
    object to Appellant’s in-court identification by Officer Morar.
    Q. So you knew this person prior to June 3rd of 2018?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you know his name at the time, at the time you watched
    the video, did you know his name?
    A. I did.
    Q. And what was his name?
    A. Walter Brown.
    Q. How – how far before June 3rd of 2018 did you have prior
    dealings with –
    A. I would say maybe two weeks.
    Q. Two weeks before?
    A. Yeah.
    -7-
    J-S17007-21
    Q. Okay. Officer, I’m going to ask you to look around the room
    today and if you see – if you see Walter Brown in the courtroom?
    A. I do.
    Q. You do?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Could you point to him? You can stand up and point to him and
    describe what he’s wearing right now.
    A. He is wearing an off-white buttoned-collar shirt (indicating).
    [Assistant District Attorney]: I’ll ask that the record reflect that
    the witness has identified [Appellant], Walter Brown.
    [The trial court]: It shall.
    Q. Even though the person you identified right now has a face
    mask on, does that impair your ability to have the identification
    without any doubt?
    A. Yes, it doesn’t impair. I’m sorry. It doesn’t, no.
    Q. Is that him? Do you have any doubt that that is the person in
    the video?
    A. No.
    Q. Even with the face mask on today?
    A. Yeah.
    N.T. Trial, 11/18/20, at 35-36.      Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s
    evidentiary challenge to his in-court identification by Officer Morar is waived.
    See Commonwealth v. Ballard, 
    80 A.3d 380
    , 400 (Pa. 2013), (holding
    appellant’s arguments were waived because appellant failed to object at trial),
    cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2842 (2014)
    ; see also Pa.R.E. 103(a).
    -8-
    J-S17007-21
    In sum, Appellant neither obtains relief on his weight claim that the
    officers’ trial testimony was unreliable and incredible, nor on his evidentiary
    challenge to the in-court identification by Officer Morar.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/05/2021
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 29 MDA 2021

Judges: Stabile

Filed Date: 10/5/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024