Painter, W. v. Leakway, T. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S20040-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    WILLIAM A.L. PAINTER                         :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    TIFFANY M. LEAKWAY F/K/A TIFFANY             :
    M. LEAKWAY-PAINTER                           :
    :    No. 246 MDA 2021
    Appellant               :
    Appeal from the Order Entered January 22, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
    2014-FC-000582-03
    BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                        FILED: OCTOBER 8, 2021
    Tiffany M. Leakway f/k/a Tiffany M. Leakway-Painter (“Mother”) appeals
    from the Order granting the Motion filed by William A.L. Painter (“Father”)1 to
    relinquish jurisdiction in this custody matter to the Commonwealth of Virginia,
    where Father and the parties’ female child, M.P. (“Child”) (born in April 2007),
    have lived since 2017, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
    Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”).2 We affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1 We note that the trial court used the parties’ full names in the caption, and
    no party has applied for the use of initials on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)
    (stating that “[i]n an appeal of a custody action where the trial court has used
    the full name of the parties in the caption, upon application of a party and for
    cause shown, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to use the initials
    of the parties in the caption based upon the sensitive nature of the facts
    included in the case record and the best interest of the child.”).
    2 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5401-5482.
    J-S20040-21
    Mother and Father are the natural parents of Child.       The parties
    separated in 2012. Father initially filed a Custody Complaint, in Pennsylvania,
    in March 2014, when the parties were sharing custody of Child.       Following
    additional proceedings not relevant to the instant appeal, Father sent Mother
    a Notice of his proposed relocation with Child to Virginia.     Mother filed a
    Counter-Affidavit opposing both the relocation and modification of custody.
    The trial court entered a Final Custody Order on December 2, 2016, awarding
    Father sole legal custody and primary physical custody, and awarding Mother
    supervised custody. The trial court also granted Father permission to relocate
    with Child following the 2016-2017 academic year.3 Further, the Final Custody
    Order permitted Mother to exercise periods of unsupervised custody, on a
    fixed schedule, so long as she complied with various requirements (i.e.,
    completion of drug and alcohol counseling, completion of a threat and harm
    evaluation and compliance with recommendations).
    On December 9, 2020, Mother filed a Petition for Contempt and
    Modification, arguing that Father had restricted her access to Child, and
    seeking shared legal and physical custody. Father did not directly respond to
    Mother’s Petition, but filed a Motion for Transfer of Venue on December 31,
    2020.
    ____________________________________________
    3 Mother continues to reside in Pennsylvania.
    -2-
    J-S20040-21
    Following a conciliation conference on January 5, 2021, the trial court
    filed an Interim Order for Custody, pending trial.4 The Interim Order directed
    the parties to confer and try to agree on a counselor for family counseling.
    The trial court conducted a hearing on the Motion to Transfer on January
    21, 2021. The testimony at the hearing established that Father and Child
    moved to Virginia in 2017. N.T., 1/21/21, at 4, 5. Father testified that Child
    attends school in Virginia, is involved in sports and volunteer work, and has
    friends there. Id. at 6. According to Father, the parties had not been to court
    in Pennsylvania since 2016. Id. at 9; see also id. at 35 (wherein Mother
    acknowledged that the parties had not been in court for this matter between
    2017 and 2019). Additionally, Mother agreed that she could participate in
    another jurisdiction’s proceedings via Zoom. Id. at 37. At the close of the
    hearing, the trial court stated as follows:
    The [trial c]ourt has before it Father’s [M]otion to [T]ransfer
    jurisdiction and/or venue. More precisely, Father wants the [trial
    c]ourt to relinquish jurisdiction, presumably, for Virginia to
    resume jurisdiction in this matter.
    It is the Order of [c]ourt in this matter that this [c]ourt does
    relinquish jurisdiction of this matter to Virginia and/or any other
    state that may qualify as a home state under the UCCJEA. The
    [trial court] does this under Section 5422, which is titled
    Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction.
    This [c]ourt finds as a matter of law and fact that neither
    the Child, nor the parent, nor a person acting as a parent, have a
    significant connection with [Pennsylvania]. And, further, the
    [c]ourt finds that substantial evidence is no longer available in
    ____________________________________________
    4 The Interim Order was not entered on the docket until February 16, 2021.
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    J-S20040-21
    [Pennsylvania] concerning the Child’s care, protection, training,
    and personal relationships.
    Id. at 41; Trial Court Order, 1/22/21, at 1-2.5
    Mother filed a timely Notice of Appeal, along with a Concise Statement
    of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and
    (b).
    On appeal, Mother raises the following issues:
    I. [Whether] the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining
    that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5422[?]
    II [Whether] the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to
    analyze whether the trial court would otherwise have subject
    matter jurisdiction under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5421[?]
    III. [Whether] the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in
    immediately relinquishing jurisdiction without communicating with
    the receiving court to determine whether its willness [sic] to
    accept jurisdiction upon consideration of 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5428/VA
    Code [] § 20-146.19[?]
    IV. [Whether] the trial court erred as a matter of law by
    determining that it could decline to exercise subject matter
    jurisdiction pursuant to [23] Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5427 without first
    finding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction[?]
    V. [Whether] the trial court erred in determining that Father
    successfully challenged subject matter jurisdiction without
    complete analysis[?]
    Mother’s Brief at 7.
    ____________________________________________
    5 The Order was memorialized in writing and entered on the docket on January
    22, 2021.
    -4-
    J-S20040-21
    In each of her issues, which we will address together, Mother challenges
    whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that it lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5421, 5422, 5427, and
    5428. First, Mother argues that the trial court erred in determining that it
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 5422 of the UCCJEA.
    Brief for Appellant at 19. Mother claims that the trial court improperly ignored
    the impact of Father’s contemptuous behavior on her inability to parent Child.
    Id. at 20-22. According to Mother, she completed the requirements to receive
    unsupervised visits with Child, but Father failed to respond to her or “discuss
    expansion of custody.” Id. at 23. Mother asserts that the trial court did not
    address whether “substantial evidence” exists in Pennsylvania. Id. at 24.
    Mother next argues that the trial court erred in failing to analyze whether
    it would otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction under section 5421. Id.
    at 25.   Mother acknowledges that Pennsylvania does not qualify as Child’s
    “home state” within the 6 months preceding this action.          Id. at 25-26.
    Further, Mother asserts that the trial court did not inquire as to whether the
    court in Virginia would accept jurisdiction. Id. at 26.
    In her third issue, Mother contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction without first determining the receiving
    court’s willingness to accept jurisdiction, in accordance with section 5428. Id.
    at 28; see also id. at 29 (wherein Father argues that “the [t]rial [c]ourt has
    potentially set this matter up to be stuck in legal limbo between Virginia and
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    Pennsylvania.”). Mother also argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the
    test set forth under section 5421. Id. at 31.6
    In her fourth claim, Mother, citing section 5427, asserts that the trial
    court erred in determining that it could decline to exercise subject matter
    jurisdiction, without first finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
    Finally, Mother generally challenges the trial court’s decision, arguing
    that the court failed to conduct a complete analysis. Id. at 32. According to
    Mother, Father “has resumed his past behavior of drinking to excess in the
    presence of the [C]hild.” Id. Mother claims that the trial court should have
    considered exercising emergency jurisdiction under section 5424. Id. at 35.
    Mother’s claims challenge the trial court’s transfer of jurisdiction to
    Virginia. Mother’s claims present a question of law, for which our standard of
    review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. J.S. v. R.S.S., 
    231 A.3d 942
    , 947 (Pa. Super. 2000); see also S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 
    94 A.3d 402
    ,
    ____________________________________________
    6 Mother failed to raise a claim related to emergency jurisdiction under section
    5424 in her Concise Statement, nor does she direct us to any place in the
    record where she raised this claim with the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not included in the Statement … are
    waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial
    court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Further,
    though Mother quotes section 5424(b) and baldly asserts that Father has an
    alcohol problem, this claim is not fully developed. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
    (providing that the argument shall include “such discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); see also Lackner v. Glosser, 
    892 A.2d 21
    , 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “arguments which are not
    appropriately developed are waived.”). For these reasons, Mother’s final claim
    is waived.
    -6-
    J-S20040-21
    408 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that, while an appeal from and order to
    exercise or decline jurisdiction would be subject to an abuse of discretion
    standard, a challenge to a court’s determination that it possesses subject
    matter jurisdiction under section 5422 is a question of law, and subject to de
    novo review).
    “[T]he UCCJEA governs questions of child custody jurisdiction arising
    between Pennsylvania and the other states of the United States.” J.S., 231
    A.3d at 947.       Regarding an initial custody determination, section 5421
    provides as follows:
    § 5421. Initial Child Custody Jurisdiction
    (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section 5424
    (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court of this
    Commonwealth has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
    determination only if:
    (1) this Commonwealth is the home state[7] of the child on the
    date of the commencement of the proceeding or was the home
    state of the child within six months before the commencement
    of the proceeding and the child is absent from this
    Commonwealth but a parent or person acting as a parent
    continues to live in this Commonwealth;
    (2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under
    paragraph (1) or a court of the home state of the child has
    declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
    Commonwealth is the more appropriate forum under section
    5427 (relating to inconvenient forum) or 5428 (relating to
    jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct) and:
    ____________________________________________
    7 Section 5402 of the UCCJEA defines “[h]ome state,” in relevant part, as
    “[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent
    for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of
    a child custody proceeding.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5402.
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    J-S20040-21
    (i) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least
    one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a
    significant connection with this Commonwealth other than
    mere physical presence; and
    (ii) substantial evidence is available in this Commonwealth
    concerning the child’s care, protection, training and
    personal relationships;
    (3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2)
    have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a
    court of this Commonwealth is the more appropriate forum to
    determine the custody of the child under section 5427 or 5428;
    or
    (4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under
    the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2) or (3).
    (b) Exclusive jurisdictional basis.--Subsection (a) is the
    exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody
    determination by a court of this Commonwealth.
    (c)   Physical     presence     and    personal      jurisdiction
    unnecessary.--Physical presence of or personal jurisdiction over
    a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child
    custody determination.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421 (emphasis in original).
    As the trial court noted in its Opinion, section 5421 concerns a court’s
    jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination.        Trial Court Opinion,
    3/11/21, at 8. The record reflects that Pennsylvania was Child’s home state
    when these proceedings were commenced in 2014, and at the time the trial
    court entered the Final Custody Order in 2016. See J.S., 231 A.3d at 948
    (stating that Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to make an initial custody
    determination in 2015, where Pennsylvania was child’s home state at that
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    time, and father and child did not relocate until 2016); S.K.C., 
    94 A.3d at 410
    (concluding that Pennsylvania trial court had jurisdiction to make an initial
    custody determination where the child was a Pennsylvania residence on the
    date the proceeding commenced).
    Accordingly, we proceed to the question of whether Pennsylvania
    retained “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” after Father and Child had
    relocated to Virginia in 2017. See J.S., 231 A.3d at 948 (stating that “[i]f a
    Pennsylvania trial court with jurisdiction enters an order awarding custody,
    this state will retain ‘exclusive, continuing jurisdiction’ unless or until certain
    conditions occur.”). Section 5422 provides for jurisdiction after a court has
    already made an initial custody determination.        Section 5422 provides as
    follows:
    § 5422. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
    (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section 5424
    (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court of this
    Commonwealth which has made a child custody determination
    consistent with section 5421 (relating to initial child custody
    jurisdiction) or 5423 (relating to jurisdiction to modify
    determination) has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the
    determination until:
    (1) a court of this Commonwealth determines that neither
    the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a
    person acting as a parent have a significant connection
    with this Commonwealth and that substantial evidence is
    no longer available in this Commonwealth concerning the
    child’s   care,    protection,   training   and    personal
    relationships; or
    (2) a court of this Commonwealth or a court of another
    state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any
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    J-S20040-21
    person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this
    Commonwealth.
    (b) Modification where court does not have exclusive,
    continuing jurisdiction.--A court of this Commonwealth which
    has made a child custody determination and does not have
    exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify
    that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial
    determination under section 5421.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422.
    This Court clarified the requirements of Section 5422(a)(1)
    in Rennie v. Rosenthol, 
    995 A.2d 1217
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    …. In Rennie, we observed that 5422(a)(1) contains two prongs,
    a “significant connection” prong and a “substantial evidence”
    prong, both of which must be satisfied in order for Pennsylvania
    to lose exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Id. at 1211. Regarding
    the “significant connection” prong, this Court explained that
    Pennsylvania will retain exclusive, continuing jurisdiction “as long
    as the child and at least one parent have an important or
    meaningful relationship to the Commonwealth.” Id. (footnote
    omitted). We went on to reject the appellant’s contention in that
    case that Pennsylvania lost jurisdiction because [the mother] had
    relocated with the parties’ child to Minnesota. Id. at 1222.
    Observing that the appellee continued to reside in Pennsylvania
    and exercised custody of the child here, we reasoned that a
    significant connection “will be found where one parent resides and
    exercises parenting time in the state and maintains a meaningful
    relationship with the child.” Id. We reasoned, “[a]s indicated in
    clear language in the statute, a ‘significant connection’ will be
    found where one parent resides and exercises parenting
    time in the state and maintains a meaningful relationship
    with the child.” Id.
    J.S., 231 A.3d at 948-49 (emphasis added).
    Regarding its decision under section 5422, the trial court explained as
    follows:
    Preliminarily, given that Mother’s visits are fully supervised
    since the 2016 Order was implemented, it should be noted that
    she has not operated in a parental role prior to 2016.
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    J-S20040-21
    [The following exchange is questioning of Father by his
    counsel on direct examination at the hearing on January 21,
    2021.]
    Q. [Father’s counsel:] Okay. So[,] from your knowledge,
    there is no one in Pennsylvania or in York County for that
    matter that can provide any insight into her current care
    or protection, or her relationships, is that correct?
    A. [Father:] No.
    Q. So[,] you operate under a Custody Order out of York
    County from 2016. Does that Custody [O]rder provide you
    with sole legal and primary physical custody?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And what does it provide Mother?
    A. Supervised visitation at this point.
    Q. Has the [C]hild ever been to Mother’s home?
    A. No.
    Q. Are you aware of any instance since 2016 where Mother
    has parented the [C]hild in York County, or Pennsylvania
    for that matter?
    A. No.
    Trans., Jan. 21, 2021 at 6-7.
    [The following exchange is questioning of Father by Mother’s
    counsel on re-cross-examination at the hearing on January 21,
    2021.]
    Q. [Mother’s counsel:] Okay. But your testimony today
    about whether or not [Mother] offered any discipline, any
    parenting advice, or any type of counsel to [Child], you
    can’t testify as to whether or not you know that?
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    J-S20040-21
    A. [Father:] I can say that I would know that. I mean,
    [Child] would be very upfront about that.
    Q. But you have not personally observed by hearing a
    consecration [sic]?
    A. I hear conversations when they Facetime. I mean, it is
    out there[;] you can hear it.
    Id. at [2]3.
    Further, no visitation with Mother has taken place in
    Pennsylvania since 2016. Id. at 7. Rather, Mother’s supervised
    visits take place in Virginia and [Child] receives all of Mother’s
    calls and texts in Virginia. Id. at 7, 16-17. Moreover, testimony
    established that [Child] has not been in Pennsylvania since 2017
    and she does not participate in any activities in Pennsylvania. Id.
    at 4, 6. Instead, she is deeply involved in her community in
    Virginia.
    [The following exchange is questioning of Father by his
    counsel on direct examination at the hearing on January 21,
    2021.]
    Q. [Father’s counsel:] Describe [Child]’s involvement in
    Bouttoit [sic] County[, Virginia]?
    A.[Father:] She has been playing school soccer for the last
    three years. She is involved in the community churches.
    She does a lot of volunteer work in the community, in the
    food bank. She is in Future Athletes of America through
    the school. She does a lot of volunteering through the
    soccer team in the community. She has tons of amazing
    friends in the community.
    Id. [at 6.]
    [Child]’s relationship connections with Pennsylvania are also
    limited.    Specifically, [Child]’s contact with her maternal
    grandmother is limited in that she does not speak with her
    regularly and the last contact was over six months ago. Id. at 13.
    … Additionally, [Child] has some cousins but their current location
    as to whether they reside in Pennsylvania or elsewhere appears
    to be unknown. Father testified that “they have bounced around
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    J-S20040-21
    multiple places” and “once in a blue moon [Child] will hear
    something from them.” Id. at 14.
    Mother’s main proffered evidence included her efforts to
    obtain a Threat of Harm Evaluation as well as phone calls from
    Pennsylvania to Virginia and vice versa as significant contacts. Id.
    at 29-33. However, this [c]ourt did not find that Mother’s own
    efforts to get a Threat of Harm Evaluation supported a connection
    that linked the [C]hild to Pennsylvania. Even if these were
    contacts, given the overwhelming significance of [Child]’s contacts
    to Virginia, the length of time the [C]hild has resided outside of
    Pennsylvania, and the lack of this [c]ourt’s involvement over such
    [a] long period of time, these connections are certainly
    insignificant. Therefore, this [c]ourt did not err or abuse its
    discretion.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/11/21, at 11-14.
    Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s determination. The record
    confirms that Child has lived in Virginia with Father since 2017. Additionally,
    the Final Custody Order granted Mother only supervised custody, and all of
    Mother’s supervised visits have taken place in Virginia.      Thus, the record
    reflects that, while Mother resides in Pennsylvania, she does not exercise
    parenting time in this state. Mother claim under section 5422 therefore lacks
    merit.
    We now turn to Mother’s jurisdictional challenges under section 5427
    and 5478, which provide, in relevant part, as follows:
    § 5427. Inconvenient forum
    (a) General rule.--A court of this Commonwealth which has
    jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child custody
    determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
    if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the
    circumstances and that a court of another state is a more
    appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised
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    J-S20040-21
    upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion or request of
    another court.
    (b) Factors.--Before determining whether it is an inconvenient
    forum, a court of this Commonwealth shall consider whether it is
    appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction.
    For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit
    information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
    (1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to
    continue in the future and which state could best protect
    the parties and the child;
    (2) the length of time the child has resided outside this
    Commonwealth;
    (3) the distance between the court in this Commonwealth
    and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
    (4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
    (5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should
    assume jurisdiction;
    (6) the nature and location of the evidence required to
    resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the
    child;
    (7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue
    expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the
    evidence; and
    (8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts
    and issues in the pending litigation.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5427(a), (b).
    § 5428. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct
    (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section 5424
    (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction) or by other laws of
    this Commonwealth, if a court of this Commonwealth has
    jurisdiction under this chapter because a person seeking to invoke
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    its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall
    decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
    (1) the parents and all persons acting as parents have
    acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;
    (2) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under
    section 5421 (relating to initial child custody jurisdiction)
    through 5423 (relating to jurisdiction to modify
    determination) determines that this Commonwealth is a
    more appropriate forum under section 5427 (relating to
    inconvenient forum); or
    (3) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction
    under the criteria specified in sections 5421 through 5422.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5428(a).
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed and rejected Mother’s claim that
    it should have applied section 5428 before section 5427.         The trial court
    explained as follows:
    In this case, section 5428 is inapplicable. The statute refers
    to a [c]ourt in Pennsylvania, assuming jurisdiction for reasons of
    a party seeking for a Pennsylvania court to assume jurisdiction
    due to a party’s unjustifiable conduct. 23 P[a].C.S.A. § 5428(a).
    Preliminarily, this [c]ourt was not convinced that there was
    unjustifiable conduct. Rather, Mother’s claims regarding this
    matter seemed to be primarily dictated by [the] 2016 [Final
    Custody] Order. Given that Mother did not complete or claim to
    complete the [court’s] requirements until 2020, this [c]ourt was
    not convinced that Mother could prove that [] Father’s alleged
    conduct was the primary or even the sole reason that Virginia was
    the proper forum. See Trans. Jan. 21, 2021, at 35-36.
    Furthermore, none of the exceptions which would permit
    this [c]ourt to assume jurisdiction are met. The first prong
    requires waiver by both parents. Father objected[,] so this is
    inapplicable.    The second prong refers to another court’s
    determination that Pennsylvania is [a] more appropriate forum.
    No court prior to this preceding [sic] has done so[;] thus[,] this is
    inapplicable. The third prong is inapplicable[,] as neither court
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    J-S20040-21
    has jurisdiction under either of these sections[,] and Virginia
    would have jurisdiction under section 5427 as analyzed below.
    Accordingly, this [c]ourt did not err or abuse [its] discretion by
    not applying section 5428 before section 5427 because it is not
    applicable to the facts of this case.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/11/21, at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
    Further, regarding section 5427, the trial court detailed its conclusions
    as follows:
    This [c]ourt would also opine that it had the authority to
    decline jurisdiction under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5427.
    ….
    Here, factor one was not at issue because neither party
    presented evidence relative to domestic violence. Factor two
    clearly favored Virginia as [the] convenient forum because[,] as
    explained above, the [C]hild has not been in Pennsylvania for over
    three years. Factor three favors Virginia in that Father and the
    [C]hild[,] as well as all of his witnesses including Mother’s
    supervisor[,] would have to travel five hours from Virginia. Trans.
    Jan. 21, 2021. Relative to factor four, the [c]ourt did hear
    testimony regarding the hardship and costs of Mother and Father
    to litigate in the different states. However, both parties admitted
    that they could [have] participated by [Z]oom or some other
    electronic means to eliminate this difficulty. Id. at 25, 37.
    Accordingly, the [c]ourt found that Father would have more
    pertinent witnesses[,] including the [C]hild[,] in Virginia than
    Mother would have in Pennsylvania[,] and[,] presumably some of
    Mother’s witnesses, i.e., the supervisor, are actually located in
    Virginia. Id. at 21, 24.
    Factor five was not relevant[,] as both parties desire
    different states to assume jurisdiction. As analyzed under factor
    four, Father presented quite a bit of evidence of persons that
    would need to be involved in the litigation[,] who are currently
    residing in Virginia[,] relative to factor six. Both parties agreed
    that another court could review this [c]ourt’s [O]rder and make
    an expedient and informed decision, therefore eliminating the
    relevance of factor seven. Id. at 22, 34-35. This [c]ourt also
    believed that factor eight was not relevant. Namely, the assigned
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    J-S20040-21
    judge has not heard the facts of this case in over four years and
    even declined to hear the [case] because the case was no longer
    familiar to him.      Accordingly, it was evident that both a
    Pennsylvania [c]ourt and a Virginia [c]ourt are unequally [sic]
    unfamiliar with this case. As many of the factors are neutral and
    the remaining factors indicate that this Commonwealth is an
    inconvenient forum, this [c]ourt did not err or abuse its discretion.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/11/21, at 14-16 (emphasis in original).
    We agree with the trial court’s analysis, as stated above, and conclude
    that Mother’s claims regarding sections 5427 and 5428 lack merit.
    For the foregoing reasons, under our de novo review, we agree with and
    adopt the trial court’s analysis and conclusions with regard to sections 5421,
    5422, 5427, and 5428.         Accordingly, we affirm the trial court Order
    relinquishing jurisdiction in this custody matter to the Commonwealth of
    Virginia.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/08/2021
    - 17 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 246 MDA 2021

Judges: Musmanno

Filed Date: 10/8/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024