Com. v. Snider, J. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A20033-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JOSEPH SNIDER                                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1362 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 24, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-10-CR-0000185-2017
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED: OCTOBER 12, 2021
    Joseph Snider (Appellant) appeals from the order entered in the Butler
    County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to dismiss his guilty plea
    to recklessly endangering another person (REAP).1 On appeal, he claims the
    trial court was required to dismiss his conviction after his successful
    completion of the Butler County Veterans Treatment Court Program. For the
    reasons below, we affirm.
    We glean the following facts from Appellant’s hearing admitting him into
    Veterans Court.
    [O]n November 2, 2016, in Lancaster Township, [Pennsylvania,
    Appellant] did drive, operate, or [was] in actual physical control
    of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount
    of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in [Appellant’s]
    blood or breath was .16 percent or higher within two hours after
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
    J-A20033-21
    [Appellant] had driven, operated[,] or been in actual physical
    control of the movement of a vehicle in violation of Section
    3802[(c)] of the Vehicle Code.
    N.T., Admission into Veterans Court, 7/19/17, at 3.2
    Appellant was initially charged with driving under the influence (DUI)
    (highest rate of alcohol).3 On June 28, 2017, Appellant, represented by James
    Herb, Esquire, entered and subsequently withdrew a guilty plea for the
    purposes of Veterans Court admission. On July 19, 2017, the Commonwealth
    amended its complaint to include one count of REAP, and Appellant was
    admitted into Veterans Court.          That same day, Appellant completed “two
    alternative pleas.” N.T., 7/19/17, at 3. Appellant would enter the first plea,
    for one count of DUI (highest rate of alcohol), a first-degree misdemeanor, “in
    the event of unsuccessful completion of Veterans Court.” Id. Appellant would
    enter the second plea, for one count of REAP, a second-degree misdemeanor,
    “in the event of successful completion of Veterans Court.” Id. at 4. Both plea
    agreements were open, meaning the Commonwealth and Appellant did not
    agree on a particular sentence before he entered the agreement. Id. at 3-4.
    On July 11, 2018, after Appellant successfully completed the Veterans
    Court Program,4 the trial court sentenced Appellant to a period of 12 months’
    ____________________________________________
    2 The transcript is dated as having taken place on July 19, 2019; however, the
    record confirms this to be a typographical error.
    3 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
    4 Appellant’s date of completion of the Veterans Court Program is not provided
    in the record, but the “expected length of participation” in the program is 12
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -2-
    J-A20033-21
    probation.    On October 20, 2020, Appellant, still represented by Attorney
    Herb, filed a petition for dismissal of his REAP charge. The trial court ordered
    a hearing on the petition for dismissal on November 20, 2020, and
    subsequently denied Appellant’s motion on November 23, 2020. This timely
    appeal followed. Appellant timely complied with the trial court’s order to file
    a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b).
    Appellant raises one issue on appeal:
    Did the [trial court] err when it failed to dismiss charges against
    Appellant, where Appellant had completed all requirements of the
    Veterans’ Treatment Court Program and the program policy states
    charges will be dismissed upon successful completion?
    Appellant’s Brief at 7 (emphasis in original).
    Preliminarily, we note that the Butler County Veterans Court has two
    program tracks. We cite the relevant portion of the Butler County Veterans
    Treatment Court Policies and Procedures below:
    Dismissal of Charges
    Diversionary Track:
    For participants completing the diversionary track, charges will
    not be dismissed until the participant has graduated, completed
    aftercare and paid any and all applicable fines; costs, and fees. It
    is the responsibility of the participant to furnish proof of final
    payment to their Veterans Treatment Court Probation Officer.
    Once verified, the Office of the District Attorney will prepare a
    Court order seeking dismissal of the charges. Further, upon
    ____________________________________________
    months. Some participants may take longer.             Veterans Treatment Court
    Policies and Procedures, Butler County, at 15.
    -3-
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    successful completion of aftercare, which includes remaining drug
    and alcohol free along with not obtaining new charges, the
    defendant who entered into the program as diversionary may
    petition the court to have their criminal case/s expunged. The
    participant must pay the appropriate fee in the Clerk of Courts
    Office prior to the filing the petition for expungement. The Office
    of the District Attorney will prepare the necessary paper work for
    participant's expungement.        Failure to successfully complete
    aftercare may result in the District Attorney denying the
    expungement request.
    Non-Diversionary Track:
    For participants completing the non-diversionary track, any
    remaining supervision may terminate early if all requirements of
    aftercare have been met including, but not limited to, all financial
    obligations paid in full, remaining drug free and remaining free of
    new criminal offense.
    Veterans Treatment Court Policies and Procedures, Butler County, at 33. In
    its Order dismissing Appellant’s motion, the trial court notes,
    [t]he Butler County Veterans Treatment Court Policies and
    Procedures Manu[a]l contains two tracks, a Diversionary Track[ ]
    for participants who are offered the diversion program of ARD[,
    Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition]. The supervision for those
    participants requires them to complete the requirements of Butler
    County Treatment Court in order to obtain dismissal of their
    charges. For the Non-Diversionary Track[ ], participants in Butler
    County Veterans Treatment Court are offered a plea agreement
    and remain in Veterans Treatment Court with bond conditions and
    if they successfully complete the program they are sentenced
    according to the plea agreement they entered. If they do not
    successfully complete Veterans Treatment Court, they are
    sentenced to an alternative plea agreement to which they have
    entered into with the Butler County District Attorney’s Office.
    Order, 11/24/20, at 2 (unpaginated).
    In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues he is entitled to dismissal
    of his charges as he successfully completed the Veterans Court Treatment
    Program. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant insists he and the Commonwealth
    -4-
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    “are to reach a plea agreement as a requirement for entry into the program”
    and that pleading guilty does not waive a claim of “validity of guilty plea[.]”
    Id. at 14 citing Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
    173 A.3d 286
    , 290 (Pa. Super.
    2017).     Appellant maintains that “upon graduation [and] successful
    completion” of the diversionary track of the program, the Commonwealth is
    required to seek dismissal of charges.       Id. at 15.   The trial court stated
    Appellant was not in the diversionary track of program, as evidenced by “entry
    of the REAP [p]lea[,]” and as such was not entitled to dismissal. Id. at 16.
    Appellant asserts that the terms “diversionary” and “non-diversionary” are not
    defined anywhere in the treatment court Policies and Procedures and “the
    record does not set forth that the plea to REAP is one on a non-diversionary
    track.” Id. at 16-17. Appellant insists “the language or lack of definition” of
    these terms caused confusion “acknowledged by the [trial court]” and
    Commonwealth. Id. at 21. Appellant cites the Commonwealth’s comment
    that “[it] understood where [Appellant] sees that the diversionary track
    language in [its] policies and procedures ” as well as the trial court’s comment
    “if we need to make some changes in the program, that might be appropriate.”
    Id. at 21-22.     Appellant contends that because of this, he entered an
    unknowing plea. Id. at 17.
    Before addressing Appellant’s claim on its merits, we note he argues the
    validity of his plea for the first time on appeal.
    A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea
    on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file
    a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.
    -5-
    J-A20033-21
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either
    measure results in waiver. Historically, Pennsylvania courts
    adhere to this waiver principle because “[i]t is for the court which
    accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first instance,
    any error which may have been committed.” [ ]
    Normally, issues not preserved in the trial court may not be
    pursued before this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). For example,
    a request to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds that it
    was involuntary is one of the claims that must be raised by
    motion in the trial court in order to be reviewed on direct
    appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d 606
    , 609-610 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (citations omitted). Because his arguments supporting an involuntary plea
    are waived, we may not address them; we address his remaining argument
    on its merits. See 
    id.
    Appellant bases his argument on the alleged confusion caused by the
    treatment court’s program, which has both a diversionary and non-
    diversionary track, citing comments made by the Commonwealth and trial
    court.     However, Appellant mischaracterizes these comments to create his
    own confusion.       The Commonwealth simply stated it understood “where”
    Appellant pulled the diversionary track language from. See N.T., Motion to
    Dismiss H’rg, 11/20/20, at 6. The trial court commented on potential future
    “changes in the program” and on Appellant’s “exemplary” work in the
    program. See id. at 6-7. The trial court did not imply that any changes were
    necessary due to any confusion on Appellant’s part, rather context makes it
    clear that the trial court was simply acknowledging Appellant participated
    successfully.
    -6-
    J-A20033-21
    Moreover, at Appellant’s plea hearing, the Commonwealth clearly stated
    the terms of each plea agreement, and Appellant stated he understood the
    agreement’s terms:
    The first plea [ ] is the plea in the event of unsuccessful completion
    of Veterans Court. That will be a plea of guilty to count [2] of the
    information, [DUI], second offense. The information sets forth
    that on November 2, 2016, in Lancaster Township, [Appellant] did
    drive, operate[,] or be in actual physical control of the movement
    of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that
    the Alcohol concentration in [Appellant’s] blood or breath was .16
    percent or higher within two hours after [Appellant] [operated a
    vehicle] in violation of [75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c), a misdemeanor of
    the first degree]. The agreed upon recommended sentence is a
    straight or open plea.
    *        *       *
    The second plea to be recited will be the plea enforced in the
    event of successful completion of Veterans Court. That will
    be a plea of guilty to count four, [REAP], misdemeanor of the
    second degree. The information in that regard will set forth at the
    same time and place, [Appellant] did recklessly endanger other
    persons or property. [ ] This is a straight and open plea as well[.]
    *       *        *
    [Plea counsel: D]o you understand that if you successfully
    complete the Veterans Court program, that the [DUI] charge will
    be withdrawn or dismissed by the [Commonwealth], that you will
    enter a plea to [REAP] only?
    [Appellant:] Yes.
    N.T., Admission into Veterans Court, at 3-4, 7 (emphasis added). Appellant
    stated he truthfully filled out a written colloquy admitting he understood the
    terms and conditions of Veterans Treatment Court and plea counsel answered
    any questions he had regarding his guilty plea.          Id. at 6-7; Appellant’s
    -7-
    J-A20033-21
    Veterans Treatment Court Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/20/17, at 3. We note at the
    plea hearing, counsel stated to Appellant that upon successful completion of
    Veterans Court, the Commonwealth would withdraw or dismiss his DUI
    charge and Appellant would “enter a plea to [REAP] only[.]” N.T., Admission
    into Veterans Court, at 7. Now, on appeal, counsel is arguing for dismissal of
    Appellant’s REAP charge despite explicitly explaining the contrary to Appellant.
    After Appellant’s colloquy, the trial court confirmed again Appellant “met
    with [ ] the Probation Office” where they “explained [ ] the requirements of
    [ ] Veterans Court[.]” N.T., Admission into Veterans Court, at 9. At no point
    in the terms of the plea agreement or Appellant’s colloquy did the
    Commonwealth say or give Appellant the impression that his charge for REAP
    would be dismissed. On the contrary, the Commonwealth specifically stated
    in exchange for completion of the program, a plea resulting in a conviction for
    REAP, a lesser charge, would be enforced and the harsher DUI conviction
    would be averted.       Because he successfully completed the program, he
    escaped a DUI conviction and the consequences that follow. Thus, he has
    received the benefit of his bargain.
    We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that his plea agreement
    included a conviction and sentence to one count of REAP, and thus Appellant’s
    claim is meritless.
    Order affirmed.
    -8-
    J-A20033-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/12/2021
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1362 WDA 2020

Judges: McCaffery

Filed Date: 10/12/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024