Frazer, J. v. McEntire, S. ( 2021 )

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2021 PA Super 211JANICE L. FRAZER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ADMINISTRATRIX, D.B.N.C.T.A., OF : PENNSYLVANIA
THE ESTATE OF CLAIR D. MCENTIRE :
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SANDRA E. MCENTIRE, : No. 118 WDA 2021
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF :
DAVID C. MCENTIRE :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 29, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Civil Division
at No(s): 46 C.D. 2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.
OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2021
Janice L. Frazer (Appellant), Administratrix, d.b.n.c.t.a., of the Estate of
Clair D. McEntire, appeals from the order entered in the Clarion County Court
of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of Sandra E. McEntire
(Appellee), Executrix of the Estate of David C. McEntire. In this matter,
Appellant, as administratrix of her father’s estate, has sued her brother’s
estate for fraud and conversion, for allegedly withholding a “cash asset” that
should have passed through the father’s will to the beneficiaries. On appeal,
Appellant avers the trial court erred in: (1) applying the Dead Man’s Act1 to
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1 42 Pa.C.S. § 5930.
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preclude witness testimony about the existence of the cash asset; and (2)
granting summary judgment where there existed additional evidence of the
existence of the cash asset. We hold that under the particular facts presented,
the court did not err in: (1) applying the Dead Man’s Act to preclude
testimony; and (2) finding the Dead Man’s Act devisavit vel non2 exception
did not apply, as the matter did not relate to the passage of property through
will or intestacy, but instead, the instant claims sounded in fraud and
conversion. Accordingly, we affirm.
We glean the following generally from the pleadings. Appellant’s father,
Clair D. McEntire, died testate on December 28, 2010. Appellant’s Second
Amended Complaint, 1/29/18, at 3. Clair’s will named three beneficiaries: (1)
his son, David C. McEntire; (2) his daughter, Appellant; and (3) his
granddaughter, Rebecca V. Shick, who is the child of a daughter who
predeceased Clair.3 David was named the executor of Clair’s will, but he died
on April 30, 2012, prior to the finalization of Clair’s estate. Id. at 4. Appellant
was then named administratrix of Clair’s estate. Meanwhile, David’s wife,
Appellee (Appellant’s sister-in-law) was named executrix of David’s estate.
This matter commenced with Appellant’s filing of a praecipe for writ of
summons on January 10, 2014, against Appellee, as administratrix of David’s
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2 See Black’s Law Dictionary 463 (7th ed. 1999) (“he (or she) devises or not”).
3 N.T., 11/5/19, at 9.
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estate. Appellant’s January 29, 2018, second amended complaint presented
claims of conversion and fraud. It averred:
On January 1, 2011, the day after [Clair’s funeral], at a meeting
in the kitchen of David[’s] residence, between [David, Appellant,
and Rebecca,] and during the administration of [Clair’s estate, the
executor David] informed [Appellant] and Rebecca . . . that [Clair]
had cash assets of $130,000.00, which [David] was keeping in his
safe located at the McEntire Funeral Home, [in] Knox,
Pennsylvania, for eventual distribution to [Clair’s] three
beneficiaries[.]
Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint, at 7-8. Appellant contended that
David, as executor of Clair’s estate, was duty bound to distribute this cash
asset to the three beneficiaries. Id. at 6. However, neither David, nor
Appellee as administratrix of his estate, has distributed any portion of this
cash asset. Id.
On August 14, 2019, Appellee filed a motion in limine, asserting the only
evidence supporting Appellant’s claim of a $130,000 “cash asset” was “an
alleged statement made by David . . . now deceased, more than eight years
ago.” Appellee’s Motion in Limine, 8/14/19, at 1. Appellee argued that any
testimony or evidence about that alleged statement was barred by the Dead
Man’s Act. Appellant responded with her own motion in limine, denying that
the Dead Man’s Act applied. In support, she contended: (1) her and Rebecca’s
interests were not adverse to David’s interests, “since they are trying to
marshal assets belonging to [Clair’s estate,] of which [David] was once
Executor;” and, in the alternative (2) the devisavit vel non exception applied.
Appellant’s Motion in limine, 8/28/19, at 3-4.
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For ease of review, at this juncture we set forth the contours of the Dead
Man’s Act and relevant authority. This evidentiary rule is codified at Section
5930 of our Judicial Code in pertinent part as follows:
§ 5930. Surviving party as witness, in case of death,
mental incapacity, etc.
[I]n any civil action or proceeding, where any party to a thing or
contract in action is dead . . . and his right thereto or therein has
passed . . . to a party on the record who represents his interest in
the subject in controversy, neither any surviving or remaining
party to such thing or contract, nor any other person whose
interest shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased . . .
party, shall be a competent witness to any matter occurring before
the death of said party . . . unless the issue or inquiry be devisavit
vel non, or be any other issue or inquiry respecting the property
of a deceased owner, and the controversy is between parties
respectively claiming such property by devolution on the death of
such owner, in which case all persons shall be fully competent
witnesses.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5930.
“The Dead Man’s Act is an exception to the general rule of evidence in
this Commonwealth that: ‘no interest or policy of law . . . shall make any
person incompetent as a witness.’” Larkin v. Metz, 580 A.2d 1150, 1152
(Pa. Super. 1990), citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5921. “The Act provides that one whose
interest is adverse to the interest of a decedent is not a competent witness to
any matter which occurred before the decedent’s death.” Schroeder v.
Jaquiss, 861 A.2d 885, 887 (Pa. 2004).
This Court has stated:
The purpose of the statute is to prevent the injustice that may
result from permitting a surviving [witness] to a transaction to
give testimony favorable to himself and adverse to the decedent,
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which the decedent’s representative would be in no position to
refute by reason of the decedent’s death.
Under the Dead Man’s Act three conditions must exist before
the surviving party or witness is disqualified: “(1) the deceased
must have had an actual right or interest in the matter at issue,
i.e. an interest in the immediate result of the suit; (2) the interest
of the witness—not simply the testimony—must be adverse; (3) a
right of the deceased must have passed to a party of record who
represents the deceased’s interest.”
Larkin, 580 A.2d at 1152 (citations omitted). “[A]pplication of the rule
requires that the interest of the proposed witness be adverse to the interest
of the decedent’s estate. ‘In order to be adverse the interest must be one
from which the witness will either gain or lose as the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.’” Gibbs v. Herman, 714 A.2d 432, 436 (Pa.
Super. 1998) (citation omitted).
We further consider:
The devisavit vel non exception provides that “witnesses are
competent to testify in disputes arising over the passage of
property, through will or intestacy, although their testimony might
otherwise be rendered incompetent through operation of the
general rule.” “This exception applies to disputes involving the
transfer of a decedent’s estate both by operation of law or by will
and renders competent all witnesses claiming decedent’s property
by reason of [his] death.”
In re Estate of Janosky, 827 A.2d 512, 516 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations
omitted).
The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ cross motions in
limine on November 5, 2019. Appellant and Rebecca testified. The court
granted Appellee’s motion, concluding that the Dead Man’s Act precluded
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Appellant and Rebecca from providing any testimony about their alleged
conversation with David concerning Clair’s $130,000 cash asset. The court
first emphasized the instant action does not involve any claim against Clair’s
estate, but rather David’s estate, and that for purposes of the Dead Man’s Act,
the deceased individual is David. Memo. Opin., 11/20/19, at 4. The court
found: (1) David’s estate “clearly has an interest” in the instant conversion
and fraud action, which is based on allegations that David and Appellee, as
executor, were withholding funds belonging to Clair’s estate; (2) Appellant
and Rebecca’s interests were adverse to David’s interests, where the
allegations were that David’s estate “is in possession of an asset required to
be divided among the three” beneficiaries of Clair’s will; and (3) Appellee, as
executor of David’s estate, represents David’s interests. Id. Furthermore,
the trial court rejected Appellant’s reliance on the devisavit vel non exception.
The court reasoned: (1) this matter does not present claims against Clair’s
estate, nor challenge either Clair’s or David’s will; and (2) instead, “[t]his is
an action to determine whether a cash asset exists, not who the proper
beneficiary is under a will or what the intentions of a deceased devisee were.”
Id. at 5.
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Upon Appellant’s motion, the trial court certified its motion in limine
order as an interlocutory appealable order.4 Order, 12/23/19. However, this
Court denied Appellant permission to appeal.
Following a status conference with the trial court, Appellee filed a motion
for summary judgment on August 19, 2020. Appellant filed an answer,
attaching two affidavits: one by David’s ex-son in law, Jason Schnabl,5 and
one by Appellant’s friend, Diana Sue Glosser. The trial court heard oral
argument, by Zoom conference, on November 10th.
On December 29, 2020, the trial court issued the underlying order,
granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The court found “there is
no issue to be submitted to the jury because [Appellant] has failed to establish
a prima facie case for conversion or fraud due to the lack of evidence that a
$130,000 ‘cash asset’ ever existed.” Opin. & Order, 12/29/20, at 2. Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently complied with the court’s
order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.6
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4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) (interlocutory appeals by permission).
5 Jason was previously married to David’s daughter.
6 The trial court issued its Rule 1925(b) order on January 25, 2021, directing
Appellant to file a statement within 21 days. Order, 1/25/21. This 21-day
deadline fell on Monday, February 15th, which was a court holiday, Presidents’
Day. Appellant’s statement, filed the following day, February 16th, was
timely. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when last day of any period of time referred
to in any statute falls on legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from
computation).
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Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. The Trial Court erred in granting . . . Appellee’s Motion in Limine
based on the Dead Man’s Act (42 Pa.C.S. § 5930) and thereby
excluding the testimony of [Appellant] and Rebecca . . .
concerning statements by the now deceased [David,] concerning
the existence of a cash asset of [Clair’s estate] and in granting
[Appellee’s] Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. The Trial Court erred by disregarding the affidavits and/or
signed statements of Jason Schnabl and Diana Sue Glosser, which
provided evidentiary support and credibility to the excluded
testimony and created issues of fact in their own right concerning
the cash asset’s existence that preclude summary judgment.
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
In her first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in applying the
Dead Man’s Act to exclude her and Rebecca’s testimony about statements
made by David about the $130,000 cash asset. First, Appellant maintains that
her and Rebecca’s interests are not adverse to David’s interests. In support,
she reasons: (1) “she now holds the same position,” executor of Clair’s estate,
which David held when he made the statement at issue; (2) Appellant, David,
and Rebecca “all have the same interest — sharing one-third of the $130,000
that was bequeathed to them through Clair[’s] will;” and (3) Appellant “is not
seeking to deprive David’s Estate of his [one-third] interest in the $130,000.”
Appellant’s Brief at 16, 20. Next, Appellant contends Appellee “does not
represent David’s interest in the $130,000 because David was acting as
Executor of [Clair’s] Estate . . . to effectuate [Clair’s] wishes to share the
$130,000 equally with” Appellant and Rebecca. Id. at 22. See also id. (“In
reality, it is [Appellee’s] interest that is adverse to David’s because the
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$130,000 in dispute was never David’s in the first place. . . . Thus, David’s
right has not passed to a party who represents his interest was to effectuate
the testamentary wishes of Clair[.]”). Third, Appellant asserts this action
“does not focus upon a contract or thing,” as she and Rebecca “are not parties
to a transaction or contract with David.” Id. at 23. Instead, Appellant states,
she, Rebecca, and David were “co-beneficiaries of an asset from [Clair’s]
Estate.” Id. Finally, Appellant claims that even if the Dead Man’s Act applied
to the facts sub judice, the proposed testimony is admissible under the
devisavit vel non exception, which “applies when the parties are litigating the
testamentary distribution of property, which is precisely the case here.” Id.
at 25. We conclude no relief is due.
“A trial court’s decision to grant a motion in limine ‘is subject to an
evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.’” In re Fiedler, 132 A.3d
1010, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2016).
On appeal, Appellant ignores the trial court’s rationale that Appellant
and Rebecca’s interests were adverse to David’s and/or his estate’s interests,
because the instant suit alleges David’s “Estate is in possession of an asset
required to be divided amongst the three” Clair-estate beneficiaries. See
Memo. Opin., 11/20/19, at 4. We agree with the trial court. It is true that
Appellant, Rebecca, and David could have compatible interests in Clair’s estate
matter, as they each were to receive equal shares under his will. However,
as the court emphasized, this matter is not Clair’s estate probate, but instead
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Appellant’s lawsuit against David’s estate. Appellant overlooks that she has
alleged conversion and fraud against David’s estate. Under Appellant’s own
complaint, the adverse interests could be summarized as follows: whereas
Appellant and Rebecca seek their shares of the $130,000 cash asset, David,
acting as executor, failed to provide the asset for proper distribution through
Clair’s estate. Indeed, Appellant argues on appeal, “David’s Estate is seeking
to hide behind the Dead Man’s Act to unjustly enrich itself in the amount of
$86,666.67.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. Appellant and Rebecca “will either gain
or lose as the direct legal operation and effect of” the judgment in this
conversion and fraud case. See Gibbs, 714 A.2d at 436. Accordingly, we
agree with the trial court that Appellant and Rebecca’s interests are adverse
to those of David. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5930; Gibbs, 714 A.2d at 436; Larkin,
580 A.2d at 1152; Memo. Opin., 11/20/19, at 4.
Next, the trial court found the deceased individual, David, and now his
estate, have an interest in this matter, “as it is alleged that his Estate is in
possession of $130,000.00 that was to be divided into thirds pursuant to”
Clair’s will. Memo. Opin., 11/20/19, at 4. We conclude this is a
straightforward and proper finding. Appellant’s argument to the contrary —
that “David was acting as Executor of [Clair’s] Estate and acting to effectuate
[Clair’s] wishes to share the $130,000 equally with” her and Rebecca — when
read against her complaint, is not entirely clear. See Appellant’s Brief at 22.
Appellant’s present lawsuit is centered on claims that David did not act in
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accordance with his duties as executor and did not properly distribute the
$130,000 through Clair’s estate. Thus, we agree with the trial court that both
“the deceased . . . had an actual right or interest in the matter at issue, i.e.
an interest in the immediate result of the suit,” and the “right of the deceased
[has] passed to a party of record who represents the deceased’s interest.”
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5930; Larkin, 580 A.2d at 1152. For the foregoing reasons,
we agree with the trial court that the Dead Man’s Act applies to the instant
issue.
We next consider Appellant’s insistence that the devisavit vel non
exception could apply here. That exception, as stated above, “applies to
disputes involving the transfer of a decedent’s estate.” See Estate of
Janosky, 827 A.2d at 516 n.3. While allegations surrounding the distribution
of a $130,000 asset under Clair’s estate form the context for Appellant’s
instant claims of conversion and fraud, the estate distribution of the asset
itself is not the subject of the case sub judice. Instead, the allegations in this
case are that David and Appellee have withheld $130,000. The trial court
properly summarized the present action is “to determine whether a cash asset
exists, not who the proper beneficiary is under a will or what the intentions of
a deceased devisee were.” Memo. Opin., 11/20/19, at 5. On appeal,
Appellant fails to address this discussion. We agree with the court that the
devisavit vel non exception does not apply. For the foregoing reasons, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Dead Man’s Act to
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preclude Appellant and Rebecca’s proposed testimony, nor did it err in
granting Appellee’s motion in limine. See In re Fiedler, 132 A.3d at 1023.
In her second issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellee, where there existed additional
evidence of the existence of the $130,000 cash asset. Appellant cites the
affidavit of her friend, Diana Sue Glosser, as “provid[ing] independent
corroboration that the meeting [between Appellant, David, and Rebecca]
occurred.” Appellant’s Brief at 30. Appellant also relies on Jason Schabl’s
affidavit, which she proposes “confirmed both the existence of the safe where
David stored money and the fact that David was taking action to shield
[Clair’s] assets from inheritance tax.” Id. Finally, Appellant argues that
Appellee “herself admitted to the existence of the safe, although she denied
knowledge of the $130,000.” Id. at 31. Appellant asserts Appellee’s “denial
should have been subject to cross-examination and a credibility determination
at trial.” Id. No relief is due.
We note the relevant standard of review:
Our scope of review of an order “granting or denying
summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear:
the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established
that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.”
“We examine the record, which consists of all pleadings, as well
as any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
affidavits, and expert reports, in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and we resolve all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact against the moving party.”
Since the issue of whether there are genuine issues of
material fact is a question of law, our standard of review on that
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issue is de novo, and we need not defer to the determination of
the trial court in this regard. Furthermore, in resolving a question
of law, we review the issue in the context of the entire record.
In re Estate of Caruso, 176 A.3d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
omitted). “Summary judgment can be entered ‘only in those cases where the
record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.(citations omitted).
Here, the court reasoned both the existence of a $130,000 “cash asset”
and the fact “that it belonged to” Clair’s estate were “essential” to Appellant’s
claims of conversion and fraud. Opin. & Order, 12/29/20, at 4. However, the
court found Appellant’s affidavits did not establish either. It found:
Jason Schnabl makes no mention of the $130,000 “cash
asset,” but rather states that he “heard David . . . discuss on
multiple occasions that he was storing cash in a large safe . . .
[and] only viewed the outside of the safe . . . . .”
Additionally, Diana Sue Glosser states that she was not privy
to the alleged conversation about the “cash asset” and “went
upstairs and started vacuuming the bedroom” during the meeting
held on Clair[’s] estate.
Consequently, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury
because [Appellant] has failed to establish a prime facie case for
conversion or fraud due to the lack of evidence that a $130,000
“cash asset” ever existed.
Id. at 4-5 (record citations omitted and paragraph break added).
Again, on appeal Appellant fails to address the trial court’s reasoning.
Our review of the two affidavits supports the court’s synopses of them. We
add that whereas Appellant avers the meeting between her, David, and
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Rebecca occurred on January 1, 2011, Diana’s affidavit stated she
accompanied Appellant to a meeting on “October 7, 2011.” Affidavit of Diana
Sue Glosser, 9/17/20. In any event, the trial court correctly summarized that
Diana stated she left the room before Appellant, David, and Rebecca discussed
any matter relating to Clair’s estate, and thus Diana could not testify about
the existence of a $130,000 cash asset. See Opin. & Order, 12/29/20, at 4-
5.
Similarly, Jason’s affidavit merely stated: (1) he heard David “on
multiple occasions [say] that he was dispersing cash from [Clair’s] estate . . .
to avoid losing money to the government in case his father required assisted
living . . . and/or paying inheritance tax;” (2) Jason also heard David “discuss
on multiple occasions that he was storing cash in a large safe . . . at his funeral
home . . . in Knox, Pa[.];” (3) Jason “viewed the outside of the safe” but not
the inside of the safe. Affidavit of Jason Schnabl, 9/8/20. Jason’s affidavit
thus likewise did not establish the existence of a particular $130,000 asset.
Finally, Appellant’s claim, that this matter should proceed to trial so that
she may cross-examine Appellee, is meritless. Appellant acknowledges that
Appellee “denied knowledge of the $130,000.00.” Appellant’s Brief at 31. Any
anticipated cross-examination at trial is not, as Appellant contends,
“independent and circumstantial evidence that the $130,000.00 exists and
was stored in the safe.” See id.
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Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of Appellee, as “the record clearly demonstrates that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that [Appellee] is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” See Estate of Caruso, 176 A.3d at 349.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/20/2021
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