Com. v. West, D. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A20045-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DAVID THOMAS WEST                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 292 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 27, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-63-CR-0000219-2017
    BEFORE:       PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2021
    David Thomas West (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order entered
    in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his “Motion
    for Time Credit and Corrected Commitment.” The court treated this motion
    as a Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition and found that because
    Appellant was requesting the same sentencing credit that had previously been
    applied to another trial docket, no relief was due. We affirm.
    On March 28, 2017, at the instant trial docket, CP-63-CR-0000219-2017
    (219-2017), Appellant pleaded guilty to one count each of access device fraud
    ____________________________________________
    1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-A20045-21
    and identity theft.2 On the same day, the parties stipulated, and the probation
    officer testified, that Appellant violated the terms of his probation at three
    additional trial dockets: CR-0465-2016; CR-0478-2016; and CR-0482-2016.3
    Order, 3/30/17, at 1.4
    On July 6, 2017, at the instant 219-2017 docket, the trial court imposed
    two concurrent state intermediate punishment sentences of 24 months.
    Order, 7/13/17, at 2 (unpaginated). In the same sentencing order, the court
    also imposed violation-of-probation (VOP) sentences on his three other
    dockets, noting that parole or probation in each had previously been revoked.
    Id. at 2-3.
    One year and eight months later, on March 29, 2019, the trial court
    revoked Appellant’s state intermediate punishment at Docket 219-2017. It
    imposed the following new VOP sentences: (1) for identity theft, six to 23
    ____________________________________________
    2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4106(a)(1), 4120(a).    These charges arose from Appellant’s
    use of another’s credit card to make charges totaling $701.16 at Walmart and
    Kwik Fill.
    3 The full Court of Common Pleas dockets of these dockets are not apparent
    in the record.
    4 The orders cited throughout this memorandum often state one date in the
    text (reflecting the date of the corresponding proceeding), but are stamped
    as “filed” and/or entered on the trial docket with slightly later dates. For ease
    of future review, our citations of the trial court’s orders will utilize the trial
    docket date. Additionally, we note the certified record does not include any
    notes of testimony.
    -2-
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    months’ imprisonment; and (2) for access device fraud, a consecutive term of
    36 months’ probation. Order, 4/3/19, at 1-2 (unpaginated). The court also
    imposed new VOP sentences at Dockets 482-2016 and 465-2016.5
    On May 8, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion for Time Credit and
    Corrected Commitment,” which listed the instant trial docket as well as the
    above referenced dockets. He requested, inter alia, 712 days of sentencing
    credit to be applied “toward probationary sentences.” See Appellant’s Motion
    for Time Credit 7 Corrected Commitment, 5/8/19, at 1 (unpaginated).
    On July 16, 2019, the trial court issued an ordering, explaining that on
    March 29th, it had
    issued a sentence that [was] a blend of total confinement, partial
    confinement and supervised release. The sentencing order shows
    a clear intent that the sentence rendered at [Docket 219-2017]
    was to be effective as of the date of re-sentencing[, and that
    Appellant] serve an additional three (3) months of total
    confinement before he was eligible for work release.
    Memo. & Order, 7/16/19, at 1 (unpaginated). The court granted Appellant’s
    “request for time to be credited against his probationary sentences” and
    accordingly directed that 712 days be credited toward his sentence at Docket
    482-2016. Id. at 2. The court specified, “[This] credit for time served shall
    ____________________________________________
    5 The trial court did not impose any new penalty at Docket 478-2016, but
    ordered the supervision in this matter to run concurrently with the new
    supervision imposed. Order, 4/3/19, at 2.
    -3-
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    not be applied to any other docket number at which [Appellant] is the
    Defendant.” Id.
    Subsequently, on April 30, 2020, the trial court again revoked
    Appellant’s probation at Docket 219-2017.6 The court directed that: (1) for
    identity theft, Appellant “shall be remanded to the Washington County
    Correctional Facility to serve the balance of his maximum sentence, with credit
    for time served of 122 days;” and (2) for access device fraud, his term of
    three years’ probation shall be reinstated. Order, 5/4/20, a 2 (unpaginated).
    On July 15, 2020, Appellant filed another pro se “Motion for Time Credit
    and Corrected Commitment,” requesting sentencing credit for 712 days to be
    applied to his sentence at the instant matter, Docket 219-2017. Appellant
    wished “to close out Count 2 . . . and go toward probationary period in Count
    1.” Appellant’s Motion for Time Credit and Corrected Commitment, 7/15/20,
    at 1-2 (unpaginated).         He acknowledged the trial court “had previously
    granted time.”      Id. at 2.     Appellant filed a second petition on July 30th,
    essentially presenting the same arguments.          We note that the periods of
    incarceration requested were identical to the time previously applied by the
    trial court to Docket 482-2016.
    ____________________________________________
    6 The basis for the revocation was Appellant’s guilty plea, entered that same
    day, to a new charge of driving while operating privilege is suspended or
    revoked/DUI related/third offense, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1)(iii). Order,
    5/4/20, at 1.
    -4-
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    The trial court construed Appellant’s two petitions together as requests
    for relief under the PCRA, and appointed Corrie Woods, Esquire, to represent
    Appellant.       Order,    9/8/20.       Attorney   Woods   subsequently   filed   a
    Turner/Finley7 motion to withdraw from representation, and accompanying
    “no merit” letter. On December 29th, the trial court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
    notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. In a detailed
    opinion, the court explained, inter alia, that application of the requested
    sentencing credit would “close” Appellant’s instant case, at Docket 219-2017.
    Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(a), 12/29/20, at 6.
    The court reasoned, however, that the same credit was previously applied,
    upon Appellant’s motion, to the sentence at Docket 482-2016, and his present
    request would result in improper “duplicate credit.” Id. at 9. The court also
    granted counsel’s permission to withdraw. Id. at 10. Appellant did not file a
    response.
    On January 27, 2021, the trial court entered the underlying order
    denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of
    appeal, and subsequently complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
    ____________________________________________
    7 Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -5-
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    Appellant’s pro se brief fails to set forth a statement of questions
    involved, see Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (a), and his entire brief is comprised of five
    sentences.8 His sole argument is that he has “lost all time served that was
    previously awarded by [the trial court]. This time in question was originally
    served incarcerated or in in-patient rehab in accordance to sanctions imposed
    on [Docket] 219-2017.” Appellant’s Brief at 1-2. We conclude no relief is
    due.
    In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, “we determine whether the ruling
    of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of legal error.”
    Commonwealth v. Webb, 
    236 A.3d 1170
    , 1176 (Pa. Super. 2020). This
    Court has stated:
    Subsequent to revocation of probation, the sentencing court has
    available to it all the options permissible at the time of initial
    sentencing, giving due consideration “to the time spent serving
    the order of probation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). As long as the
    new sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum
    when factoring in the incarcerated time already served, the
    sentence is not illegal. . . .
    . . . This Court also held in Commonwealth v. Bowser, . . .
    783 A.2d 348
     (Pa. Super. 2001), that a defendant is not entitled to
    credit for time served following revocation of probation if the new
    sentence of incarceration does not reach the statutory maximum.
    ____________________________________________
    8 Appellant also attaches, amid his exhibits to his brief, a document he titles
    “Non PCRA Brief,” which summarizes his multiple periods of incarceration and
    includes the following one-sentence argument, “Appellant was not awarded
    his time spent incarcerated for the (SIP) State Intermediate Punishment
    Program or while waiting to be resentenced.” Appellant’s Non PCRA Brief at
    1-4.
    -6-
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    Commonwealth v. Crump, 
    995 A.2d 1280
    , 1285 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some
    citations omitted).
    Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court9 has
    “consistently held that . . . double credit for time served is neither
    contemplated, nor authorized, by Section 9760 [of the Sentencing
    Code.]” “The operative rule . . . is that a defendant should receive
    credit only once for time served before sentencing.”
    Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    214 A.3d 308
    , 314-15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)
    (citations and footnote omitted), citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 (“Credit for time
    served.”).
    Appellant’s brief fails to address the trial court’s discussion that the
    sentencing credit has already been applied — upon his own request — to
    Docket 482-2016. See Foxe, 214 A.3d at 314-15. Thus, Appellant’s claim,
    that he has been denied this sentencing credit, is mistaken and meritless.
    That Appellant’s multiple VOPs have now altered his overall sentencing
    scheme, causing him to desire a more favorable outcome, is not a basis for
    awarding the requested credit. As we agree with the trial court’s reasoning,
    we do not disturb the order denying relief. See Webb, 236 A.3d at 1176.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    9 While “[t]his Court is not bound by the decisions of the Commonwealth
    Court[,] such decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to our
    colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.”
    Commonwealth v. Hunt, 
    220 A.3d 582
    , 590 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations
    omitted).
    -7-
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    -8-
    J-A20045-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/20/2021
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 292 WDA 2021

Judges: McCaffery

Filed Date: 10/20/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024