Com. v. Johnson, R. ( 2021 )

J-S29030-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RASHEED JOHNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 488 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 10, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007811-2017.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2021
Rasheed Johnson appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
following his conviction of rape, aggravated indecent assault, robbery,
kidnapping, witness intimidation, possessing a criminal instrument, and three
counts of violation of the Uniform Firearm Act (“VUFA”).1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural background
as follows:
This case stems from [Johnson’s] heinous actions on
December 31, 2016, when he forcibly entered a woman’s car in
Germantown, demanded she drive to a secluded alleyway, and
then proceeded to sexually assault and rob her at gun-point. That
day, at approximately 4:00 p[.]m[.], the victim (C.B.) began her
shift working as a delivery person for Amazon. Between the hours
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3125(a)(1), 3701(a)(1), 2901(a)(2),
4952(a)(1), 907, 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108.
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of 4:00 p[.]m[.] and 6:00 p[.]m[.], she was scheduled to be
delivering packages in the Northwest section of Philadelphia. At
approximately 4:24 p[.]m[.], C.B. got out of her vehicle at 49 East
Cliveden Street in Philadelphia to deliver a package. When she
unlocked the doors to get back into her vehicle, [Johnson] opened
her passenger-side door and entered her vehicle. At first, the
complainant believed that [Johnson] was mistaken and told him
to get out of her car. When [Johnson] did not get out of the car,
C.B. said, “get the fuck out of my car.” [Johnson] then took out
a gun, pointed it at C.B., and said, “don’t move, don’t do anything
stupid!” [Johnson] then shoved the gun to the side of C.B.’s body
and said, “I’m not playing, just drive!”
As [C.B.] drove, [Johnson] directed [her] which way to turn
at every intersection, and she did as he said, fearing for her life.
C.B. did not know where she was and just continued to follow
[Johnson’s] direction. [Johnson] then told her that he needed her
debit card, to which she responded that she did not have a card
and only had $20 cash in her wallet. [Johnson] finally directed
C.B. to a dead-end alleyway located at 5900 Chew Avenue in
Philadelphia. He then demanded her to turn off her car and open
the packages in the back seat. C.B. opened a package, but the
only thing inside the package was iron hangers. [Johnson]
became frustrated and commanded her to get in the back seat.
When she did not initially comply, he grabbed her hair and pulled
her to the back seat of her car. [Johnson] then forced the gun to
C.B.’s backside and told her to take off her pants. A struggle
ensued and [Johnson] digitally penetrated her vagina, then he put
on a condom and vaginally raped her with his penis.
After [Johnson] had finished raping C.B., he told her to put
on her pants and drive. She complied. [Johnson] told her to drive
to the intersection of Germantown and Duval Streets. While
[C.B.] was driving there, [Johnson] stole the cash from [her]
wallet, took her identification card out, and took a picture of her
ID with his cellphone. [Johnson] stated, “if you call the cops I will
be at your house, and if you have kids they’re going to get hurt.”
When they arrived at the intersection of Duval and Baynton
Streets, C.B. pulled over to allow [Johnson] out of the car.
[Johnson] reached over to remove C.B.’s keys from the ignition,
he placed the keys on the railing next to the car, and told her that
once she didn’t see him anymore, she was free to take the keys
and leave. [Johnson] shut the passenger door and left. Once C.B.
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didn’t see [Johnson] anymore, she took the keys, drove to the
train station at Washington Lane, and called the police. Once the
police arrived, they drove her around to search for [Johnson] and
record the scene of the crime. After a short time, officers
transported C.B. to the Special Victims Unit where the case was
assigned to Detective Robert Conn of the Line Squad.
Detective Conn ensured that officers held C.B.’s car and that
it was towed to the police garage at 4298 Macalester Street in
Philadelphia. Detective Conn then placed the items recovered
from the sexual assault examination on property receipts and
submitted them to the lab for DNA testing. On January 2, 2017,
Detective Conn contacted the Crime Scene Unit to take latent
prints from the vehicle. Thereafter, he drafted and executed a
search warrant for the inside of the vehicle. Two weeks later, on
January 17, 2017, Patrick Raytik of the Latent Print Unit
Laboratory concluded that the impressions taken from outside the
vehicle were suitable for individualization and that [Johnson’s]
fingerprints were on the outside of the vehicle. On January 26,
2017, Detective Conn assembled a photo array which was
administered by Detective Owens of the Special Victims
Investigations Unit. C.B. identified [Johnson] as the person who
raped her on December 31, 2016.
[Johnson] was arrested on January 31, 2017 by the United
States Marshalls Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force for an
outstanding warrant and for absconding from state parole.
[Johnson’s] cellphone was recovered at that time and historical
cell site analysis was conducted for [Johnson’s] cell site data. FBI
Task Force Officers and Philadelphia Detectives Anthony Vega and
James Dunlap performed the cell site analysis. The analysis
revealed that [Johnson] was in fact in the area of the abduction
and rape at the exact time of the crime. Thereafter, Pennsylvania
State Police performed a forensic analysis on [Johnson’s]
cellphone. On it, they found a photograph of C.B.’s identification
taken on the date of the crime[, as well as three photographs of
Johnson holding a gun.] [Johnson’s] Google history revealed that
he had searched the phrases “rapes caught on camera in
Philadelphia” and “arrest warrant Rasheed Johnson”
approximately two hours after he committed the rape and
robbery.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/20, at 1-4 (citations to the record omitted).
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The matter was initially assigned to one judge but then reassigned to
two others as the case progressed. The matter proceeded to trial in December
2018; however, a mistrial was declared, and a retrial was ordered. The case
was reassigned to a fourth judge and the matter proceeded to a second trial
in October 2019. On October 24, 2019, a jury convicted Johnson of the above-
referenced charges. On January 10, 2020, the trial court sentenced Johnson
to an aggregate sentence of forty-six to ninety-two years in prison. The trial
court also imposed sex offender conditions, including lifetime registration with
state police and complying with all Tier III Megan’s Law requirements.
Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Johnson raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court err
when it overruled a prior trial court’s ruling precluding the introduction of a
photograph of [Johnson] possessing a firearm?” Johnson’s Brief at 3.
Johnson contends that the trial court violated the “law of the case” or
“coordinate jurisdiction” doctrine by disregarding a ruling made by a different
judge earlier in the case. Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands
that upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction,
a transferee trial judge may not alter resolution of a legal question previously
decided by a transferor trial judge. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d
1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995). More simply stated, judges of the same court should
not overrule each other’s decisions. Id. As a claim alleging a violation of the
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coordinate jurisdiction rule presents a question of law, our standard of review
is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Jones v. Rivera, 866
A.2d 1148, 1150 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Johnson argues that prior to his first trial, the Commonwealth litigated
a Pa.R.E. 404(b) motion to introduce a photograph of Johnson found on a
phone in his possession that showed him holding a firearm. Johnson argued
against the admission of the photograph on the basis that no weapon was
recovered and the photograph was taken three days after the incident.
Johnson claims that the first trial court ruled, “I’m not going to allow photos .
. . unless something comes up during trial where the issue can be raised again.
But for purposes of the case in chief, I’m not going to allow it.” Johnson’s
Brief, at 12 (quoting N.T., 12/3/18, at 49).
Johnson contends that the second trial court overturned the previous
trial court’s ruling on the basis that the first trial court judge’s “perception was
skewed by misstatements made by defense counsel; [and] the evidence
provided to this court in full, live fashion had not occurred when Judge Bright
made her preliminary respective view of the situation.” Id. at 12-13 (quoting
N.T., 10/21/19, at 66). Johnson argues that neither statement was true nor
supported by the record, and that the second trial court’s ruling undermined
the policies supporting the law of the case and coordinate jurisdiction doctrine.
Here, Johnson’s reliance on the law of the case and coordinate
jurisdiction doctrine is misplaced. As explained above, the core of the doctrine
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is that a court acting at a later stage of a case should not reopen questions
decided at an earlier stage by another judge of the same court or by a higher
court. See Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331. However, the grant of a new trial wipes
the slate clean so that a previous court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
generally does not bind a new court upon retrial. See Commonwealth v.
Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 311 (Pa. 2002). Thus, because the evidentiary ruling
in question was made in connection with Johnson’s first trial and prior to the
grant of a retrial, the ruling was not binding upon the court during Johnson’s
second trial. See id. Accordingly, as the doctrine does not apply in the
present procedural context, Johnson’s sole issue on appeal merits no relief.2
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/26/2021
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2 Additionally, the trial court correctly noted that the previous judge left the
matter open for further review when she ruled the photograph inadmissible
“unless something comes up during trial,” which it did. See N.T., 12/3/18, at
49. Finally, Johnson makes no alternative argument that, in the event the
doctrine is inapplicable, the photograph was nevertheless inadmissible. Thus,
we need not undertake an admissibility analysis in the present matter.
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