Com. v. Adams, T. ( 2024 )


Menu:
  • J-S36040-24
    
    2024 PA Super 281
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    TYLER THOMAS ADAMS                      :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 297 MDA 2024
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 1, 2024
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal
    Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000156-2021
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    TYLER THOMAS ADAMS                      :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 427 MDA 2024
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 1, 2024
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal
    Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000154-2021
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
    OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:               FILED: NOVEMBER 21, 2024
    Appellant, Tyler Thomas Adams, appeals from the aggregate judgment
    of sentence of 2 to 6 years’ incarceration, imposed after he pled guilty to
    aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4), carrying a firearm without a
    license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), and criminal conspiracy to commit robbery,
    18 Pa.C.S. § 903. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
    J-S36040-24
    denying his two motions to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.          After careful
    review, we affirm.
    The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions are not germane to our
    disposition of his appeal. We need only note that a criminal complaint was
    filed on October 30, 2020, in case CP-49-CR-0000154-2021 (hereinafter “case
    154”), charging Appellant with various offenses including robbery and
    conspiracy to commit robbery.1 In case CP-49-CR-0000156-2021 (hereinafter
    “case 156”), a criminal complaint was filed on January 14, 2021, charging
    Appellant with offenses including aggravated assault, possession of a firearm
    by a person prohibited, and carrying a firearm without a license.
    Appellant’s cases were consolidated. On April 11, 2022, Appellant filed
    a Rule 600 motion to dismiss both cases, which the court denied on July 12,
    2022. Appellant filed a second motion to dismiss his cases on May 3, 2023,
    which the court again denied on August 3, 2023. Ultimately, on December 4,
    2023, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without
    a license, and criminal conspiracy to commit robbery. On February 1, 2024,
    he was sentenced to the aggregate term set forth supra.
    ____________________________________________
    1  Appellant states that the complaint in case 154 was filed on October 28,
    2020. See Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unnumbered). However, the date on the
    first page of the criminal complaint contained in the certified record bears a
    filing date of October 30, 2020.
    -2-
    J-S36040-24
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 22, 2024.2
    Although it does not appear that the court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Appellant filed
    a statement on March 18, 2024. On May 13, 2024, the trial court issued a
    “Statement in Lieu of Opinion” concluding that Appellant’s Rule 600 issues are
    waived but, alternatively, it is relying on the rationale set forth in its July 12,
    2022 order denying his motion to dismiss.
    Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:
    Question 1: Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion when it denied
    Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 600 without [a]
    hearing or any evidence being presented?
    Question 2: Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion when it denied
    Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 600 where the
    Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence in bringing
    Appellant to trial within the time limit required by Rule 600?
    Appellant’s Brief at 8 (unnumbered).3
    ____________________________________________
    2 Initially, Appellant filed a single notice of appeal listing the docket numbers
    for both his cases in violation of Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    (Pa. 2018) (requiring appellants to file separate notices of appeal when single
    order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket). In light
    of Commonwealth v. Young, 
    280 A.3d 1049
    , 1057 (Pa. Super. 2022)
    (holding when there is Walker defect in appeal to which Pa.R.A.P. 902 applies,
    default position is to allow correction of defect unless good cause is shown by
    opposing party), we directed Appellant to file amended notices of appeal. He
    timely complied, and we consolidated his appeals sua sponte on April 23,
    2024.
    3 Appellant does not delineate these two issues as separate claims in the
    Argument section of his brief, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The
    argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
    argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in distinctive type or in type
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -3-
    J-S36040-24
    Before we address Appellant’s Rule 600 claims, we discuss the trial
    court’s determination that he waived these issues because he “entered a plea
    and was sentenced[,]” and he “did not reserve the right to appeal the Rule
    600 issue as part of the plea agreement or at the time of his plea or sentence.”
    Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 5/13/24, at 2 (unnumbered). As stated above,
    Appellant filed his motions to dismiss under Rule 600 in April of 2022 and May
    of 2023, both of which were denied. He then pled guilty on December 4, 2023.
    Generally, “upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all
    claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction
    of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed
    the ‘legality’ of the sentence imposed[.]” [Commonwealth v.
    Eisenberg, 
    98 A.3d 1268
    ,] 1275 [(Pa. 2014)] (citation omitted).
    A guilty plea, however, does not always extinguish all claims
    outside of these three categories.         In Commonwealth v.
    Singleton, 
    169 A.3d 79
     (Pa. Super. 2017), this Court recognized
    that defendants may enter a guilty plea conditioned on the
    preservation for appeal of issues outside of these categories.
    [Id.] at 81-82 (stating that[,] “[w]hile our courts have not
    specifically addressed the validity of conditional plea agreements,
    our courts have proceeded to review the merits of issues
    specifically reserved in plea agreements”[)](citations omitted)[].
    Therefore, an issue may be properly preserved for appeal, despite
    entry of a guilty plea, if a defendant raised that issue prior to
    entering a guilty plea and specifically reserved the right to
    seek appellate review of that issue as part of the plea
    agreement. See id.; accord Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1274-75
    (concluding that the defendant “adequately preserved his []claim
    for [Pa.R.A.P.] 302 purposes at the plea hearing”). In reviewing
    the terms of a plea agreement, we approach the plea agreement
    as a contract, “to be analyzed under contract-law standards.”
    Commonwealth v. Snook, 
    230 A.3d 438
    , 444 (Pa. Super.
    ____________________________________________
    distinctively displayed--the particular point treated therein, followed by such
    discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).
    Nevertheless, our review is not meaningfully impacted by this briefing error.
    -4-
    J-S36040-24
    2020). In a dispute over the terms of a plea agreement, “[a]ny
    ambiguities … will be construed against the Government.” 
    Id.
    Commonwealth v. Speed, --- A.3d ----, 
    2024 PA Super 206
    , *2 (filed Sept.
    11, 2024) (emphasis added).
    In Eisenberg, our Supreme Court held that, although Eisenberg pled
    guilty, he had preserved a claim that a mandatory fine for one of his offenses
    was unconstitutionally excessive. The Court pointed to the fact that, at the
    plea hearing, Eisenberg’s “[c]ounsel specifically referenced the Cruel
    Punishments Clause of Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,”
    “articulated an objection sounding in terms of disproportionality and
    excessiveness,” and “labeled the fine ‘draconian[.]’” Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at
    1275. Additionally, the Court noted that “the trial court plainly understood
    the gravamen of the claim,” and “conveyed at the outset of its remarks, …
    that the constitutional issue would ultimately not be resolved in that trial
    courtroom.” Id.
    Similarly, in Speed, this Court concluded that Speed’s Rule 600 claim
    was not waived even though he pled guilty. We relied on the fact that, at
    Speed’s guilty plea proceeding, he “and the Commonwealth disagreed on
    whether the terms of the plea agreement prevented [Speed] from raising a
    Rule 600 claim on appeal[,]” and the trial court specifically concluded that the
    “plea agreement [did] not preclude” Speed from doing so. Speed, supra at
    *2 (emphasis added).     The Speed panel also noted that, “[a]fter the trial
    court made clear that it considered [Speed’s] Rule 600 appeal rights to be
    preserved in his offer to plead guilty, the Commonwealth did not withdraw
    -5-
    J-S36040-24
    from its plea agreement with [Speed].” Id. Therefore, we found that Speed
    could raise his Rule 600 issue on appeal. Id.
    We cannot reach the same conclusion in the instant case. At Appellant’s
    plea proceeding, the Commonwealth stated the offenses to which Appellant
    was pleading guilty, and then declared:
    [The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, the terms of the plea
    agreement are that … the [sentences for Appellant’s] charges are
    to be run concurrent to his current incarceration sentence in Union
    County, and that the sentence is to be within the standard range.
    All other remaining charges and counts shall be dismissed and
    those are the terms of the plea agreement, [Y]our Honor.
    N.T. Plea, 12/4/23, at 2-3. Defense counsel stated, “That’s correct, [Y]our
    Honor.” Id. at 3. At no point did defense counsel, or Appellant during his
    oral colloquy, mention Rule 600 or indicate that Appellant wished to preserve
    for appeal a challenge to the court’s denial of his Rule 600 motions to dismiss.
    Id. at 3-7.
    Similarly, at Appellant’s sentencing proceeding, there was also no
    mention of any Rule 600 issue.       There, the court restated the terms of
    Appellant’s plea consistently with the Commonwealth’s recitation, quoted
    supra. See N.T. Sentencing, 2/1/24, at 7. Afterward, Appellant’s counsel
    said he had “[n]othing further[,]” id., and when the court asked Appellant if
    there was “anything [he] would like to tell the [c]ourt before [it] impose[d
    his] sentences[,]” Appellant replied, “No, sir.” Id. at 8.
    Unlike in Eisenberg and Speed, there was no mention of any Rule 600
    issue at Appellant’s plea proceeding or sentencing hearing that would indicate
    -6-
    J-S36040-24
    this issue was preserved, nor anything to even suggest ambiguity in this
    regard.   Therefore, we agree with the trial court that by pleading guilty,
    Appellant waived his challenge to the court’s denial of his motions to dismiss
    under Rule 600.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/21/2024
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 297 MDA 2024

Judges: Bender

Filed Date: 11/21/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024