Com. v. Lambert, J. ( 2024 )

J-A18013-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAVON MICHAEL LAMBERT :
:
Appellant : No. 228 WDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 14, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-03-CR-0000298-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 25, 2024
Appellant, Javon Michael Lambert, appeals from the order entered on
February 14, 2024, in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of
Armstrong County, that denied his petition for collateral relief under the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court furnished the following summary of the pertinent factual
and procedural history.
[On April 26, 2021, t]he [Commonwealth] charged [Appellant]
with numerous felony counts in connection with an armed home
invasion in which [Appellant] entered a residence at [4:00] a.m.,
pistol-whipped the homeowner, held the gun to the
homeowner’s head and pulled the trigger so that the hammer
clicked, and finally stole guns before fleeing the house[.]
***
[Thereafter, Appellant] hired Blaine Jones Law, a firm which at
that time consisted of [Rodney Blaine Jones, II, Esquire,] and
two other attorneys. … The three attorneys worked as a team,
each representing [Appellant] at various proceedings.
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[On May 6, 2022,] Blaine Jones Law filed an omnibus pretrial
motion nunc pro tunc, and a few days later filed an amended
omnibus pretrial motion. Both motions raised the same issue:
whether a search of [Appellant’s] house conducted pursuant to
a search warrant was actually conducted prior to the signing of
the warrant by a judge.
Prior to any hearing on the motion, Blaine Jones Law []
negotiated a plea agreement with the district attorneys of both
Armstrong County and Westmoreland County.[1] The plea
agreements provided that [Appellant] would plead guilty in
Armstrong County to a single count of [r]obbery for a
recommended sentence of 11[4]-228 months in the Department
of Corrections, and plead guilty in Westmoreland County to
certain felonies for a recommended sentence of 10-20 years[’
incarceration] with a five[-]year probation[ary] tail, concurrent
to the Armstrong County sentence.
***
[Based upon the foregoing, Attorney Jones] . . . advised
[Appellant] to accept the plea offers[.]
***
[Ultimately, on January 3, 2023, Appellant pled guilty to robbery
- serious bodily injury.2] The court in Armstrong County followed
the District Attorney’s recommendation [and sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of] 114-228 months’
incarceration.]
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/14/24, at 1-3 (footnotes added).
On June 15, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, alleging that
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. More specifically, Appellant
claimed that trial counsel failed to file a timely suppression motion and that
____________________________________________
1 In July 2021, Appellant was charged via criminal information in
Westmoreland County with, inter alia, aggravated assault, at trial court docket
number CP-65-CR-0001834-2021. See Appellant’s Brief at 16, n.4; see also
N.T. Evidentiary Hearing, 2/7/24, at 11.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i).
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his guilty plea was invalid because trial counsel erroneously advised him that
he was a repeat felony offender. On August 30, 2023, the PCRA court
appointed counsel. Rather than filing an amended PCRA petition on
Appellant’s behalf, PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley3 no-merit letter, as
well as a petition to withdraw as counsel. The PCRA court, however, denied
counsel’s request and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s
petition.
On February 7, 2024, the PCRA court convened an evidentiary hearing,
during which Attorney Jones and Appellant testified. In particular, Attorney
Jones discussed the circumstances of his representation of Appellant, including
the fact that his law firm worked with the district attorneys of both Armstrong
County and Westmoreland County to secure plea agreements that would
ultimately result in Appellant’s sentences in both counties running concurrent
to each other. Appellant, however, testified that he did not actually enter a
guilty plea in Westmoreland County. On February 14, 2024, the PCRA court
issued an order denying Appellant’s petition. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issue for our consideration.
Whether the [PCRA] court erred in finding trial counsel was not
ineffective for inducing [Appellant] into entering a plea where the
record reflects trial counsel did not recall discussions concerning
a suppression motion, its withdrawal, and whether [Appellant]
understood the impact of entering a plea?
____________________________________________
3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); see also
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization and footnote omitted).
Herein, Appellant argues that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him
to enter an invalid guilty plea. Our standard of review for a challenge to the
dismissal of a petition filed pursuant to the PCRA is well-settled.
[W]e must determine whether the findings of the PCRA court
are supported by the record and whether the court's legal
conclusions are free from error. The findings of the PCRA court
and the evidence of record are viewed in a light most favorable
to the prevailing party. The PCRA court's credibility
determinations, when supported by the record, are binding;
however, this [C]ourt applies a de novo standard of review to
the PCRA court's legal conclusions. We must keep in mind that
the petitioner has the burden of persuading this Court that the
PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief. Finally,
this Court may affirm a valid judgment or order for any reason
appearing of record.
Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations
omitted).
Importantly,
[I]n order to obtain relief based on an [ineffective assistance of
counsel] claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying
claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for
counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result of counsel's error such that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different absent such error. Trial counsel is
presumed to be effective, and [an a]ppellant bears the burden
of pleading and proving each of the three factors by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel
extends to counsel's role in guiding his client with regard to the
consequences of entering into a guilty plea. Allegations of
ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will
serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the
defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where
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the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases. Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial. The reasonable probability test
is not a stringent one; it merely refers to a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.
[Central] to the question of whether a defendant's plea was
entered voluntarily and knowingly is the fact that the defendant
know[s] and understand[s] the nature of the offenses charged
in as plain a fashion as possible. A guilty plea is not a ceremony
of innocence, it is an occasion where one offers a confession of
guilt. Thus, a trial judge and, by extension, plea counsel is not
required to go to unnecessary lengths to discuss every nuance
of the law regarding a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury
trial in order to render a guilty plea voluntary and knowing.
Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192-193 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(cleaned up; quotation marks and citations omitted).
Moreover,
[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea
was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of
proving otherwise.
***
The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant
may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while
under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A
person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he
makes in open court while under oath and may not later assert
grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the
statements he made at his plea colloquy.
***
A defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer
questions truthfully. We cannot permit a defendant to postpone
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the final disposition of his case by lying to the court and later
alleging that his lies were induced by the prompting of counsel.
Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). “The law does not require that the defendant be pleased
with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required
is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made.” Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 770 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(internal citations and brackets omitted).
On appeal, Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea. Appellant
states:
Trial counsel was ineffective in inducing [Appellant] into entering
a plea where the record reflects that trial counsel did not recall
discussions concerning a suppression motion, its withdrawal, and
whether [Appellant] understood the impact of entering a plea [i.e.,
it would prevent him from pursuing issues of suppression].
Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant’s claim fails.
At the outset, we note that Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition stated,
verbatim:
[First Amendment] right to effective assistance of counsel;
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel failed to timely raise meritorious suppression issues in
timely omnibus pre-trial motion.
Affidavits have conflicting sworn testimony; unlawful search
executed prior to warrants being issued/applied for.
[Appellant] entered a plea under improper advisement that he
was a repeat violent offender when he ha[d] no more than [one]
violent crime.
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Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 6/15/23, at 4 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted). Hence, the allegations contained within the pro se PCRA petition
were limited to Appellant’s contentions that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a suppression motion and that Appellant entered a guilty plea
involuntarily because trial counsel wrongly informed him that he was a repeat
offender. See Motion to Withdraw, 9/5/23, at 2; see also Appellant’s Pro Se
PCRA Petition, 6/15/23, at 4. Because Appellant’s pro se petition did not
expressly link suppression issues to trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in
the inducement of Appellant’s guilty plea, the issues raised on appeal are
waived.4 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (explaining that, under the PCRA, a
petitioner must set forth “[e]ach ground relied upon in support of the relief
requested” and the “[f]ailure to state such a ground in the petition shall
preclude the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for [PCRA]
relief”); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa.
2004) (internal citations omitted) (explaining that “a claim not raised in a
PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).
Even if we were to read Appellant’s pro se petition as including an
allegation that Appellant entered an unlawful plea because trial counsel failed
____________________________________________
4 As we stated above, PCRA counsel proceeded on the allegations contained
within Appellant’s pro se filing and neither amended nor supplemented his
submission before the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 2020
WL 3078060 *1, *3 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) (holding
that the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was waived
because it was not included in his initial PCRA petition or an amended PCRA
petition).
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to file, or improperly withdrew, a suppression motion and further failed to
explain the ramifications of entering a guilty plea on his ability to litigate a
pre-trial suppression motion, we still would conclude that Appellant is not
entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. First, it is important to note that,
during the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Jones testified about his efforts to
inform Appellant of the ramifications of entering a guilty plea, specifically
regarding potential issues of suppression. The exchange is relevant.
[PCRA counsel]: As far as the actual plea[,] you were involved
when the plea was taken, correct?
[Attorney Jones]: Yes ma’am.
[PCRA counsel]: In filling out the plea colloquy[,] did you discuss
the issue of the suppression [motion] and that [Appellant] would
be waiving any suppression issues if it moved forward?
[Attorney Jones]: Specifically, no. Generally speaking, in my
years of practice that is something that we routinely say.
Specifically I do [not] remember saying that.
N.T Hearing, 2/7/24, at 8. The foregoing demonstrates that, even though
Attorney Jones did not recall the specifics of his conversation with Appellant,
it was his routine practice to inform his clients that, by entering a guilty plea,
any potential efforts to suppress evidence would no longer be viable. Second,
a review of the certified record reveals that, prior to entering his guilty plea,
Appellant signed a guilty plea statement, wherein he agreed, inter alia, that
he knowingly surrendered his “pre-trial rights,” including the right to file
pre-trial motions, “such as motions to keep out or ‘suppress’ evidence.” Guilty
Plea Statement, 1/4/23, at 5. Importantly, Appellant is bound by the
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statements he made during his written guilty plea colloquy. See Yeomans,
supra. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s guilty plea
was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and he, therefore, is not
entitled to relief.
Before we conclude, however, we briefly address Appellant’s contention
that the PCRA court erred in finding that Attorney Jones had a reasonable
basis to advise Appellant to forgo any claims of suppression and, instead,
enter the instant guilty plea. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/14/24, at 4
(“Counsel’s action in recommending the plea did, in fact, effectuate
[Appellant’s] best interests.”); see also Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928
A.2d 215, 224 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that an appellant’s failure to meet any
prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel will defeat an
ineffectiveness claim). On appeal, Appellant recognizes that, prior to entering
his guilty plea, Attorney Jones and his firm worked with prosecuting attorneys
in both Armstrong County and Westmoreland County to reach an
understanding where Appellant would enter guilty pleas in both counties in
exchange for concurrent sentences on all pending charges. Appellant claims
that, in view of this understanding, Attorney Jones advised him to enter his
guilty plea in Armstrong County. Appellant, however, avers that a review of
the “docket in Westmoreland County” reveals that a plea was not “entered
anytime near the time of the Armstrong County plea.” Appellant’s Brief at 18.
Accordingly, Appellant contends that his failure to “[enter] a plea agreement
in Westmoreland County” undercut[] Attorney Jones’s basis for recommending
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the entry of a guilty plea in this case and, in turn, nullifies the PCRA court’s
finding. Id.Upon review, we reject Appellant’s contention that Attorney Jones’s
advice to plead guilty herein fell wholly outside “the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Commonwealth v. Timchack,
69 A.3d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Importantly, at the
evidentiary hearing, Attorney Jones provided the following testimony
regarding the potential plea agreement in this case, as well as the matter in
Westmoreland County.
[District Attorney]: Mr. Jones, you had mentioned a case
pending in Westmoreland County?
[Attorney Jones]: Yes ma’am.
[District Attorney]: Was it your understanding, at the time of
entering the plea, that both my office and the Westmoreland
County District Attorney’s Office were in agreement that we
could run this case, which was a robbery case, concurrently with
the Westmoreland County case, which was an aggravated
assault, discharging [a] firearm into [an] occupied vehicle and
possession of a firearm prohibited case?
[Attorney Jones]: I thought that this case started as an
attempted homicide if I am not mistaken[.] I actually have an
email from Anthony Iannarelli. … He is the [District Attorney] I
was referring to in Westmoreland County. It is dated Tuesday,
November 1, 2022. It states: “All: The plea agreement is
below. I have modified it to be 10 to 20 years with [five] years
consecutive probation. As we discussed, this sentence can run
concurrent with the Armstrong County sentence that [District
Attorney] Charlton offered. I believe you should plea in
Armstrong first to facilitate this. Once this is done, let me know
and we can arrange a time for him to get in front of [the
Honorable] Bilik Defazio for a plea. We can email her staff and
make that happen quickly.” I believe that answers your
question. We were – my office was working diligently, quite
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frankly, to run the case in this county with the case in
Westmoreland County, which we thought it might be a
challenge but we were able to get it done.
[District Attorney]: You got both district attorney’s offices on
board with that?
[Attorney Jones]: Yes ma’am. That is correct.
[District Attorney]: And in doing so your client would have
served a 10 to 20 year sentence in Westmoreland County? Is
that what that said? 10 to 20 years?
[Attorney Jones]: It is a little confusing, but that is what it says.
“I have modified it to be 10 to 20 years with [five] years
consecutive probation.”
[District Attorney]: So 10 to 20 years but that is to be
concurrent with the Armstrong County case?
[Attorney Jones]: Yes ma’am.
[District Attorney]: Which in this case [Appellant] pled to I think
it was 114 months?
[Attorney Jones]: That is what I have on the sentencing order
I referred to a moment ago. 114 months to 228 months
[incarceration].
[District Attorney]: In fact, that was the plea and what he was
sentenced to in this county?
[Attorney Jones]: Yes ma’am. You asked me a moment ago
about this county working with Westmoreland County. In my
20 years of practicing law I do [not] think that I have ever had
that happen, where I had two different county [district
attorneys] agree to run a sentence concurrent. We were
actually excited and happy about it. We being my office.
[District Attorney]: You were excited because that was a huge
benefit to your client?
[Attorney Jones]: Yeah, because there is no reason that the
nature of these cases should run concurrent. In my experience;
when you have cases that deal with violence and recidivism –
and I believe that [Appellant’s] record is a[ repeat felony
offender].
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[District Attorney]: He came in here as a repeat felon?
[Attorney Jones]: According to what we have. It is challenging.
We were excited about it. We expressed that to [Appellant]
that we thought we did a very nice job for him.
N.T. Evidentiary Hearing, 2/7/24, at 11-13.
The foregoing reveals that, when Attorney Jones recommended the
instant plea deal, Appellant had the opportunity to enter guilty pleas in two
counties, where multiple violent felony charges were pending against him.
Indeed, in the instant case, Appellant’s original charges included, inter alia,
“robbery, aggravated assault, [and] burglary.” PCRA Court Opinion, 2/14/24,
at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The charge of robbery alone carries
a maximum penalty of 20 years’ incarceration. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)(1)
(explaining that robbery under subsection (a)(1)(i) constitutes a felony in the
first degree); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1) (“In the case of a felony of the
first degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 20
years.”). Importantly, Appellant does not claim that the understanding about
concurrent sentences on charges lodged in Armstrong County and
Westmoreland County did not exist. Instead, Appellant argues that his
ultimate failure to enter a guilty plea in Westmoreland County compels a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if Appellant did not ultimately
enter a guilty plea to the charges against him in Westmoreland County,
however, we cannot say that Attorney Jones was ineffective in his
recommendation. To the contrary, we agree with the PCRA court’s
assessment that, based upon the information available to Attorney Jones at
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the time Appellant pled guilty herein, Attorney Jones “served [Appellant’s]
best interests by securing a sentence far less than his potential aggregated
sentence.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/9/24, at 2.
Order affirmed.
DATE: 11/25/2024
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