Com. v. Woodford-McMahon, M. ( 2024 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARILY IRIS WOODFORD-MCMAHON :
:
Appellant : No. 1238 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 7, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-42-CR-0000478-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: November 14, 2024
Marily Iris Woodford-McMahon (“Woodford-McMahon”) appeals from the
judgment of sentence imposed following her jury convictions for, inter alia, six
counts of receiving stolen property, possession of a firearm with an altered
manufacturer’s number, and two counts of possession of an offensive
weapon.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual history as follows:
Ryan Bray testified that he stole the firearms and crossbows
from his [parents’] home[,] and he took them to [Woodford-
McMahon’s] home and gave them to her son, [Paul McMahon
(“Paul”),] in exchange for heroin. He testified that he had
numerous exchanges of stolen guns for drugs at [Woodford-
McMahon’s] home with [her] son, Paul[, the latest of which
transactions occurred on July 26, 2022]. Paul . . . did not reside
with [Woodford-McMahon,] and his residence was only two blocks
away. Paul . . . kept a “safe” at [Woodford-McMahon’s] home,
and[] “you can see it. It’s right in the living room.” The guns
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3925(a), 6110.2(a), 908(a).
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were [stolen] on July 23, 2022. The guns and crossbows were
[recovered] [after the last transaction between Ryan Bray and
Paul at Woodford-McMahon’s house] on July 27, 2022. They were
located at [Woodford-McMahon’s] residence in her bedroom.
[Woodford-McMahon] was present when the multiple firearms and
crossbows were located in her bedroom. [Twelve] firearms were
located under [her] bed, and[] others in the bedroom closet. The
bedroom was approximately [twenty] feet by [fifteen] feet. Some
of the firearms were also under a child’s blanket directly adjacent
to [Woodford-McMahon’s] bed. [Woodford-McMahon] admitted
that the bedroom was her bedroom; and, that she sleeps in that
room every night and is the only one who sleeps there. She
admitted that she had slept in that bedroom the night before the
search of it. [Woodford-McMahon] admitted that marijuana
located in the room was hers. This marijuana was located within
inches of the guns. [Woodford-McMahon] admitted to having
“brief touch” with one of the stolen crossbows in her bedroom.
[Thirty-three] firearms were located in the bedroom;
and[ Woodford-McMahon] told the police that she [had] not
see[n] any of them.
Dusty Clark [(“Dusty”), Woodford-McMahon’s] daughter,
testified[, inter alia,] . . . that [Woodford-McMahon] had a history
[of] “cater[ing] to Paul.” . . . Paul . . . testified that he had
“always” been “close” with his mom ([Woodford-McMahon]). He
testified that he went to her home every day.1
1[Paul] also testified that he hid many guns
throughout [Woodford-McMahon’s] bedroom, and[] he just
happened to be moving them and put them by [her] bed
right before the police arrived. . . ..
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/23, at 4-5 (citations to the record omitted). The
Commonwealth charged Woodford-McMahon with, inter alia, the supra
offenses. She then proceeded to a jury trial, after which the jury convicted
her of the offenses at issue here and acquitted her of related offenses not
relevant to our disposition. The trial court sentenced Woodford-McMahon on
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September 7, 2023, and she timely appealed on October 6, 2023.2 Both
Woodford-McMahon and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Woodford-McMahon raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to establish
all necessary elements of “[r]eceiving [s]tolen [p]property?
2. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to establish
that [Woodford-McMahon] committed the offense of
“[p]ossession of a [f]irearm with an [a]ltered [m]anufacturer’s
[n]umber”?
3. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to establish
that [Woodford-McMahon] committed the offense of
“[p]ossession of an [o]ffensive [w]eapon”?
Woodford-McMahon’s Brief at 10.
Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence issues is as
follows:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.
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2 The trial court entered an order on October 25, 2023, amending the sentence
to correct a clerical error, to direct that the sentence for count eight is to run
consecutively to count seven, not count one as stated at the sentencing
hearing. Compare N.T., 9/7/23, at 13 with Amended Order, 10/25/23. This
correction does not increase the aggregate sentence as originally stated. The
trial court originally stated its intention that the aggregate sentence of
incarceration total thirty-nine to one hundred and eight months. See N.T.,
9/7/23, at 14. This aggregate would only be reached if count eight were
imposed consecutively to count seven. Thus, the original sentence, insofar as
it directed count eight run consecutively to count one instead of seven, was a
clerical error. See Commonwealth v. Kremer, 206 A.3d 543, 548 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (trial court retains jurisdiction to correct clear clerical errors).
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The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the
accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 349 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal
citations omitted). This Court has held that “in evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence, we do not review a diminished record. Rather, the law is clear
that we are required to consider all evidence that was actually received,
without consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence or whether the
trial court's evidentiary rulings are correct.” Arias, 286 A.3d at 350 (internal
citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
In her first issue, Woodford-McMahon argues the evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction for receiving stolen property. Receiving
stolen property is defined as follows: “A person is guilty of theft if he
intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen,
unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it
to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). “Receiving” means “acquiring
possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property.” Id.,
§ 3925(b). This Court has explained: “To sustain a [receiving stolen property]
conviction, the prosecution must prove that the defendant (1) intentionally
acquir[ed] possession of the movable property of another; (2) with knowledge
or belief that it was probably stolen; and (3) the intent to deprive
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permanently.” Arias, 286 A.3d at 350 (internal citations and quotations
omitted; brackets in original).3
While mere possession of stolen property is insufficient to establish the
requisite knowledge or belief the property was stolen, guilty knowledge may
be inferred from unexplained, or unsatisfactorily explained, possession of
recently stolen goods. See id. Indeed:
. . . “[G]uilty knowledge” may be proven through other
circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge may include,
inter alia, the place or manner of possession, alterations to the
property indicative of theft, the defendant’s conduct or statements
at the time of arrest (including attempts to flee apprehension), a
false explanation for the possession, the location of the theft in
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3 Regarding constructive possession, this Court has explained:
Where possession is an element of the offense, the concept of
constructive possession is a legal fiction used to prove the element
although the individual was not in physical possession of the
prohibited item. The evidence must show a nexus between the
accused and the item sufficient to infer that the accused had the
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over it.
Dominion and control means the defendant had the ability to
reduce the item to actual possession immediately, or was
otherwise able to govern its use or disposition as if in physical
possession. Mere presence or proximity to the contraband is not
enough. Constructive possession can be established by inferences
derived from the totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 741 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal
citation omitted). Indeed, prior physical possession is not a necessary
prerequisite for constructive possession. See id. False statements to police
are evidence of consciousness of guilt. See id. More than one person can
constructively possess the same contraband. See Commonwealth v.
Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 554 (Pa. Super. 2021).
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comparison to where the defendant gained possession, the value
of the property compared to the price paid for it, or any other
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.
Id. at 350–51 (internal citation and indentation omitted).
Woodford-McMahon argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain her
convictions for receiving stolen property. She reasons that because there was
no evidence she actually possessed the stolen firearms, the Commonwealth
needed to prove constructive possession. See Woodford-McMahon’s Brief at
17. She asserts the Commonwealth failed to prove constructive possession
because Paul had full access to her home and garage, and was there “on a
frequent basis.” Id. at 18. She also maintains the evidence did not show that
she knew of the existence and location of the stolen items. See id. She
points out that the Commonwealth did not show she was present at the time
Paul received firearms in exchange for drugs. See id. at 19. Woodford-
McMahon further argues that Dusty’s testimony did not establish Woodford-
McMahon knew any specific guns were stolen, since some of the firearms in
her home were legally owned. See id. at 20. She concludes the
Commonwealth failed to prove she knew any specific firearms were stolen.
The trial court considered Woodford-McMahon’s arguments and
concluded they merit no relief:
First, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
[Woodford-McMahon] took possession of the firearms and
crossbows. They were in the most personal space of an individual,
her private bedroom. Some were uncovered, some had a baby
blanket on them and some under her bed — but they were
everywhere. The jury was free to completely reject the assertion
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that [Woodford-McMahon] didn’t see the visible guns, or that she
didn’t wonder what was stacked up and had a baby blanket over
it, feet from her bed, or that she didn’t see the guns that were
inches [from] her marijuana, or wonder what was under her bed[.]
The circumstantial evidence established that both she and her son
possessed the firearms and crossbows, her son because he
obtained and put them there, and [Woodford-McMahon] because
she catered to him and allowed him to store and stack them up in
her private bedroom, so that they would be out of view from
others[.]
Second, there is sufficient evidence in the record to
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Woodford-
McMahon] knew that her son had stolen weapons and he wanted
to conceal them, and that she allowed him to hide them in her
bedroom. [Woodford-McMahon] and her son were very close and
in contact daily. As defense counsel brought out on cross
examination, [Woodford-McMahon] would “cater” to him. The
evidence here supports the finding that that is exactly what she
did here, she catered to him storing the stolen firearms and
crossbows that he obtained in her bedroom. The jury was free to
reject [Woodford-McMahon’s] absurd assertion that she did not
see the [thirty-three] firearms and crossbows throughout her
[twenty] feet by [fifteen] feet bedroom, some under and stacked
directly beside her bed. [Woodford-McMahon] chose to make
statements to the officers and the absurdity of her assertions, that
she slept over guns, slept beside guns and crossbows, had them
stacked in the room and in a closet, could be considered by the
jury in determining her guilty knowledge. . . . Also, although not
needed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the short time
between the theft of the Brays’ . . . firearms and crossbows and
their recovery in [Woodford-McMahon’s] bedroom is further
circumstantial evidence of guilt. . ..
Finally, there is evidence that [Woodford-McMahon]
intended to deprive the true owners of the firearms and
crossbows. . . . When the police asked her about them being in
her private bedroom, she didn’t indicate that they were borrowed
or her son[’]s, but instead indicated that she hadn’t seen anything
. . .. Specifically, the jury was free to find that [Woodford-
McMahon] was lying and that she [had seen] the weapons. The
jury was free to find that [she] said she didn’t see them because
she knew they were, or likely were, stolen[,] and her son was
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stashing them with her in her bedroom to conceal them and
prevent their return to the Brays.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/23, at 6-7 (emphasis omitted).
Following our review, we likewise conclude Woodford-McMahon is due
no relief. We begin by noting that she and the trial court have treated the
stolen firearms collectively, and, accordingly, we do the same. The record
reveals that a stolen 9 mm firearm was stored in a lockbox under Woodford-
McMahon’s bed along with twelve other firearms. See N.T., 8/14/23, at 51-
52. Two stolen long rifles were under Woodford-McMahon’s bed. See id. at
53.4 Woodford-McMahon had in her closet three stolen crossbows “stacked
up on some boxes,” with nothing covering them. See id. at 71. Crucially,
Woodford-McMahon’s clothes were in the closet. See id. at 72. Woodford-
McMahon also stored some of her marijuana in the closet. See id. at 72-73.
Woodford-McMahon admitted that the bedroom was hers, as was the closet
and the marijuana therein, and that she knew she had a lockbox under her
bed. See id. at 99. Nevertheless, Woodford-McMahon, in response to
questions from Trooper Hunter Freer (“Trooper Freer”) denied knowing there
were any firearms at all in her bedroom. Trooper Freer testified:
[S]he told me that she had no idea, that she had never
observed any one of these firearms or crossbows within her
bedroom[, w]here she told me she sleeps every night[;] and she
told me she’s the only one that sleeps there every night. So to
me, I was inquisitive as to how someone could sleep in a bedroom
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4 Several other long rifles were leaning against a nightstand next to Woodford-
McMahon’s bed under a child’s blanket. See N.T., 8/14/23, at 53.
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with that many firearms and crossbows in it and not recognize a
single one of them.
So, when I asked her about how she didn’t see the guns
next to her nightstand, where she told me she sleeps every night
in that bed, she informed me that there was a blanket up over top
of them, so how could she see them?
Id. at 99-100. Later, when confronted with the fact that her marijuana had
been placed inches from the stolen crossbows she claimed she had no idea
were there, she had no answer, but then admitted to touching one of the
crossbows, but not moving it. See id. at 101-02. Additionally, we observe
that Ryan Bray stole the firearms and crossbows from his family on July 23,
2022 and traded them to Paul for drugs on July 26, 2022, and Trooper Freer
executed a search warrant the next day, at which time he discovered the
stolen weapons. See id. at 20-21, 37, 43, 51.
We conclude the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Woodford-McMahon constructively possessed the stolen weapons
with the knowledge they were stolen and the intent to permanently deprive
the owners of them based on the following: the location of the stolen property
(i.e., in Woodford-McMahon’s bedroom under her bed, and in her closet, and
amongst her personal possessions, including her clothes and marijuana); her
implausible and shifting statements to police first disclaiming any knowledge
of the weapons at all, and then her admission to “touching” one of them; and
the close temporal proximity between the thefts and the police search,
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pursuant to a warrant, discovering the property. See Arias, 286 A.3d at 350-
51; Bowens, 265 A.3d at 741.5
In her second and third issues, Woodford-McMahon challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence for her convictions for possession of a firearm with
an altered manufacturer’s number and possession of an offensive weapon.
Before reaching the merits of Woodford-McMahon’s issues, we must determine
whether she has preserved them.
“In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the
element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was
insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super.
2013). Where a Rule 1925(b) statement does not specify the allegedly
unproven elements, the sufficiency issue is waived on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008). See
also Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(stating that a Rule 1925(b) statement must identify the elements upon which
the evidence was insufficient).
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5 Woodford-McMahon’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31,
37-38 (Pa. Super. 2018), is misplaced. There, we held the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession of contraband
where it was all located in a bag in the front passenger floor of a car and the
defendant was in the back on the driver’s side. See id. No evidence was
adduced from which the jury could infer Parrish had knowledge of the
contraband. Here, in contrast, the contraband was in Woodford-McMahon’s
bedroom distributed amongst her things, and she gave equivocal statements
about knowing whether the weapons were there before admitting to touching
one. Contra Woodford-McMahon’s Brief at 18.
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Our review of Woodford-McMahon’s Rule 1925(b) statement reveals that
she failed to specify, for her second and third issues, the elements of the
offenses for which the evidence was allegedly insufficient. See Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 10/24/23, at ¶¶ 2-3.
Accordingly, she has waived these issues for our review.6
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 11/14/2024
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6 The trial court concluded for the same reasons that Woodford-McMahon had
waived her third issue. See Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/23, at 2. Additionally, the
trial court did not address the possession element of the second issue but,
ostensibly due to the vagueness of her concise statement, addressed instead
the evidence that the firearm’s manufacturer’s number had been altered. See
id. at 8.
We note that, even if preserved, Woodford-McMahon would be due no
relief on her second and third issues. To the extent that she challenges in
these issues merely the possession element of the offenses, see Woodford-
McMahon’s Brief at 22-23, as we concluded above, the circumstantial
evidence, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, demonstrates Woodford-McMahon constructively possessed the
firearms.
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