Spolar, M.&J. v. Spolar Family Trust ( 2024 )

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2024 PA Super 256MARGARET AND JAMES SPOLAR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
THE SPOLAR FAMILY TRUST, :
MARGARET M. SPOLAR, :
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF : No. 482 MDA 2023
THE SPOLAR FAMILY TRUST, AND :
ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING BY :
OR THROUGH THE SAID PARTIES :
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS :
INTERESTED IN THE REAL PROPERTY :
SUBJECT TO THIS ACTION :
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 20, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County
Civil Division at No(s): 2018-972
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 1, 2024
The Spolar Family Trust and Margaret M. Spolar (collectively,
“Appellants”) appeal from the judgment entered March 20, 2023, after the
non-jury verdict in favor of Margaret and James Spolar (collectively,
“Appellees”) in the amount of $133,000.00. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual history:
1. [Appellee] Margaret Spolar (hereinafter referred to as
Daughter) is the daughter of [Appellant] Margaret M. Spolar
(hereinafter referred to as Mother).
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2. [Appellee] James Spolar (hereinafter referred to as James) is
the current husband of Daughter.
3. [Appellant] Spolar Family Trust is a trust created in 2017 which
currently holds title to the disputed real estate located in Forest
Lake Township, Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter
referred to as the 20-acre parcel [or disputed real property]).
4. Mother and her husband, Thomas Spolar, acquired the 20-acre
parcel in 1972.
5. Mother owns an additional 55-acre parcel of real property that
she and her husband acquired in 1968 which is adjacent to the
20-acre parcel.
6. After the 20-acre parcel was acquired by Mother and Thomas
Spolar, Daughter improved the real property by having a well
drilled, septic installed and excavation and grading completed.
7. Mother encouraged Daughter to construct her residence on the
20-acre parcel.
8. After graduating high school and getting married in September
1978, Daughter placed a trailer on the disputed real property and
began living there with her then-husband, Edward Birchard.
9. Daughter obtained electricity in her name for the trailer located
on the 20-acre parcel.
10. Thereafter, Daughter began to build a residence on the
disputed real property.
11. In building the residence, Daughter had the assistance of her
family members, including her father, Thomas, as well as her
younger twin brothers, Gregory and Michael.
12. Daughter never took out a mortgage to build the home but
paid for things gradually when she had the money to complete the
work.
13. As a result, the construction of the house took decades to
complete but Daughter was living in the residence prior to October
1981 and simply continued to work on completing the residence
when she had the funds and/or time to do so.
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14. Daughter did not complete the residence until the 2000’s.
15. Despite the passage of several decades, Daughter maintained
many of the receipts documenting the monies she spent on
construction of the residence. Daughter had produced $16,197.36
in receipts.
16. In July 1989, Daughter and Edward Birchard were divorced.
17. In Daughter’s separation agreement, Edward Birchard waived
“all his right, title and interest in and to the marital residence.”
There was no indication in the separation agreement that
Daughter owned the real property upon which the marital
residence was situated.
18. On July 20, 1989, in a divorce hearing, Daughter testified
under oath that her parents owned the real property upon which
the marital residence was located but that she and her husband
had built and owned the marital residence itself. Upon being
questioned by the court later in the proceeding, Daughter again
admitted that she lived in a home located on her parents’ real
property.
19. In 1989, Daughter married James and he began to reside with
her in the residence located on the 20-acre parcel.
20. Mother likewise permitted her two younger sons to build their
residences on the 55-acre parcel. Daughter and her two younger
brothers were expected to pay the real estate taxes and insurance
for their respective residences as well as maintain the real
property.
21. In August 2005, Daughter obtained a bail bond to secure the
release of her children from incarceration in Lehigh County and
Daughter provided a deed of trust to the bail bond company using
the 20-acre parcel as collateral.
22. In 2015, Daughter and James moved to Missouri.
23. Despite living in Missouri, Daughter continued to maintain the
20-acre parcel as well as pay utilities, insurance and taxes and
Daughter would stay at the residence when she returned to
Susquehanna County for visits.
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24. After Daughter moved to Missouri, there were discussions
within the family, including offers personally made by Mother, to
purchase Daughter’s interest in her residence but those
discussions never reached fruition as the parties had different
views as to the value of Daughter’s interest.
25. Luke Spolar is the son of Daughter and the grandson of
Mother. He grew up in the residence located on the 20-acre parcel.
He never heard Mother contest Daughter’s ownership of the
residence.
26. Ernest Loessy, Mother’s brother, was a frequent visitor to
Mother’s residence and, after it was built, to Daughter’s residence.
Loessy indicated that Mother announced at Daughter’s wedding
that Daughter was going to build her own house on the 20-acre
parcel.
27. Michael Lutz, a friend of the Spolar family since approximately
1987, heard Mother admit that Daughter owned the house on the
20-acre parcel and that Mother was proud of Daughter for building
the home with her own funds without the need to obtain a
mortgage. On several occasions, Lutz heard Mother say that
Daughter and her husband Ed Birchard paid for the house
paycheck-by-paycheck.
28. After Daughter had moved to Missouri, Mother asked Daughter
to allow another grandchild to move into the residence on the 20-
acre parcel but Daughter refused the request.
29. In 2017, Mother created the Spolar Family Trust, which is an
irrevocable trust, for which Daughter is a beneficiary.
a. The Spolar Family Trust Agreement specifically
provided Daughter the “right to reside in [her]
[residence] . . . and pay necessary utilities and
upkeep.”
b. The Spolar Family Trust Agreement also provided
Mother, as the trustee, with the power to “lease
property for any period of time and give options of any
duration for sale, exchange or leases.”
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c. The Spolar Family Trust Agreement, however, fails
to explain whether the Trustee’s power to lease trust
property supersedes Daughter’s right to reside in her
residence.
30. Mother did not notify Daughter that she had created the Spolar
Family Trust nor did Mother advise Daughter that the 20-acre
parcel had been placed into the Spolar Family Trust.
31. On June 12, 2018, Mother, as trustee of the Spolar Family
Trust, posted an eviction notice on Daughter’s residence notifying
her that she was to vacate the residence located on the 20-acre
parcel.
a. The eviction notice did not identify the provision of
the Spolar Family Trust Agreement that conferred
upon Mother, acting as trustee, the power to remove
Daughter from the residence that the Spolar Family
Trust Agreement specifically gave Daughter the right
to utilize.
32. After posting the eviction notice and taking possession of the
20-acre parcel, Mother allowed another grandchild to move into
Daughter’s residence.
33. Daughter paid the real property taxes for the 20-acre parcel
from 1978 until the initiation of this litigation. The real property
taxes, however, remained in Mother’s name.
34. Mother never executed any deed conveying the 20-acre parcel
to Daughter.
35. Prior to posting the eviction notice, Mother made offers
through third parties to purchase Daughter’s interest in the
residence and/or real property.
36. Excluding Daughter’s residence, the 20-acre parcel has an
appraised value of $102,000.00.
37. If Daughter’s residence is included in the appraisal, then the
20-acre parcel coupled with Daughter’s residence has a value of
$235,000.00.
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38. As such, Daughter’s residence increased the appraised value
of the 20-acre parcel by $133,000.00.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/22, at 2-8 (footnotes and record citations omitted).
After the eviction notice was placed on Daughter’s residence, Appellees
filed suit against Appellants. Appellees included five counts: quiet title,
declaratory relief, unjust enrichment, conversion/misappropriation of
royalties, and a request for injunctive relief. After a two-day trial, the trial
court found for Appellants as to all counts but unjust enrichment. The trial
court consequently held that Appellants own the 20-acre parcel, but because
Mother encouraged Daughter to build her home on the 20-acre parcel, Mother
was unjustly enriched by the increased value of the 20-acre parcel and
awarded Appellees the difference in value between the land without the
residence and the land with the residence, i.e., $133,000.00.
Appellants filed a motion for post-trial relief. The trial court granted it in
part and denied in part. The trial court granted it solely to amend paragraph
18:
[Appellants’] motion to post-trial relief is GRANTED IN PART as it
relates to a limited Finding of Fact made in the first sentence of
Paragraph 18 in the December 18, 2022 Opinion, which shall be
amended to read as follows: “On July 20, 1989, in a divorce
hearing, Daughter testified under oath that her parents owned the
real property upon which the marital residence was located but
that she and her husband owned the marital residence itself. (Plf.
Ex. 13, at 3.)” The remainder of Paragraph 18 is hereby
confirmed.
Order, 3/9/23, at 1. All other arguments raised in Appellants’ post-trial motion
were denied.
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On March 20, 2023, judgment was entered for Appellees in the amount
of $133,000.00. Appellants timely appealed and complied with the trial court’s
order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellants raise three claims:
1. Did the trial court err in finding in favor of Appellees and against
Appellants on Appellees’ claim for unjust enrichment because the
statute of limitations barred such claim?
2. Did the trial court err in finding in favor of Appellees and against
Appellants on Appellees’ claim for unjust enrichment because
Appellees received a benefit and/or benefits which barred such
claim?
3. Did the trial court err in awarding Appellees damages in the
amount of $133,000.00?
Appellants’ Brief, at 10 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers
omitted).
Our scope and standard of review regarding non-jury verdicts is as
follows:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial
verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are
supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
committed error in any application of the law. The findings of the
trial court must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as
the verdict of a jury. We consider evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only
if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in
the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope
of review is plenary. The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal
originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate
court because it is the appellate court’s duty to determine if the
trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.
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El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi, 260 A.3d 944, 958 (Pa. Super. 2021) (brackets and
citation omitted).
The resultant verdict was an equitable decree, and as such, we accept
the factual findings of the trial court “because the demeanor and credibility of
witnesses, as well as conflicts in the evidence presented, are issues solely
determined by the trier of fact and, therefore, beyond the scope of review of
appellate courts.” Wilson v. Parker, 227 A.3d 343, 352 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citation omitted). Furthermore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s findings of fact, as all are supported in the record.
Appellants first argue the statute of limitations on Appellees’ claim of
unjust enrichment expired on July 20, 1993, as that is four years after
Daughter admitted she did not own the land upon which she built her home.
See Appellants’ Brief, at 15. The trial court and Appellees assert Appellants
waived this claim by failing to plead the defense of statutes of limitations with
sufficient specificity. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/22, at 21 n. 12;
Appellees’ Brief, at 10-11.
“A statute of limitations defense is generally raised in new matter.” El-
Gharbaoui, 260 A.3d at 962 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a)).
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be
specifically pleaded, or the defense is waived. An affirmative
defense, including a statute of limitations defense, may not be
raised by general averment but, rather, must be supported by
factual allegations sufficient to give rise to the affirmative defense.
Id. at 963 (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).
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Appellants here simply averred in their new matter “Plaintiffs’ claims are
barred by the statutes of limitations.” Answer and New Matter, 8/20/18, at
10. We agree with the trial court and Appellees this claim is waived for failure
to raise it with the trial court with sufficient specificity. Appellants’ “threadbare
declaratory sentence” stating all claims are waived without any elaboration is
not sufficient to present the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.
Gharbaoui, 260 A.3d at 963. Therefore, Appellants’ first claim is waived.
Even if not waived, we would find Appellants are not entitled to relief on
their first claim. The statute of limitations for unjust enrichment is four years.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4); Sevast v. Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1153
(Pa. 2007) (unjust enrichment is an action based upon a contract implied at
law and therefore has a four-year statute of limitations). “Generally, a cause
of action accrues, and thus the applicable statute of limitations begins to run,
when an injury is inflicted. An injury is inflicted when the corresponding right
to institute a suit for damages arises.” Estate of Hogarty v. Jeffers Farms,
Inc., 303 A.3d 482, 488 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quotation marks, ellipsis, and
citations omitted).
Appellants assert “Appellees’ claim arose on July 20, 1989, when
[Daughter] acknowledged and testified under oath [in her divorce
proceedings] that she was not the owner of the [20-acre parcel].” Appellants’
Brief, at 16. Therefore, Appellants believe the statute of limitations expired on
July 20, 1993. See id. We disagree.
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Daughter was permitted to live on the 20-acre parcel until an eviction
notice was placed on her door in 2018 by Appellants. At all times prior to the
eviction notice, Daughter believed she owned the home on the 20-acre parcel,
a belief buttressed by Mother’s actions as Mother frequently told people
Daughter owned the home on the 20-acre parcel. Therefore, no injury was
inflicted until Daughter was informed that she no longer was permitted to
reside on the 20-acre parcel. While Daughter may have known the land was
not hers in 1989, she was not aware the home she built was not hers until
Appellants evicted her. As the trial court aptly held:
[Appellees] cause of action for unjust enrichment only ripened
after Mother tried to evict Daughter from the home on June 12,
2018. Until that time, [Appellees] could not have known that they
were injured, i.e., that Mother was disputing Daughter’s alleged
ownership of the home that Daughter built on Mother’s 20-acre
parcel. Since the right to institute their claim did not attach until
2018 and [Appellees] filed their claim on July 16, 2018, a little
more than a month later, their claim for unjust enrichment would
not have been barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/22, at 21 n. 12. The trial court’s factual findings
are supported by the record, which established Mother actively encouraged
Daughter to build her home on the 20-acre parcel and held out her Daughter
as the owner of the home. See N.T. Trial, 6/17/22, at 38, 101, 126, 160, 170.
As the injury was not inflicted until June of 2018, and Appellees filed suit
approximately a month later, Appellants’ first claim of error fails.
Appellants next argue the trial court erred in finding they were unjustly
enriched because “Appellees clearly received a significant benefit for over 35
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years [because Daughter was permitted to live on the property rent-free].”
Appellants’ Brief, at 21-22.
As the term “unjust enrichment” implies, recovery under that
doctrine requires (1) an enrichment that (2) was unjust. This is a
matter of equity, and, to succeed, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) benefits were conferred on defendant by plaintiff;
(2) appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and
(3) acceptance and retention of such benefits under
such circumstances that it would be inequitable for
defendant to retain the benefit without payment of
value. In determining if the doctrine applies, our focus
is not on the intention of the parties, but rather on
whether the defendant has been unjustly enriched.
Wilson, 227 A.3d at 353 (brackets, ellipsis, and citations omitted; emphasis
in original). “Unjust enrichment describes recovery for the value of the benefit
retained when there is no contractual relationship, but when, on the grounds
of fairness and justice, the law compels performance of a legal and moral duty
to pay.” Artisan Builders, Inc. v. Jang, 271 A.3d 889, 893 (Pa. Super.
2022) (citation omitted). We have further defined unjust enrichment as the
defendant either “wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit that []
would be unconscionable for her to retain.” Mark Hershey Farms, Inc. v.
Robinson, 171 A.3d 810, 817 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
The trial court found Appellees met their burden of proving unjust
enrichment for the following reasons:
Mother encouraged Daughter to build a home upon the 20-
acre parcel — and Mother did so when Daughter was still a
teenager having just graduated from high school. Mother likewise
promoted Daughter’s decision to perform the construction work
slowly and over time so as to avoid the need to obtain a loan to
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finance the construction. Based upon this encouragement, and
Daughter’s belief that she was the owner of her residence,
Daughter invested all of her savings and earnings into
constructing a home upon the 20-acre parcel. While Daughter
understood that Mother continued to own the underlying real
property, Daughter believed that she owned the residence itself.
This belief was confirmed in Daughter’s divorce proceeding, which
occurred a decade after Daughter began construction on her
residence and 30 years prior to this litigation, wherein she
reiterated she owned the residence but not the 20-acre parcel.
Over the years, Mother confirmed this understanding to other
family and friends when she would express her pride for
Daughter’s accomplishment in building her own home without
having to borrow any money to do so. Mother conceded to various
third parties that Daughter was the owner of the residence on the
20-acre parcel.
The record plainly establishes that Mother not only knew
that Daughter was constructing a residence on the 20-acre parcel
but that Mother actively promoted and encouraged Daughter to
construct the residence. Daughter’s construction efforts spanned
several decades as the home was not completed until
approximately 2000 and, even thereafter, Daughter continued to
make improvements or repairs including installing a new roof just
prior to Daughter relocating to Missouri. Mother remained aware
of the efforts that Daughter was undertaking to improve and
maintain the residence on the 20-acre parcel. Daughter’s efforts
resulted in a substantial financial benefit to Mother as the value of
the 20-acre parcel was increased by $133,000. As such, Daughter
conferred a benefit to Mother, namely, constructing a residence
on Mother’s property, and Mother appreciated that benefit,
namely, an increase in her property value by $133,000.
Mother’s retention of the property appreciation of $133,000
would be inequitable given the circumstances presented in this
case. Daughter not only constructed the residence on Mother’s
property but Daughter likewise paid all of Mother’s expenses (real
property taxes and insurance) relative to the 20-acre parcel and
continued to maintain the residence for a period of roughly 35
years. Throughout this period of time, Mother actively reinforced
Daughter’s belief that she owned the residence itself even though
Mother had never conveyed the real property to her. After
Daughter moved to Missouri, Mother actively engaged in
negotiations with Daughter relative to a purchase of Daughter’s
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residence. It was not until the parties were unable to agree upon
a value for Daughter’s residence that Mother asserted absolute
ownership over not only the 20-acre parcel but Daughter’s
residence as well. As a result of Daughter’s efforts, which were
encouraged and promoted by Mother with the understanding that
Daughter owned her residence, the value of Mother’s 20-acre
parcel has appreciated by $133,000. Given Mother’s
encouragement of Daughter’s efforts to build the residence,
coupled with Mother’s repeated confirmation that the residence
belonged to Daughter which thereby encouraged Daughter to
continue making additional improvements and repairs to the
residence itself, it would be inequitable to allow Mother to retain
$133,000 in increased value of the 20-acre parcel that is wholly
attributed to Daughter’s actions. For these reasons, Daughter has
presented sufficient evidence to prove her unjust enrichment
claim against Mother in the sum of $133,000.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/22, at 18-21 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The trial court did not err in making this determination. Appellants’ claim
that Appellees were permitted to live rent-free and therefore received their
own benefit of the arrangement flies in the face of logic. Daughter never would
have built the home on Mother’s land if Daughter did not believe she owned
the home. See N.T. Trial, 6/17/22, at 160. Daughter produced many receipts
and photographs at trial that showed her progression of clearing the lot,
installing electric, building the septic, drilling the well, and the construction of
the home. See id. at 152, 153, 158-159, 165, 166, 192-193, 239-251, 257,
260-290. The trial court found credible Daughter’s testimony that she paid for
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everything. We cannot disturb that finding. See Wilson, 227 A.3d at 352.
Appellants’ second claim does not merit relief.1
In Appellants’ final claim, they assert the trial court erred in agreeing
with the Appellees’ appraisal of the value of the property. See Appellants’
Brief, at 23-24. The trial court adopted the Appellees’ appraisal as to both the
land with the house and without. Appellants did not present their own
appraisal of the land. Appellants argue the trial court should not have accepted
the appraisal as credible because the appraiser did not enter the property,
Appellants presented evidence the inside of the home had mold, and the date
of the appraisal was “at a high point in the real estate industry.” Id. at 23.
We disagree.
As noted above,
[w]e accept the factual findings of a trial court sitting in equity, if
they are largely dependent upon the credibility of witnesses
because the demeanor and credibility of witnesses, as well as
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1 We note Appellants further argue the court erred in finding they were
unjustly enriched because Daughter has the right to move back into the
property at any time under the provisions of the Spolar Family Trust. See
Appellants’ Brief, at 22. However, Appellants do not explain how Appellees
have this right when other family members currently reside in the residence
with the permission of Appellants. See N.T. Trial, 10/17/22, at 119, 144. The
trial court specifically found: “The Spolar Family Trust Agreement… fails to
explain whether the Trustee’s power to lease trust property supersedes
Daughter’s right to reside in her residence.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/22, at
7. Appellants do not dispute this factual finding nor explain whether
Daughter’s right supersedes the current residents’ right to remain in the
residence. As such, we address this claim no further. See Dockery v.
Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc., 253 A.3d 716, 721 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (“When an appellant’s argument is underdeveloped, we may not
supply her with a better one.”) (brackets and citation omitted).
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conflicts in the evidence presented, are issues solely determined
by the trier of fact and, therefore, beyond the scope of review of
appellate courts.
Wilson, 227 A.3d at 352 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and citation omitted). We
will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by
competent evidence. See id.
The trial court’s finding of the difference in value of the 20-acre parcel
with and without the home is based upon competent evidence. Appellants
stipulated the appraiser was an expert in the field of real estate appraisals.
See N.T. Trial, 6/17/22, at 7-8. The appraiser determined the value of the 20-
acre parcel without the residence to be $102,000.00. See id. at 9. The
appraiser determined the value of the 20-acre parcel with the residence to be
$235,000.00. See id. at 12. The appraiser conducted a drive-by appraisal and
did not enter the residence. See id. The appraiser had been provided pictures
of the inside of the home. See id. at 12-13. Contrary to Appellants’ assertion,
the appraiser did take into consideration the mold inside the home as he was
given a mold report for the residence. See id. at 13-14. The appraiser listed
the condition of the residence as average, partially due to the mold in the
residence. See id. at 14, 27. As the factual determination of the trial court is
based upon competent evidence, we will not overturn the court’s factual
findings. Therefore, Appellants’ final claim fails.
Thus, we find Appellants’ claims do not merit relief and affirm the
judgment entered in the amount of $133,000.00.
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Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/01/2024
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