Com. v. Corliss, J. ( 2024 )

J-S25011-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUSTIN CORLISS :
:
Appellant : No. 19 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered December 4, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0002173-2013
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2024
Appellant, Justin Corliss, appeals pro se from the December 4, 2023
order entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus which he based on challenges to the
constitutionality of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(3). After
careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are briefly as follows. On June
1, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of Aggravated Indecent
Assault of a Child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b). On October 7, 2016, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of nine to 18 years of
incarceration.1 On December 8, 2017, this Court affirmed Appellant’s
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1 The court ordered this sentence to run consecutively to a 30- to 60-year
sentence imposed at Docket No. 2173-2013.
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judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for
allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, No. 108 EDA 2017
(Pa. Super. filed Dec. 8, 2017) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied,
No. 176 MAL 2018 (Pa. filed Oct. 30, 2018). Appellant did not seek further
relief from his judgment of sentence.
Appellant subsequently filed two petitions pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, neither of which
garnered relief.
On December 4, 2023, Appellant filed the instant petition seeking a writ
of habeas corpus based on his challenge to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 and 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5552(c)(3) as unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied. Petition,
12/4/23, at 1. In particular, he claimed that Section 3125—the Aggravated
Indecent Assault statute—"fails to provide fair notice as to what behavior is
unlawful” in that the statute and “fails to state with definiteness”: (1) “that it
is not intended to encompass acts designed to arouse or gratify sexual
arousal”; (2) that the legislature designed it to “address conduct that results
in serious bodily injury or the threat thereof”; (3) “that it is a ‘crime of
violence’”; (4) “that its culpability element is that of malice aforethought”; (5)
“that persons found guilty of it are subject to sentencing reserved for the ‘most
violent offenders’”; and (6) “what conduct is proscribed such that persons of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application[.]” Id. at 2-3.
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Appellant also claimed that Section 5552(c)(3), which sets forth the
statute of limitations for certain sexual offenses, not including Aggravated
Indecent Assault, “violates the ex post facto prohibitions of both the
Commonwealth and the United States Constitutions.” Id. 3-4. He specifically
asserted that Section 5552(c)(3) “fails to state with definiteness”: (1) “that it
is, or is not, a tolling statute”; (2) “that it is, or is not, a pure statute of
limitations, akin to [Section] 5552(a) or (b) as were in effect in 1997”; (3)
“that it is, or is not, subject to rules specifically designed for pure statutes of
limitations, such as 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 1975”; (4) “that it does, or does not, require
some quantum of evidence to support its use”; (5) “that it is, or is not, subject
to the prohibitions regarding extending or enlarging limitations found under
[Sections] 1722 and [] 5504”; (6) “that it does not violate the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s guarantee of access to accrued legal remedies by invalidating a
defense based on the expiration of the statute of limitations”; and (7) “that
its application can, or cannot, be decided by a jury.” Id.
That same day, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s
petition. With respect to Appellant’s claim that the Aggravated Indecent
Assault statute is unconstitutional, the trial court determined that because the
statute does not require that a defendant acted in a violent manner when
engaging in the conduct prohibited by it, nor with malice aforethought,
Appellant “misinterpreted the statute.” Order, 12/4/23, at 1. In rejecting
Appellant’s other contentions, including his claim that Section 5552(c)(3) is
unconstitutional, the trial court “rel[ied] on prior opinions/orders and appellate
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orders in this case regarding 18 Pa.C.S.[ §] 3125 and applicable case law.”
Id. at 1-2.
On December 19, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to vacate the court’s
order denying his petition as “improvidently denied.” The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion on January 2, 2024.
This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In response, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion relying on its
December 4, 2023 order.
Pro se Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
1. Whether the habeas court erred and abused its discretion when
it obstructed litigation of [A]ppellant’s habeas petition, averring
as applied and facial challenges to statutes by:
A. dismissing without a responsive pleading from the
respondent party; and
B. sua sponte obstructing this litigation to self-vindicate
prior erroneous claims; and
C. advocating for the executive branch of government; and
D. acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction; and
E. interposing erroneous interpretations that render
statutes unconstitutionally vague, such as:
(1) claiming that no violence or physical injury is required to
commit aggravated indecent assault “crime of violence”
where sentencing is reserved for the “most violent”
offenders; and
(2) claiming that reviving charges whose limitations period
expired does not violate the ex post facto clause[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
A.
When reviewing an order that denies habeas corpus relief, we face a
pure question of law for which our standard of review is de novo, and our
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scope of review is plenary. Rivera v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 837 A.2d 525, 528
(Pa. Super. 2003)
“Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy and is available after all
other remedies have been exhausted or ineffectual or nonexistent. It will not
issue if another remedy exists and is available.” Commonwealth v. Smith,
194 A.3d 126, 138 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
B.
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we consider whether
he has preserved them for this Court’s review. Constitutional claims not
implicating the legality of a defendant’s sentence are subject to waiver. See
id. (finding the defendant’s void-for-vagueness claim waived because the
defendant did not raise it at his sentencing hearing, or in a post-sentence
motion.); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116, 124 (Pa. Super.
2014) (explaining that an ex post facto challenge presents a legal question
that cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Following our review of the record, we conclude that Appellant has
waived the claims raised in his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus
because he did not raise them at his sentencing hearing, in a post-sentence
motion, or on direct appeal. We, therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s order
denying Appellant’s petition.2
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2 “To the extent our legal reasoning differs from the trial court’s, we note that,
as an appellate court, we may affirm on any legal basis supported by the
certified record.” Smith, 194 A.3d at 138 (citation omitted).
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Order affirmed.
Date: 11/1/2024
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