State v. Brittany Michaud ( 2021 )

May 26, 2021
Supreme Court
No. 2018-277-C.A.
(P 16-114CR)
State :
v. :
Brittany Michaud. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
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Supreme Court
No. 2018-277-C.A.
(P 16-114CR)
State :
v. :
Brittany Michaud. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, Brittany Michaud,
appeals from a judgment of conviction following a bench trial in Family Court for
cruelty to or neglect of a child, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-9-5.1 The defendant
was sentenced to a one-year suspended term of imprisonment, with probation. The
defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, the defendant argues that the trial justice
erred by proceeding with a bench trial without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial. Second, the defendant asserts that the
trial justice erred by finding habitual neglect in this case. For the reasons set forth
herein, we vacate the judgment of the Family Court.
1
General Laws 1956 § 11-9-9 was amended effective June 18, 2018, vesting the
Superior Court with jurisdiction over violations of § 11-9-5. See P.L. 2018, ch. 44,
§ 1. The defendant’s trial took place in 2017, prior to this amendment.
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I
Facts and Travel
In light of the nature of defendant’s appeal now before us, we do not deem it
necessary to discuss the specific nature of the criminal activity for which defendant
stands convicted. We simply note that, in 2016, defendant was charged with “having
custody and control of [her fifteen-month-old daughter], a child under the age of
eighteen (18) years[,]” and “wrongfully caus[ing] that child to suffer for want of
proper care or oversight, in violation of * * * § 11-9-5.”
A bench trial was held over several days between September 18, 2017, and
October 6, 2017. On the second day of trial, after two witnesses had already testified,
the following exchange took place:
“[PROSECUTOR]: There was one thing brought to my
attention by one of my colleagues yesterday, that—we all
agreed that it was going to be a non-jury trial, but we have
to actually have a signed jury waiver according to the
rules. I don’t know if we’ve done that. Maybe we did.
“THE COURT: I have never seen it, but it came to me
from another judge, if you recall.
“[PROSECUTOR]: Right, yeah.
“THE COURT: Well, if you don’t have it and you should
have it, you’ll do it.
“[PROSECUTOR]: We will do it.
“(Discussion off the record * * *)
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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The State is looking for
something from my client that she can’t offer. In other
words, I mean—may we approach, your Honor, off the
record?”
The transcript indicates that a chambers conference occurred. The parties then
returned to the courtroom, presumably after defendant had executed a written waiver
of her right to a jury trial. The following colloquy occurred:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I approach with the jury
waiver form, please?
“THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. Okay. We are back on
the case of the State of Rhode Island versus Brittany
Michaud. We tried this case yesterday, and we’re back to
continued trial. It’s on the State’s case. You may proceed.
“[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, should we put the jury
waiver on the record?
“THE COURT: It’s already a stipulation. If you want to
put it on the record besides that, that’s fine.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I would just note that the jury waiver
was just executed. We had discussions prior to the trial
and immediately prior to the trial that it would be a jury
waive trial. [Defense counsel] informed me that was a
decision that he and his client made. I don’t know if he
wants to commemorate that.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I confirm it actually happened.
We have waived the right to trial by jury.
“THE COURT: You want your client to state that on the
record too?
“* * *
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“[DEFENDANT]: I acknowledge that I waive my right for
a jury.”
The trial thereafter continued with the state calling its next witness.
The trial justice rendered a bench decision on December 13, 2017, finding that
defendant was guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment of
conviction entered on January 29, 2018. 2 The defendant filed a timely appeal to this
Court.
II
Standard of Review
“When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of
review.” State v. Morais, 203 A.3d 1150, 1154 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v.
Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008)). “In construing statutes or court rules,
it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that when the language of a rule is
clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and
ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi
Corporation, Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 382 (R.I. 2016)). “If we find the statute or rule to
be unambiguous, we simply apply the plain meaning and our interpretive task is
done.” Id. (quoting Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc., 139 A.3d at 382).
2
On remand and pursuant to an order of this Court, the Family Court, on November
16, 2019, entered judgment of conviction nunc pro tunc as of January 29, 2018.
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III
Discussion
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial justice erred by conducting a bench
trial in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial and Rule 23(a) of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 Specifically, she argues that the
trial justice erred by proceeding with a bench trial without a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of defendant’s right to a jury trial. She contends that Rule
23(a) and this Court’s jurisprudence require a trial by jury unless a defendant waives
that right in open court in writing before the beginning of the trial.
As this Court has explained, “Rhode Island law is well settled that a
criminally accused defendant has an absolute right to waive a trial by jury if the
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Morais, 203 A.3d at 1154 (quoting
State v. Moran, 605 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 1992)). “‘This substantive right to invoke
a bench trial belongs to the defendant and is subject only to the procedural
requirement that a trial justice determine that the defendant understands and
accepts the consequences of executing a waiver,’ pursuant to Rule 23[(a)] of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id. (brackets omitted) (emphasis
3
We note that this Court recently approved the Family Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective January 6, 2020. At the time this case was tried, however, the
Family Court was bound by the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure for
cases such as this. Nevertheless, Rule 23(a) appears to be identical in either set of
rules. See Super. R. Crim. P. 23(a); Fam. R. Crim. P. 23(a).
-5-
added) (quoting Moran, 605 A.2d at 496). Rule 23(a) provides that “[c]ases required
to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant in open court waives a jury
trial in writing with the approval of the court.”
The defendant was charged under § 11-9-5, a felony offense, and therefore
she was constitutionally guaranteed a jury trial, absent a determination by the trial
justice that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived this right. See
Morais, 203 A.3d at 1154. However, nothing in the exchange on the second day of
the trial, nor elsewhere in the record, indicates that the trial justice made a
determination as to whether defendant understood and accepted the consequence of
executing such a waiver. Notably, the prosecutor, not the trial justice, raised the
issue of whether such a waiver had been executed; however, “determin[ing] that the
defendant understands and accepts the consequences of executing a waiver” of his
or her right to a jury trial is the responsibility of the trial justice. Moran, 605 A.2d at
496. Although “we have never proclaimed a bright line rule or even suggestions
delineating requirements for a colloquy between a trial justice and a defendant
regarding the differences between a jury trial and a non-jury trial[,]” Morais, 203
A.3d at 1158, there must be some meaningful documentation in the record indicating
that the trial justice made a determination that the defendant understood the right
that he or she was giving up, and that he or she did so voluntarily.
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There is nothing in the record before us demonstrating that the trial justice
was assured by the defendant that her waiver was made “intelligently and with full
knowledge of the consequences of [her] waiver.” Morais, 203 A.3d at 1156 (quoting
State v. Cruz, 517 A.2d 237, 243 (R.I. 1986)). Accordingly, we hold that a new trial
is required.4
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the judgment of the Family Court.
The case is remanded to the Family Court with instruction to transfer the case to the
Superior Court for a new trial. See § 11-9-9 (vesting jurisdiction for violations of
§ 11-9-5 in the Superior Court).
4
In light of the fact that we vacate the judgment on the issue of jury-trial waiver, we
need not, and shall not, reach the defendant’s second argument regarding the charge
of habitual neglect.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Brittany Michaud.
No. 2018-277-C.A.
Case Number
(P 16-114CR)
Date Opinion Filed May 26, 2021
Suttell, C.J. Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Family Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Howard I. Lipsey
For State:
Mariana E. Ormonde
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:
Kara J. Maguire
Office of the Public Defender
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)