William A. Bettez v. Robert A. Bettez ( 2015 )

Supreme Court
No. 2013-305-Appeal.
(PP 12-4239)
William A. Bettez :
v. :
Robert A. Bettez et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
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corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2013-305-Appeal.
(PP 12-4239)
William A. Bettez :
v. :
Robert A. Bettez et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on April 8,
2015, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in
this appeal should not summarily be decided. The plaintiff, William A. Bettez (William),1
appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, Robert A. Bettez (Robert),
Ronald A. Bettez (Ronald), and Attorney Daniel Stone (Attorney Stone) as co-executors of the
estate of Rudolph T. Bettez (collectively, defendants), dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal and
sustaining the decision of the Probate Court of the Town of Scituate allowing the last will and
testament of Rudolph T. Bettez (Rudolph). After considering the arguments advanced by
counsel, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be decided at
this time. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
Rudolph passed away on December 4, 2010. He was survived by his three sons—Robert,
Ronald, and William—as well as his second wife, Joyce Bettez (Joyce). Rudolph also had a
daughter, Deborah Bettez, who predeceased him but left two children, Sarah Vernon and Jesse
1
First names may be used throughout this decision for ease of reading. We intend no disrespect.
-1-
King. Rudolph’s four children were from his first marriage, to Barbara Bettez (Barbara), who
passed away in December 2003. Before Barbara passed away, she and Rudolph had entered into
a joint revocable trust agreement on February 13, 2003 (Bettez Trust). The Bettez Trust was
drafted by Attorney Stone. The Bettez Trust became an irrevocable trust when Barbara passed
away.
After Barbara’s death, the relationship between Rudolph and William steadily
deteriorated, to the point, according to William, that he became the “black sheep” of the family.
William testified at his deposition that “if it wasn’t for my mama, I would have beat the [****]
out of [Rudolph] after he hit [Barbara].” In addition to the animosity arising from the alleged
domestic discord, the relationship between Rudolph and William was strained based on their
financial dealings. On December 23, 2003, William executed a promissory note in favor of his
father, whereby William was to repay a loan made in the amount of $130,200 that was paid to a
company controlled by William—Global Industries & Technologies, Inc. (Global). In order to
obtain the funds necessary to loan the money to Global, Rudolph secured a bank loan. The terms
of the loan were the same terms that were extended to William in the promissory note. However,
William failed to make the monthly payments in accordance with the terms of the promissory
note; and, in 2006, Rudolph settled the debt owed to the bank by using proceeds from the sale of
a general store he owned.
Further tension arose because of William’s chronic failure to pay rent that was owing to
Rudolph, his landlord, in a timely manner. William rented both a residential and a commercial
property from his father. Rudolph—through Attorney Stone—communicated with William
regarding the terms of the lease for the two properties. On August 12, 2008, Attorney Stone
wrote that the continued nonpayment or late payment of rent would no longer be tolerated by
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Rudolph. William subsequently entered into a new lease agreement with Rudolph in November
2009, which provided that William would pay a reduced rent on a weekly basis. Despite the new
agreement, William continued to pay rent sporadically.
There were also other nonrecurring financial dealings that caused further tension between
Rudolph and William. For example, William maintained an outstanding account at a general
store owned by Rudolph. When the store eventually was sold, William claimed that Barbara
“forgave” the outstanding debt owed at the store. Also, in early 2009, William received $18,000
from Rudolph to refurbish a truck. Further evidence suggests that William received an extra
$10,000 from Rudolph when disbursements were being made by Rudolph to his children from a
trust fund.
Joyce and Rudolph began dating in March 2009, and on October 3, 2009, they were
married. In anticipation of his marriage, Rudolph contacted Attorney Stone to prepare a
prenuptial agreement and a new will. In late September 2009, Rudolph executed both
documents. The will, according to Attorney Stone, took several drafts to complete and some of
the changes had been discussed by Rudolph for several years. The new will excluded William
from a share of the Bettez Trust. However, it also released William from any debts owed to
Rudolph. The will specifically explained these changes as follows:
“My omission to make any other provision herein for my said son
[William], is due to my belief that funds heretofore advanced to
him, as loans, as rent not paid by him for properties occupied by
him personally and by his business interests, and otherwise,
constitute adequate provision for him in respect of my estate, the
estate of my late spouse, Barbara Bettez and the Bettez Trust.”
The intentional exclusion of William as a beneficiary was confirmed by Joyce, who testified in a
deposition that Rudolph had declared that “[William] had already had his share.” Furthermore, it
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was William’s observation that, during the brief courtship of Rudolph and Joyce, Rudolph was
“of his own mind.”
On December 22, 2010, Robert petitioned the Probate Court of the Town of Scituate to
admit his father’s September 2009 will to probate. On July 20, 2012, the will was admitted to
probate by a consent order entered by the Probate Court of the Town of Scituate and agreed to by
all parties. On August 6, 2012, William filed a claim of appeal in the Probate Court of the Town
of Scituate; and, later, on August 17, 2012, he filed his reasons of appeal in Superior Court.
William alleged that the judgment of the Probate Court of the Town of Scituate should be
vacated because Rudolph lacked testamentary capacity when he executed the will and because he
was subject to undue influence.2 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment that was
heard before the Superior Court on March 19, 2013. On April 17, 2013, the Superior Court
justice issued a written decision granting defendants’ motion and finding that defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Superior Court justice entered final judgment on
April 23, 2013. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews de novo a trial justice’s decision granting summary judgment.” Sola
v. Leighton, 45 A.3d 502, 506 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc., 965 A.2d
417, 424 (R.I. 2009)). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when the ‘pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as [a] matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I. 2005)).
2
Subsequently, plaintiff abandoned his claim that Rudolph lacked testamentary capacity.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s sole challenge is that Rudolph was subject to undue influence when he
executed the will.
-4-
“Although summary judgment is recognized as an extreme remedy, * * * to avoid summary
judgment the burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that ‘prove[s] the
existence of a disputed issue of material fact[.]’” Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404, 407 (R.I.
2013) (quoting Mutual Development Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., 47 A.3d 319, 323 (R.I. 2012)).
Analysis
Undue Influence
The plaintiff alleges that defendants collectively exerted undue influence over Rudolph in
order that he exclude William from any share of his estate. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that
Attorney Stone used knowledge that he obtained when he served as counsel for plaintiff to assist
in unduly influencing Rudolph, in concert with plaintiff’s siblings. The plaintiff alleges that
there existed a conflict of interest with Attorney Stone and that, therefore, his involvement in
drafting the documents was improper.3 Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that it was Barbara’s intent
that the Bettez children each receive an equal distribution from the trust and that his siblings
unduly influenced Rudolph to change the planned equal-distribution scheme.
“Undue influence is the ‘substitution of the will of [the dominant] party for the free will
and choice [of the subservient party].’” In re Estate of Picillo, 99 A.3d 975, 982 (R.I. 2014)
(quoting Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 630 (R.I. 2003)). “When determining what constitutes
undue influence, ‘a trial justice ordinarily examines the totality of [the] circumstances, including
the relationship between the parties, the physical and mental condition of the [subservient party],
the opportunity and disposition of [the] person wielding influence, and his or her acts and
declarations.’” Id. (quoting Filippi, 818 A.2d at 630). Ordinarily, “[t]he question of whether
3
Notably, Attorney Stone testified at his deposition that he performed occasional corporate work
for William and the entities with which William was associated.
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undue influence exists is a fact-intensive inquiry.” Id. (quoting Filippi, 818 A.2d at 630).
However, G.L. 1956 § 33-23-10(c) provides in pertinent part:
“If the probate appeal can be decided as a matter of law,
upon motion of the appellant or any party to the proceedings
pursuant to § 33-23-8(e), the matter shall be assigned to the formal
and special cause calendar where a briefing schedule shall be
established and the matter further assigned to a justice of the
superior court for decision based upon the record and the briefs
submitted.”
It is precisely a situation like the one before us—in which the nonmoving party fails to
produce any evidence—that § 33-23-10(c) appropriately is employed to decide this case on
summary judgment. See Campbell v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 125 A. 220, 221 (R.I.
1924) (“The evidence of opportunity, unaccompanied by evidence, direct or indirect, that such
influence was exerted, does not warrant the submission of the issue to the jury, nor will it support
a finding that the instrument was the result of undue influence. There is an entire absence of
direct evidence of such influence, nor was there anything in the case from which a reasonable
inference to that effect can be drawn. It is true, as the appellants argue, that undue influence,
from its nature, is usually exerted secretly and is difficult of proof. The lack of evidence,
however, does not warrant a resort to conjecture to establish its existence.”). The record before
us not only supports the conclusion that Rudolph was not unduly influenced when he executed
the will, but also that plaintiff has failed to raise any disputed issue of material fact that would
preclude the grant of summary judgment.4
The plaintiff’s primary contention, that Attorney Stone used certain knowledge that he
obtained while representing plaintiff to then later unduly influence Rudolph, is, as the trial justice
4
When asked at his deposition for the bases of his assertions that his siblings and Joyce exerted
undue influence over Rudolph, William replied with comments such as: “I don’t know, that
would be a million dollar question[,]” “I don’t know how[,]” and “[b]ecause [Joyce] couldn’t
stand me. She hated me because I wouldn’t put up with her bull[* * * *].”
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put it, “pure, unsubstantiated speculation that is wholly unsupported in the record.” Rather, in
his will, Rudolph specifically addressed why he decided to exclude William from any share in
the Bettez Trust. The reasons enumerated in the will—that William already had received
substantial sums from Rudolph that constituted an adequate provision—are supported by the
record and are unchallenged by William. For example, William acknowledged that he did not
make the payments due on the $130,200 promissory note. William also admitted that he paid
rent “[a]s much as possible” but agreed that this meant that he did not pay rent on a regular or
timely basis. The provision excluding William from the Bettez Trust reflected Rudolph’s belief
that, by the forgiveness of his numerous and substantial outstanding debts, William was
adequately compensated. The plaintiff’s broad-based allegations that Attorney Stone—in
conjunction with William’s siblings—somehow exerted undue influence over Rudolph are not
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment without the production of “competent
evidence that ‘prove[s] the existence of a disputed issue of material fact[.]’” Sullo, 68 A.3d at
407 (quoting Mutual Development Corp., 47 A.3d at 323).5
Even in a probate appeal proceeding such as this, at summary judgment, the nonmoving
party bears the “affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
of material fact.” Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I. 1998) (citing St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Co. v. Russo Brothers, Inc., 641 A.2d 1297, 1299 (R.I. 1994)). When the
nonmoving party fails to carry his or her burden, then summary judgment is appropriate and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. The trial justice’s decision was
predicated on the fact “that no evidence of undue influence has been set forth in opposition to the
5
The plaintiff did not allege any facts suggestive of undue influence in the traditional sense,
including evidence bearing on “the relationship between the parties, the physical and mental
condition of the grantor, the opportunity and disposition of a person wielding influence, and his
or her acts and declarations.” Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 438 (R.I. 2001).
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instant [m]otion.” We agree with this determination by the trial justice. We are satisfied that
summary judgment was proper because “the ‘pleadings, depositions, * * * [and] the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law.’” See Sola, 45 A.3d at 506 (quoting Plunkett, 869 A.2d
at 1187).6
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The
papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
6
The record discloses that plaintiff requested the trial justice to either deny the motion for
summary judgment or, in the alternative, to defer ruling on the motion as premature due to the
existence of a separate proceeding related to the Bettez Trust before the Superior Court for Kent
County. However, plaintiff does not explain or provide a meaningful discussion of why the
existence of another action should preclude the entry of summary judgment in this case.
Therefore, we decline to address the issue. See Wilkinson v. State Crime Laboratory
Commission, 788 A.2d 1129, 1131 n.1 (R.I. 2002) (“Simply stating an issue for appellate review,
without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court
in focusing on the legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.”).
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: William A. Bettez v. Robert A. Bettez et al.
CASE NO: No. 2013-305-Appeal.
(PP 12-4239)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: April 29, 2015
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Daniel A. Procaccini
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff: Jonathan L. Stanzler, Esq.
For Defendants: Barry J. Kusinitz, Esq.