In re Jake G. ( 2015 )

Supreme Court
No. 2014-113-Appeal.
(04-1450-2)
(04-1450-3)
In re Jake G. et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2014-113-Appeal.
(04-1450-2)
(04-1450-3)
In re Jake G. et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The respondent, Donald Greenslit, appeals from a
decree entered in Family Court terminating his parental rights to his children, Jake and Lily.
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and
show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After
considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that
cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or
argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decree of the Family Court.
I
Facts and Travel 1
The incident leading to the termination of respondent’s parental rights is disturbing and
gruesome. On January 22, 2012, respondent stabbed Stacie Dorego, the mother of two of his
children, while in their home. After she died, he brutally dismembered her body and began
burning her remains in a fireplace located in the basement of their house. The two children were
present in the house throughout the entirety of the incident. The respondent relayed these facts
1
We relate the facts as found by the trial justice in her bench decision and as set forth in the
Family Court record.
-1-
to members of the Johnston Police Department, claiming that he had stabbed Dorego in self-
defense.
In March 2013, respondent was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder (count 1),
failure to report a death (count 2), obstructing a police officer (count 3), and violation of a no-
contact order (count 4). 2 The respondent was sentenced to life in prison for the first-degree
murder conviction, five years on count 2, one year on count 3, and one year on count 4. All
sentences are to be served consecutively.
On January 25, 2012, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed
petitions in Family Court alleging that respondent had abused and neglected his son Jake, who
was then five years old, and his daughter Lily, who was then three years old. On June 29, 2012,
DCYF filed petitions in Family Court seeking to terminate respondent’s parental rights to both
Jake and Lily (TPR petitions). In wording substantially similar to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i),
(ii), and (vii), the TPR petitions alleged that:
“1. The father is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously
detrimental to the child, such as institutionalization of the father,
including imprisonment, of such duration as to render it
improbable for the father to care for the child for an extended
period of time.
“2. The father is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously
detrimental to the child in that the father has committed or allowed
to be committed, conduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive
nature.
“3. The father has exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously
detrimental to the child, of such a duration as to render it
improbable for the father to care for the child for an extended
period of time.”
The Family Court trial justice consolidated the neglect and termination petitions for trial, which
was held on September 25, 2013. The trial justice heard testimony from four witnesses and
2
The respondent’s appeal from the judgment of conviction, No. 2013-290-C.A., is currently
pending before this Court.
-2-
considered five sets of exhibits, including medical records from Hasbro Children’s Hospital
concerning the children’s treatment beginning January 22, 2012, respondent’s Superior Court
criminal case action sheets, 3 the Johnston Police Department’s records from the January 2012
incident, and the Family Service of Rhode Island records concerning the children’s
psychological treatment during the year and a half after their mother’s murder.
Sergeant Joseph Salvadore, one of the members of the Johnston Police Department who
had responded to respondent’s home on January 22, 2012, was the first witness to testify at trial.
He testified that, when he arrived, he saw respondent in front of the residence and observed
respondent “yelling, swearing” and being “very confrontational physically with his body.”
Sergeant Salvadore further testified that, from prior dispatches to this residence for domestic
disturbances, he knew that two children and a woman resided at this address along with
respondent. He also stated that he observed the children “being taken out of the residence by fire
personnel” and then he followed the rescue to Hasbro Children’s Hospital. At the hospital, Sgt.
Salvadore spoke with each child separately and testified that both were wearing oxygen masks.
Sergeant Salvadore also testified that Jake had told him that he had smelled smoke in the house
and that Lily had told him that she saw “black stuff” and coughed.
Helder Ramos, a child protective investigator with DCYF, testified next. Ramos had
been assigned to investigate a call that DCYF received from Hasbro Children’s Hospital. Ramos
testified that “Jake reported the house was full of smoke, his father was outside, and that the
mother was at the beach.” Ramos also testified that he had visited respondent at the Adult
Correctional Institutions’ (ACI) “Intake Department” and that respondent had admitted that Jake
3
The attorney for DCYF presented the trial justice with a certified copy of the criminal case
action/warrant for commitment sheet in lieu of the judgment of conviction form because the
attorney was not able to locate the Superior Court’s file for respondent’s criminal prosecution on
the charges that stemmed from the events of January 22, 2012.
-3-
might have seen his mother dead on the floor. Ramos also stated that respondent had admitted to
leaving the children alone for about fifteen minutes, but that respondent would not disclose
where he had gone. Ramos indicated the case for both neglect and abuse.
Cheryl Dill, a marriage and family therapist with Family Service of Rhode Island, was
qualified to testify as an expert in trauma-based therapy. Dill worked with Jake and Lily from
March 2012 until May 2013. Dill testified that, when she began working with the children, Jake
was “developmentally delayed in many areas - - speech, activities of daily living. * * * He had
no social skills. He didn’t understand basic boundaries, would get in people’s space, touch them
inappropriately, go up to kids on the playground and get in their space, climb on the laps of kids
in school * * *.” Dill further testified that Jake exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), including nightmares, flat affect, and “a lot of talk about death.” As to Lily,
Dill testified that her physical neglect was “extreme. She was very, very weak, couldn’t climb
stairs, very underweight, very difficult to understand her, her speech. * * * Emotionally she too
was showing some signs of attachment disorder, and * * * again, boundary issues, climbing into
anybody’s lap, running up and hugging anybody.” Dill further testified that Lily’s PTSD
symptoms included not going to sleep, screaming from bed, and deliberately wetting her pants
during the day.
Jake and Lily were placed with their maternal aunt, and lived with their two cousins and
their foster father. Dill testified that both children “wanted very much to immediately integrate
with their new foster family.” Dill further testified that, after three to four months of therapy, it
was “clinically striking” that both children did not “talk more about missing their mother, and it
surprised [her] that they didn’t talk more about wanting to go home. They very much just
wanted to be in the present. They were angry with their father.” Dill also relayed that Jake and
-4-
Lily referred to their foster parents as mom and dad within three days of living with them, and
they referred to respondent as “bad dad.” After approximately fifteen months of living with their
foster family, Dill testified that “[t]he kids were thriving in the home environment, very
comfortable there, sleeping well, eating well, had gained activities of daily living skills, were not
afraid anymore of most of the things they’d been afraid of before, were no longer talking about
the trauma incident or constant talk of death and dying.” Dill opined that the children “would be
best off staying in their current placement. It’s been a stable placement, and they seem to be
very comfortable there and feel like part of the family now. * * * [I]t would be harmful to them
to be moved out of that placement.”
Bethany Gregor, a social caseworker with DCYF, testified about the variety of both
home-based and community services that had been provided to the children. Gregor testified
that, based on her personal observations of the children in their foster home, the relationship
between the children, their aunt, and their foster father was “very close” and “very bonded.” 4
On November 26, 2013, the trial justice held a permanency hearing, at which respondent
testified. The respondent stated that he had not received “proper representation” and that he had
“filed suit against [his attorney] th[at] week in [f]ederal [c]ourt.” The respondent testified that he
had been the primary caregiver for the children since their respective births because their mother
had not become “attached,” that he had done the dishes, all the baths, and cooked all of the
meals. The respondent further testified that he could not work because the children’s mother had
4
Gregor also testified that, in June 2012, DCYF had evaluated respondent’s adult daughter,
Christine (Jake and Lily’s half-sister), for potential placement of the children with her. Gregor
further testified that Christine, who lived in Florida, had expressed an interest and willingness to
have the children live with her; but, according to Gregor, placement was not approved because
Christine’s home only had one bedroom. Gregor acknowledged that Christine had not contacted
her again and that no other member of respondent’s family had contacted DCYF regarding
placement of the children.
-5-
been unable to care for them, but that he had an annuity fund as a result of being a union
carpenter. At respondent’s request, his attorney represented to the court that respondent’s
mother and brother were willing and able to take Jake and Lily. The attorney for DCYF stated,
however, that while respondent’s mother and brother had been helpful to the children’s DCYF
social caseworker, neither had expressed a willingness to explore placement of the children with
them.
On February 25, 2014, the trial justice rendered a detailed bench decision granting
DCYF’s petitions. Before she read her decision, she noted that the Family Court had been
advised that respondent’s attorney, who had represented him during the trial, would not be able
to appear for the bench decision because he was at a hearing in Superior Court; she added that he
had indicated his intent to file a motion to withdraw because respondent had filed a disciplinary
complaint against him as well as a lawsuit against him in federal court. 5 The trial justice asked
another attorney “to sit in and to take notes on behalf of the respondent and to consult with the
respondent if necessary regarding the decision.” Substitute counsel entered his appearance on
behalf of respondent. The trial justice also stated that “the [c]ourt, of course, will grant you a lot
of leeway in terms of any suggestions or motions that you might want to make when the decision
has ended today or in the very near future * * *.” 6
5
On March 3, 2014, respondent’s attorney did in fact file a motion in the Family Court to
withdraw as counsel due to a conflict between him and his client. The respondent’s attorney
attached a copy of the disciplinary complaint form to his motion; the form had been filed with
this Court on February 6, 2014. The trial justice granted this motion on March 17, 2014. During
oral argument before us, respondent’s appellate counsel represented to us that respondent had not
actually filed a lawsuit against his attorney.
6
After the trial justice completed her bench decision, she reiterated that substitute counsel could
put any additions or amendments on the record, but that she would have to schedule another date
because it was so late in the afternoon that respondent had to be taken back to the ACI.
-6-
In her decision, the trial justice summarized the testimony provided by the witnesses and
the contents of the exhibits filed by the state. The trial justice stated that she found each of the
four witnesses to be truthful and credible, and she made twenty-two formal findings of fact
regarding respondent’s actions on January 22, 2012, and the consequences that emanated
therefrom. Based on these findings of fact, she found that “respondent ha[d] indeed abused and
neglected Lily and Jake [G.];” and she ordered that “Lily and Jake are now committed to the
care, custody, and control of DCYF.”
The trial justice also found “that [respondent] ha[d] been in jail since January of 2012 and
there [we]re no other viable members of * * * respondent’s family who could have the placement
of the two children.” The trial justice found “by clear and convincing evidence that the
children’s lives ha[d] been enriched by placement with their aunt” and described the progress
that Jake and Lily had made socially and educationally. The trial justice also found “that DCYF
ha[d] proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent [wa]s unfit as a parent,” and
the trial justice described the facts on which she relied to find that DCYF had proven each of the
three bases that DCYF had set forth in the TPR petitions. The trial justice also found as a fact
that “it is in the children’s best interests to know that they can enjoy a permanent home with their
loving aunt and her family.”
Ultimately, the trial justice terminated respondent’s parental rights to Jake and Lily in
accordance with § 15-7-7(a)(2). The respondent filed a notice of appeal on March 17, 2014. 7
The decree terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children was entered on April 9, 2014.
7
Although respondent filed a notice of appeal before the decree had entered, we treat his notice
of appeal as valid. See State v. Wray, 38 A.3d 1102, 1107 n.15 (R.I. 2012); State v. Chase, 9
A.3d 1248, 1252 n.2 (R.I. 2010).
-7-
II
Standard of Review
When we are presented with an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, “we
remain keenly mindful that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children.” In re Jah-nell B., 116 A.3d 784, 791 (R.I. 2015)
(quoting In re Isabella M., 66 A.3d 825, 830 (R.I. 2013)). This Court reviews the record to
determine whether legal and competent evidence lends support to the trial justice’s ruling. Id.
“In conducting this review, ‘a trial justice’s findings are entitled to great weight and will not be
overturned unless we determine that they are clearly wrong or the trial justice overlooked or
misconceived material evidence.’” Id. (quoting In re Evelyn C., 68 A.3d 70, 77 (R.I. 2013)).
“[I]n order to permanently sever the rights of a parent in his or her children, the trial justice must
make a determination that the parent is unfit and [t]he state must prove parental unfitness by
clear and convincing evidence in order to satisfy the parent’s right to due process.” Id. (quoting
In re Isabella M., 66 A.3d at 830). “However, ‘upon a determination of parental unfitness, the
best interests of the child outweigh all other considerations.’” Id. (quoting In re Isabella M., 66
A.3d at 830).
III
Discussion
A
Appointment of Substitute Counsel
The respondent asserts that his “due process rights were trampled on” by the trial justice
when she rendered her findings of fact and decision immediately after she had appointed
substitute counsel “as a friend of the [c]ourt * * * to sit in and to take notes on behalf of the
-8-
respondent and to consult with the respondent if necessary regarding the decision.” The
respondent contends that the trial justice should have continued the hearing to allow the newly
appointed substitute counsel sufficient time to review the record and exhibits and meet with
respondent. The guardian ad litem (GAL) contends that this issue has not been properly
preserved because there is no indication on the record that either respondent, his trial attorney, or
substitute counsel objected to the decision being rendered as scheduled on February 25, 2014.
Nonetheless, the GAL addresses this issue by arguing that, even with a timely objection before
the trial justice, any error would have been harmless because the trial justice advised substitute
counsel that he would be granted “a lot of leeway” and asked him to pay close attention to what
she said because he would have an opportunity to suggest corrections or additions. For its part,
DCYF argues that the trial justice did not have an obligation to render her decision from the
bench with respondent present as she could have issued a written decision instead. DCYF also
argues that there are no specific due process rights associated with the manner in which a trial
justice renders a decision on a TPR petition.
After carefully reviewing the record, we discern no error in the manner in which the trial
justice proceeded to render her decision. Assuming without deciding that the issue has been
properly preserved, we fail to see any due process rights that have been implicated. The trial
justice in this case was not obligated to render her decision from the bench; she could have
simply chosen to file a written decision. Thus her reading of the lengthy decision, comprising
over seventy-two transcript pages, was essentially a formality.
Contrary to respondent’s contentions on appeal, the record discloses that the trial justice
was being very solicitous of his rights. While ‘“[a] parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is * * * a commanding one,’” we have
-9-
previously held that “there is no mandate to appoint substitute counsel after a respondent has
discharged an appointed counsel.” In re Bryce T., 764 A.2d 718, 721 (R.I. 2001) (quoting
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981)). Rule 18(c) of the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings provides that “[a]
preliminary hearing shall be held on [a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights] for
the court to * * * (4) Appoint an attorney to represent the parent(s) and any person having such
care or custody of such child when said parent(s) or custodian [is] unable to afford such
representation[.]” There is no dispute that counsel was appointed to represent respondent at the
trial on DCYF’s petitions. Rule 18(c), however, does not provide a right to substitute counsel in
the event that a parent discharges the counsel assigned to them. See In re Bryce T., 764 A.2d at
721.
Although respondent’s trial attorney had not yet withdrawn as counsel before the trial
justice rendered her decision, respondent had effectively discharged him when respondent filed a
disciplinary complaint against him. The trial justice had been advised that respondent’s attorney
intended to file a motion to withdraw and commented that “it [was] very clear that there [wa]s
now a conflict between [respondent’s attorney] and [respondent].” Even though respondent was
not entitled to substitute counsel, the trial justice asked another attorney to enter his appearance
and to represent respondent while she rendered her decision from the bench. 8 She explicitly
stated that substitute counsel would be granted “a lot of leeway in terms of any suggestions or
motions that [he] might want to make when the decision has ended today or in the very near
future * * *.” The trial justice did not, therefore, infringe respondent’s due process rights when
she proceeded to render her decision to terminate his parental rights without the presence of his
8
We note that the attorney in question is an experienced attorney and well-known to the Family
Court.
- 10 -
trial attorney. Furthermore, respondent has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced in any way
by either said attorney’s absence during the bench decision or by substitute counsel entering his
appearance immediately prior to it. Significantly, the decree terminating respondent’s parental
rights was not entered until April 9, 2014, affording both respondent and substitute counsel
ample opportunity to raise any objections or suggest corrections to the trial justice’s findings of
fact.
B
Finding of Parental Unfitness
The respondent also asserts that the trial justice erred by finding that DCYF had proved
by clear and convincing evidence that he was unfit to parent his two minor children. As DCYF
and the GAL counter, however, the respondent did not indicate any specific error in the trial
justice’s finding of unfitness and he did not support his position with either facts or law. This
Court generally “consider[s] an issue to be waived when a party ‘[s]imply stat[es] an issue for
appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues * * *.’”
Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160, 1170 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State
v. Chase, 9 A.3d 1248, 1256 (R.I. 2010)). Since the respondent has not provided any discussion
regarding why or how DCYF failed to prove that he was an unfit parent, this issue is not properly
before us for review. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the trial justice overlooked or
misconceived material evidence or that she was clearly wrong when she found that the
respondent was an unfit parent. The trial justice’s finding was supported by a detailed review of
the evidence before her, and she made specific findings of fact on which she explicitly based her
decision.
- 11 -
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decree of the Family Court terminating the
respondent’s parental rights. The record of this case shall be returned to the Family Court.
- 12 -
RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: In re Jake G. et al.
CASE NOS: No. 2014-113-Appeal.
(04-1450-2)
(04-1450-3)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: November 16, 2015
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Family Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Chief Judge Haiganush R. Bedrosian
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Petitioner: Karen A. Clark
Department of Children Youth and Families
Lynn M. Radiches
Court Appointed Special Advocate
For Respondent: Christopher S. Gontarz, Esq.