State v. Juan Gibson ( 2015 )

Supreme Court
No. 2014-248-C.A.
(P2/05-2017A)
No. 2014-249-C.A.
(P2/10-2070A)
No. 2014-250-C.A.
(P2/12-416A)
State :
v. :
Juan Gibson. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2014-248-C.A.
(P2/05-2017A)
No. 2014-249-C.A.
(P2/10-2070A)
No. 2014-250-C.A.
(P2/12-416A)
State :
v. :
Juan Gibson. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
October 1, 2015, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The defendant, Juan Gibson
(Gibson or defendant), appeals from an adjudication by a justice of the Superior Court declaring
him in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. The defendant contends that the
trial justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding a violation. Having carefully reviewed
the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that cause
has not been shown, and the appeal may be decided at this time. We affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
In the early morning hours of May 19, 2013, a violent home invasion occurred at
112 Dawson Street in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. According to the description related by the
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complainant, Jeffrey Lebrun (Jeffrey),1 to the responding officers of the Pawtucket Police
Department,2 the invasion was perpetrated by two males, dressed in black and wearing ski
masks. Armed with a knife, the shorter of the two perpetrators grabbed Jeffrey’s neck from
behind while he was sitting on his couch and began choking him. As Jeffrey struggled with his
attacker for possession of the knife, the second assailant, whom Jeffrey later described as
approximately five-feet-eight inches to five-feet-ten inches in height, pushed Jeffrey’s head
down on the couch. During this struggle, Jeffrey called out to awaken his wife, Sheri, for help.
Sheri got out of bed and ran down the stairs in time to see Jeffrey struggling with one of the
intruders.3 Sheri then called 911, and the assailants fled.4
Shortly after Sheri’s 911 call, then-Pawtucket Police Patrolman (now Sergeant) Eric
Bucka (Sgt. Bucka) received a radio description of the suspects, indicating that the perpetrators
were “two males dressed in all black, with masks, black sweatshirts, black pants, black shoes.”
Approximately one block from the crime scene, Sgt. Bucka encountered Gibson, who was
wearing black sneakers, black pants, and a white shirt, but no sweatshirt. In response to Sgt.
Bucka’s questioning, Gibson stated that he was coming from his girlfriend’s house in Attleboro,
Massachusetts. After a few minutes, Sgt. Bucka and Gibson parted ways.
1
To distinguish Jeffrey Lebrun from his wife, we refer to the Lebruns by their first names.
2
By the time of defendant’s probation violation hearing, Jeffrey Lebrun had died.
3
Sheri testified that, unlike Jeffrey, she saw only one intruder.
4
A recording of Sheri’s 911 call was played for the trial justice, and both that recording and a
transcript of it were admitted as full exhibits at Gibson’s probation violation hearing. However,
after the hearing, the exhibits were permanently withdrawn for use at future proceedings.
Consequently, the record before this Court contains neither the recording of the 911 call nor the
transcript of that recording.
-2-
In the aftermath of the tumultuous events at the Lebrun residence, several items
attributable to the perpetrators were uncovered at the scene and in the surrounding neighborhood.
Police obtained latex gloves outside of the home at 112 Dawson Street, and a backpack
containing various break-in tools was found inside the dwelling. Additionally, police found the
knife wielded by one of the assailants inside the home. Later that morning, Patrolman Carl
Barovier (Ptlm. Barovier) was summoned to a home one and a half blocks away from the crime
scene at 90 County Street, the same street on which Sgt. Bucka had stopped Gibson earlier that
morning. When Ptlm. Barovier arrived, the residents informed him that, when they awoke that
morning, a black sweatshirt was discovered on their lawn, inside their six-foot stockade fence.
The sweatshirt was tossed back over the fence by the homeowners and was situated between the
road and the fence at 90 County Street. Patrolman Barovier placed the sweatshirt into an
evidence bag and returned to 112 Dawson Street to show it to the Lebruns. Both Jeffrey and
Sheri confirmed that the black sweatshirt looked like the sweatshirt that one of the intruders was
wearing.
All the evidence recovered by the Pawtucket Police investigators was sent to the Rhode
Island Department of Health (DOH) for DNA testing.5 Tamara Wong (Wong), a forensic
biologist employed by the DOH and an expert in DNA testing, explained the results of the DNA
5
The road to DNA testing of this evidence was a somewhat winding one. Shortly after the
break-in in May 2013, the gloves found outside 112 Dawson Street were sent to the DOH. In
July 2013, Jeffrey was murdered in his home, and, in August 2013, Pawtucket Police Detective
Charles Devine (Det. Devine) was assigned to investigate both the murder and the home
invasion. In connection with the investigation, Det. Devine ordered the transfer of the remaining
items of evidence from the home invasion—the black sweatshirt, the knife, and the break-in tools
from the backpack found at the crime scene—to the DOH. After Det. Devine learned that DNA
extracted from the collar of the sweatshirt matched the DNA profile of a convicted offender
named Juan A. Gibson from a DNA indexing system known as CODIS (Combined DNA Index
System), he apprehended Gibson. A buccal swab was then taken from Gibson and transferred to
the DOH for comparison analysis.
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testing of this evidence. Wong testified that a saliva stain on the right shoulder of the black
sweatshirt matched Jeffrey’s DNA profile. Additionally, DNA was extracted from the collar of
the sweatshirt, and this extracted DNA matched Gibson’s DNA profile.6 Wong also testified that
she examined other items found at the scene—the glove and a piece of cord or clothesline found
in the backpack—and that the DNA profiles were consistent with Gibson’s DNA profile; she
elaborated that twenty-one of the twenty-three loci in the profile found on both the glove and the
piece of cord or clothesline matched Gibson’s DNA profile. During questioning from Det.
Devine following Gibson’s apprehension in March 2014, Gibson told Det. Devine that, on the
night of the home invasion, his car broke down while he was coming back from North
Attleborough,7 he was walking home, and he had to call AAA to take care of the car.
Gibson was serving suspended sentences for three separate drug convictions and was on
probation as a result. First, in 2005, Gibson entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver and was sentenced to ten years at the Adult
Correctional Institutions (ACI), two years to serve and the remaining eight years suspended, with
probation.8 Second, in 2010, Gibson entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of cocaine
and possession of marijuana, and he was sentenced to six years at the ACI, one year to serve and
6
Wong testified that there is a mere one-in-fifty-six-trillion chance that the DNA from the
sweatshirt collar does not belong to Gibson. On cross-examination, Wong testified that the DNA
extracted from the sweatshirt collar was so-called “touch DNA,” which consists of “anything that
comes in contact with skin or epithelial cells that can be shedded.” Wong acknowledged that the
presence of Gibson’s touch DNA on the sweatshirt collar did not necessarily mean that he ever
wore the sweatshirt; if he simply touched the collar, his touch DNA could have transferred to the
collar.
7
Although Det. Devine remembers Gibson saying that he was coming back from North
Attleborough, he acknowledged that Gibson could have said Attleboro instead.
8
Gibson had previously been adjudicated a probation violator on this sentence; at the time of the
probation violation hearing in this case, eighty-two months remained on the 2005 sentence.
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five years suspended, with probation. Finally, in 2012, Gibson entered a plea of nolo contendere
to possession of an enumerated quantity of cocaine and was sentenced to nine years at the ACI,
eighteen months to serve and ninety months suspended, with probation. Accordingly, on March
27, 2014, the state filed, pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, notices of probation violation in each of these three cases. At the probation violation
hearing, in addition to the evidence recounted above, Sheri testified that she knew Gibson
through a friendship with his wife and that, although Gibson had been to the back porch of the
Lebrun home at 112 Dawson Street, he had never been inside the residence.
After considering the evidence, the trial justice was “more than reasonably satisfied” that
Gibson violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The trial justice found that two
aspects of the black sweatshirt that police had recovered—and that Sheri and Jeffrey identified as
similar to the sweatshirts worn by the perpetrators—were indicative of defendant’s involvement
in the break-in: (1) the discovery of the sweatshirt close to the crime scene, evidently discarded
over a fence by one of the perpetrators; and (2) the fact that both Gibson’s and Jeffrey’s DNA
were found on the sweatshirt. The trial justice was also “trouble[d]” that Gibson “told [Sgt.]
Bucka one story and [Det.] Devine a different one.” He reasoned that, if Gibson’s car had
broken down and he was waiting for AAA to assist him, then it was “odd” that he had not
relayed these important facts to Sgt. Bucka. Although acknowledging Sheri’s testimony that she
saw only one intruder, the trial justice found that there were two intruders. He noted that Sheri’s
“911 recording makes it quite clear that she is speaking of two assailants.” Additionally, the trial
justice did not deem the discrepancy between Gibson’s height—somewhere between six-feet-one
and six-feet-two—and Jeffrey’s estimation of the height of the taller intruder—approximately
five-feet-eight to five-feet-ten—to be significant. He noted the approximate nature of Jeffrey’s
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estimation and reasoned that gauging an individual’s height while simultaneously fending off
armed home invaders is a difficult task.
The trial justice (1) ordered that the eighty-two months that remained on the suspended
sentence imposed in 2005 be served at the ACI; (2) removed the five years remaining on the
suspended sentence imposed in 2010 and ordered that Gibson serve that time at the ACI,
concurrent with the time to be served on the 2005 sentence; and (3) ordered that the ninety-
month suspended sentence imposed in 2012 be continued, with the same conditions and terms.
Gibson timely appealed.
Standard of Review
A probation violation hearing has a singular focus: determining whether the conditions of
probation—namely, “[k]eeping the peace and remaining on good behavior—have been violated.”
State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d 45, 48
(R.I. 2012)). Unlike the burden of proof at a criminal trial, the state’s burden in the probation
violation context is far less exacting; the state need only “prove to the reasonable satisfaction of
the [trial] justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously
imposed probation.”9 Id. (quoting Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 48). We review a trial justice’s
adjudication of probation violation deferentially, reversing only where the trial justice “acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation.” Id. (quoting Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 48).
Challenges to a trial justice’s credibility determinations typically are unavailing in this Court
because the assessment of witness credibility “in a probation violation hearing is a function of
the [trial] justice, not this Court.” Id. (quoting Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 49).
9
Consistent with the sole purpose of a probation violation hearing, the reasonable-satisfaction
standard is employed to determine only whether the terms and conditions of probation were
violated, not whether defendant is guilty of the offenses that form the basis of the violation
allegation. See State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013).
-6-
Analysis
On appeal, Gibson offers several reasons why, in his view, the trial justice acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in finding him to be a probation violator. None is persuasive. First,
Gibson argues that the trial justice erroneously credited Jeffrey’s statements that there were two
perpetrators over Sheri’s testimony that she saw only one. We discern no error in this regard.
Jeffrey struggled with the two intruders from the outset of the home invasion, while Sheri
witnessed the break-in only after Jeffrey awakened her with his calls for help. By the time Sheri
arrived downstairs, one of the perpetrators may have fled, as did the assailant Sheri saw soon
after she came downstairs. Additionally, in his decision, the trial justice did address Sheri’s
testimony that she saw only one intruder, but he noted that she referred to two perpetrators in her
911 call. Because the trial justice considered all of the evidence, accepted Jeffrey’s version for
plausible reasons, and rationally rejected the inference that Gibson sought to draw from Sheri’s
testimony that she saw only one intruder, he did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding
that there were two intruders. See Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 49.
Gibson next claims that, because he is at least four inches taller than the taller of the two
intruders that Jeffrey identified, he could not have been involved in the break-in. The trial justice
considered this argument and rejected it because of the approximate nature of Jeffrey’s height
estimation and the difficulty in accurately pinpointing a person’s height in the midst of a frantic
struggle. We are satisfied that discounting the significance of the height discrepancy for the
reasons articulated by the trial justice does not lead to an arbitrary or capricious conclusion.
Gibson also faults the trial justice for placing too much reliance on the DNA evidence
found on the black sweatshirt and on Gibson’s statements to Sgt. Bucka and Det. Devine; he
contends that this evidence, although incriminating at first blush, does not establish that Gibson
-7-
was one of the intruders. With respect to the DNA found on the sweatshirt, Gibson argues that
the touch DNA “might * * * have been transferred to the sweatshirt unremarkably, and
innocently, in any number of different exchanges” between Gibson and Jeffrey prior to the night
of the home invasion. Finally, with respect to his statements, Gibson contends that the
statements he gave to Sgt. Bucka and Det. Devine were not inconsistent: he was walking home
from his girlfriend’s house in Attleboro, as he told Sgt. Bucka, because his car broke down on his
way home, as he told Det. Devine. These contentions are unavailing. The weight of the
evidence in a probation hearing rests with the trial justice.
Gibson was found approximately one block from the crime scene shortly after the police
were called, and he was wearing black pants and black sneakers and no jacket or outerwear.
However, a black sweatshirt—matching the description of the clothing worn by the suspects—
was found within the same proximity of the crime scene, apparently thrown over a fence on the
night of the break-in. That sweatshirt, which matched the sweatshirts worn by the perpetrators,
contained Gibson’s DNA on the collar and Jeffrey’s DNA on the right shoulder. Although it is
possible that there is an unremarkable and innocent explanation for how this evidence—
containing both Gibson’s and the victim’s DNA—wound up behind a stockade fence near the
crime scene, the trial justice properly rejected that speculation. He was not required to turn a
blind eye to the highly probative and incriminating nature of this evidence. His conclusion that
this evidence pointed towards Gibson’s involvement in the home invasion was neither arbitrary
nor capricious. See State v. McLaughlin, 935 A.2d 938, 942 (R.I. 2007) (“The hearing justice
can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented to determine whether the defendant
violated the terms of his probation.” (quoting State v. Seamans, 935 A.2d 618, 621-22 (R.I.
2007))).
-8-
The same can be said for the discrepancy between Gibson’s statements to the
investigating officers. He told Det. Devine that his car broke down and that he needed to call
AAA. The trial justice found it “odd” that, if car failure was the true reason for Gibson’s
presence in the vicinity of the crime scene in the early morning hours of May 19, 2013, Gibson
did not report his car troubles to Sgt. Bucka. Although one could reconcile Gibson’s statements
to Sgt. Bucka and Det. Devine, the trial justice’s conclusion that Gibson told different stories to
the two officers is reasonable. See McLaughlin, 935 A.2d at 942.
Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probation.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: State v. Juan Gibson.
CASE NOS: No. 2014-248-C.A.
(P2/05-2017A)
No. 2014-249-C.A.
(P2/10-2070A)
No. 2014-250-C.A.
(P2/12-416A)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: November 4, 2015
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Robert D. Krause
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For State: Virginia M. McGinn
Department of Attorney General
For Defendant: Lara Montecalvo
Office of the Public Defender