Gregory H. Andrews v. Beverly Plouff ( 2013 )

Supreme Court
No. 2011-348-Appeal.
(NC 08-677)
Gregory H. Andrews et al. :
v. :
Beverly Plouff. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
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corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2011-348-Appeal.
(NC 08-677)
Gregory H. Andrews et al. :
v. :
Beverly Plouff. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Robinson, for the Court. A Superior Court jury found that the plaintiffs,
Gregory H. and Christina G. Andrews, were entitled to the return of their deposit after a
residential real estate transaction came to naught. On appeal, we must decide whether the trial
court properly included prejudgment interest in the judgment for plaintiffs.
This case is before the Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why
the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the
record, the memoranda submitted to this Court on behalf of the parties, and the oral arguments of
counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be resolved
without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the
award of prejudgment interest.
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I
Facts and Travel
This case arose from a failed real estate transaction. In June of 2008, defendant Beverly
Plouff’s property on Shore Road in Tiverton was listed for sale. On June 29 of that year,
plaintiffs Gregory and Christina Andrews, being interested in purchasing the property, signed a
purchase and sales agreement and submitted it to defendant. The agreement stated that the
purchase price was $490,000. As provided for in the agreement, plaintiffs deposited $49,000
with defendant’s real estate agent to be held in escrow until the parties closed on the transaction.
On July 2, 2008, defendant signed the agreement. However, she also made certain
handwritten alterations to the contract. For example, the original agreement signed by plaintiffs
provided that defendant would ―pay the cost of [a] new septic design and installation‖; the
handwritten changes, however, placed a cap of $30,000 on that obligation. Further, the original
agreement provided that defendant would ―pay for installation of [a] new water tank and
systems‖; again, defendant’s handwritten changes placed a cap of $10,000 on that obligation and
also imposed an obligation on plaintiffs to ―make earnest attempt[s] to‖ connect to a well before
defendant would be responsible for the installation of a new water tank and system.
On December 1, 2008, plaintiffs Gregory and Christina Andrews filed a complaint
against defendant Beverly Plouff in Newport Superior Court. In their complaint, plaintiffs
alleged that defendant’s handwritten alterations were ―material changes‖ which ―constituted a
counter-offer, not an acceptance of [plaintiffs’] offer to purchase‖ the property. The plaintiffs
alleged that the parties then engaged in further negotiations, but could not reach an agreement.
The plaintiffs’ complaint stated that, ―[s]ince there was never a valid contract between the parties
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for the purchase and sale of the [property], the [plaintiffs] are entitled to the return of the $49,000
deposit.‖
On January 31, 2011, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor. Pursuant to the
verdict form, the jury found as follows:
―Plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that
they did not enter into a binding, written contract with Defendant
to buy the Defendant’s property for $490,000 [on] Shore Road,
Tiverton, Rhode Island, in July, 2008 and [are] entitled to the
return of their deposit of $49,000.00.‖
That same day, the trial court entered a civil judgment on the verdict, which added 12 percent
interest per annum to the $49,000 judgment. The amount of interest was $15,239.67,1 which
brought the total amount of the judgment to $64,239.67.
On February 9, 2011, defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule
59(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. She argued that plaintiffs were ―entitled to
[the] return of their deposit of $49,000 but with no interest thereon.‖ The trial court held a
hearing on the motion on May 13, 2011; the hearing justice denied defendant’s motion from the
bench. On May 20, 2011, the court entered a written order memorializing its decision. The
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
Issue on Appeal
On appeal, defendant contends that the motion justice erred when he denied her motion to
alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). She argues that, under G.L. 1956 § 9-21-10,
prejudgment interest applies only to awards for ―pecuniary damages.‖ She contends that the trial
1
The amount of interest appears to have been calculated from June 29, 2008—the day that
plaintiffs deposited the $49,000 with defendant.
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court should not have included prejudgment interest because plaintiffs’ award—viz., the return
of their deposit—was a reimbursement rather than an award of pecuniary damages.
III
Standard of Review
Since the sole issue raised by defendant on appeal presents an issue of law, we review
that issue de novo. Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I. 2009).
IV
Analysis
It is our opinion that the return of plaintiffs’ deposit does not fall within the category of
―pecuniary damages‖ under § 9-21-10(a) and that, therefore, plaintiffs were not entitled to
prejudgment interest.
Statutory prejudgment interest is governed by § 9-21-10(a). That statute provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
―In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a
decision made for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the
clerk of the court to the amount of damages interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum thereon from the date the cause of
action accrued, which shall be included in the judgment entered
therein.‖ (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs first argue that the award of prejudgment interest should be affirmed
because § 9-21-10(a) provides for interest in two scenarios: (1) when ―a verdict is rendered‖ and
(2) when ―a decision [is] made for pecuniary damages.‖ In other words, they contend that the
General Assembly’s use of the disjunctive ―or‖ means that the ―pecuniary damages‖ requirement
applies only to ―decision[s] made,‖ and not to ―verdict[s] * * * rendered.‖ They argue that, since
their award came from a jury verdict, they are entitled to prejudgment interest regardless of
whether the award constitutes ―pecuniary damages.‖
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We disagree with plaintiffs’ statutory analysis. If we accepted plaintiffs’ argument, we
would have to conclude that the General Assembly intended prejudgment interest to apply to
every jury ―verdict‖—yet, by contrast, only to those ―decisions‖ by a trial justice which involve
―pecuniary damages.‖ We perceive no basis for concluding that the General Assembly created
such an arbitrary (and indeed absurd) distinction. See, e.g., Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d
68, 71 (R.I. 2011) (―[S]tatutes should not be construed to achieve meaningless or absurd results.‖
(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is our opinion that the ―pecuniary damages‖ requirement
of § 9-21-10(a) applies to both jury verdicts and trial justices’ decisions.
We therefore must address whether or not the return of the deposit in this case represents
―pecuniary damages‖ under § 9-21-10(a). We addressed this issue in Bogosian v. Bederman,
823 A.2d 1117 (R.I. 2003). In that case, the plaintiffs agreed to buy real estate from the
defendants. Id. at 1118–19. The parties signed an agreement, but the sale never closed ―due to
the rapid deterioration of the relationship between the parties.‖ Id. at 1119. The plaintiffs filed a
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against the defendants. Id. After a bench trial, plaintiffs
were eventually awarded the return of their deposit plus statutory interest. Id. On appeal, we
held as follows:
―The return of a deposit is simply a reimbursement rather
than an award of pecuniary damages, and thus the plaintiffs are not
entitled to the addition of statutory interest.‖ Id. at 1121 (citing
Rhode Island Insurer’s Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Manufacturing
Co., 763 A.2d 590, 597–98 (R.I. 2000)).
We believe that Bogosian controls the case that is now before us. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs’ prayer for relief requested the trial court simply to ―[o]rder defendant to return to them
their deposit.‖ Further, the jury’s verdict form indicates that the jury found that the plaintiffs
were ―entitled to the return of their deposit.‖ Bogosian clearly indicates that such relief is a
reimbursement, not an award of ―pecuniary damages‖ that would entitle the plaintiffs to statutory
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interest under § 9-21-10(a).2 We therefore hold that the motion justice erred when he denied the
defendant’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment to remove prejudgment interest
from the award.
V
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the award of prejudgment interest in
this case. The record may be remanded to the Superior Court.
2
We note that our holding does not preclude every plaintiff from recovering prejudgment
interest whenever a deposit is at issue. For example, if a plaintiff were awarded damages in a
breach of contract case involving a deposit, then that plaintiff might well be entitled to statutory
interest under G.L. 1956 § 9-21-10(a). In the present case, however, (1) plaintiffs’ complaint
simply requested the return of their deposit and (2) the jury’s verdict form stated only that
plaintiffs were entitled to the return of their deposit. The complaint did not include any
allegations that plaintiffs were entitled to pecuniary damages, nor did the jury make any such
findings. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover prejudgment interest. See In re
Estate of Cantore, 814 A.2d 331, 335 (R.I. 2003) (―[A]n action for reimbursement * * * is not
the equivalent of a civil action for pecuniary damages.‖).
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Gregory H. Andrews et al. v. Beverly Plouff.
CASE NO: No. 2011-348-Appeal.
(NC 08-677)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: May 29, 2013
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice William P. Robinson
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Newport County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Stephen P. Nugent
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiffs: Turner C. Scott, Esq.
For Defendant: Kenneth Kando, Esq.