In re Jae&39La G., In re Jae&39Ona G., In re Jae&39Ona G., In re Jae&39La G. ( 2022 )


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  • June 17, 2022
    Supreme Court
    In re Jae’La G.           :               No. 2021-23-Appeal.
    (PNG 16-612)
    In re Jae’Ona G.          :               No. 2021-24-Appeal.
    (PNG 16-613)
    In re Jae’Ona G.          :               No. 2021-25-Appeal.
    (P 18-5730)
    In re Jae’La G.           :               No. 2021-26-Appeal.
    (P 18-5729)
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
    before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
    are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
    Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
    Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
    Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
    or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
    made before the opinion is published.
    Supreme Court
    In re Jae’La G.           :                No. 2021-23-Appeal.
    (PNG 16-612)
    In re Jae’Ona G.           :                No. 2021-24-Appeal.
    (PNG 16-613)
    In re Jae’Ona G.           :                No. 2021-25-Appeal.
    (P 18-5730)
    In re Jae’La G.           :                No. 2021-26-Appeal.
    (P 18-5729)
    Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
    OPINION
    Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The respondent father, Jason Smith,
    appeals from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights to his two
    children, Jae’La G., born in May 2014, and Jae’Ona G., born in November 2015
    (collectively the children), pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(3).1 Although DCYF’s
    1
    There were neglect petitions and termination of parental rights petitions filed
    against the respondent with respect to both children. All petitions were heard and
    decided together. The four appeals were consolidated by order of this Court on July
    27, 2021. The respondent is not challenging the findings of neglect.
    -1-
    petitions were also filed against the children’s mother, Brittany G., she executed a
    direct-consent adoption before trial and is thus not a part of these appeals.2
    These consolidated appeals came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an
    order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in these
    appeals should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and
    oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been
    shown and that these appeals may be decided without further briefing or argument.
    For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decree of the Family Court.
    I
    Facts and Travel
    The respondent first became involved with the Department of Children,
    Youth, and Families in 2012 after an incident that involved Keandra, the mother of
    his two sons, and Keandra’s then-twelve-year-old son, who is not respondent’s
    child.3 In 2015, respondent pled nolo contendere to second-degree child abuse and
    simple assault/domestic charges. The respondent was sentenced to a five-year
    suspended sentence, with probation, and no contact with Keandra and her son.
    2
    To protect the identities of the children, in this opinion, we will use the children’s
    biological mother’s first name and last initial only.
    3
    We note that there are inconsistencies in the record as to the spelling of Keandra,
    Jae’La, and Jae’Ona. We utilize the spelling from the documents that were
    introduced as trial exhibits in Family Court. Keandra, her son, and respondent’s
    sons with Keandra are not a part of this case.
    -2-
    Thereafter, respondent again came to the attention of DCYF in September
    2016, when the department was contacted by the Central Falls Police Department to
    report that there had been a domestic incident between respondent and Brittany.
    After reviewing the DCYF history, it was discovered that respondent had been “red
    flagged for criminal child abuse and neglect charges, domestic violence and potential
    sex offender charges regarding a minor in Massachusetts.” Upon completing an
    investigation, the DCYF child protective investigator indicated the case for neglect.
    The criminal charges against respondent stemming from the 2016 incident were
    dismissed at the request of Brittany and sealed on November 22, 2016.
    On December 9, 2016, DCYF filed petitions alleging that the children were
    neglected because (1) respondent failed to provide each child with a minimum
    degree of care, supervision, or guardianship, and (2) each child was without proper
    parental care and supervision. On December 12, 2016, a social worker with DCYF,
    Jaimee Clerc, was assigned to the case. When Clerc’s involvement with the case
    ended in February 2018, Barbara Silvia, a social caseworker, took over the assigned
    case. In 2017, respondent became incarcerated after pleading nolo contendere to
    possession of over 400 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver, and a violation of
    his probation. The respondent was released in December 2017.
    On November 27, 2018, DCYF filed petitions to terminate respondent’s
    parental rights to the children (the TPR petitions). DCYF contended that each child
    -3-
    had been in the custody or care of DCYF for at least twelve months, that respondent
    had been offered or received services to correct the situation that led to the children
    being placed in DCYF custody, and that there was not a substantial probability that
    the children could safely return to respondent’s care within a reasonable period of
    time.
    A trial on the neglect petitions and the TPR petitions was held between
    September 12, 2019, and September 15, 2020.             On September 14, 2020, a
    permanency hearing took place, at which the trial justice approved DCYF’s service
    plan goal of adoption. Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence during the
    trial, including respondent’s psychiatric records, several certificates of completion
    for programs that respondent completed while at the Adult Correctional Institutions,
    three DCYF service plans for each child, records from the Providence Center, and
    records from the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families. DCYF
    presented witness testimony by John P. Parsons, Ph.D., Robert Tyler McMahon Jr.,
    Jaimee Clerc, and Barbara Silvia.
    -4-
    A
    Testimony
    1
    Dr. John Parsons
    At trial, Dr. Parsons testified as an expert in psychology with a specialization
    in psychological assessments and assessments for children and families. Doctor
    Parsons stated that he was asked to complete an evaluation in addition to conducting
    an interactive session with the children; he conducted an assessment of respondent
    and the children between March and June 2018. Doctor Parsons testified that he met
    with respondent on March 30, 2018, the initial assessment date. Doctor Parsons
    stated that, overall, there were “four extended sessions anywhere from between
    [ninety] minutes to [two] hours” with respondent and a final session with the
    children.
    Doctor Parsons indicated that he began respondent’s session with a clinical
    review, wherein respondent disclosed that, when he was a juvenile, he had been
    arrested for sexually assaulting a twelve-year-old girl, who he believed at the time
    to be sixteen years old, and that he had been incarcerated for six months. Moreover,
    respondent discussed his adult criminal history, including the issues of domestic
    violence, child neglect, and criminal charges for possession of marijuana. The
    -5-
    respondent indicated to Dr. Parsons that he smoked marijuana “two times per week
    or one time per day[.]”
    Doctor Parsons testified that he performed cognitive testing on respondent and
    determined that respondent “was of low-average intelligence.” The respondent’s
    responses to the doctor’s questions about his emotions and feelings were not an
    accurate representation, according to Dr. Parsons. Similarly, Dr. Parsons reported
    that respondent’s responses to a drug abuse screening were also inconsistent. Doctor
    Parsons stated that respondent’s responses to a bipolar disorder stress checklist
    struck him as odd, and that respondent’s answers to the Minnesota Multiphasic
    Personality Inventory additionally struck him as invalid. Doctor Parsons testified
    that respondent’s affect was flat with no emotions; he seemed irritable, but there
    were no signs of overt anger, which struck Dr. Parsons as odd given the
    circumstances.
    For the parent/child portion of the assessment, Dr. Parsons explained that the
    children were present in the office before respondent entered the session. When
    respondent entered the room where the children were, respondent came in, sat in one
    of the chairs, and did not speak for a few minutes; respondent did not acknowledge
    the children, according to Dr. Parsons. Doctor Parsons found it to be significant that,
    after observing the children playing, respondent asked either one or both children to
    come sit on his lap; however, neither child responded, and they had their backs to
    -6-
    respondent. Doctor Parsons testified that, eventually, one of the children crawled to
    respondent on her hands and knees, and respondent picked her up and put her on his
    lap.
    Doctor Parsons further stated that the only time the children were “engrossed
    in any way” was when respondent put cartoons on his telephone. The respondent
    did not ask the children any questions, and they did not respond to him until he told
    them to pick up toys at the end of the session, according to Dr. Parsons. Doctor
    Parsons recounted that the older child cried hysterically after respondent told the
    children to pick up the toys, and no one “said good-bye or hugged[.]” He stated that
    this suggested that there was a clear absence of a showing that respondent cared to
    show love and affection toward his children.
    As for forensic recommendations and findings, Dr. Parsons stated that he
    recommended that, despite respondent having taken a parenting class while in the
    ACI, he needed to retake a parenting class “because there was no evidence of a bond,
    no evidence of how to interact with his children.” He additionally recommended
    substance abuse treatment and a psychiatric evaluation. Moreover, Dr. Parsons
    recommended that respondent sign releases of information in order to allow Silvia,
    the DCYF caseworker, to monitor compliance and progress.             Doctor Parsons
    maintained that it was a significant risk to reunify the children with respondent due
    to respondent’s substance abuse history, multiple arrests, admission of sexual assault
    -7-
    as a teenager, incarcerations, drug crimes, allegations of domestic violence, and his
    “complete lack of parenting skills with [the children].”
    On cross-examination, Dr. Parsons testified that respondent was cooperative
    during the evaluation, although he missed an appointment on April 26, 2018. Doctor
    Parsons acknowledged that respondent had mentioned that his greatest fear was
    being a bad father, his mind was focused on his children, he was concerned about
    his children, and his greatest worry was losing his family. Doctor Parsons conceded
    that, based on those statements, respondent cared about his children. Doctor Parsons
    further acknowledged that it was possible that there was no emotional bond between
    respondent and the children because they were “in a strange place[.]” However, Dr.
    Parsons added that it was respondent’s responsibility “to get up, go over and sit down
    with them, explain what’s happening, ask how they’re doing, make good eye
    contact.”
    2
    Robert Tyler McMahon Jr.
    McMahon, a DCYF child protective investigator, testified that in 2016 he was
    assigned to this case when the police department informed him that there had been
    a domestic incident between respondent and Brittany. McMahon testified that, when
    conducting a review of the DCYF history, he noticed that respondent had been
    red-flagged for criminal child abuse and neglect charges, domestic violence, and
    -8-
    potential sex offender charges. McMahon stated that a review of the police report
    from the domestic incident that he was investigating revealed that the children were
    home at the time of the incident. He further stated that a no-contact order was put
    in place after the domestic incident.
    Following the domestic incident, McMahon went to the ACI intake service
    center to interview respondent. According to McMahon, he reviewed the allegations
    against respondent and advised him of the no-contact order. McMahon testified that
    respondent indicated to him that respondent had family out of state, and he had no
    intention of returning to the home due to the no-contact order. McMahon testified
    that he ultimately indicated respondent for neglect.
    3
    Jaimee Clerc
    Clerc, a DCYF social worker, testified that, on December 16, 2016, neither
    Brittany nor respondent appeared in court for the scheduled arraignment on the two
    neglect petitions. Clerc further stated that, at the December 16, 2016 arraignment,
    she expressed concerns to the court over “[t]he domestic violence situation that was
    ongoing[,] * * * that mother was still allowing father into the home, [and] that there
    had been * * * another [h]ot [l]ine call very recent to the arraignment date.” Clerc
    confirmed that the Family Court hearing justice had charged her with removing the
    children from the home at that time.
    -9-
    After the arraignment, Clerc, a DCYF caseworker, and the police went to the
    home in Central Falls. Clerc testified that respondent answered the door and told
    them that Brittany had left a few days earlier with the children to go to Florida. Clerc
    noted that, pursuant to the safety plan in place, respondent was supposed to have
    moved out of the home “and not have any unsupervised contact with the children.”
    Three days later, on December 19, 2016, Clerc, a DCYF caseworker, and the police
    went back to the house; Clerc testified that respondent allowed only police into the
    home. Clerc testified that respondent reported that he did not know where Brittany
    and the children were. Clerc testified that they were eventually able to locate
    Brittany and the children at a homeless shelter in Lowell, Massachusetts. On
    December 23, 2016, the Family Court issued an order that the children were to be
    placed in the temporary custody of DCYF.
    On March 9, 2017, Clerc; her supervisor, Ms. Fernandes; and respondent met
    at the DCYF office, according to Clerc. Clerc testified that the purpose of the
    meeting was to go over respondent’s history and the services he needed to complete
    for his case planning. Clerc confirmed that the service plan goal at that time was
    reunification with either one or both parents. As to the services respondent was
    asked to complete, Clerc testified that he was asked to participate in batterers’
    intervention, which respondent indicated he had done before, and Clerc stated that
    he was not “terribly receptive to doing it again.” Additionally, Clerc testified,
    - 10 -
    respondent was asked to complete a parent/child evaluation, some parenting
    services, and possibly a substance abuse evaluation to determine if substance abuse
    services were necessary.
    According to Clerc, on April 25, 2017, an e-mail was sent to respondent to
    schedule parenting services and visitation, which initially was to be biweekly for
    respondent. Clerc testified that it was her recollection that respondent missed the
    first two scheduled visitations. She also testified that respondent had been referred
    to Boys Town for parenting visitation services, but that, on May 9, 2017, she was
    notified by Boys Town that respondent had not started the program. The following
    day—May 10, 2017—Clerc was notified that respondent was incarcerated on
    charges of possession of marijuana.
    Clerc also testified regarding service plans; Clerc stated she created the first
    two service plans. The plans required that respondent address significant parenting
    concerns and domestic violence history by complying with court orders regarding
    the child abuse charges, refraining from physical punishment, completing a
    parent/child evaluation, completing all recommendations in that evaluation, and
    maintaining adequate housing when released from the ACI. The respondent was
    also required to complete anger management and domestic violence counseling,
    utilize skills learned in counseling in interactions with others, and refrain from
    abusive and intimidating interactions with others.
    - 11 -
    Clerc further testified that, although she was present in court for the
    permanency hearing on November 29, 2017, respondent was not because he was still
    incarcerated at the ACI. However, Clerc stated, respondent was present in court for
    a review date on February 16, 2018, because he had been released from the ACI.
    Clerc testified that her assignment to the case ended on February 16, 2018.
    Clerc testified that respondent provided copies of certificates of completion
    for classes he completed while in the ACI. On cross-examination, Clerc stated that
    respondent did not complete any services that DCYF referred him to while she was
    involved with the case; however, she acknowledged that some of the classes
    respondent completed at the ACI complied with the service plan. She added that
    DCYF wanted respondent to complete a supervised visitation program at Boys Town
    for feedback on visits.
    4
    Barbara Silvia
    When Clerc’s assignment ended in February 2018, Silvia was assigned to the
    case.    At trial, Silvia testified that there was a no-contact order in place for
    respondent and the children due to domestic violence issues. She added that, despite
    the no-contact order, respondent was still in contact with the children because, when
    she entered the home for a visit with Brittany and the children, the children yelled
    out, “Daddy, daddy.” Moreover, Silvia testified that the children were removed from
    - 12 -
    their mother’s care and placed back into nonrelative foster care when, in February
    2018, a tip from the hot line revealed that respondent was with the children in a
    restaurant.
    Silvia and her supervisor, Betsy Aubin, met with respondent on March 20,
    2018, to go over and develop service plans. Silvia testified that she developed a new
    case plan in March when she was assigned to the case.          As stated in the service
    plans, respondent was required to complete a psychological parent/child evaluation;
    follow recommendations; participate in a visitation program at the discretion of the
    children’s clinician to increase parenting skills as well as learn the skills to maintain
    safety and well-being; ensure that the children’s basic needs were met, including
    maintaining housing that met the minimum housing standards; and sign releases of
    information to allow DCYF to communicate with providers. Furthermore, the plan
    required respondent to obey laws and abide by all conditions of probation,4 utilize
    the skills learned from the batterers’ intervention program, and refrain from violent
    or abusive behavior. The respondent was also required to engage in both mental
    health counseling and a substance abuse evaluation that included weekly random
    toxicology screenings, and he was required to follow recommendations.
    4
    Silvia testified that she contacted respondent’s probation officer to get information
    on the conditions of his probation so that they could be incorporated into his services.
    - 13 -
    As a result of Silvia’s March 2018 meeting with respondent, she completed
    referrals for respondent’s services; respondent was referred to Dr. Parsons. Silvia
    testified, however, that she could not make a referral to the Providence Center
    because “parents need to make their own referrals for that agency[,]” although she
    encouraged respondent to do so. She later testified that she did assist respondent in
    enrolling at the Providence Center by sending him certified mail to verify his
    address. Silvia additionally testified that, while visits had been set up between
    Brittany and the children, visits had not been arranged for respondent because there
    was a court order stating that visits had to be clinically recommended for the
    children, which at that time had not yet occurred. Silvia stated that the order had
    been modified following the parent/child evaluation, and visitation was approved by
    the children’s clinician. Silvia acknowledged that she contacted authorities in
    Massachusetts, where respondent’s mother lived, to determine whether the children
    could be placed with her. She testified that Massachusetts declined placement of the
    children with respondent’s mother.
    Silvia testified that, on May 2, 2018, there was a hearing in which parent/child
    sessions had been permitted at the recommendation of the children’s clinician.
    Thereafter, with the clinician’s approval, monthly visits with respondent were
    established. Silvia testified that the visits initially occurred at the DCYF office, but
    that respondent later received a referral for the Northern Rhode Island Visitation
    - 14 -
    Center, a program that provides “wraparound” services with the family. Silvia
    explained that she considered that to be an appropriate program because “the goal
    remained reunification at that time,” and respondent had completed the parent/child
    evaluation with Dr. Parsons as well as reported that he was engaged in services
    through the Providence Center for mental health services.
    Next, Silvia testified on the third set of service plans provided for respondent,
    dated September 20, 2018.       Those plans closely mirrored the previous plans;
    however, the requirement for a psychiatric evaluation had been added. Silvia further
    testified that respondent had signed releases for DCYF to obtain his juvenile records
    from Massachusetts. Silvia stated that respondent denied being registered as a sex
    offender and reported that he had been involved in an incident in Massachusetts as
    a minor but it was “plead [sic] out to a different charge.” Silvia testified that, on
    July 26, 2018, she had a conversation with respondent on the telephone, in which
    she reminded respondent that the substance abuse screenings were to be conducted
    weekly; according to Silvia, respondent told her that the screenings were only being
    completed on a monthly basis.
    Silvia testified that, on July 27, 2018, she supervised a visit between
    respondent and the children, and she described the children as hesitant and nervous
    to greet respondent. She stated that respondent provided snacks and allowed the
    children to play games on his telephone. Silvia confirmed that this was the first
    - 15 -
    meeting between respondent and the children in a DCYF setting. The respondent
    was accepted into the Northern Rhode Island Visitation Center program in late
    August 2018, but he did not start services until October 2018, according to Silvia.
    Silvia testified that the program required respondent to be engaged in mental health
    counseling, and that he had discontinued his services with the Providence Center.
    Thus, respondent was not able to start services until October because he had to attend
    two mental health counseling services before visitation could begin.
    Silvia testified that she was not aware whether respondent maintained
    engagement in the mental health treatment because, on October 31, 2018, DCYF
    was ordered by the court to file TPR petitions within thirty days. She also testified
    that, to her knowledge, respondent did not attend the weekly toxicology screenings.
    Additionally, Silvia testified that the children were doing well and that they had been
    together in the same placement since their removal from the home in December
    2016, except for two months when they were returned to their mother’s care.
    On cross-examination, Silvia confirmed that, on February 24, 2019, she
    received an e-mail from respondent asking to meet and for the names of service
    providers. When asked if that was in accordance with the service plan, Silvia
    responded that it was not, because the service plan goal at that time was not
    reunification, due to the court order to file the TPR petitions within thirty days.
    Silvia stated that, after the filing of the TPR petitions in November 2018,
    - 16 -
    respondent’s monthly visitations remained the same. Silvia stated that, although
    visits remained in place, respondent stopped visiting in November and December
    2018, and he did not reengage in the visitations until after a court hearing in March
    2019.
    Additionally, Silvia acknowledged that respondent sent her e-mails through
    July 2019 to set up visits, and respondent had invited her in October 2018 to inspect
    his apartment that he had obtained for the children. Silvia testified that respondent
    and the children attended a session with Dr. Parsons, which was a part of the service
    plan. Although respondent attended two sessions with Northern Rhode Island
    Visitation Center in October and November 2018, Silvia testified, respondent then
    missed a session and never reengaged. Silvia further stated that, upon respondent
    missing the session and not reengaging, he was sent a ten-day notice and ultimately
    was discharged from the program in January 2019 for noncompliance.
    Moreover, Silvia stated that DCYF did not receive the substance abuse
    screenings that respondent reported that he was doing monthly with the Providence
    Center.    Regarding batterers’ intervention training, Silvia testified, respondent
    completed the training prior to engaging services with her, and he submitted a copy
    of the completed form. Silvia testified that she did not know whether respondent
    completed mental health counseling and a psychiatric evaluation, which was a
    required service respondent had to complete. Silvia acknowledged that, prior to the
    - 17 -
    filing of the TPR petitions, respondent attended two counseling sessions at LifeSpan
    after being discharged from the Providence Center.
    5
    Respondent
    The respondent provided extensive testimony, both for DCYF and on his own
    behalf. Beginning with his testimony for the department, respondent stated that he
    had been charged with second-degree child abuse, to which he pled nolo contendere,
    and no services were put in place by DCYF after that incident. He testified that he
    completed batterers’ intervention as a part of his probation. At the time respondent
    testified, he was still on probation for the child abuse and marijuana charges. The
    respondent stated that he spent nine months in the ACI for the marijuana charge and
    was released in December 2017. Furthermore, respondent acknowledged that, when
    he was sixteen, he was accused of statutory rape, but pled to a lesser charge of
    aggravated assault.
    The respondent admitted that a domestic incident took place involving
    Brittany in 2016, although he stated that no “physical argument” occurred. He also
    testified that the children, along with Brittany’s older child, who is not respondent’s
    child, were present in the home at the time of the incident. The respondent denied
    that McMahon went over a safety plan with him in 2016 or that he had agreed to
    leave the home at that time. However, respondent testified that, when DCYF told
    - 18 -
    him to leave the home, he did. According to respondent, when the criminal case was
    dismissed in 2016, he returned to the home because McMahon did not specify that
    the DCYF case was separate and distinct from the criminal case.
    The respondent stated that, when Clerc was looking for Brittany and the
    children, he did not know where they were. He admitted that he did not file a
    missing-persons report. The respondent denied that Clerc set up any services for
    him, asked him to address parenting issues, or required him to undergo a parent/child
    evaluation. The respondent additionally could not recall whether Clerc had asked
    him to complete anger management or domestic violence counseling. Likewise,
    respondent stated that Silvia did not ask him to complete anger management and
    domestic violence counseling. The respondent testified that he was not told that he
    had to go to substance abuse treatment, and thus he was not in substance abuse
    treatment. He confirmed completing a parent/child evaluation with Dr. Parsons.
    In March 2018, respondent testified, he met with Silvia and Aubin and
    discussed his attendance at the Providence Center. He stated that he went to his
    appointments at the Providence Center, but later switched his provider to LifeSpan.
    The respondent testified that the first time he went to the Providence Center for those
    services was in September 2018, because it took some time for him to get an
    appointment. He testified that he attended two visits at the Northern Rhode Island
    - 19 -
    Visitation Center, but respondent stopped attending when the plan goal changed to,
    what he deemed to be, the termination of parental rights.
    On cross-examination, respondent testified that, regarding his sons with
    Keandra, he had visitation with them twice a week and spoke to them on the
    telephone two to three times a day. The respondent stated that he was a full-time
    student at the Community College of Rhode Island, where his educational focus was
    general studies. Additionally, respondent testified, he obtained his GED while he
    was at the ACI, and he also earned certificates of completion related to substance
    abuse, job search skills, parenting skills, and counseling.         The respondent
    acknowledged that he continued to smoke marijuana recreationally about once a
    week.
    The respondent testified that he sent an e-mail in January 2018 to DCYF
    inquiring about reunification. At that time, the children had been reunited with
    Brittany. The respondent stated that he had also reached out to Silvia by e-mail,
    asking for referrals, but that Silvia said, according to respondent, that, because
    DCYF was focused on termination, referrals for services would no longer be made.
    The court-appointed guardian ad litem next cross-examined respondent. The
    respondent acknowledged that there were three warrants issued for his arrest when
    he failed to appear in court while the child abuse charges were pending. The
    respondent contended that it was not his fault that he missed the court dates, and he
    - 20 -
    ultimately voluntarily surrendered himself. The respondent stated that the child
    abuse charge stemmed from when he accidentally elbowed Keandra’s son during an
    incident with Keandra.
    On redirect examination by DCYF, respondent admitted that, when he was
    arrested in 2017, he had a serious marijuana problem. His heavy marijuana use
    began when his children were removed, according to respondent. The respondent
    further admitted that there had been a substantiated Massachusetts investigation for
    excessive and inappropriate discipline with the sons he shares with Keandra.
    On further examination by his attorney, respondent confirmed that he was still
    on probation at the time of trial for the 2017 marijuana conviction, and that he had
    not violated the terms of his probation. On recross-examination by the guardian ad
    litem, respondent confirmed that there was a Massachusetts order in place to “keep
    separate” from Keandra and her son when respondent was charged with child abuse
    and domestic simple assault in 2012.
    Testifying on his own behalf, respondent stated that he did everything that
    was required of him by DCYF. He stated that he had attended counseling at the
    Providence Center approximately two times, but the appointments were not as
    frequent as he was “comfortable with” and he needed to see a psychiatrist for
    medication. He stated that it was for those reasons that he switched from the
    Providence Center to LifeSpan, where he received helpful treatment. In addition,
    - 21 -
    respondent stated, he leased an apartment with bedrooms for the children and his
    two sons when they visited, and he had been going to school as well as working two
    jobs, earning $250 per week.      The respondent testified that he was in anger
    management treatment at the Providence Center, and he went to Common Sense
    Parenting, Open Doors, and Boys Town.
    B
    Motion to Dismiss and the Trial Justice’s Decision
    When DCYF rested, counsel for respondent moved to dismiss the TPR
    petitions, arguing that DCYF had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
    evidence that respondent was an unfit parent, that he had failed to comply with the
    service plan, and that DCYF had failed to show that there was a reasonable
    likelihood that the children could not be reunified with respondent. The guardian ad
    litem contended that the motion to dismiss was not a valid motion; rather, it should
    have been one for directed verdict. Moreover, she argued that DCYF had met its
    burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s rights should
    be terminated. The trial justice denied the motion, citing to what he deemed
    compelling testimony from both Silvia and Dr. Parsons.
    On October 1, 2020, the trial justice delivered a bench decision. The trial
    justice stated that the decision was “based upon the most weighty, relevant and
    credible evidence.” The trial justice found by clear and convincing evidence that the
    - 22 -
    children had been neglected by respondent. This determination was based on the
    fact that the children had been removed from respondent’s care for over two years,
    visitation occurred only in supervised settings, and there was no evidence as to what
    support respondent provided for the children. The trial justice focused on Dr.
    Parsons’ testimony that respondent showed little affect and did not ask any personal
    questions about the children.
    Turning next to the issue of termination of parental rights, the trial justice
    noted that Clerc testified that respondent was unwilling to discuss his criminal
    history and unwilling to participate in batterers’ intervention and that, despite
    referrals to parenting and visitation programs such as Boys Town, respondent failed
    to engage in those services during Clerc’s involvement in the case. Moreover, the
    trial justice found that, when Silvia was assigned to the case, she went over the
    service plans with respondent in March 2018. The trial justice noted that there was
    a safety plan in effect, which was violated when respondent was spotted at a
    restaurant with the children, and the children were subsequently removed from
    Brittany’s care. The trial justice also found that respondent did not comply with the
    weekly toxicology screening requirement. The trial justice noted that Silvia was
    unable to verify that respondent complied with the requirement of mental health
    counseling at the Providence Center.
    - 23 -
    The trial justice was most impressed by the testimony of Clerc and Silvia. He
    stated that, when Clerc was assigned to the case, respondent did not complete any of
    his service plan requirements. Although Silvia acknowledged that respondent had
    completed some tasks when she was assigned to the case, he did not complete all
    tasks.     Silvia was especially concerned with respondent’s failure to address
    substance abuse issues due to his marijuana use. The trial justice found it of note
    that Dr. Parsons felt that reunification of the children with respondent presented a
    serious risk, and that the doctor stated that respondent needed a parenting program.
    The trial justice found that DCYF had carefully developed three service plans
    to address why the children were in placement, and that respondent never fully
    completed a service plan. The trial justice ultimately decided that, by clear and
    convincing evidence, respondent was unfit to parent the children and had failed to
    comply with and complete his service plans. In addition, the trial justice found that
    it was in the best interest of the children that the parental rights of respondent be
    terminated. A decree entered setting forth the trial justice’s findings of fact and
    granting the neglect and TPR petitions on November 20, 2020, and respondent filed
    timely notices of appeal.
    - 24 -
    II
    Standard of Review
    “Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
    management of their children.” In re Manuel P., 
    252 A.3d 1211
    , 1218 (R.I. 2021)
    (quoting In re Rylee A., 
    233 A.3d 1040
    , 1051 (R.I. 2020)). That interest “does not
    evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
    custody of their child to the [s]tate.” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re Indiana M., 
    230 A.3d 577
    ,
    583 (R.I. 2020)). The fundamental right of parents, however, is “not absolute[.]” 
    Id.
    (quoting In re Indiana M., 230 A.3d at 586). The Family Court justice must find
    that the parent is unfit before terminating a parent’s rights. E.g., In re Violet G., 
    212 A.3d 160
    , 166 (R.I. 2019). “Given the drastic and irreversible nature of a termination
    of parental rights decree, ‘the right to due process requires that the state support its
    allegations by clear and convincing evidence.’” In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d at 1051
    (quoting In re Violet G., 212 A.3d at 166).
    “On appeal, this Court reviews termination of parental rights rulings by
    examining the record to establish whether the Family Court justice’s findings are
    supported by legal and competent evidence.” In re Violet G., 212 A.3d at 166
    (quoting In re Amiah P., 
    54 A.3d 446
    , 451 (R.I. 2012)). Those findings “are entitled
    to great weight, and this Court will not disturb them unless they are clearly wrong
    - 25 -
    or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re
    Amiah P., 54 A.3d at 451).
    III
    Discussion
    A
    Parental Fitness
    On appeal, respondent argues that the trial justice erred in finding that he was
    unfit. In particular, respondent takes issue with the trial justice’s finding that he
    “failed to comply, and complete his case plans.” The respondent avers that he had
    substantially complied with the service plans, and a finding of unfitness was “at
    odds” with the evidence presented. The respondent asserts that DCYF sought “to
    minimize the worth of the programs and classes he attended while incarcerated.”
    DCYF argues that a finding of unfitness was supported by the evidence in that
    respondent “failed to complete a number of [service] plan requirements.” Similarly,
    the guardian ad litem contends that the evidence supported the trial justice’s findings
    that respondent was unfit. The guardian ad litem further argues that respondent was
    unable to address his own case plan needs, “which resulted in a lack of cooperation
    with the array of services that the Department attempted to provide for
    [respondent’s] family to facilitate reunification.”
    - 26 -
    Before terminating parental rights, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3), the trial justice
    must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. Specifically, the
    statute states that a trial justice shall terminate any and all legal rights of the parent
    to the children if the trial justice finds by clear and convincing evidence that
    “[t]he child has been placed in the legal custody or care of
    the department for children, youth, and families for at least
    twelve (12) months, and the parents were offered or
    received services to correct the situation which led to the
    child being placed; provided, that there is not a substantial
    probability that the child will be able to return safely to the
    parents’ care within a reasonable period of time
    considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent
    home[.]” Section 15-7-7(a)(3).
    “This Court has said that the ‘refusal to cooperate with the objectives of the case
    plans constitutes clear and convincing evidence of a lack of interest in the child[ren]
    and, as such, could properly serve as a basis for a finding of parental unfitness.’” In
    re Elana W., 
    249 A.3d 287
    , 294 (R.I. 2021) (brackets omitted) (quoting In re James
    H., 
    181 A.3d 19
    , 27 (R.I. 2018)).
    In finding respondent unfit, the trial justice found by clear and convincing
    evidence that the children had been in the care of DCYF for a period in excess of
    twelve months—since February 2018.            Moreover, his determination rested on
    respondent’s failure to comply with several requirements and/or services that DCYF
    included in the service plans, such as those related to parenting skills, violence
    prevention, and substance abuse. The trial justice found that, while Clerc was
    - 27 -
    assigned to the case, until February 2018, respondent failed to complete any of the
    services to which he had been referred. The trial justice explicitly stated that Clerc
    referred respondent “to the Boys Town Visitation and Parenting Services
    program[,]” in which respondent did not engage. We view the trial justice’s findings
    as supported by legal and competent evidence, namely, the testimony provided by
    Clerc, Silvia, and Dr. Parsons. Additionally, the trial justice found that respondent
    was tasked with completing weekly toxicology screenings; however, respondent
    admitted to completing them only monthly. While we acknowledge respondent’s
    efforts during his incarceration, we are also of the opinion that respondent failed to
    proactively continue engaging in the required services upon his release from the
    ACI.
    Accordingly, our review of the record convinces us that legally competent
    evidence exists to support the trial justice’s findings as to parental unfitness.
    B
    Reasonable Efforts to Reunify
    The respondent further argues that his conduct and DCYF’s effort in
    providing reasonable visitation were relevant factors in determining whether DCYF
    made reasonable efforts toward reunification. The respondent submits that, despite
    his completing a parent/child evaluation, DCYF filed the TPR petitions instead of
    making referrals consistent with Dr. Parsons’ recommendations. The respondent
    - 28 -
    further contends that suspending visitation until it was approved by the children’s
    clinician was not consistent with DCYF’s obligation “to offer services to strengthen
    the parent-child relationship and to preserve the bond.” Again, respondent notes that
    he substantially complied with all service plan tasks.
    DCYF counters by arguing that the department cannot be faulted for a lack of
    visits when the Family Court was justified in conditioning visitation on the
    recommendations from the children’s clinician and the outcome of Dr. Parsons’
    evaluation.   Moreover, DCYF maintains that the Family Court was aware of
    respondent’s “history of domestic violence and drug use.” DCYF further asserts that
    the Family Court correctly found that the service plans were carefully developed,
    and respondent never fully completed a plan. The guardian ad litem also argues that
    the record amply supports the trial justice’s findings of reasonable efforts.
    “Section 15-7-7(a)(3) ‘mandates that DCYF establish by clear and convincing
    evidence that it offered services that amount to a reasonable effort to correct the
    situation that led to the child[ren]’s removal from the parent’s care.’” In re Gelvin
    B., 
    251 A.3d 503
    , 510 (R.I. 2021) (quoting In re Violet G., 212 A.3d at 167). We
    have held that DCYF does not need to “demonstrate that it took extraordinary
    efforts”; rather, DCYF must “employ reasonable efforts, and the reasonableness of
    such efforts must be determined from the particular facts and circumstances of each
    case.” Id. (quoting In re Violet G., 212 A.3d at 167). This Court has stated that
    - 29 -
    reasonable efforts is “a subjective standard subject to a case-by-case analysis, taking
    into account, among other things, the conduct and cooperation of the parents.” In re
    Jose Luis R.H., 
    968 A.2d 875
    , 882 (R.I. 2009) (quoting In re Natalya C., 
    946 A.2d 198
    , 203 (R.I. 2008)). We have previously held that reasonable efforts include
    “suitable arrangements for visitation[.]” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re Nathan F., 
    762 A.2d 1193
    ,
    1195 (R.I. 2000)).
    In deciding this issue, the trial justice found that DCYF carefully developed
    three service plans, and respondent never completed a plan. As to visitation, we note
    that Clerc testified that, until May 2017, visitation was biweekly; however,
    respondent missed the first two visits and never contacted Boys Town to engage in
    parenting services and supervised visitation. Additionally, Dr. Parsons reported that,
    during the parent/child evaluation, respondent made little effort to engage with the
    children. Silvia also testified to setting up visitation services at the Northern Rhode
    Island Visitation Center, with which respondent failed to comply until October 2018.
    Silvia further testified that respondent was ultimately discharged from the visitation
    center in January 2019 due to missing sessions and for noncompliance with the
    program. The trial justice found the testimony of Clerc, Silvia, and Dr. Parsons to
    be “clear, convincing, credible, and compelling.” This Court has previously stated
    that “[s]uch a finding is entitled to ‘a substantial amount of deference due to the fact
    that the trial justice has had an opportunity to appraise witness demeanor and to take
    - 30 -
    into account other realities that cannot be grasped from a reading of a cold record.’”
    In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d at 510 (deletion omitted) (quoting Tsonos v. Tsonos, 
    222 A.3d 927
    , 934 (R.I. 2019)). We similarly are of the opinion that respondent’s
    argument regarding conditioned visitation is unpersuasive.          The conditioned
    visitation was ordered by the Family Court and was not a discretionary decision
    made by DCYF. See In re Kristen B., 
    558 A.2d 200
    , 204 (R.I. 1989) (“The
    suspensions of visitation were always court ordered and not discretionary with
    DCF.”).
    We therefore decline to declare the conclusion made by the trial justice on the
    issue of reasonable efforts to reunify as clearly erroneous.
    C
    Due Process
    As his final argument, respondent contends that the Family Court made
    conclusive merit findings prior to the completion of the trial that were “prejudicial
    and violated fundamental notions of fairness and due process, both procedural and
    substantive, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” The
    respondent is specifically referencing the permanency hearing conducted by the trial
    justice on September 14, 2020, wherein DCYF was seeking approval for a service
    plan change to adoption. Altogether, respondent maintains that the trial justice’s
    “prejudicial” ruling on reasonable efforts and determination that the children could
    - 31 -
    not be safely reunited with respondent “made the resulting ‘Decision’ on termination
    a foregone conclusion.” DCYF argues that the Family Court was statutorily required
    to conduct a permanency hearing within a twelve-month period.
    We likewise view respondent’s argument as unavailing.                 Pursuant to
    G.L. 1956 § 40-11-12.1(a), DCYF is required to file a motion requesting a
    permanency hearing on the status of the child within a twelve-month period after a
    child is placed in the care of DCYF. When determining the order of permanency,
    the court considers factors that include:
    “(1) The appropriateness of the department’s plan for
    service to the child and parent;
    “(2) What services have been offered to strengthen and
    reunite the family;
    “(3) Where return home of the child is not likely, what
    efforts have been or should be made to evaluate or plan for
    other modes of care;
    “(4) Any further efforts that have been, or will be made, to
    promote the best interests of the child; and
    “(5) The child’s health and safety shall be the paramount
    concern.” Section 40-11-12.1(d)(1)–(5).
    Under § 40-11-12.2(a), at the permanency hearing, DCYF must present a written
    reunification and/or permanency plan to the court for approval. The plan must
    include, among other options, whether and, if applicable, when the child will be
    placed for adoption. Section 40-11-12.2(a).
    At the conclusion of the permanency hearing in the present case, the trial
    justice, in approving the service plan, found that DCYF had exercised reasonable
    - 32 -
    efforts to reunite the children with respondent, which is a factor that the trial justice
    was to consider. See § 40-11-12.1(d). He further noted that the TPR petitions, filed
    in November 2018, were pending and were still being heard by the court at that time.
    The trial justice stated, “The [c]ourt shall continue with hearing the TPR and make
    a decision at the end of the evidence being completed.” We view no error in the
    permanency hearing conducted by the trial justice and the subsequent decision
    thereon, as it was statutorily required of the trial justice upon motion by DCYF.
    IV
    Conclusion
    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decree of the Family Court
    terminating the respondent’s parental rights with respect to his children, Jae’La G.
    and Jae’Ona G. The papers may be remanded to the Family Court.
    - 33 -
    STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
    SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
    Licht Judicial Complex
    250 Benefit Street
    Providence, RI 02903
    OPINION COVER SHEET
    In re Jae’La G.
    In re Jae’Ona G.
    Title of Case
    In re Jae’Ona G.
    In re Jae’La G.
    No. 2021-23-Appeal.
    (PNG 16-612)
    No. 2021-24-Appeal.
    (PNG 16-613)
    Case Number
    No. 2021-25-Appeal.
    (P 18-5730)
    No. 2021-26-Appeal.
    (P 18-5729)
    Date Opinion Filed                     June 17, 2022
    Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
    Justices
    Long, JJ.
    Written By                             Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
    Source of Appeal                       Providence County Family Court
    Judicial Officer from Lower Court      Associate Justice Stephen J. Capineri
    For Petitioner:
    Benjamin Copple
    Department of Children, Youth, and Families
    Attorney(s) on Appeal
    Andrew J. Johnson
    Court Appointed Special Advocate
    For Respondent:
    Robert J. Caron, Esq.
    SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-23, 24, 25, 26

Filed Date: 6/17/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/17/2022