State v. Joseph Colwell , 3 R.I. 132 ( 1855 )

Staples, C. J.

Tbe witness whose testimony was excepted to, stated distinctly, that after examining tbe memorandum made by him as to tbe day on which tbe sale was made, bis memory was not so refreshed that be could then swear from bis memory that tbe sale took place on that day. Had tbe testimony stopped here, it ought not to have passed to tbe jury: but as tbe witness went further, and producing bis memorandum, testified that when be made it it was true, be supposed it was, be knew it was, there seems to be no reason for excluding tbe testimony from the jury. If testimony of this kind is to be rejected, one of the principal objects of making-memorandums of this kind will be entirely lost. Most people, after committing a fact to writing as a memorial of it, dismiss the matter from their recollections, and cease to remember or to try to remember it, trusting to the memorandum so made. And when the memorandum is produced, all they can say is, that they made it and knew it was true when it was made. Such occurrences are frequent in the technical proof of the execution of old deeds and wills, and unless admitted, many of the most important muniments of title to property would be lost, and that by taking means to preserve them.

The exceptions of the defendant are therefore overruled.