State v. Gerrit Musterd , 2012 R.I. LEXIS 133 ( 2012 )

Supreme Court
No. 2011-159-C.A.
(P1/09-3256AG)
State :
v. :
Gerrit Musterd. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2011-159-C.A.
(P1/09-3256AG)
State :
v. :
Gerrit Musterd. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Indeglia, for the Court. The defendant, Gerrit Musterd, appeals from a Superior
Court judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and three related crimes. On appeal,
Musterd argues that the trial justice erred in denying his pretrial motions to suppress evidence; he
also contends that the trial justice improperly denied his motions for a new trial and for a
judgment of acquittal. After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ written
submissions and oral arguments, we discern no error on the part of the trial justice and affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
On September 2, 2009, Officer John Brown of the Pawtucket Police Department
responded to Newell Avenue in Pawtucket to investigate a call regarding “a black male that was
sleeping or slumped over in a vehicle.” Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Brown saw a vehicle
with the bloodied body of a black male inside. There appeared to be a bullet wound in the back
of the victim’s head. Shortly thereafter, a rescue captain determined that the man was dead.
Officials later identified the decedent as Michael Benson. Benson had recently been released
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from prison, and when his body was found, he was wearing an electronic monitoring ankle
bracelet. At the time his body was discovered, a detective found marijuana in the back of his
vehicle. Two days later, on September 4, 2009, police searched Benson’s home pursuant to a
warrant and recovered about $72,000 in cash.
Several days later, on September 13, 2009, a woman who identified herself as “Dawn”
called the police department and notified a dispatcher that she had information concerning the
recent murder. 1 Sergeant Dennis Lefebvre returned her call several minutes later. The woman
identified herself as Dawn Edmonds and told Lefebvre that she knew who had committed the
murder. She gave Lefebvre certain information about that individual, such as his physical
description, where he worked, what kind of car he drove, and his cell phone number. She said
that although she knew the man as “Joe,” she was unsure of his exact name. Edmonds informed
Lefebvre that in August and September of 2009, she was living with Nicole Meireles, whose
boyfriend was Gerrit Musterd—the man Edmonds knew as Joe Rodrigues. 2
Edmonds’s criminal history was reviewed in some detail at trial, both on direct
examination and cross-examination. She testified that, when she contacted Officer Lefebvre, she
told him that she had a warrant out for her arrest and was concerned about going to jail.
Edmonds had several pending charges against her when she contacted the police department.
She later resolved those charges and entered into a cooperation agreement with the Attorney
General.
At trial, Edmonds testified that, in August 2009, Musterd asked her if she could get him
some black sweatpants and gloves, explaining that he needed to “handle something.” When she
1
The transcript reveals that the prosecutor initially identified the date in question as September
13, 2010 (not 2009), but later corrected his mistake.
2
As we note below, Musterd later told police that “Joe Rodrigues” was his alias. For
simplicity’s sake, we will identify him as Musterd throughout the remainder of this opinion.
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later asked him if he had handled what he needed to, Musterd told her that he was “waiting on a
gun.” Musterd then told her that “Joey,” who owned the gym where he worked, would provide
him with a gun. Edmonds testified further that, on some later date, Musterd asked her if she had
watched the news. 3 When she replied that she had not, he told her: “I did it. I handled it. I put
two bullets into him. * * * He’s dead.” Edmonds described Musterd’s demeanor that day as
“nervous” and “shaken up.” Musterd told Edmonds that his boss, Joey, had paid him $5,000 for
the murder and that he had purchased a blue Buick Century with the money. 4
On September 14, 2009, Edmonds went to the police department and gave a statement to
detectives that memorialized what she had told Lefebvre the day before. The detectives then
asked her to call Musterd’s cell phone. Although that call did not yield any information, Musterd
called the police station three times that day after Edmonds called him—perhaps curious about
why Edmonds had called him from the police department. Recordings of those calls were played
for the jury at trial, 5 and a detective testified that the caller identified himself as Gerrit Musterd.
During these conversations, Musterd told the police that he worked at a gym and was an
undocumented immigrant from the Netherlands. He told them that he was living as “Joe
Rodrigues” because that was the name his birth parents gave him. He also told them his date of
birth and his telephone number.
The officers next asked Edmonds to attempt to capture an in-person conversation with
Musterd using a hidden recording device. She agreed to do so, and on September 17, 2009,
3
The record does not reflect exactly when this conversation occurred, but we presume any
conversation on this subject would have taken place on September 2, 2009, or shortly thereafter,
when the murder would have been reported by local news media.
4
As we note below, Musterd later told police that his boss, Julio Reverdes, asked him to murder
Benson because Reverdes owed Benson a debt for drugs.
5
Although the trial transcript suggests that transcripts of all three calls were collectively marked
as a trial exhibit, the record contains the transcript of only one phone call.
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Edmonds brought a recording device with her to the gym where Musterd worked. Edmonds and
Musterd had a conversation outside the gym, and detectives observed this encounter from a
distance. 6 Edmonds went back to the police station to return the recording device. Moments
later, Musterd’s vehicle pulled up outside. He yelled to her, asking her what she was doing
there. Feeling nervous, she replied that she was seeing probation officials about a court date,
went inside, and gave a detective the recording device.
Shortly thereafter, detectives directed that Musterd be stopped and arrested. Police
arrested Musterd at about 2 p.m. He was interviewed at the station shortly after 5 p.m. that
afternoon. After several hours of questioning, Musterd gave a statement to the police in which
he confessed to the murder. Musterd explained that his boss at the gym, Julio Reverdes, whom
he knew as “Joey,” had asked him to kill Benson because Reverdes owed Benson a debt for
drugs. 7 The next day, on September 18, 2009, Musterd signed a waiver of his right to prompt
presentment to court under Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and
accompanied police officers to Boston so that he could point out the spot on the shoreline
adjacent to a body of water where he told them he had discarded the murder weapon. 8
In October 2009, a grand jury indicted Musterd on charges of first-degree murder in
violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1 (count 1), discharging a firearm during the commission of a
crime of violence in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-47-3.2(a) and 11-47-3.2(b)(3) (count 2),
6
Edmonds testified that Musterd was the person with whom she spoke outside the gym, and a
detective testified that he observed Edmonds exit the gym and converse with a person who met
Musterd’s description.
7
Julio Reverdes (whose last name is spelled in the record alternately as “Riverdes”) was not
named in the indictment, but the indictment refers to an unnamed, unindicted coconspirator. In
instructing the jury, the trial justice referred to Reverdes as Musterd’s coconspirator.
8
A dive team conducted a search of the area but did not recover a firearm.
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conspiracy to commit murder in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6 (count 3), and carrying a pistol
without a license in violation of § 11-47-8(a) (count 4).
Over the course of a four-day trial, the prosecution presented fifteen witnesses who
testified to the facts summarized above. 9 After the trial concluded, a jury convicted Musterd on
all counts. The trial justice subsequently denied Musterd’s motion for a new trial. On July 28,
2010, the trial justice sentenced Musterd to life sentences for murder (count 1) and discharging a
firearm during the commission of a crime of violence (count 2). The trial justice also imposed
sentences of ten years to serve for conspiracy to commit murder (count 3) and carrying a pistol
without a license (count 4). All four counts of the sentence were to be served consecutively.
Musterd timely appealed his conviction to this Court.
II
Issues on Appeal
On appeal, Musterd contends that the trial justice committed three errors of law. First,
Musterd submits that, because the police lacked sufficient probable cause to arrest him without a
warrant, the trial justice should have granted his motion to suppress his confession and any
evidence seized as the fruits of an illegal arrest. Second, he argues that, because the Pawtucket
police failed to properly present him in court, and because they engaged in “trickery and lying”
during his interrogation, the trial justice should have granted his motion to suppress his
9
In addition to Dawn Edmonds and several law enforcement officers, the state’s witnesses
included: Lisa McCarty, Benson’s common-law wife; Dr. William Cox, a medical examiner;
James Leite, the individual from whom Musterd bought a Buick with the money he earned from
the murder; Peter DiLorenzo, a mixed martial arts promoter who knew both Musterd and
Reverdes; Sharon Turner, a parole officer who was monitoring Benson before his death; Brian
Canavan, an officer in the Ballistics Unit of the Massachusetts State Police; and Megan Murasso,
a firearms and toolmark examiner employed by the Connecticut Department of Public Safety.
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confession. Finally, he argues that the trial justice erred in denying his motions for a judgment
of acquittal and for a new trial. This Court will address each of Musterd’s arguments in turn.
III
Discussion
A
Motion to Suppress—Probable Cause
1
Standard of Review
When this Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress, “we defer to the trial
justice’s factual findings” and accept those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v.
Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 479 (R.I. 2003) (citing State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I. 2002)).
“In reviewing a probable-cause-to-arrest determination, however, we engage in a de novo review
of the ultimate conclusion because this type of ruling involves a mixed-law-and-fact analysis that
implicates constitutional rights.” Id. at 479-80 (citing State v. Guzman, 752 A.2d 1, 3 (R.I.
2000)). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police
officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to
warrant a reasonable person’s belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.” State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178, 1182 (R.I. 1999) (quoting
State v. Jenison, 442 A.2d 866, 873-74 (R.I. 1982)).
2
Analysis
The trial justice denied Musterd’s motion to suppress evidence, including his confession,
finding that sufficient probable cause existed to support his arrest without a warrant. At the
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hearing on the motion, the prosecution presented three witnesses (two of whom also testified at
trial). Their cumulative version of the facts was consistent with the trial testimony described
above. 10 The trial justice stated that he had “no question” that probable cause existed to support
Musterd’s arrest on September 17, 2009.
After reviewing the record and taking into account all the circumstances surrounding
Musterd’s arrest, this Court is of the opinion that the trial justice properly denied the motion to
suppress. As of September 2, 2009, the police knew that someone had murdered Michael
Benson. Less than two weeks later, Edmonds called the police and told them that she knew who
had committed the murder. Edmonds revealed several details about Musterd, whom she knew as
Joe Rodrigues. She also told them that he had made incriminating statements to her. According
to a detective who testified at the pretrial hearing, Edmonds told the police a detail about
Benson’s murder that had not been released publicly. 11 On September 14, 2009, Edmonds called
Musterd from the police station; and, although that call failed to yield any information related to
the crime, officers learned more about him when he later called the police station. They learned
that his name was Gerrit Musterd, that his alias was Joe Rodrigues, and that he was an
undocumented immigrant. A few days later, on September 17, 2009, officers observed Edmonds
meet with a man who fit Musterd’s description (Edmonds had described him as a black male);
they met at the gym where Edmonds said he worked, and he was driving a blue Buick Century,
as Edmonds described. After this meeting, Edmonds drove to the police station to return the
recording device, and moments later, Musterd arrived there and confronted her. Officers arrested
him shortly thereafter.
10
No testimony was offered on events that occurred after Musterd was arrested, however.
11
Specifically, she told them that Musterd had told her he shot the victim twice.
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These circumstances lead us to conclude that, when the police arrested Musterd, probable
cause existed to take him into custody without a warrant. Edmonds’s information about
Musterd, coupled with Musterd’s own statements and actions, furnished ample reason to believe
that he was responsible for the murder of Michael Benson. Concluding that probable cause
existed to support Musterd’s arrest, we perceive no error on the part of the trial justice in denying
the motion to suppress for that reason.
We now turn to Musterd’s two additional arguments supporting his motion to suppress.
Regardless of whether probable cause existed to support his arrest, he contends that, because the
Pawtucket police failed to properly present him in court, and because they engaged in “trickery
and lying” during his interrogation, the trial justice should have granted his motion to suppress
his confession and evidence derived from it.
B
Motion to Suppress—Confession
1
Standard of Review
“When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should ‘admit a
confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or
her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona.’” State v. Barros, 24 A.3d 1158,
1179 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I. 2008)). We employ “a two-step
analysis” in reviewing such a ruling. Id. (quoting State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.
2009)). First, we defer to the trial justice’s findings of historical fact concerning the
voluntariness of the confession unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Taoussi,
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973 A.2d at 1146). Second, we “apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial
justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.” Id. (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at
836).
“[A] statement is voluntary ‘when it is the product of [the defendant’s] free and rational
choice.’” State v. Robinson, 989 A.2d 965, 974 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 715
A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I. 1998)). If a statement was “extracted from the defendant by coercion or
improper inducement, including threats, violence, or any undue influence that overcomes the free
will of the defendant,” it is involuntary. Id. at 974-75 (quoting Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274).
When reviewing de novo the voluntariness of a confession, this Court considers “the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the challenged statement.” Robinson, 989 A.2d at 975 (quoting
Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274). We must consider not only whether a defendant’s statement was
made voluntarily, but also whether it was made knowingly and intelligently—that is, “with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it.” State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 734 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Leuthavone, 640
A.2d 515, 519 (R.I. 1994)).
2
Analysis
Here, Musterd’s motion to suppress is directed at the statement he gave to the police after
he was arrested on September 17, 2009. 12 At the suppression hearing, a detective testified that,
on the day Musterd was arrested, he was brought to the police station at approximately 2 p.m.
He was then booked and processed over the course of thirty to forty minutes. Before beginning
12
The motion was not directed at the statements Musterd made when he called the police station
before he was arrested. In addition, defense counsel did not dispute the legality of the search of
Musterd’s car (conducted by officers after his arrest based on Musterd’s signed consent form).
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his interview shortly after 5 p.m., officers apprised him of his Miranda rights. They used a
printed form, read Musterd his rights, and asked him whether he understood those rights.
Musterd signed the waiver form, indicating that he understood his rights and that he wanted to
speak with the police. According to the detective’s testimony, when the police asked him if they
could record his statement, Musterd replied that he would rather not be on tape and that he
preferred the statement to be typed. Nevertheless, detectives videotaped a portion of the
interview. The transcript of that videotaped portion indicated that Musterd reviewed his
statement with detectives before they typed out a final version for his editing, approval, and
signature. During this portion of the interview, Musterd explained in great detail why he
committed the murder. 13
The trial justice issued a bifurcated ruling with respect to the admissibility of Musterd’s
statement. First, he considered whether Musterd gave that statement knowingly and
intelligently. The trial justice noted that Musterd was given a printed rights form, was orally
apprised of his Miranda rights, and initialed that form to acknowledge his understanding of those
rights. The trial justice rejected Musterd’s argument that the surreptitious recording of his
statement—after he had expressed a preference that it be typed rather than recorded—rendered
that waiver unknowing and unintelligent. Accordingly, the trial justice concluded that Musterd
had given his statement knowingly and intelligently.
Second, the trial justice considered whether Musterd’s statement was voluntary.
Musterd’s counsel argued that it was involuntary for two reasons: first, because police had
13
Musterd explained that his boss at the gym, Julio Reverdes, asked him to kill Benson because
Reverdes owed Benson money and feared that Benson might kill him over the debt. Musterd
knew that Reverdes was having money troubles, and he worried that he would be out of a job if
Reverdes had to sell the gym. Musterd had himself borrowed money from Reverdes, so he felt
obligated to commit the murder.
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videotaped Musterd after he told them he did not want to give a videotaped statement; and
second, because the police had delayed in presenting him to court. The trial justice rejected both
of these contentions and ruled that Musterd had given his statement voluntarily. Having found
that Musterd’s statement was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial justice
denied Musterd’s motion to suppress that statement.
We agree with the trial justice’s conclusion that any delay in presentment did not affect
the voluntariness of Musterd’s statement to the police. When police officers make a warrantless
arrest, Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires law enforcement
officials to “take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a judge of the District
Court.” “[T]his Court views Rule 5(a) as ‘a prophylactic measure designed to prevent other
constitutional infirmities.’” Barros, 24 A.3d at 1181 (quoting State v. King, 996 A.2d 613, 621
(R.I. 2010)). “[O]ur well-settled case law with respect to Rule 5(a) unambiguously indicates that
a defendant who seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an unnecessary
delay in presentment ‘must demonstrate both: (1) that the delay in presentment was unnecessary
and (2) that such delay was “causative” with respect to’ the making of the inculpatory
statement.” Id. at 1182 (quoting King, 996 A.2d at 622). Applying this test, the trial justice
found that “the delay in no way affected the statements that [Musterd] gave.” 14
Likewise, we also agree with the trial justice’s finding that the surreptitious recording of
Musterd’s statement, after Musterd had expressed a preference that officers memorialize his
statement through typing and not recording, could not serve as a basis upon which to exclude it
from evidence. At the suppression hearing, Musterd’s counsel argued that the secret recording of
14
The trial justice did not specifically address whether any delay in presentment was
unnecessary; but, given that the trial justice found that any delay was not causative with respect
to Musterd’s statement, it was unnecessary for him to make a specific finding on this ground.
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his statement to the police affected both prongs of the Miranda analysis; that is, whether the
statement was voluntary and whether it was knowing and intelligent. The trial justice found that,
notwithstanding the surreptitious recording, Musterd gave his statement knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily.
We perceive no error with the trial justice’s conclusion on either prong of the Miranda
analysis. As to the first prong of the analysis, we are satisfied that Musterd knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights. “[A] knowing and intelligent waiver may be executed when a
defendant is apprised of the Miranda warnings, comprehends such warnings, and thereafter
makes a voluntary statement.” Jimenez, 33 A.3d at 735 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.
Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010)). The record supports the trial justice’s conclusion that, since Musterd
was advised of his rights, understood those rights, and then spoke to the police of his own
accord, he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
As to the second prong of the Miranda analysis, we are similarly convinced that Musterd
gave statements to the police “because [he] wanted to”—in other words, that his statements were
voluntary. The trial justice characterized the interview as “a free-flowing dialogue that the
defendant very much wanted to be a part of.” The trial justice noted several cases from other
jurisdictions in which courts found that statements of a defendant were given voluntarily even
though police recorded those statements against the defendant’s wishes. 15 Rhode Island
precedent does not speak to this precise issue, but the United States Supreme Court has held that
“[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely
15
See Woods v. McDonough, No. 8:03-CV-2336-T-27MAP, 2007 WL 1017666, at *9 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 30, 2007); Blake v. State, 972 So.2d 839, 842-45 (Fla. 2007); State v. Wilson, 755
S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Lewis, 533 A.2d 358, 364 (N.H. 1987); Hardin v.
State, 649 P.2d 799, 802 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). Another case which the trial justice cited has
since been reversed by a higher court. See Lee v. State, 975 A.2d 240, 255 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2009), rev’d, 12 A.3d 1238, 1251 (Md. 2011).
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can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional
right.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). Because Musterd was unaware that the
police were recording his statements, that fact has no bearing on whether he voluntarily waived
his Miranda rights. Moreover, we note that Musterd did not expressly forbid police from
recording his interview; rather, he merely expressed a preference that his statement be typed
rather than recorded. In these circumstances, we decline to hold that Musterd’s knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights was later vitiated when the police
recorded a portion of his statement without his knowledge.
C
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lastly, Musterd argues that the trial justice erred when he denied his motions for a
judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. These motions challenged the legal sufficiency of the
evidence. In deciding whether to grant a motion for a new trial, the trial justice may exercise his
or her “independent judgment to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses.”
State v. Navarro, 33 A.3d 147, 156 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 640 (R.I.
2011)). By contrast, in ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial justice must
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, * * * giving full credibility to the
state’s witnesses, and draw[ing] therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt.” Id.(quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d at 640). Where, as here, a defendant appeals the trial court’s rulings on
both types of motions, this Court first evaluates the ruling on the new-trial motion. Id. (citing
Pineda, 13 A.3d at 640). If our review of the evidence adduced at trial shows that the evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction under the standard applicable to a new-trial motion, it follows
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that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
See id. (citing Pineda, 13 A.3d at 640).
1
Motion for a New Trial
“When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as
a thirteenth juror.” Navarro, 33 A.3d at 156 (quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d at 640-41). “The trial
justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or
she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” Id. (quoting Pineda, 13
A.3d at 641). If the trial justice has set forth sufficient reasoning to support his or her ruling, this
Court “accord[s] great weight” to that ruling on appeal. Id. (quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d at 641).
We will not reverse the trial justice’s decision unless “we are convinced that [he or she]
committed clear error or * * * overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence
[relating] to a critical issue in the case.” Id. at 156-57 (quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d at 641).
To support his argument that the trial justice should have granted him a new trial,
Musterd presses only one point. He contends that Edmonds’s testimony on cross-examination
indicates that her conversation with Musterd, in which he told her that he was looking for a gun,
took place after the murder was committed. 16 This observation fails to take into account that her
16
During this portion of Edmonds’s cross-examination, Musterd’s counsel referred Edmonds to
the statement she gave to police on September 14, 2009. The following exchange then took
place:
“Q: * * * So, I had asked you earlier about your statement
in there about where you say about a week ago, you were
home and that’s when Joe told you about this. Correct? We
spoke of that?
“A: Yes.
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testimony on direct examination made clear that this conversation took place in August 2009,
sometime after Musterd originally asked her for dark clothing but before the murder occurred on
September 2, 2009. Given that Musterd’s own statements corroborated Edmonds’s account to
the police, we cannot say that the trial justice committed clear error in finding that this
inconsistency on cross-examination was outweighed by the rest of the evidence adduced at
trial. 17
The trial justice neither committed clear error nor overlooked or misconceived material or
relevant evidence when he denied Musterd’s motion for a new trial. We therefore affirm his
ruling on this motion and turn to whether he properly denied Musterd’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal.
2
Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal
“We review a trial justice’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal using the same
prosecution-deferential standard as the trial court applies.” Navarro, 33 A.3d at 158 (quoting
Pineda, 13 A.3d at 642). Under this standard, “[if the evidence] is sufficient to support a verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion must be denied.” Id. (quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d
at 642). Since we hold that the evidence here is “sufficient to withstand the more stringent
review applicable to a motion for a new trial, it follows that the evidence * * * [is] also sufficient
“Q: And then, later on in that same sentence of the
document you just read and you signed, you said that he
told you that he was waiting for a gun at that time, correct?
“A: Mm hmm.” (Edmonds later made clear that her answer
to the preceding inquiry was yes.)
17
In denying Musterd’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice noted that “Edmonds was
subjected to lengthy and severe cross-examination and her credibility was fully tested. Her
problems, both psychologically and in criminal cases, were exposed, warts and all, and this jury
obviously accepted her testimony as credible. And I, as a front-row observer, have no qualms
about their having accepted her testimony as credible.”
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to withstand a motion for a judgment of acquittal.” Id. (quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d at 642).
Accordingly, we decline to disturb the trial justice’s denial of Musterd’s motion for a judgment
of acquittal.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The record of the case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: State v. Gerrit Musterd.
CASE NO: No. 2011-159-C.A.
(P1/09-3256AG)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: November 2, 2012
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Robert D. Krause
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For State: Christopher R. Bush
Department of Attorney General
For Defendant: C. Daniel Schrock, Esq.