Joseph Hall v. State of Rhode Island , 2013 R.I. LEXIS 33 ( 2013 )

Supreme Court
No. 2011-297-Appeal.
(PM 08-7298)
Joseph Hall :
v. :
State of Rhode Island. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
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corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2011-297-Appeal.
(PM 08-7298)
Joseph Hall :
v. :
State of Rhode Island. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
January 23, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The applicant, Joseph Hall (Hall),
appeals from a judgment that denied his application for postconviction relief. After hearing the
arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion
that cause has not been shown, and we proceed to decide the appeal at this time. We affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
The facts underlying Hall‟s conviction are set forth in detail in State v. Hall, 940 A.2d
645, 649-52 (R.I. 2008). We recount only those facts relevant to the issues raised in Hall‟s
application. In June 2006, Hall was tried in Superior Court for unlawfully carrying a pistol
without a license; possession of a firearm after a conviction of a crime of violence; discharging a
firearm within city limits; eluding a police officer; and resisting arrest. The state called Agent
Edward Troiano (Agent Troiano), an Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives agent. When
questioned about the statement Agent Troiano obtained from Hall on the night Hall was arrested,
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Agent Troiano indicated—over Hall‟s objection—that he did not believe Hall‟s statement was
“accurate and honest.” Faced with this testimony, the trial justice offered to give a curative
instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony or, in the alternative, to consider a mistrial.
After defense counsel was instructed to discuss these alternatives with Hall, Hall opted for a
cautionary instruction and one was given, to which there was no objection.
The jury found Hall guilty on all counts. On direct appeal, Hall challenged an out-of-
court identification, the competency of an eyewitness, aspects of the Habitual Offender Act, and
the alleged involuntariness of his recorded statements. We affirmed the conviction. Hall, 940
A.2d at 660.
On November 19, 2008, Hall filed an application for postconviction relief, claiming that
he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the jury was improperly instructed. Further, Hall
claimed that the trial justice erred when he permitted Agent Troiano to “offer to the jury an
opinion on the truthfulness of a statement that [Hall] made.”
Hall‟s court-appointed counsel filed a “no-merit memorandum” and a motion to
withdraw, in accordance with Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).1 The memorandum
suggested that one claim might conceivably have merit: the claim that the trial justice
1
“In Shatney, we established a procedure by which an attorney * * * who has been appointed to
represent an applicant for postconviction relief may later seek to withdraw from that
representation under specific and limited circumstances[.]” Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 455
(R.I. 2012). Specifically,
“[u]pon notice to the applicant, counsel for an applicant may request permission
from the court to withdraw, based upon an assessment that the application has no
arguable merit. To do so, however, appointed counsel must file with the court
and serve upon the applicant a motion to withdraw accompanied by a „no-merit‟
memorandum that details the nature and extent of his or her review of the case,
lists each issue the applicant wished to raise, and explains why in counsel‟s
professional opinion those issues and any others that he or she may have
investigated lacked merit.” Id. (quoting Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130, 135 (R.I.
2000)).
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improperly permitted Agent Troiano to offer an opinion on the truthfulness of Hall‟s statement.
Even so, counsel reasoned that Hall‟s “rights were promptly protected by his defense attorney‟s
objection when the issue of a mistrial was raised.” Because Hall “chose not to pursue a mistrial
but [rather] to allow the trial to continue with a curative instruction,” counsel concluded that the
postconviction-relief claim was without merit.
At the October 19, 2009 hearing on Hall‟s application, the trial justice granted counsel‟s
motion to withdraw. The trial justice informed Hall that he would not provide him with another
lawyer, but stated that he would hear Hall‟s arguments. Hall simply pointed to his application—
which was “right there in front of [the trial justice]”—but did not offer anything other than the
contention that he was “railroaded” and “the whole case, period, was bogus.” In requesting that
the application be denied, the state argued that Hall had fallen short of his burden of proof; none
of the issues raised in the postconviction-relief application were raised on direct appeal. The trial
justice found that “[c]autionary instructions were offered, requested, given,” and “[t]he transcript
clearly reflects every effort to provide [Hall] with a fair trial.”2 The trial justice found that the
application was “devoid of any merit whatsoever” and denied and dismissed it.
On appeal to this Court, Hall raises one claim of error: “he did not receive a fair and
impartial trial due to vouching by one of the [state‟s] * * * witnesses * * * [that was] done in the
presence of the [j]ury.”3 He argues that it is “naïve” to assume that “prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury” and, in fact, the damaging testimony “created a strong
impression on the [j]ury.” The cautionary instruction, according to Hall, did not cure the
2
When pressed regarding his allegation that he was “railroaded,” Hall conceded that he had no
basis for that contention.
3
Hall filed his postconviction-relief application and appeal pro se; appellate counsel was
appointed by this Court.
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prejudicial effects of the testimony and “[t]he trial justice * * * did commit error of [a]
constitutional magnitude by allowing the trial to proceed.”
Standard of Review
The statutory remedy of postconviction relief set forth in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1 is
“available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that
the conviction violated the applicant‟s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly
discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.” Sosa v.
State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189, 192 (R.I. 2008)).
When reviewing the grant or denial of postconviction relief, the trial justice‟s factual findings
and credibility determinations will be upheld “absent clear error or a determination that the
hearing justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.” Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603,
605 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 985 A.2d 311, 313 (R.I. 2009)); see also Rice v.
State, 38 A.3d 9, 17 n.11 (R.I. 2012) (stating that this Court will not disturb credibility
determinations “unless the [applicant] „demonstrate[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that
the [hearing] justice was clearly wrong.‟” quoting Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 526 (R.I.
1992)).
Discussion
Before this Court, Hall argues that Agent Troiano‟s testimony was prejudicial and not
capable of being cured with a cautionary instruction. Hall also challenges the instruction given
by the trial justice, which Hall characterizes as “radically defective” and insufficient to “remove
th[e] taint.”
Section 10-9.1-8 “codifies the doctrine of res judicata as applied to petitions for post-
conviction relief.” Taylor v. Wall, 821 A.2d 685, 688 (R.I. 2003) (quoting State v. DeCiantis,
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813 A.2d 986, 993 (R.I. 2003)); see also Price v. Wall, 31 A.3d 995, 999 & n.10 (R.I. 2011).
Section 10-9.1-8 provides in pertinent part:
“Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted
in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds that in the interest of
justice the applicant should be permitted to assert such a ground
for relief.”
“Res judicata bars the relitigation of any issue that could have been litigated in a prior
proceeding, including a direct appeal, that resulted in a final judgment between the same parties,
or those in privity with them.” Taylor, 821 A.2d at 688; see also Price, 31 A.3d at 999-1000.
“Under § 10-9.1-8, an applicant is permitted to assert an otherwise estopped ground for relief
only if it is in the „interest of justice.‟” Ferrell v. Wall, 971 A.2d 615, 621 (R.I. 2009).
Accordingly, before we consider the merits of the claims, we first assess whether they are
procedurally precluded.
Hall argues that the cautionary instruction was error and that a mistrial was the proper
course of action, despite his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. However, we conclude
that this issue has been waived. The record establishes that the trial justice provided Hall with
two choices: mistrial or a cautionary instruction. Hall elected the cautionary instruction, thereby
waiving any right to a mistrial. Hall received the remedy of his own choice; he failed to object to
the instruction at the time it was given; and he did not raise the issue on direct appeal. It is
apparent that Hall and his trial attorney were well aware of the grounds upon which a mistrial
could have been granted; the trial justice openly offered that remedy as an alternative to the
cautionary instruction.
The purported inadequacy of the cautionary instruction is likewise barred by res judicata,
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and, as a result, is not properly before us. See Taylor, 821 A.2d at 688 (“Res judicata bars the
relitigation of any issue that could have been litigated in a prior proceeding, including a direct
appeal * * *.”); see also State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040, 1047 (R.I. 2004) (finding that a
defendant had “failed to preserve for review any issue concerning the adequacy of the trial
justice‟s curative instruction” because he failed to raise any objection to it at the time it was
given). Here, Hall could have raised the issue of the alleged improper cautionary instruction on
direct appeal and, therefore, he was barred from raising the claim in his application for
postconviction relief. We therefore affirm the denial of the improper jury instructions claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment below. The papers may be
remanded to the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Joseph Hall v. State of Rhode Island.
CASE NO: No. 2011-297-Appeal.
(PM 08-7298)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: March 1, 2013
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Robert D. Krause
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Applicant: Robert J. Caron, Esq.
For State: Virginia M. McGinn
Department of Attorney General