Karen McAninch v. State of Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training , 2013 R.I. LEXIS 60 ( 2013 )

Supreme Court
No. 2011-358-M.P.
(PC 10-5950)
(PC 10-5899)
Karen McAninch et al. :
v. :
State of Rhode Island Department of Labor :
and Training et al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion
Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Tel. 222-3258 of any typographical or other
formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is
published.
Supreme Court
No. 2011-358-M.P.
(PC 10-5950)
(PC 10-5899)
Karen McAninch et al. :
v. :
State of Rhode Island Department of Labor :
and Training et al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Flaherty, for the Court. The plaintiff, Karen McAninch, business agent for
United Service and Allied Workers of Rhode Island (USAW-RI), seeks review of a judgment of
the Superior Court that dismissed her complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff had filed a
complaint in the Superior Court under G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA), seeking judicial review of a decision of the State of Rhode Island Department of
Labor and Training (DLT). The plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred when she found that
the plaintiff was tardy in filing her complaint after the statutory timeframe for doing so had
expired. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on February 27, 2013,
pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this
matter should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments and examining the
memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown, and we
proceed to decide the case at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set
forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
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I
Facts and Travel
The plaintiff is the business agent for a labor organization that represents former
employees of the Providence Public Library (the library). On June 30, 2009, the final day of the
library’s fiscal year, the library terminated the employment of thirty-eight union and eight
nonunion employees. On July 9, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint with the DLT’s Division of
Labor Standards. The complaint alleged that the library had failed to pay the employees a total
of $149,482.82 in vacation pay that the employees had accrued at the time of their termination.
McAninch argued that, under USAW-RI’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA), as well as the
library’s employee manual, the employees were entitled to the vacation time for the fiscal year
that ended on June 30, 2009. The library, on the other hand, argued that the vacation pay did not
accrue until July 1, 2009, and because the employees were terminated on the previous day, they
were not entitled to the vacation pay.
On July 8, 2010, a hearing officer of the DLT conducted a hearing. In a written decision,
he held that, under the CBA and employee handbook, the employees’ vacation time accrued on
July 1 of each fiscal year. Because the employees were not employed on that date, he concluded
that they were not entitled to any vacation pay for the previous year. The DLT decision was
mailed to the parties on September 9, 2010. The plaintiff then filed a complaint in the Superior
Court on October 12, 2010, seeking judicial review of the DLT’s decision. 1 The plaintiff
1
The plaintiff contends that the complaint that was filed on October 12, 2010 was hand delivered
to the clerk’s office on that date, and an identical complaint also had been mailed to the clerk’s
office on October 8, but was not filed until October 13. As a result, two case files were opened
by the clerk’s office, but the files were later consolidated. However, for purposes of determining
whether the complaint was timely filed, we will employ the October 12 date, because it is the
earlier of the two filing dates.
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requested that the court reverse that decision and order the library to remit the requested vacation
pay to the affected employees.
On October 5, 2011, the trial justice issued a written decision in which she dismissed
plaintiff’s appeal “due to lack of jurisdiction,” holding that the complaint had not been timely
filed. The trial justice raised the jurisdictional issue sua sponte, holding that “[i]f an
administrative appeal is untimely filed, the [c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” She also
concluded that administrative appeals are not civil actions, but rather that they are appellate in
nature. Thus, she held that such appeals are analogous to this Court’s review of Superior Court
decisions. According to the trial justice, adherence to the time limitations for filings in this Court
are “mandatory,” and therefore she held that “Rule 6 of the [Superior Court] Rules of Civil
Procedure—which extends the last day in computing any time period to the next day which is
neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor holiday—is not applicable and does not govern the review
proceedings for an administrative appeal.” Further, she found that “§ 42-35-15 does not provide
for an extension of time for ‘excusable neglect.’”
Accordingly, the trial justice held that, under the clear and unambiguous language of §
42-35-15(b), plaintiff had exactly thirty days within which to file its complaint in the Superior
Court, which meant that plaintiff had “until October 9, 2010 to file a timely appeal.” Because
plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until October 12, 2010, the trial justice concluded that the
court “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over th[e] matter,” and she dismissed the case, even
though October 9, 10, and 11 comprised the Columbus Day weekend. The plaintiff filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari on November 4, 2011, which this Court granted on
February 2, 2012.
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II
Standard of Review
This Court’s review under § 42-35-16 of the APA is de novo. Heritage Healthcare
Services, Inc. v. Marques, 14 A.3d 932, 936 (R.I. 2011). “Although this Court affords the
factual findings of an administrative agency great deference, questions of law—including
statutory interpretation—are reviewed de novo.” Id. (quoting Iselin v. Retirement Board of the
Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008). “When we
undertake such a review, ‘our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended
by the Legislature.’” Id. (quoting Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340, 344
(R.I. 2004)). Additionally, a determination on the meaning and effect of court rules is a question
of law, which this Court also reviews de novo. Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d
580, 583 (R.I. 2005).
III
Discussion
Before this Court, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in the manner in which she
calculated the date by which the complaint had to be filed. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that
even if the complaint was not timely filed, the doctrine of excusable neglect should apply and the
late filing was justified. However, before addressing plaintiff’s arguments, we shall address the
trial justice’s conclusion that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an
administrative appeal that she determined to be untimely filed.
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A
Jurisdiction of the Superior Court
In her decision, the trial justice found that plaintiff’s complaint was filed after the
timeframe for doing so had expired, and, therefore, she concluded that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the case. We believe that this was a misstatement of the law.
Section 42-35-15(a) and (b) provides that “[a]ny person * * * who has exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him or her within the agency, and who is aggrieved by a
final order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review,” and “[p]roceedings for [such]
review are instituted by filing a complaint in the superior court.” Additionally, “[t]he court may
affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced * * *.” Section 42-
35-15(g).
This Court has held that, based on the language of this statute, “[c]ertainly, the Superior
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over proper administrative appeals.” Rivera v. Employees’
Retirement System of Rhode Island, No. 2011-166-M.P., slip op. at 13 (R.I., filed April 8, 2013).
However, “the real issue before the Superior Court was whether that tribunal, which
unquestionably had subject matter jurisdiction, ‘should have exercised that jurisdiction.’”
Narragansett Electric Co. v. Saccoccio, 43 A.3d 40, 44 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Trainor v. Grieder,
23 A.3d 1171, 1174 (R.I. 2011)). To be sure, and as this Court has noted in the past, “the
distinction between the ‘appropriate exercise of power and the absence of power’ may at times
be ‘blurry.’” Id. (quoting Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 665 (R.I. 1986)).
However, in this case, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred when she held that the Superior
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an administrative appeal that she had determined
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was untimely filed. Nonetheless, it is our task to decide whether plaintiff’s appeal was, in fact,
timely filed, and thus, whether the Superior Court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked.
B
Applicability of Rule 6 to Administrative Appeals
In her decision, the trial justice held that Rule 6 “is not applicable and does not govern
the review proceedings for an administrative appeal.” The plaintiff contends that this holding
was erroneous and that Rule 6 should be applied in such appeals, based not only on the rule’s
clear language, but also on the language of Rules 80(c) 2 and 81 3 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, plaintiff argues that, because the last day to file the complaint fell on the
2
Rule 80(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, that “[t]hese
rules, so far as they are applicable, shall govern the review proceedings.”
3
Rule 81 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part,
“(a) To What Proceedings Applicable.
“(1) These rules do not apply during the process and pleading
stages to the following proceedings:
“Probate appeals
“Proceedings in condemnation
“Petitions for enforcement of mechanics’ liens
“Statutory petitions for receiverships and for dissolution of
corporations.
“(2) These rules do not apply to the following proceedings:
“Assignments for benefit of creditors
“Petitions for foreclosure of redemption of interests in land sold
for nonpayment of taxes
“Naturalization proceedings
“Prerogative writs except where governed by this rule or Rule
80.
“(3) These rules do not apply to petitions for the writ of habeas
corpus.
“* * *
“(e) * * * In applying these rules to any proceedings to which
they are applicable, the terminology of any statute which is also
applicable, where inconsistent with that in these rules, shall be
taken to mean the device or procedure proper under these rules.”
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Saturday of Columbus Day weekend, Rule 6 should have extended that deadline to October 12,
the Tuesday after the legal holiday. As a result, plaintiff urges this Court to hold that her
complaint was timely filed. The defendants, on the other hand, argue that Rule 6 is not
applicable to administrative appeals based on this Court’s decision in Pizzi v. Rhode Island State
Labor Relations Board, 857 A.2d 762 (R.I. 2004) (mem.). Furthermore, defendants cite Rule
80(b), which says that “[t]he time within which review [of an administrative action] may be
sought shall be provided by law.” (Emphasis added.) The defendants contend that § 42-35-15(b)
unambiguously granted plaintiff thirty days within which to file a complaint for review and that
Rule 6 cannot be used to elongate this timeframe. 4 However, for the reasons that follow, we
conclude that Rule 6 should apply in administrative appeals, and, therefore, plaintiff’s complaint
was timely filed.
Rule 6(a) provides that
“[i]n computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
rules, by order of court or by any applicable statute, the day of the
act, event, or default after which the designated period of time
begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period is to
be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is
neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday.”
In the past, this Court has held that “[s]tatutes prescribing the time and procedure to be followed
by a litigant attempting to secure appellate review are to be strictly construed.” Rivera, slip op. at
12 (quoting Sousa v. Town of Coventry, 774 A.2d 812, 814 (R.I. 2001)). However, this does not
mean that the timeframes set forth in those statutes are utterly inflexible. See id. at 13 (holding
that “the Superior Court has the equitable authority to determine whether the statute providing
4
General Laws 1956 § 42-35-15(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[p]roceedings for review [of
administrative actions] are instituted by filing a complaint * * * within thirty (30) days after
mailing notice of the final decision of the agency * * *.”
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for judicial review of an administrative decision pursuant to § 42-35-15(b) should be tolled in
appropriate circumstances”).
Rule 80(b) says that “[t]he time within which review [of an administrative action] may
be sought shall be provided by law.” To determine what law should cabin that timeframe,
defendants urge this Court to look no further than § 42-35-15(b), which allows an aggrieved
party thirty days within which to file a complaint. However, statutes are not the only “law” to
which this Court must look; case law as well as court rules also provide guidance. See Carbone
v. Planning Board of Appeal of South Kingstown, 702 A.2d 386, 388 (R.I. 1997) (looking to
Rule 80(c) to determine whether Rules 15 and 21 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to administrative appeals). Therefore, we shall look to those sources of law as well.
The language of Rule 6(a) itself clearly says that it should be applied “[i]n computing any
period of time prescribed or allowed * * * by any applicable statute * * *.” (Emphases added.)
Furthermore, Rule 80(c), which pertains to reviews of administrative actions, provides that
“[t]hese rules [of civil procedure], so far as they are applicable, shall govern the review
proceedings.” Finally, Rule 81 lists the types of proceedings to which the Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not apply; administrative appeals are not included on that list. Reading all these
provisions together, it is our opinion that Rule 6 should apply to the Superior Court’s review of
administrative decisions.
In addition, our case law directs us to that same conclusion. In Carbone, 702 A.2d at
388-89, this Court addressed the applicability of certain Rules of Civil Procedure to appeals from
administrative agencies. In that case, this Court reaffirmed its holding in Mauricio v. Zoning
Board of Review of Pawtucket, 590 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1991), in which we held that such appeals
were analogous to this Court’s review of lower-court decisions where “the filing of a notice of
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appeal is a sine qua non in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for appellate
purposes.” Carbone, 702 A.2d at 388 (quoting Mauricio, 590 A.2d at 880). Thus, Rule 3 of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure was held to be inapplicable insofar as it allowed a
plaintiff to initiate a civil action by depositing a complaint in the mail. Carbone, 702 A.2d at 388.
But we also held that Rules 11, 15 and 21 applied to administrative appeals, and we suggested
that other rules, such as Rule 24 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, may also apply.
Carbone, 702 A.2d at 389. Finally, this Court held that:
“By mentioning certain rules, we should not be deemed or
construed to be excluding other rules that may meet the general
requirements set forth in Rule 1 which commands that the rules of
civil procedure be construed and administered ‘to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ In short,
those rules of civil procedure which are consistent with the nature
of an appellate proceeding may be applied in furtherance of that
goal.” Id. (quoting Rule 1 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure).
It is noteworthy that Article I, Rule 20(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which speaks to the computation of time for appellate proceedings, is almost identical to Rule
6(a) of the Superior Court rules, in that it extends the last day in computing any time period to
the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday. 5 Thus, we hold that consistency
demands that Rule 6(a) applies to the Superior Court’s review of administrative decisions. See
Carbone, 702 A.2d at 389.
5
Article I, Rule 20(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
“In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by
order of the Court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act,
event, or default after which the designated period of time begins
to run is not to be included. The last day of the period is to be
included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is
neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday.”
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The defendants cite this Court’s order in Pizzi, 857 A.2d at 763-64, to support their
argument that Rule 6 should not apply to administrative appeals. In that case, the plaintiff
sought to extend the period of time within which to appeal an administrative decision based on
Rule 6(d), the subsection which adds one extra day to any prescribed time period if that period
begins when a party is served by mail. 6 Pizzi, 857 A.2d at 763. This Court dismissed the matter
on procedural grounds because the plaintiff had incorrectly sought review by filing an appeal and
not a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. The defendants direct us to the language in Pizzi, 857
A.2d at 763-64, which reads as follows:
“Nevertheless, we note in passing that even if this case were
properly before this Court, Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure is of no assistance to Pizzi. Rule 80 of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that, with
respect to Superior Court claims seeking review of agency
decisions, ‘[t]he time within which review may be sought shall be
provided by law.’ (Emphasis added.) In this circumstance, the
governing law is G.L.1956 § 42-35-15(b), which provides that an
appeal from an administrative agency decision to the Superior
Court must be perfected within thirty days.”
According to defendants, this language unequivocally prohibits plaintiff from seizing on Rule
6(a). We do not agree.
First, we note that this decision was in the form of a memorandum order—not a full
opinion—which gives it little precedential value. Second, the language that defendants rely upon
is pure dicta, and it had no bearing on the disposition of the case. See Black’s Law Dictionary
1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “obiter dictum” as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a
6
Rule 6(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or
take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service
of a notice or other paper upon the party, and the notice or paper is
served upon the party by mail, 1 day shall be added to the
prescribed period.”
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judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential”). Finally, Pizzi, 857 A.2d at 763, does not control our decision in this matter
because it is inapt to the issues raised in this case. In Pizzi, the issue before this Court was
whether Rule 6(d) extended the time frame for appealing an administrative decision by one day
because the plaintiff received that decision by mail. Pizzi, 857 A.2d at 763. Here, we are asked
only to decide whether Rule 6(a) should be employed to compute the allowable time, not to
extend the allowable period for filing. Thus, we do not believe that the language of Pizzi, dicta
though it may be, cuts across our conclusion.
Indeed, from a practical standpoint, because the Superior Court Clerk’s office is closed
on weekends and holidays, the trial justice’s decision would have afforded the plaintiff only
twenty-nine days within which to file her complaint. Section 42-35-15(b) says that a plaintiff is
to be afforded thirty days. 7
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the judgment of the Superior Court.
The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Robinson did not participate.
7
Because we hold that Rule 6 applies to administrative appeals and that plaintiff’s complaint
was timely filed, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the doctrine of excusable
neglect.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Karen McAninch et al. v. State of Rhode Island Department of
Labor and Training et al.
CASE NO: No. 2011-358-M.P.
(PC 10-5950)
(PC 10-5899)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: April 19, 2013
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Francis X. Flaherty
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff: Carly Beauvais Iafrate, Esq.
For Defendant Providence Public Library: Matthew H. Parker, Esq.
For Defendant State of Rhode Island Department of Labor and
Training: Mary Ellen McQueeney-Lally, Esq.