State v. Muhammad Farooq , 2015 R.I. LEXIS 64 ( 2015 )

Supreme Court
No. 2014-111-C.A.
(P1/11-1105A)
State :
v. :
Muhammad Farooq. :
ORDER
This case came before the Court on May 6, 2015, pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily
decided. The defendant, Muhammad Farooq (Farooq or defendant), who was convicted on one
count each of first-degree sexual assault, felony assault, and second-degree sexual assault,
appeals from the denial of his motion to reduce sentence in accordance with Rule 35 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. After careful review of the parties’ arguments, we
conclude that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be decided at this time. For the
reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
We briefly recite the facts of the underlying charge. Shortly after 11:30 p.m. on
November 1, 2008, 1 Farooq invited the complaining witness, Caitlin (complainant or Caitlin), 2 a
customer, to the back room of his convenience store. At knifepoint, Farooq told Caitlin to
disrobe and then proceeded to sexually assault her. After a brief struggle, Caitlin managed to
grab Farooq’s knife and escape.
1
There is some discrepancy in the record as to whether the assault took place on November 1,
2008 or November 2, 2008.
2
We refer to the complaining witness in this case by a pseudonym. We do so in order to protect
her privacy.
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On April 15, 2011, criminal indictment P1/11-1105A charged defendant with: first-
degree sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-2 and 11-37-3 (count 1); assault with a
dangerous weapon in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2 (count 2); and second-degree sexual
assault in violation of §§ 11-37-4 and 11-37-5 (count 3). The defendant’s jury-waived trial
commenced on January 23, 2012, where he testified on his own behalf, categorically denying
that he sexually assaulted Caitlin.
On January 26, 2012, the trial justice found defendant guilty on all three counts. The
defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial justice on February 10, 2012. At the
sentencing hearing on March 22, 2012, the trial justice referenced the appropriate Superior Court
sentencing benchmarks and noted that, without remorse, he would not give defendant a lesser
sentence. He then sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of thirty years, eighteen to serve, and
twelve suspended with probation on count 1; ten years, one to serve, and nine suspended with
probation on count 2; and fifteen years, five to serve, and ten suspended with probation on count
3. On April 2, 2012, defendant filed a notice of appeal of his conviction to this Court, but he
withdrew it on December 14, 2012, leaving himself with no avenue for appellate review.
On April 10, 2013, defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35.
In support of his motion, defendant attached a statement accepting responsibility for the “horrible
crime [he] committed.” The defendant included a summary of arguments, in which he pointed
out that the withdrawal of his appeal was further evidence that he accepted responsibility and
showed remorse for his actions.
On December 16, 2013, at the hearing on the motion, defendant made a further statement
accepting responsibility, which defense counsel insisted was justification for a reduction in
sentence from a total of eighteen years to serve to six years. When the hearing resumed on
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February 17, 2014, complainant addressed the court and stated that she did not wish to see
defendant granted any further relief. In his final plea for leniency, defendant averred that there
had been a change in circumstances since sentencing, evidenced by the withdrawal of his appeal
and the fact that, because an immigration detainer had been lodged against him, he would likely
not make parole and would be deported on completion of his sentence.
The trial justice noted his appreciation for defendant’s letter acknowledging
responsibility, which he understood to be a “tacit acknowledgment that he lied on the stand.”
The trial justice reiterated that, at sentencing, he could have made a finding that defendant lied
on the witness stand and increased his sentence accordingly, but that he chose not do so. He then
recognized that the standard on a Rule 35 motion is essentially a plea for leniency and an
opportunity to consider whether the original sentence was “really harsh.” Denying the motion,
the trial justice concluded that there was no need for leniency and that the sentence was not
unduly harsh. An order denying the motion was entered on March 7, 2014, and defendant filed a
notice of appeal later that day.
“A motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency.” State v.
Ruffner, 5 A.3d 864, 867 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Mendoza, 958 A.2d 1159, 1161 (R.I.
2008)). “The motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice, who may grant it if
he or she decides on reflection or on the basis of changed circumstances that the sentence
originally imposed was, for any reason, unduly severe.” Id. (quoting Mendoza, 958 A.2d at
1161). We have “maintained a strong policy against interfering with a trial justice’s discretion in
sentencing matters, and, therefore, we only will interfere with that discretion in rare instances
when the trial justice has imposed a sentence that is without justification and is grossly disparate
from other sentences generally imposed for similar offenses.” Id. (quoting State v. Coleman, 984
-3-
A.2d 650, 654 (R.I. 2009)). “Thus, ‘our review of a motion justice’s ruling on a motion to
correct pursuant to Rule 35 is limited.’” Ruffner, 5 A.3d at 867 (quoting Curtis v. State, 996
A.2d 601, 603-04 (R.I. 2010)).
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice erred when he denied the Rule 35
motion to reduce sentence because the trial justice failed to consider circumstances, including his
expression of remorse, that had changed since sentencing. After a careful review of the record,
we cannot agree with defendant’s assertion.
It is well established that a “motion [to reduce sentence] is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial justice, who may grant it if he or she decides on reflection or on the basis of
changed circumstances that the sentence originally imposed was, for any reason, unduly severe.”
Ruffner, 5 A.3d at 867 (quoting Mendoza, 958 A.2d at 1161 (emphasis added)); see also State v.
Tiernan, 645 A.2d 482, 485 (R.I. 1994) (“[A] trial justice may also take into consideration a
corollary factor to justify reducing a sentence—that a defendant exhibited contrition and
consideration for the victims of his or her criminal activity * * *.” (emphasis added)). It is thus
evident that a trial justice is under no obligation to take a particular approach in considering a
Rule 35 motion. As long as there is reflection on the severity of the original sentence, there is no
requirement that the trial justice consider changed circumstances on a Rule 35 motion. See
Ruffner, 5 A.3d at 867.
A thorough examination of the record reveals that the trial justice gave ample reflection
to the severity of the original sentence. Over the course of his decision covering nearly seven
pages of the transcript, the trial justice considered defendant’s expression of remorse, the
decision not to increase sentence although defendant lied on the stand, complainant’s wishes, and
the effects on defendant’s family, all before making a determination that the original eighteen-
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year sentence required no leniency and was not unduly harsh. There is no question that this
comprehensive consideration constituted sufficient reflection for the purposes of a Rule 35
motion.
In any event, it is readily apparent that the trial justice did consider changed
circumstances in denying the defendant’s motion to reduce sentence, specifically noting that he
was “pleased that [the defendant] has withdrawn [his] appeal before the merits were decided and
has indicated that he’s truly sorry for what happened.” He considered changed circumstances
and wrestled with the defendant’s newfound remorse, but was not persuaded that those
circumstances warranted a sentence reduction in light of the nature of the crime and its effect on
the complainant. Given this Court’s reluctance to interfere with a trial justice’s decision on a
Rule 35 motion, we cannot say that this analysis constituted an abuse of discretion.
We therefore deny and dismiss the defendant’s appeal and affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court, to which the papers in this case are remanded.
Entered as an Order of this Court this 27th Day of May, 2015.
By Order,
___________/s/_____________
Clerk
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: State v. Muhammad Farooq.
CASE NO: No. 2014-111-C.A.
(P1/11-1105A)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE ORDER FILED: May 27, 2015
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: N/A – Court Order
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice William E. Carnes, Jr.
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For State: Jane M. McSoley
Department of Attorney General
For Defendant: Megan F. Jackson
Office of the Public Defender