Warnsey Wiggins v. Edward Pianka ( 2021 )

March 22, 2021
Supreme Court
No. 2019-268-Appeal.
(KM 19-106)
Warnsey Wiggins :
v. :
Edward Pianka. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
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typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may
be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2019-268-Appeal.
(KM 19-106)
Warnsey Wiggins :
v. :
Edward Pianka. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. Before us is an appeal from a Superior
Court judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the petitioner, Warnsey
Wiggins. The respondent, Edward Pianka, contends that the hearing justice erred in
denying his motion to vacate the arbitration award and in granting the petitioner’s
motion to confirm the award. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to
an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this
appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and
oral submissions and after reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been
shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. In
accordance with the strong public policy in favor of the finality of arbitration awards,
we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
On October 31, 2013, at approximately 6 p.m., a collision occurred between
an automobile driven by petitioner and respondent, who was walking across Main
Street in West Warwick, Rhode Island. The respondent subsequently filed a
negligence action against petitioner in Superior Court.1 Thereafter, the parties
submitted the matter to nonbinding arbitration as required by the Superior Court
Rules Governing Arbitration of Civil Actions. The arbitrator found that each party
had been 50 percent at fault for the accident and he awarded respondent 50 percent
of his damages. In his decision, the arbitrator noted that petitioner had testified that
“[h]e believe[d] he was traveling 25 to 30 mph.” The respondent rejected the
nonbinding arbitration award.
The parties subsequently consented to submit the case to binding arbitration.
At the arbitration hearing, a surveillance camera video of the accident was admitted
into evidence. In his testimony at the arbitration hearing, petitioner stated that he
was driving at approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour at the time of impact.
The respondent also testified at the arbitration hearing and stated that the
accident occurred in a heavily residential area. Additionally, respondent states that
he submitted evidence in the form of documentation regarding stopping distances
for cars traveling at various speeds, which he believed demonstrated that petitioner
1
The underlying negligence action was No. KC-2014-363.
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could not have stopped ten feet after the accident unless petitioner had begun to
apply his brakes before hitting respondent. The respondent asserts that, under
cross-examination, petitioner denied that he previously testified that he was traveling
at 25 to 30 miles per hour.2
The arbitrator issued his award on June 28, 2018. The arbitrator reviewed the
testimony and noted that petitioner testified that he did not see what had hit his car
and that he had “stopped approximately 10 feet past the point of impact.” The
arbitrator noted that petitioner’s testimony established that “there were really no
houses in the area” and, therefore, trick-or-treaters were not expected in the area on
that Halloween evening. The arbitrator also noted that respondent testified that he
had consumed three beers and two vodka shots at a friend’s house prior to his going
out for a walk and that he chose not to use a crosswalk that was farther up the road.3
The arbitrator also noted that when respondent crossed Main Street he saw
petitioner’s vehicle approaching and assumed that petitioner had seen him and
nevertheless proceeded to cross the street with his back to oncoming traffic.
The arbitrator also reviewed the video surveillance and stated that the video
showed respondent wearing dark clothing, talking on a cell phone, and walking with
2
There is no transcript of the arbitration proceeding. Thus, we rely on the parties’
assertions as to what occurred.
3
The petitioner submitted a report that indicated that respondent had an estimated
blood alcohol level of .193 at the time of the accident.
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a staggered gait while crossing the street. The arbitrator found that the video showed
that respondent was not paying attention to traffic and that he walked into the front
fender of petitioner’s vehicle. The arbitrator also observed that the video did not
demonstrate that petitioner failed to pay attention and also did not show that
petitioner was speeding; he found that “[t]here was nothing [petitioner] could have
done to avoid what happened.”
The arbitrator concluded that respondent had failed to satisfy his burden of
showing that petitioner acted negligently. Thus, he determined that it was
respondent who “was negligent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause
of his injuries and damages.” Therefore, he concluded, his decision should enter in
favor of petitioner.
The respondent then filed a motion to compel the arbitrator to provide all
arbitration statements and packages submitted for the arbitration proceeding. It was
later revealed that the arbitrator had destroyed all the records submitted by the parties
for the arbitration. The respondent then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration
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award.4 The petitioner filed a separate petition to confirm the arbitration award.5 A
hearing justice conducted a hearing on the competing motions.
At the hearing, respondent argued that he had been unable to cross-examine
petitioner about the discrepancy in testimony about how fast he was traveling. He
also maintained that the arbitrator committed misconduct by ignoring evidence
submitted by respondent about stopping times and by later destroying all evidence
associated with the arbitration. The petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the
arbitrator had carefully reviewed the evidence and issued a thorough decision and
that respondent simply disagreed with the arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence.
With respect to the arbitrator’s destruction of the arbitration record, petitioner argued
that this was not significant because the arbitrator did away with the records after he
had issued his award. The petitioner also noted that the parties had exchanged the
arbitration evidence and each had copies of all documents and other evidence that
had been presented.
After oral argument, the hearing justice issued a bench decision and concluded
that, based on the demanding standard of review with respect to arbitration awards,
4
The respondent also filed a separate action in the Superior Court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief and damages relating to the accident at issue in this
case in No. KC-2019-19.
5
The parties later stipulated that respondent’s prior motion to vacate, filed in a
related case, would be considered along with petitioner’s petition to confirm in the
present case.
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there was no basis for vacating the award in this case. The hearing justice went on
to confirm the award. The respondent timely appealed.
On appeal, respondent again raises the arguments that he presented in the
Superior Court. First, he asserts that the award was procured by undue means
because, he alleges, petitioner falsely testified about the speed of his vehicle.
Second, respondent argues that the award was irrational, contending that the
arbitrator refused to give any weight to the evidence that had been submitted by
respondent. Finally, respondent contends that the arbitrator exceeded his powers
and committed misconduct in physically discarding the evidence submitted by the
parties after the arbitration award was issued.
Standard of Review
“To preserve the integrity and efficacy of arbitration proceedings, judicial
review of arbitration awards is extremely limited.” Lemerise v. Commerce Insurance
Company, 137 A.3d 696, 699 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC
v. Bilray Demolition Co., Inc., 91 A.3d 830, 834-35 (R.I. 2014)). It is well settled
that “public policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and such awards enjoy a
presumption of validity.” Caffey v. Lees, 175 A.3d 478, 481 (R.I. 2018) (brackets
omitted) (quoting Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 699).
General Laws 1956 § 10-3-12 provides the grounds for vacating an arbitration
award. The limited grounds for a court to vacate are as follows:
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“(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud
or undue means.
“(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption on
the part of the arbitrators, or either of them.
“(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in hearing legally immaterial evidence, or
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been substantially prejudiced.
“(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.” Section 10-3-12.
We review arbitration awards “merely ‘to determine whether the arbitrator
has resolved the grievance * * * but not to determine whether the arbitrator has
resolved the grievance correctly.’” Prospect Chartercare, LLC v. Conklin, 185 A.3d
538, 544 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 912, 391 A.2d 1173,
1176 (1978)). “Accordingly, ‘only in cases in which an award is so tainted by
impropriety or irrationality that the integrity of the process is compromised should
courts intervene.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Prudential Property and Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Flynn, 687 A.2d 440, 441 (R.I. 1996)). Thus “‘every reasonable
presumption in favor of the award will be made,’ and the party claiming that an
arbitrator exceeded his authority ‘bears the burden of proving that contention.’” Id.(brackets omitted) (quoting Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC, 91 A.3d at 835).
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Discussion
After a careful review of the respondent’s oral and written submissions, we
are satisfied that he has failed to overcome the formidable burden necessary to defeat
the presumption of validity to which an arbitration award is entitled. See Caffey, 175
A.3d at 481. First, respondent has asserted that the arbitration award was procured
through undue means because, he alleges, petitioner falsely testified about the speed
of his vehicle and his legal counsel failed to correct this testimony.
This Court has indicated that the “undue means” referenced in § 10-3-12(1)
would include “underhanded or conniving ways of procuring an award that are
similar to corruption or fraud, but do not precisely constitute either.” Caffey, 175
A.3d at 481 (quoting National Casualty Co. v. First State Insurance Group, 430 F.3d
492, 499 (1st Cir. 2005)). Also, there must be a “causal nexus” between the improper
conduct and the arbitration award in order to vacate the award on this basis. See id.
at 483 (quoting McGinity v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Company, 899 A.2d 504,
507 (R.I. 2006)).
The arbitrator was not required to agree with respondent’s assessment that
petitioner offered false testimony. The arbitrator could have determined that
petitioner simply did not remember his earlier testimony during the course of the
nonbinding arbitration proceedings. Alternatively, as the hearing justice pointed out,
petitioner’s testimony could have reflected the fact that his later testimony was the
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correct statement of his vehicle’s speed.6 Furthermore, it was the function of
respondent’s counsel to bring out any false testimony that he believed had been
offered by petitioner through cross-examination. In our opinion, petitioner’s
testimony and actions did not constitute procuring an arbitration award by undue
means. See Caffey, 175 A.3d at 482-83 (concluding that the arbitration award was
not procured by undue means although counsel failed to disclose doctor’s initial
opinion, which was contrary to doctor’s subsequent opinion, before or during
arbitration hearing).
The respondent additionally asserts that the arbitrator acted irrationally,
exceeded his powers, and committed misconduct in deciding not to rely upon
evidence submitted by respondent and in later destroying such evidence. However,
it appears that the arbitrator’s decision was rational and was based on pertinent
evidence. The arbitrator was not required to interpret the evidence the way
respondent desired. Further, although we pause to note that it may not be the best
practice to destroy the records submitted by the parties so soon after the arbitration
proceeding, respondent has not demonstrated that the arbitrator refused to consider
his evidence. From the decision, it appears that the arbitrator simply found the
evidence submitted by petitioner to be more credible. Additionally, the arbitrator
6
Notably, the only difference in testimony argued by respondent was a 5 miles per
hour difference in the estimated speed range given at the first arbitration as 25 to 30
miles per hour, then 20 to 25 miles per hour at the binding arbitration hearing.
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relied upon the video of the incident to assist him in making the credibility
determinations. See Atwood Health Properties, LLC v. Calson Construction
Company, 111 A.3d 311, 317 (R.I. 2015) (recognizing “that unless provided
otherwise, arbitrators[,] * * * like a jury, are under no obligation to set out the reasons
for their award or the findings of fact or conclusions of law on which that award is
premised”) (quoting Purvis Systems, Inc. v. American Systems Corporation, 788
A.2d 1112, 1118 (R.I. 2002)).
We therefore cannot agree with the respondent’s assertion that the arbitrator’s
actions were irrational, exceeded his powers, or amounted to undue means in
accordance with Rhode Island law. See Flynn, 687 A.2d at 441 (“Only in cases in
which an award is so tainted by impropriety or irrationality that the integrity of the
process is compromised should courts intervene.”). Simply put, the respondent has
failed to provide any evidence to establish any of the factors set forth in § 10-3-12
that would warrant vacating the award. Accordingly, we perceive no error by the
hearing justice in granting the motion to confirm and denying the motion to vacate
the award.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court. The record may be returned to the Superior Court.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Warnsey Wiggins v. Edward Pianka.
No. 2019-268-Appeal.
Case Number
(KM 19-106)
Date Opinion Filed March 22, 2021
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata
Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Licht
For Petitioner:
Patricia A. Buckley, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Respondent:
Ronald J. Resmini, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)